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T0 
MY  FATTIER  AND  MOTHER 
spoyclta The  vholo  Thesis  is  divided  into  tbre*  partse 
In  the  first  part  th*  view  of  Platole  fororunnere  on 
the  natur*  of  the  human  goul  vad  its  Imcwtality  we 
disoussed  very  briefly* 
Th*  surv*y  shows  that  Plato's  pr*deoooaore  tr*at  tho 
Vbol*  problem  In  coxinection  with  the  Universe  relying  an 
vague  and  unreliable  mythaq  rolklore  and  popular  boliere* 
1'21*  natur*  of  tho  humm  soul  mid  its  immort&lity  I& 
also  =mined  In  the  **eend  parts  as  it  is  represented  In  the 
Platcmale  dialogues  and  In  the  third  onop  as  it  to  portwayed 
In  the  Pau]L:  Lu*  Spistles  e 
In  the  second  part  it  is  stated  that  Plato  conceives  the 
human  soul  as  a  pure  spiritual  prIziciples  a  rational  distimet 
entityq  the  source  of  lire,  in  fact  life  itseirl  though  it  Is 
uneroatedg  nevertheless  it  is  a  "process",  albeit  not  a 
physical  on*@  being  Intermediate  between  the  Formis  and  the 
Universe  * 
plate  vj4nrq  the  soul  as  nimpl*  and  unoaoqpoxmdodo  The 
so-called  *parts*  are,  not  real  or  distinct  parts  or  separate 
oloomts  of  the  soujL  ot  an  I  tb*y  are  simply  spiritual 
facultl".  transitory  and  temporary  mmul  tationag  owing 
th*Ir  smisteme  to  the  moull's  connection  with  thO  b0ldY9  WhIsh - 
to  the  prisonhouse  or  the  aoulq  a  hindrance  to  it,  an 
IMPOdIment  to  the  higber  activities  or  the  soul  and  on  the 
whole  the  source  or  evil  and  corruPtIOne  Finally  he 
r0gards  the  soul  In  g-enerals  and  hence#  the  individual  soul  In 
particular  as  being  inherently  immortal  and  deathlosso 
ThO  thUld  part  d*alo  with  th*  PSYChOllog:  LC&l  tOrlm4l  GOulv 
spirlt#  boftq  with  the  trichotmW  or  =OR  and  the  roe  oction 
bodys 
Soulg  not  a  very  Impox-tant  torup  denotes  for  Ste  Paul 
tb,  *  vital  primiploy  tb*  prineWe  of  aninal  and  human  lifo 
lnvolvftg  a  state  or  consciounriesse  of  VVLIL  mid  feelinge 
Spirit  Is  doecribed  as  tbo  ruling  Inner  power  of  our 
entire  hum=  ezigtomm,  it  ig  the  gouroo  of  humm 
cortselousness  and  intellicewmes  the  seat  of  f*e]LLng  and  willi 
furthor  it  is  the  God-conscious  eliment  in  mene 
The  body  Is  the  temple  of  the  Holy  SpIrItl  it  can  be 
trwiarorvmd  and  re"  i-  10  It  to  accear,  ibU  to  God  or  evil  e 
Sto  Paul's  trichotemic  pasaago  (le  Thesso  5-23)  Is  a 
rhotorle-.  11twgical  sentmw*  and  is  ooncerned  with  the 
preservation  and  maxictifloation  of  the,  wholeg  of  the  entire 
'Mo  resurrection  boo  must  be  thought  of  not  w 
Id*ntioal  with  or  statilar  to  our  physlaal  and  *artbly  on*# qw  3ý 
but  as  an  Inhorent  organic  continuum,  @  a  psycho-physic 
orgenismo  a  lunifted.  person,  the  entire  sang  fit  "  suitable, 
for  the  n*ws,  glorious  and  perfect  life  In  the  Kingdom  or  God, 
which  in  otAr  day  w*  call  the  individual  &  the  personality*  the 
solfe  the  "X"* 
The  resurrection  of  b*liovers  is  an  set  and  gift  or 
God  througb  our  rimen  Lord  and  Saviour  Josue  Christ* 
7h*  conclusion  is  that  we,  cannot  speak  lightly  ab&ut 
&IWLIarities  or  parallelism 
great  thinkers  on  the  theov, 
lsmort&3LLtyo  Thor*  is  no 
either  In  : Ldoas#  languagog 
or  pbroooologyo  The  diffs 
and  real. 
a  In  anY  form  between  the  two 
of  the  bulman  soul  and  its 
affinity  wLatsoaver  between  then 
form#  content,  POInta  of  doctrineg 
renco  between  then  guerg"  ah&M III, 
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PREPACE. 
IL 
The  aim  of  this  work  is  to  study  the  Platonic 
I 
and  Pauline  theory  of  the  hunan  soul  and  its 
ir,  mortality  and  to  detect  possible  similarities* 
Our  study  is  exegetical  and  historical  rather 
than  speculative. 
The  material  is  drawn  in  Plato  from  authentic 
works  alone;  In  St.  Paul  likewise  from  the 
undoubted  works,  with  only  occasional  references  to 
Ephesidns,  the  Pastorals  and  Hebrews. 
The  translations  in  Plato  are  taken  from  the 
Loeb  Classical  Libraryl  Cornford,  Hackforth  and 
others;  the  Pauline  from  the  RSV. PART  I 
PRE-PLATOINTIC  BAC.  ýUfOUND:  Plato's  forerunners 
on  the  nature  of  human  soul  and  its 
'immortaiity. 
HOIAE 
It  is  extremely  difficult,  I  think,  to  form  a  clear 
Picture  of,  or  to  define  Drecisely3  the  Homneric  psyche  in 
our  modern  sense  as  t'Homer  has  no  one  word  to  characterize 
the  mind  or  the  soul"'  and  "he  has  an  unusually  large 
psychological  vocabulary".. 
2 
In  the  fiost  place,  'the  Hotneric  psyche  means  breath, 
3  breath-life.,  breathlixel  something  airy  or  ghostlike. 
1.  B.  Snell,  The  Discovery  of  the  Mind,  Oxford  (1953)  P-8-  See  calso  E.  P.  Dodds,  The  GreeKs  and  the  Irrational,  ,  University  of  California  Press-7-9-517  PP-15.,  25.,  n-95. 
2.  J.  E.  Burnet.,  "Soullf,  ERE,  XI  (1920)  P-738;  E.  Bohde, 
Psyche,  London  (19507-P.  5. 
3.  E.  Rohae)_Psychel  P-5;  J.  Burnet,  "Soul".  ERE,  XI 
(192  0)p.  73b;  Idem.,  "The  Socratic  Doctrine  of  the 
Soul?  '.,  Essays  and  Addresses,  London  (1029)  P.  142; 
H.  G.  Liddell  and  E.  Sgott,  Greek-English 
Lexicon,  Oxford  ý1897  )  P-1760;  A.  "OXT) 
. 1.  u  rpil'  a  CA  EjLx6vq  9  C. 
T6poC  Athens  (1951)  p.  8,104; 
F 
Un  iff,  A  Lexicon&the  Homeric 
Glasgow  (1924)  p.  424. 2. 
Its  meaningis  better  explained  by  Professor  Page,  who  very 
discerningly  says:  ttPsyche.,  for  i4hich  Ighostl  is  a  much 
better  word  than  Isoull,  is  not  to  be  thought  of  as  a 
spiritual  essence  or  inmate  of  the  body,  or  as  the  sum  of 
its  intellectual  and  emotional  faculties.  It  is  very  like 
uhat  we  might  call  a  Ighostttt.  l 
Further,  this  psyche  has  neither  any  comiectio-n  with 
the  living  body  nor  any  L-itr,,  llectual  or  emotional  function 
whatever.  Its  only  recorded  association  with  the  body 
which  we  find  in  the  Homeric  poems  is  t6  leave  it.  2  Thus 
the  soul  may  leave  the  body  temporarily  when  it  faints  or 
swoons3  or  it  escapes  through  the  teeth  (mouth)4;  it 
escapes  through  Ilthe  striczen  woundt'. 
5 
Since  the  psyche  holds  the  above  mentioned  function 
toward  the  living  man  it  natumlly  follows  that  the  body 
seems  to  be  far  more  important  and  more  e-,  --sential  than  the 
soul.  In  this  respect,  W.  Capelle  observes  "all  the 
D.  Page,  The  Homeric  Odyssey,  Oxford.  (1955)  p.  22; 
Similarly  S.  D.  F.  Salmond  in  his  book,  The  Christian 
Doctrine  and  r-nmortalit  ,  Edinburgh  (1895)  p.  121., 
writes:  "The  (ýuXý  is  more  a  physical  thing  than  a 
mental;  material  rather  than  immaterial;  apprehensible 
yet  shadowy.  It  Is  the  bond  or  principle  of  animal 
life,  something  more  than  breath  but  less  than  mind  or 
spirit". 
2.  See  also  E.  R.  Dodds,  The  Greeks  and  the  Irrational)  P-15. 
3.11.  V  696-V. 
4.11.  IX  408-9. 
5.  Ll  -  XIV  518-9; 
-1-1  -  XTI  505.,  856;  Il.  XXII  362, 3. 
activities,  mental  or  other  of  the  human  personality,  such 
as  feeling,  thought,  volition.,  exertion,  are  regarded  as 
being  possible  only  so  long  as  body  and  soul  are  united; 
in  fact  they  are  in  the  strictest  sense  functions  of  the 
body.  p6voc.,  v6oc,  pýTor,  PouXý  Ovp6c 
also  are  bodily  faculties  or  powers,  and  although  they  can 
assert  themselvos  only  with  nsyche,  at  once  the  "second  ego" 
of  man  and  the  principle  of  his  -animal  life  remains  within 
him,  yet  they  are  in  no  sense  evolved  from  the  inherent 
capacities  of  the  soul  which  has  absolutely  no  share  in 
the  waking  activities  of  man".  1 
But  where  does  the  re"-l  living  man  lie,  or  which  one  of 
I  the  two  component  factors  constitutes  the  complete  Person- 
ality  or  ego?  In  this  matter  Homer  is  self-contradictory. 
According  to  a  number  of  Dassages  he  contrasts  with  the 
body:  'land  sent  forth  to  Hades  many  valiant  souls  of 
warriors,  and  made  themselves  (  abvour,  pt.  2  Also  "For  the 
whole  night  long  hath  the  spirit  of  hanless  Patroclus  stood 
over  me.,  weeping  and  wailing,  and  gave  me  charge  concerning 
each  thing  and  was  wondrously  like  his  very  self,  13 
Er  O&HCXOV  ab-Cw  )  or  with  the  soul,  "until 
1.  W.  Cuppelle,  "Body".,  ERE.,  11  (1909)  P-769. 
2.  Il.  IY  3-4,  trans.  A.  T.  Murray)  Homer,  the  Iliad,  Vol-ly 
London  (1937)  P-3  in  LCL;  also  D  B.  Monrol  Homer, 
Iliad,  Books  I-XIII.,  Oxford  (1894  )  p.  248,  who  rightly 
translates  "their  bodies"  and  re-narks,  p.  LXX,  T)"-ra.  46: 
hence  in  Il.  14  to  distinguish  the  bo(ýy  as  the  actual 
person  from  the  soul  or  life". 
3- 
-Ll- 
XXIII,  104-62  trans.  ibid.  Vol.  II.,  London  (1934)P-503. 4. 
such  time  as  I  myself  (  AAC  Q&  )  be  hidden  in 
Hadestf.  1 
The  answer  might  be  exrressed  as  follows:  - 
For  Homer,  neither  the  psyche-alone  nor  the  body 
itself  is  the  living  man  or  real  personality  or  ego,  but 
the  union  or  fusion  of  both.  2 
We  must  mention  here  that  some  scholars  hold  different 
views  from  those  of  Rohde%  ;  they  suggest  that  Homer 
regards  the  Thymos  (  ou46c)  as  a  third  distinct  entity  in 
living3  man  and  then  he  uses  it  in  a  sense  of  psyche  and 
4  Instead  of  this  ý.  )ord.  Gomperz  traces  "a  two-soul  theory" 
in  Homer  ana  suggests  that  the  word  thymos  may  be  taken  as 
a  second  soul  in  addition  to  the  soul. 
5 
Il.  XXIII)  244,  trans.  A.  T.  Lurray,  Homer,  the  Iliad, 
see  also  in  Il.  XI,  262  XIV  4%  01.11,  P-513;  -3,  -7,  XV  251-2. 
2.  See  also  E.  Eohde,  Psyche,  -o.  6;  "both  the  visible  man  (the  body  and  its  faculties)  and  the  in-dwelling  ps-yche 
could  be  described  as  the  Man's  'self'.  According  to 
the  Homeric  view,  human  beings  exist  twice  over;  once 
as  our  outward  and  visible  shape  and  again  as  an 
invisible  timaget  which  only  gains  its  freedom  In  death. 
This,  and  nothing  else.,  is  the  psyche". 
3.  S.  G.  F.  Brandon,  Man  and  his  Destinv  in  the  Great  Religio 
Manchester  (1962)  on  p.  160  n-5.,  and  especially  sne  in 
Professor  R.  B.  Onians,  The  Origin  of  thp  FuroDean 
Thought.,  Cz:  4mbridge  (1ýýI)  pp.  23  -40ý  44-61)  66-74,79-`3Y 
93-iOOy  103-12,  where  there  is  a  v.  Tide  vC-Ariety  of 
refere,  ices. 
4.  W.  Jaeger,  The  Theology  of  the  Early  Greek  Philosonhers, 
Oxford  (1ý4-7)  PP-74-bO,  82. 
5.  J.  H.  Gomperz,  Green  Thinkers,  London  (1901)  V01.  J3  p.  249; 
and  in  E.  Rohdels.  Psyche,  PP-50-1  n.  58. 5. 
We  can  hardly  accept  and  sunDort  the  contention  that 
thymos  stands  instead  of  soul  in  Homeric  pocms,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  the  above  scholars  etymologically, 
linguistically  and  urith  skill  and  profundity.,  have  exranded 
and  elaborated  this.  The  fact  reuains  that  thyrlos  in 
Homer  "is  neither  the  soul  nor  (as  in  Plato)  a  ?  part  of  the 
soullff.  It  may  be  defined  roughly  and  generally  as  the 
organ  of  feelingl  or  as  "the  generator  of  motion  or 
agitation  while  mind  (  vo-ur, 
imagestl,,  2 
)  is  the  cause  of  Ideas  and 
Rohde,  who  rejects  and  refutes  at  length  the  Gomperz 
"two-soul"  theory,  explains  this  statement  much  more  clearly 
when  he  says:  "Again  and  again  the  thymos  (Oup6r,  )  is 
clearly  referred  to  as  a  mental  faculty  of  the  living  body; 
either  thinking  or  willing  or  merely  feeling.  (  Outlm,  VON, 
)f  8F--LcraL,  -y-WacL  Oull  ilpape  OuOv,  -Duii"y  T)  ý,  Jxox6aaro 
, ýUpý  y 
It  is  the  seat  of  the  emotioris,  (ýt  6  voý.  -,  - 
gXapc,  ýuj16v)  and.  belongs  to  the  body  of  the  living 
C) 
man,  and  especially  enclosed  in  the  yP6vEC  In  the 
face  of  this,  it  is  impossible  to  rcgard  it  as  something 
1.  E.  R.  Dodds,  The  Gree-&s  and  the  Irrational,  p.  16. 
2.  B.  Snell,  The  Discovery  of  the  Mind,  p.  8. 6. 
independent  of  the  body.  Once  indeed,  R  131)l  the 
T)  thy,  mos  (45upk  )  is  spoken  of  instead  of  soul  ((ýuXý  )  as 
that  which  goes  down  to  Hades,  but  this  can  only  be  an 
error  or  an  oversight  ......  112  and  elsewhere:  "In  the 
Line  H  131  we  really  then  do  have  thymos  (Oupk  )  instead 
of  soul  ((ýuXý  )  either  as  the  result  of  a  misunderstanding 
of  the  real  meaning  of  the  two  words  or  merely  through  an 
oversight.  But  never  (and  thIsIs  the  most  essential 
point)  do  we  have  a  case  in  Homer  of  the  oDposite  exchange 
of  significance,  i.  e.  of  soul  (Wý  )  used  in  the  sense  of 
thymos  (Ouýtk  )  etc.  as  meaning  the  mental  power  and  its 
activity  in  the  living  and  -,,  raking  man". 
3 
Now  let  us  turn  our  attention  to  see  what  Homer  has  to 
say  about  the  soul's  i=ortality. 
Homer  writes  that  the  soul  after  death  leaves  the  body 
4 
and  derarts  to  Hades,  a  place  which  is  nothing  else  than  a 
gloomy,  shadowy  and  inaccessible  land. 
These  souls  in  Hades  are  nothing  more  than  mere  images 
The  H  131  comes  from 
, 
Homer,  Iliad.  E.  Fohde  is  very 
unsystematic  and  inconsistent  in  his  mode  of  quoting 
from  ancient  authorities.  According  to  his 
translator.,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  his  translator 
has  made  an*effort,  as  he  says  in  his  translator's  note 
(E.  Rohde,  Psyche,  XV,  p.  )  to  reduce  the  number  of 
inconsistencies  and  give  references  where  possible  to 
modern  editions. 
2.  E.  Rohde,  Psyche,  P-50  n-58. 
3.  E.  Rohde,  ibid.  p.  390  n.  2. 
4.  Il-  XXII  362-3;  also  XX  294)  XIII  415,  ý  XXIV  246; 
Od.  X  560j  XI  65. 7. 
or  phantoms  or  shades  of  the  living  man. 
'  11  powerless 
headsl,  2 
without  wits3  and  therefore  destitute  of 
4 
consciousness  and  intclligence.  A  fine  description  of 
the  Homeric  souls  in  Hades  is  given  by  Apollodorus  in 
his  work  on  the  Gods:  Homer  "assumes  that  the  souls 
resemble  the  images  appearing  in  mirrors  and  arising  in 
water.,  which  are  made  in  our  likeness  and  imitate  our 
movements,  but  have  no  solid  substance  to  be  grasped  or 
touched".  5 
While  the  souls  lie  unconscious  and  witless  in  Hades, 
a  few  favoured  ones  indeed  enjoy  a  harpier  fate  (e.  g. 
Tireslas  who  by  favour  of  Persephone  retained  his 
consciousness  in  Hades  (.  2d.  X  493  ff),  Menelaus  and 
Radamanthus  in  Elysium  (gd.  IV  561  ff).,  Hercules  (Od.  XI 
6oo).  6 
It  is  far  beyond  our  main  purpose  to  discuss  the  above 
instances  in  detali  for  they  are  exceptions  and  are  regarded 
The  locus  classicus  is  11.  XXIII  1031  104;  also  see 
66  ff,  99  ff;  and  In  J.  Burnet.,  "Soul".,  ERE,  XI  (1920) 
P-738  n.  2. 
2.  Od.  XI  29. 
Il.  XXIII  104. 
Od.  XI  476. 
5.  Ap.  Stob.  Eel.  I  p.  420,  quoted  in  J.  Burnet  f'Soul"  FRE 
OP-cit-  ýPý-738-9  and  Idem,  Socratic  Doctrine  of  the 
Soul  in  his  Essays  and  Addresses,  p.  142;  and  E.  Rohde, 
Psyche,  PP-7,44.,  n.  6. 
E.  Zeller,  Pre-Socratic  PhilosoD  .  I)  p.  124. 8. 
by  many  critics  and  scholars  and  especially  the  Nekyia  of 
the  Odyssey  as  interpolations  of  the  later  Deriod. 
1 
After  this  rapid  and  very  brief  survey,  it  becomes 
crystal  clear  that  we  cannot  ascribe  to  the  Homeric  ýoems 
any  consciousness  of  immortality  after  death;  if  we  should 
do  that  we  wouid  be  very  properly  faulted  by  E.  Fohde  and 
J.  Adam2  for  the  simple  reason  that  life  after  death  becomes 
so  pale  and  empty  that  it  is  not  far  from  non-existent3  and 
the  so-called  existence  of  the  shades  is  more  of  words  than 
a  reality.  "It  contains  no  element  of  value  that  men 
should  look  forward  to  itit.  4 
More  about  it  may  be  seen  in  Professor  D.  Page's  book, 
The  Homeric  Odyssey.,  Oxford  (1955)  and  esnecially 
1"  011.1  -ý  pp.  21-52,  "Odysseus  and  th&Underworld1t 
where  he  points  out  that  there  was  once  -;,  n  indenendent 
poem  which  was  inserted  to  Odysseus  later. 
2.  E.  Rohde,  Psyche.,  p.  9;  J.  Adam,  The  Religious  Teachers 
-of 
Greece,  Eainburgh  (1923)  P-5b. 
M.  P.  Nilsson,  A  Histor  of  Greek  Religiony  Oxford  (1925) 
P-138. 
4.  A.  S.  P.  Pattison,  The  Idea  of  Immortalitv,  Oxford  (1922) 
p.  21. 9. 
2.  ORPHICS 
There  is  no  real  comparison  between  the  airy  ghost,  the 
so-called  Homeric  psyche,  and  that  entirely  new  and 
revolutionary  idea  of  the  Orphic  Soul  which  is  divine  and  of 
celestial  origin.  The  soul  for  Orphics  "is  a  rarticula 
divinae  aurae,  a  particle  of  the  pure  empyrean  substance  or 
aethertf.  1  it  is.,  as  Empedocles  has  it:  "an  exile  from 
heaven  and  a  wanuerer". 
2 
Further,  we  can  draw  a  far  clearer  nicture  of  the 
Dionysiac  descent  ((ýivinity)  and  immortality  of  the  soul 
from  the  content  of  the  following  Orphic  Plates:  III  am  a 
chi16  of  Earth  and  starry  Heaven;  but  my  race  is  of 
Hcavenfl;  III  am  the  Son  of  Earth  and  starry  Heaven".  and,, 
"For  I  also  avow  that  I  am  of  your  blessed  race". 
3 
J.  Adam.,  The  Religious  Teachers  of  Greece,  p.  99;  see 
also  S.  D.  F.  Saimond,  Christian  Doctrine  of  Ignortality, 
P-135. 
2.  Emped.  Frag.  115;  in  fl.  Diels  ed.  by  IJ.  Kranz￿  Die 
Fragmente  der  Vorsokratikes  (1951)  Erster  Biand,  P.  357. 
See  also  flippol.  Ref.  VII  29. 
"ÖCCýLOVaC  T6C  dýUXdr,  XýyWV  ga>CpaCWVar￿  O'TL  F-t(YL'V 
ä'MVaTOU  XCC  [tCLXPOUC  4&)'  LV-aLw-vac;  `  Plot.  Enn.  IV-8.1 
EýincöoxXýr,  Tý  ELn(Zv  äýtapTavoýcatg  v6g.  ýýv-,  '0  cd  *, 
ýý  - 
(P  u  my  6  r,  ￿E'ivaL 
*ra~Lr, 
1)Xa~Lr,  Xa(  aýT6C1  f\  Y  E. 
-A  so  in  F.  IL  Cornford.,  From  Religion  to  Philosor 
N.  y.  (1957)  p.  179  n.  3. 
J.  Harrison,  Prolego.  mcl2--  to  the  Study  of  the  Greek 
Reilgion.,  N.  Y.  (1957)  P-575  (arpendix  G.  Murray) 
660-74-;  also  1W.  K.  C.  Guthrie,  Orpheus  and  the  Greeks, 
London  (19522)  P-173. 10. 
"The  body  of  all  men  is  subject  to  all-powcrful  deathý 
but  alive  there  yet  remains  an  image  of  the  living  man; 
for  that  alone  is  from  the  gods. 
It  sleeps  when  the  limbs  are  active,  but  to  them  that 
sleep  in  many  a  dream  it  reveL.  Ieth  an  award  of  joy  or 
sorrow  drawing  nearlt.  1 
This  i=ortal  soul  is  sharply  distinguished  from  the 
Titanic  element,  the  body,  which  is  regarded  by  the  Orphics  , 
as  a  prison  house,  as  a  grave  or  tomb.  Here  are  their  own 
words  according  to  Plato  and  Philolaus  which  here  I  sicaDly 
mention,  reserving  comment  to  a  later  and  more  appropriate 
place. 
'?  Some  say  that  the  body  is  the  tomb  of  the 
soul.,  as  if  the  soul  in  thls  present  life  were  buried;  but 
I  think  it  most  likely  that  the  name  was  given  by  the 
followers  of  Orpheus,  with  the  idea  that  the  soul  is  under- 
going  whatever  penalty  it  has  incurred  and  is  enclosed  in 
the  body  as  in  a  sort  of  prison  house  for  safe  keepingil.  2 
"The  ancient  theologians  and  seers  beer  Iritness  that 
for  certain  purposes  of  punishment,  the  soul  is  yoked 
together  vith  the  body  and  buried  in  it  as  in  a  tomb".  3 
1.  Pindar  Frag.  131.,  quoted  in  F..,,,  I.  Cornford,  Greek 
Religious  Thought,  London  (1950)  p.  64. 
2.  Crat.  400  BC,  trans.  F.  I.  I.  Cornford,  Greek  Religious 
Thoug  Lt  IP-  74. 
3.  Philolaus.,  Frag.  B  14;  Clem.  of  Alex,,  iMiscellanies,  Il?, 
all  in  DK,  Vol.  1.  pp.  413-4. ii.. 
-  --. 
3. 
--HERACLITUS 
OF  EPHESUS 
Opening  his  paragraph  on  Heraclitean  theory  of  the 
soul.,  Q.  Huonder  observes  that:  IfTho.  doctrine  of  the  soul 
according  to  Heraclitus  stands  in  closest  relation  to  his 
doctrine  of  the  logos.  As  the  outflow  of  the  Divine  logo 
is  the  human  soui  gifted  with  the  reason.  The  soul  has 
its  own  law  (logos,  which  increases  itself,  i.  e.  grows 
according  to  its  needs)"'  and,  in  saying  so.,  it  seems  to  me 
he  is  not  far  from  the  truth.,  as  logos  is  the  centre  and 
source  of'  all  things.  Logos,  in  the  enigmatic,  oracular 
and  i)icturesque  expression  of  Heraclitus,  contains 
everything  in  himself  (everything  are  contained  to  him  and 
whatever  talces  place.  -.  comes  from  him  and  it  Is  directed  by 
him).  V 
But  let  us  examine  a  little  moro  closely  and  very 
briefly  whcit  has  been  said  by  Heraclitus  himself  about  the 
logos  and  In  relation,  of  course,  to  the  human  soul. 
In  the  first  place)  logos  is  the  , n,  op  &CCýWov,,  2 
Q.  Huonder.,  Gott  und  Seele  im  Lichte  der  Grie 
Philosophie,  Munchen  (1954)  P.  85. 
Fr.  B  30  in  DK  13  P-158. 12. 
ever-living  fire,  xindied  in  measure  and  quenched  in 
measure. 
'  This  ever-living  fire,  is  the  one  made  up  of 
all  things  and  ail  things  issue  from  the  one2  and 
transforms  itself  into  sea,  earth. 
3  These  transformations 
4  take  place  through  strife  and  war,  through  this  universal 
and  creative  force,  or  as  Heraclitus  again  calls  it,  11the 
way  up  and  downfl.  5  In  this  continuous  motion  and  change 
the  soul  also  participates,  becomes  death,  water,  earth 
and  vice-versa. 
6 
Secondly,  the  logos  is  conceived  by  Heraclitus  as  a 
rational  entity,  as  wisdom,  thought  and  intelligence7  urho2 
on  the  one  hand,  steers  the  course  of  all  things  and  is 
called  Zeus  or  God8  and  on  the  other  hand,  as  divine  law9 
who  feeds  the  human  law,  he  prevails  as  much  as  he  will  and 
suffices  for  ail  things. 
Without  any  further  discussion  and  hesitation  it  may 
1.  Fr.  B  30  in  DK  ,  I,  P-158. 
2.  Fr.  59,  fr.  22  in  J.  Burnet.,  Early  Greek  Philosop 
pp-137ý,  13  5. 
3.  Fr.  21,,  22  in  J.  Burnet,  ibi  d.  P-135. 
4.  Fr.  44,  fr.  62  in  J.  Burnet,  ibid)  PP-136,137. 
5.  Fr.  60  in  D.  K,  I,  p.  164. 
6.  Fr.  B  36  in  DK,  1)  P-159. 
7.  Fr.  19,  28,  gi  a-c,  all  in  J.  Burnet,  ibid.  DP-134.  ý  135, 
139. 
8.  Fr.  36.,  65  in  J.  Burnet,  ibid.  PP-1362  138. 
9.  Fr.  91b  in  J.  Burnet,  ibid.  P-139. 13. 
well  be  said  from  the  foregoing  that: 
1.  Heraclitus  still  remains  in  the  IonEm  ground  and 
expresses  his  ideas  in  a  corporealistic,  hylozoistic  and  to 
a  great  extent,  pantheistic  way;  nonetheless,  he  endows 
his  Logos  -  ever-living  f  ire.,,  with  intelligence  and  wisdom, 
which  are  to  be  regarded  as  valuable  and  of  great 
importance. 
2.  The  human  soul  is  a  -,  ortion  of  the  ever-living  Fire, 
divine  Law  and  Logos,  l  but  it  is  not  a  separated  and 
distinct  entity  or  personality.  Notions.,  such  as  selfhood, 
consciousness  and  immortality  are  comDletely  foreign  to  his 
theology. 
3.  HeracUtus  mentions  something  about  the  life  beyond 
when  he  says:  IfThere  a-wC,.  its  men  when  they  die  such  things 
as  they  look  not  for  nor  dr6am  of"  and  '!  Souls  smell  in 
2  HadesIt. 
But  these  fragments  do  not  produce  anything  new,  as 
they  contradict  the  notion  of  "the  way  up  and  down".  The 
soul  does  not  survive  as  a  permcnent  individual  or  ego  after 
Fr.  B  115  in  M,  I,  P-176;  see  also  J.  Burnot,  Greek 
Philosophy,  P-59;  G.  Viastos  "on  Heraclitus"  in 
Werican  Journal  of  Philology,  76  (1955)  P-438  ff; 
and  Kirk  and  Raven  ,  The  Pre-Socratic  Philosophers, 
pp.  20,208,215. 
2.  F  r.  27  and  99  in  D-K,  I,  P-1r;  7;  comp.  31so  with  fr.  62, 
63  in  E.  Zeller,  Pre-Socra'tic  Philo,,  on  II)  nP-85-87; 
trans.  J.  Burnet,  &-rly  Greek  Philosorhy,  p.  136'.  fr.  3b 
and  141  fr.  122,  as  it  is  obvious  Burnet  follows  the 
arran,  ýement  of  the  fragiiients  of  Bywater's  IIp.  xcmpl.  --ryII 
Gdition  and  not  that  of  Dicls  and  -Kranz. 14, 
death.  This  again  does  not  mean  utter  annihilation)  but 
change  into  another  element  according  to  Philo.  1  The 
only  sense  of  immortslity  which  we  can  conceive  is  that 
which  is  closely  connected  with  the  Way  up  and  Lown  theory. 
This  point  has  been  wor-'.  -:  ed  out  very  well  by  J.  Ithurriague, 
whom  I  quote:  "We  have  been  led  to  the  belief  that 
Heraciitus  could  not  in  any  sense  entertain  the  concept  of 
individual  immortality;  his  doctrine  of  eternal  change 
precludes  any  such  conclusion  and  contains  no  real  basis  on 
which  to  found  belief  in  metemDsychosis.  For  him.,  the 
soul,  a  mere  sp.  nric  from  the  universal  fire.,  exists  from  all 
eternity.  The  obscure  formulae  in  which  he  wraps  his 
concepts  have  managed  to  lead  certain  expositors  astroy; 
they  signify,  however,  nothing  other  than  the  series  of  new 
transformations  which  a-mCIn  undergoes  after  death.  In 
Places)  Heraclitus  says  quite  exrlicitly,  that  the  soul  becomes 
water;  now,  since  the  essence  of  the  soul  is  fire,  such  a 
metamorphosis  cý;  n  only  mean  extinction  (literally  I'der-i-th"). 
Consequently,  the  immortality  of  the  soul  can  be  understood 
only  in  terms  of  an  unce.  -sing  cycle  of  renewals, 
1.11.  Philo,  De  Aet.  Aundi,  21  (77.8  Cohn-Reiter  on  fr.  36). 
Odva,  uov  ob  vjv  ctc,  6-nav  &vaLpcaLv  bvoýmWv,  Wd  TT')v 
EtC.  E'TEPOV  a'TOLXF--LOV  pumpoXfM  11 
in  ýv.  K.  Guthrie.,  A  History  of  Greek  Ph-ilosop 
PP-463  n.  2  and  4bO  n.  l. '5. 
f1renouvellementsil,  from  death  to  life  and  from  life  to 
deCath".  1 
PP.  La  Croyance  do  Platon,  pp.  120-1;  sce  also  E.  Rohde, 
Psyche,  pp.  3bd,  370Y  59-4  n.  19;  J.  Adam,  The  Religious 
-Teachers  of  Greece,  p.  239;  H.  Cherniss,  Aristotle's 
Criticism  of  Pre-Socratic  Philosor  .  pp.  297-7-n.  29; 
Kirk  and  Raven,  The  Pre-SocraticPhilosophcrs.,  p.  210; 
W.  Guthrie,  A  History  of  Greek  Philosonhy  I  rp.  479  -`0  -  lWhile  J.  Burnet,  Greek  Phiiosonhy,  p.  63.,  admits  that 
"there  are  certainly  fragments  that  seem  to  assert  the 
immortality  of  the  individual  soul;  but  when  we 
examine  them,  we  see  they  cannot  bear  this  intcr- 
pretation.  Soul  is  only  immortal  so  far  as  it  is 
part  of  the  over-living  fire  whicb  is  the  life  of  the 
world.  Seeing  that  the  soul  of  every  man  is  in 
constant  flux  lik(-ýý  his  body,  what  . -ieaning  can  immortality 
have?  11  Oddly  enough,  he  checks  Rohde,  who  "refused  to 
admit  that  HerLclitus  believed  the  soul  survived  death" 
and  adds,,  "Strictly  sT.  )eaking,  It  is  no  doubt  an. 
inconsistency;  but  I  believe  with  Zeller  and  Diels  that 
it  is  one  of  a  kind  we  may  well  admit.  The  first 
argument  which  Plato  uses  to  establish  the  doctrine  of  imortaiity  'in  the  Phaedo  is  just  the  fieraclitean 
parallelism  of  life  and  death  with  sleeping  and  waking". 
J.  Burnet.,  Early  Greek  Philosophy,  P-154  n.  2.,  ro  not 
both  Burnet's  views  contradict  each  other  and  rerresent 
him  as  being  in  two  minds? -  16:.  *-.... 
4.  PYTHAGORAS  AND  PYTHAGOREANS 
Nobody  can  expect  clarity  about  the  soul's  origin, 
-nature  and  Lamortality  in  the  'Pythagoreans,  because  of  the 
lacX  of  authentic  evidences  and  of  the  ambiguity  of  the 
existing  passages,  more  particularly  for  the  faMous  theory 
of  Itsoul-harmoniall  which  has  aroused  endless  discussion 
and  argument  amon,,,  the  scholars. 
Nevertheless,  something  must  be  said  about  it  in 
general: 
5  Alexander  Polyhistorts  account  we  read,  the  "soul 
is  a  torn-off  fragment  of  aither  and  the  hot  and  the  cold; 
it  is  not  coterminous  with  life,  and  it  is  immortal 
beckause  that  from  which  it  has  been  detached  is  immortall'.  1 
Further.,  mother  passagc2  says  that  the  huLman  soul  before 
Diog.  Laert.  VIII,  24  ff.  in  DK)  I)  pp.  448-950;  trans. 
W-,  'ý-C.  Guthrie.,  A.  History  of  Grcok  Philosoph  .  Cambridge 
(1962)  Vol.  j.,  p.  202-  Regarding  immortality  of  the 
Soul  comp.  PorDhyrius  Vit.  Pythag  1-8-11  19  (D.  K.,  14  8a): 
iinpwTov  pýv  6c,  6-DdvaTov,  clvaL  YTýL  TT)V  (ýUXýV"; 
See  also  in  G.  S.  Kirk  ý2nd  J.  E.  Raven,  Thr-Pre-Socratic 
Philosophers,,  Cambridge  (1962)  p.  223;  Cornford, 
From  Philosophy  to  Religion,  p.  201  n.  1;  B.  Eussell, 
A  History  of  Wc-stern-Philosor)h 
,  London,  P.  51  n.  l. 
2.  Ap,  iýax.  Tyr.  16.,  2.1.,  287R:  qtd.  in  E.  Rohde.,  Psyche, 
p.  98  n.  49: 
....  xc:  t  ydp  abT')v 
((ýUX'V)  TEPLN  Iq"%CLV  6CZPOI'  Counp. 
, IapB,  XCXou  -nEpC  RvOcyopc(ou  BCou  14,63:  "h  Wý 
np6  To"v  Tw-6c  a6ýMTL  tV6CO-T)VUL?  ndXaL  nOTý  LPIWC 
...  "I 
ibid.  14.,  63:  llabT6c  Tc 
L*YCY\)WCY)tF-  T06r,  7LPOTF-POUC,  ýaUTOU 
prouc,  ";  ibid.  28)  134:  LyCvwaxe  TT')v  ýauTot  ýuXýv,  TIc. 
ýv  xcx(  nUcv  F-tr,  T6  CTýW[Ia  CtCYCXT)X60CL,  '106r,  TEE  RPOT6POUr, 
ab,  rýr,  pCour,  "  ail  quoted  in  Prof.  A.  1.0'  LX  LTETE  16OU 
, 
'ýIaTop(a  T-T)C  tnoXýc  Týc  KaLVýC  ALaOýWQC,  un  S, 
7- 17. 
entering  the  human  body  pre-existed.  ' 
In  addition  to  these  views,  Aristotle  ennumerates 
some  other  aspects  of  the  human  soul  held  by  the 
Pythagoreans.,  saying: 
"The  theory  held  by  the  Pythagoreans  seems  to  have 
the  same  purport;  for  some  of  them  said  that  the  soul  is 
the  motes  in  the  air,  others  it  is  what  moves  them.  They 
spoke  of  ýaotes  because  they  are  evidcntly  continual  motion) 
even  when  there  is  a  complete  calm". 
' 
This  notion  that  the  soul  is  either  the  motes  in  the 
air  or  that  which  moves  them  must  be  regardedIts  a  real 
PoDular  belief  which  has  already  been  partially  mlevated 
2  to  a  philosophical  standing",  and  that  "belongs  to  the 
early  and  unwittingly  corporeallst  generation  which 
thought  th--t  units  were  extended  in  snace". 
)  On  this 
point  I  found  nost  interesting  C-nd  quite  illumincting,  what 
H.  Cherniss-s,..  Lys  "-nd  I  quote  below: 
llýrist  Ale  _0  imiuiý.  It"  . 
2,16  ;.  rls  !,  in.  G  ýS,.  rirki.:  and 
J.  r.  -  -fi,.  vcn  Tiie  t'-Irc--S-)cr-ý,  tjc  Phil-,  s  --)!?  hers,  CL,  -, TF-it*l-.  rc* 
(1-957)  -to-'261;  DK  p.  416  2. 
2.  E.  Rohde, 
-Psyche, 
p.  396  n.  4o. 
G.  S.  Kirk  &nd  J.  E.  Raven,  ibid.  p.  262. 18. 
"The  'identification'  of  a  soul  "-nd  the  motes  is 
obscure,,  unless  it  refer  to  an  old  superstition  rather 
than  a  philosophical  doctrine  (Cf.  Zeller-Nestle,  op.  cit-I, 
P-561  n.  3)  and  in  that  case  each  speck  of  dust  was 
probably  considered  to  be  a  soul,  so  that  Aristotle's  soul 
impiies  complications  which  did  not  exist.  But  the  'other? 
Pythagoreans  who  identified  the  soul  with  the  Power  that 
moves  these  motes,  if  they  really  existed,  must  have  been 
very  late,  for  their  theory  implies  cas  truly  immaterial  soul 
which  is  simply  ýý  motor  force;  such  a  theory,  since 
fundamentally  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  motes,  must 
have  been  an  accommodation  of  the  earlier  surerstitition  to  the 
more  highly  developed  psychical  theories  of  lator  times".  ' 
Another  Pythagorean  view,  according  to  Aristotle  again, 
is  that  the  soul  has  no  esoterical  organic  connection  or 
"relutionship"  with  the  body;  it  is  not  what  may  be  called 
the  personality  of  the  individual  visible  man;  "any  soul 
H.  Cherniss,  Aristotlets  Criticism  of  Pre-Socratic 
Philosophy,  The  Johns  Hopkins  Press,  Baltimore  (10135) 
p.  29i  n:  6'-,  -  1W.,,  s-C.  Guthrie,  A  Historv  of  Groek 
PhIlosonhy,  Vol.  I,  Cambridge  (1ý62)  P-3072  on  the 
other  hand,  notes  that  the  first  form  sounds  "more 
primitive"I,  and  thrt  second  one  "a  refi--iemE,  -nt  on  it  in 
a  spiritual  directiont'. lg. 
may  dwell  in  any  body".  ' 
But  the  most  contraversial  and  T)uzzling  of  all 
theories,  as  I  mentioned  before,  or  as  L.  robin  likes  to 
call  it  "a  subJect  of  scandal  and  horror  to  pious 
PythagoreansT1.2  was,  and  still  is,  the  so-called  "soul- 
harmoniall  which  hs  been  handed  down  to  us  and  concerning 
which  there  are  many  opinions  for  and  against. 
According  to  this  theory,  the  soul  "is  -3.  kind  of 
attunement;  for  attunement  is  a  blending  and  composing  of 
opposites,  and  the  body  is  constituted  of  opnosites"  (the 
translation  is  from  Kirk  and  Raven,  The  Pro-Socratic 
Philosophers,  p.  261).  3 
The  first  reactionary  voice  and  onpositLon  came  from 
Simias,  who  clearly  observed  that:  I'Now  if  thr-  soul  really 
is  a  Aind  of  attunement,  plainly  when  our  body  is  unduly 
relaxed  or  tautened  by  sicziness  or  some  other  trouble,  the 
1.  Aristotle  de  Anima  A3,407  B  20;  in  G.  S.  Kirk  and  J.  E. 
Raven,  The  Prc-Socrutic  Philosonbeýrs.,  T-,.  261;  DK  p.  462; 
and  E.  Eohde.,  Psyche,  PP-375,396  n-37. 
2.  L.  Robin,  Greeic  Thought,  ýondon  (1928)  p.  69. 
3.  Arist.  de  ILnima,  A3.407B  20;  see  also  in  CEol.  VII  5 
13  o  618)  Diog.  Laert.  VIII  2,  all  in  DK  p-462;  G.  S. 
Kirk  and  J.  E.  Raven,  The  Pre-Socratic  Philosorber  ,  p.  261;  E.  Zeller,  Týe  Pre-Socratic  Philosophyy  P.  476: 
116L6  noXXo(  T(Mv  aoyMv  oL  ýttv 
&PPOvLCLN)  F-tvcL 
t  $F 
OL  6ý  EXFL\)  &ppo\j(a\)II. 
One  may  aiso  find  the  same  references  in  E.  14.  SimsOn., 
Der  Beigriff  der  Seele,  bei  Plato,  Leirzig  (1869) 
PP-13-17)  who  says:  "The  soul  is  united  to  the  body  by 
means  of  number  and  harmony,  indeed  the  soul  is  itself 
a  harxonyýfl  P.  15. 20. 
soul,  for  its  divine  nature.,  is  bound  forthwith  to  be 
destroyed  just  as  much  as  any  other  attunement  or 
adjustment  i-n  musical  notes.,  for  instance,  or  in  a 
craftsinan's  product  ..........  So  see  what  answer  you 
can  find  for  us  to  this  argument,  which  insists  that  the 
soul,  being  a  blending  of  the  bodily  coqstituent,  is  the 
first  thing  to  perish  in  what  is  called  death".  ' 
In  other  words,  Simias  regards  the  "soul-harino-iiall 
doctrine  as  inconsistent  with  thc,  immortality  of  the  soul, 
its  transmigration  and  in  general,  the  onposite  of  any 
kind  of  its  existence  after  death. 
An  urdent  sui)-porter  of  this  view  is  Professor  J.  Burnet, 
who  not  only  shares  this  opinion  but  strongly  strosses  it.  2 
Wilamowitz  too  "was  inclined  to  think  that  Philolaus 
denied  the  I=ortaiity  of  the  soul  that  it  was  an 
attunement  of  the  bodily  parts,  though  he  could  not 
quite  make  up  his  mindl,. 
3 
1.  Phaedo,  5  C-L,  92  A-D;  trans.  R.  Hackforth,  Plato's 
PUMP,  Owbridge  (1955)  D-98- 
2.  J.  Burnet,  Early  Greek  Philoso_nhv_,  Lonc'on  (19584)1 
pp.  295-b;  J.  Burnet,  Greek  Philosonhy,  London  (1961), 
pp.  92-93,  where  he  characteristically  remarks  "on  the 
other  hand,  nothing  can  be  more  inconsistent  with 
earlier  Pythagorean  view  of  the  soul  as  something  that 
existed  before  the  body.  This  doctrine,  on  the 
contrary,  makes  the  soul  a  mere  function  of  the  body, 
and  leaves  no  room  for  the  bclief  of  immortality". 
3.  U.  Von  'Wilamoý4itz,  doellendorff,  Platon,  Berlin  (1919) 
III  P.  90. 21. 
It  is  -far  beyond  our  main  scone  to  Plumb  thr,  whole 
matter  and  discuss  it  thoroughly.  All  we  may  do  is  to 
repeat  the  words  of  the  late  Prof.  Cornford  on  the  one 
hand.,  that  the  Pythagoreans  and  esý,  ecially  "'Philolaus  held 
both  that  the  soul  is,  in  some  sense,  b  harmony  and  that  it 
is  immortal".  91  and  on  the  other  hand.,  those  of  Prof.  Guthrie 
who  writes  as  a  conclusion  in  his  remarkable_History  of 
Greek  Phiiosop  (dhere  he  devotes  a  whole  paragraph  to  this 
inatter  in  a  most  able  account)  as  follows: 
"Two  different  notions  of  soul,  then  existed  in 
contemporary  belief,  the  psyche  which  tvanished  like  smoket 
at  death,  and  which  medical  writers  (including  no  doubt  some 
sceptical  and  therefore  heretical  Pythagoreans)  rationalized 
into  a  harmonia  of  the  physical  opposites  that  made  up  the 
body;  and  the  more  mysterious  dai-mon  in  man,  immortal, 
suffering  transmigration  through  many  bodies,  but  in  its 
pure  essence  divine.  This  too  could  be  called  psyche,  as 
it  was  by  thought,  and  both  also  survived  in  the  curious 
combination  of  mathcmatical  nhilosonhy  and  religious 
F.,,  A.  Cornford..  'Mysticism  and  science  in  Pythagorean 
Tradition'?  in  The  ClassicU-l  Ounrterly,  Vol.  XVI  (1922) 
p.  146. 22. 
mysticism  which  made,  up  Pythagoreanism". 
Cambridge,  Vol.  I.,  P-319.  Other  scholars  express 
more  or  less  similar  or  slightly  different  views  on 
the  matter,  such  as:  F.  M.  Cornford,  ttMiystery  Religions 
and  Pre-Socratic  Philosooýyll  in  the  Cambridge  Ancient 
History,  IV,  (1926)  PP-548-9,  and  his  From  Religion  to 
Philosophy,  p.  213;  also  E.  Rohde,  Psyche,  FD.  377,400, 
ns  52  5ý)  54)  55;  E.  Zeller,  Pre-Socratic  Philoson 
pp:  479-7  ;  H.  Cherniss',  Aristotlets  Criticism  of_21ý-*_7 
Socratic  Philosophy 
.,  P-323;  G.  S.  Kirk  and  J.  E.  Eaven, 
The  Pre-Socratic  Philosoph2.,  r--q  262. 
.1 ,jIP. 23. 
-. 
. 
5.  EMPEDOCLES  OF  ACRAGAS 
As  we  proceed  in  Empedocles,  we  observe  that  from  the 
first  he  holds  two  widely  different  and  incompatible  views 
of  the  nature  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 
On  nature,  he  says  that  the  physical  basis  of 
consciousness  Is  in  the  blood.,  1 
which  blood  again  arises 
from  four  elements. 
2  Here  Empedocles  ex-,  resses  himself  in 
a  purely  materialistic  way.,  as  a  'Ithorough  materialtstO 
and  leaves  no  room  for  immortality. 
On  the  othor  hand,  in  the  Purifications,  and 
particularly  in  the  Fr.  11-5,  Empedocles  ex-ressly  states 
that  he  is  calling  the  soul  daemon,  a  fugitive  and  a 
wanderer  from  the  gods. 
Between  these  two  views,  there  is  an  apparent 
discrel.,  ancy  and  contradiction.  But  is  this  discrepancy 
irreconcilable?  The  answer,  I  think,  lies  in  this: 
1.  Fr-105  in  DX,  I)  P-350,  Porphyrylp  St-)b.  Anth.  I,  49y  53; 
and  in  G.  S.  Kirk  and  J.  E.  Raven,  The  Pre-Socratic 
PhilosoDhers3  PP-344,357. 
2.  Fr.  98  in  DK,  Iy  P-346;  comp.  also  with  fr.  109)  D-K.,  ibid. 
P-351;  Arist.  idetar  .,  B41  1000b;  and  in  G.  S.  Kirk 
and  J.  E.  Raven,  ibid.  PP-3353  343  and  357.  See  also 
Aristotle,  de  Anima,  A4,40b  a.  13. 
3.  W.  Guthrie,  A  History-of  Greek  Philosop  D-318. 
4.  Fr-115;  see  also  Hi-ppolvtus  Ref.  VII,  29;  Plut.  de 
-exilig 
17  607C;  in'G.  S.  Kirk  and  J.  E.  Raven,  ibid., 
PP-35ý2-3p  356. 24. 
that  he  tried  to  bring  together  all  the  cosmological- 
-,,,  h  -IcL.  1  th57ori.  es  (Anaximander.,  Parmenides,,  etc.  )  of  his  j  . A- 
predessors  with'their  theological  conclusions  and  to 
reconcile  them,  but  he  failed  to  achi,  3ve  this.  He  speaks 
with  two  different  voices. 
2  E.  Ftohdel  F.  2.  Cornford,  G.  S.  Kirk  Cand  J.  E.  Eaven 
attempted  harmonisation.  They  believed  themsel.  ves  to  have 
effecgea  this  quite  successfully  and  convincingly. 
456  E.  Zeller,  J.  Burnet,  and  J.  Adam  took  ex..  ctly  the 
OT)posite  view  C,:,  nd  they  reached  the  incontestable 
conclusion  that  his  co-Qmologico-religious  teachings  are 
not  only  contradictory  but  irreconcible. 
1.  Psyche)  I)P-3332-3. 
2.  From  Religion  to  Philosorhy,  pp.  224-42. 
3.  The  Pre-Socratic  Philosonhers3  PP-3  9-60. 
4.  Pre-Socratic  PhiloSOT,,  hy.,  II,  pp.  176-7* 
5-  Eariy  Greok  Phiiosoohv,  p.  250. 
6.  The  Religious  Teachers  of  Greece,  p.  253. 25.:. 
A119AXAGORAS 
-OF  IUJAZOMETIAI 
Whatever  trouble,  disagreement  and  dispute 
Anaxagoras  has  caused  among  scholars, 
'  the  fact  remains 
that  for  the  first  time  in  tho  history  of  Greek 
philosophy.,  he  introduced  and  contributed  so.  mcthing  of,  2ý, 
great  importance  and  significance;  the  principle  Mind 
W-0-US) 
But  how  does  Anaxagoras  conceive  the  mpaning  of  Mind? 
It  is  true  to  say  that  he  regards  the  Nous  as  something 
2 
material,  corporeal  and  occupying  s-ace)  but  these  are 
not  his  last  words.  He  further  characterizes  Nous  as 
"infinite  and  self-ruled,  ;  ýý  is  mixed  with  nothing  but  is 
all  alone  by  itself  .....  it  has  all  knowledge  about 
everything  and  the  greatest  Power;  and  minds  and  controls 
all  things,  both  greater  and  smaller,  that  have  life  ...... 
24ind  arranged  them  ailit. 
3 
1.  G.  S.  Kirk  Lnd  J.  E.  Raven,  The  Pre-Socratic  Philosorhers, 
P.  367;  also  J.  2.  Ecaven,  "The  Basis  of  Anaxagoras' 
Cosmology".  Classical  C-uartorly,  IV  (1954)  -ý-.  123; 
G.  Vlastos  t'The  Physical  Theory  of  Anaxagoras", 
3  CA 
Philosophical  Revie 
,  59  (1950)  n-31  ff. 
2.  Fr.  12  in  DK3  11  (1952)  PP-37-39. 
3.  Fr.  12  in  M,  ibid.;  comp.  Crat  1.413C;  Aristotle  de  ,1 
Anima,  A2.405  a  153  PhYs-  5  2-2Y5-61  b  24  and  in  DX,  ibid. 
p.  20;  trans.  G.  S.  Xirk  and  J.  E.  Raven,  Pre-SocrrLtic 
Philosor)hers)  IIP-372-3. 
i-4;.  iI 26. 
Is  it  not  an  indication  that  he  would  imagine  or 
conceive  of  it  as  an  immarient,  transcendent,  sT)iritual, 
omnipotent  and  Intelligent  Deity  or  God? 
Unfortunately,  he  did  not  develol)  and  elaborate  such 
an  idea  and  he  left  it  for  his  Posterity  to  do  so,  holding 
for  himself  the  same  notion  as  his  predecessors.  ýffiile 
he  introduced  something  of  immense  value,  that  is..,  a 
sPiritual  and  intellectual  principle,  nevertheless  "he 
fails  to  understand  fully  the  essential  difference  between 
that  principle  and  the  matter  which  it  forms  or  sets  in 
E.  Zeller,  Pre-Socratic  Philosoohy,  Vol.  II,  T)  349;  and 
J.  Adam.,  The  Religious--Tec4chers  of  Greece,  D:  263,  do 
not  find  it  difficult  to  idnn.  tify  Nous  with  God., 
although  there  is  no  mention  at  all  of  the  word  God  or 
Gods  in  Anaxagorast  fragments.  Later  writers  m0lintain 
this  view:  Aat  1)  7,5  (D  299): 
"6  U  A.  yna[V  6C  CCG*Tý'XCL  XCLT'bpXdr,  T6  CY611CLTCL9  VOTUIC, 
6c'  aýTd  6Lc%6c[vnccv  Oco-u  xat  TdC  YCV6aCLC  TW-V  O'XWV 
ýnOCMCICCV";  7.,  15  (D  302)"'A.  VO-UV  XOCIIOTEOL6v  -z6v  Gc6v". 
V91--  Eur.  fr.  iOlS  '  116  Vouq  ydp  hj1W-V  taTL  tv 
ýxda,  uy.  Gc6C".  Tro  ad  ý84  (64.2);  Ia:,.  i1-l.  Protr.  8  Phil,.  ýr"  de  Piet.  C.  4  ap.  66  G  (D  532): 
"Gc6v  ycyovývaLTc  .....  xaf  voZv  6LaxocY4ýaaLll. 
(VgJ-.  B12)  Cic.  do  nat.  d.  1,11)  26  (D  532) 
...  qua  sentire  possit,  fugere  intellegentlae  nostree  vim  et  ratione,  n  videtur";  CiC.  Aca-d-,  '  Pr.  11  37.,  118  (D  119): 
.3 
'IA 
--i-lateria,  ij  infinitaci  sed  ex  ea  ocirticula,  similes  intev 
seminutas;  eas  primur,  'l  confusas  'oostca.  in  ordinem 
Ldductas  i:  ierite  divinall  qtd.  in.  D.  K.  T)p  ig-20;  C  0:.  n  T)  .  also  Sext.  bILAh.  IX,  6:  Stob.  Ecl.  1.  ý6;  The  !  Jist. 
O"Lt.  XXVI,  31ý,  C  in  E.  Zeller) 
-Pre--,, 
)cl.!  -: 
tic  Philoson. 
P-349  n.  l.  .9 27. 
motion',. 
' 
It  is  needless  to  attempt  any  clear  account  of  the 
individual  soul,  solfhood,  consciousness.,  immortality  and 
self-existence  in  Anaxagoras,  as  he  'Infest  pas  Parvenu  "a 
la  conception  d1une  ame  individuelle,  vivant  d1une  vie 
eternellett2  and  as  Aristotle  says'of  Anaxagoras  that  he 
does  not  speak  clearly  about  Mind  and  soul3.  He  seems  to 
regard  themýýuý-ýas  different  aspects  of  the  same  nature.  4 
1.  F.  Conleston,  A  History  of  PhilosoT)hy,  London  (1961) 
Vol.  I,  p-70.  For  more  on  this  noint  see  J.  E.  Raven, 
IlThe  Basis  of  Anaxagoras'Coswology".  Classical 
Cuarterly  (1954)  Vol.  IV,  'P-134;  G.  S.  Kirk  and  J.  E. 
Raven,  The  Pre-Socratic  Philosorhers,  V-374;  J.  Adam, 
The  Religious  Teachers  of  Grcece,  -rT).  261-264;,  E. 
Zeiler,  Pre-Socratic  PhUosorhy,  II,  PP-346-349;  R.  K. 
Gaye,  The  Platonic  Concel)tion  of  Immortalit  .  p.  13; 
F-Ii.  Cornford,  From  fiý,  ligion  to  Philosop  ,  1).  154; 
W.  Jaeger.,  The  Theology  of  the  Early  Greek 
-PhtjýcýQpby.  2 
PP-160-162;  -P-Leon,  "The  Hompiomeries  of  Anaxcagoras". 
. 
911assic  -141;  J.  Burnet,  LLI_yj  XXI  (1927)  DD  4  ai_Luar  rl  .  133 
Early  Grepk  Philosophy.,  p.  268,  and  Greek  Philosonhy, 
PP.  Y9-bO,  holds  the  opposite  view.  - 
2.  J.  Ithurriague.,  La  Croyance  de  Platon,  p.  123- 
3.  De  Anima.,  A2,404  b.  1;  and  in  DK,..  T).  29;:. 
-. 
E.  Zeller,;.  j 
Pre-Socratid  Philosophy,  II,  P-364'n'*51  6,.  p,.  347.  n.  2; 
E.  Rohde  v  See  also  Cherniss, 
.,. 
Pýsche,  jp..?  AýO.,  n.  11.5ý 
Aristotle's  Crittcism  of  Pre-Socratic  Philosor 
pp.  291-2  and  295-6. 
4.  De  Anima.,.  405  a-13.  On  the  contrary,  Plato  soems  to' 
suggest-  that.  AnaxjgQr',  as  uses-  b6tli  as  identical  and 
interchangeable.  '  Crat.  400  A:  11  ...  HUC  UQ\j  U-wv 
dxxwv  &ndvuwv  y6aLv  ob  nw-ce6F-Lc.  'Avaýay6pa  vo"uv  xuC 
o0v  cT\)aL  TIV  6Laxoapo-uuav  xa(  9xouaavII; 
also  in  E.  Zeller,  Pre-Socratic  Philosonhy,  II,  P-345 
n.  1;  E.  Rohde,  Psyche,  p.  410  n.  115. 28. 
The  following  remarks  of  Rohde  are  quite  to  the  point 
and  worth  quoting:  "Anaxagoras  could  not  sreak  of  the 
continued  exi-stence  of  individual.,  Self-existent  Isoulst 
after  the  dissolution  of  the  material  concretions  in  which 
moving  and  animating  I  soul-f  orce  I  had  once  livedIt.  ... 
For 
him  the  individual,  the  personality  conscious  of  itself 
and  of  the  outer  world,  can  be  nothing  but  a  manifestation 
of  the  universal,  whether  the  latter  is  regarded  as  fixed 
and  at  rest.,  or  as  a  livinG  process  that  untiringly 
6evelops  itself,  recruits  itself,  and  reconstructs  itself 
in  ever  renewed  creations.  The  only  rermanent, 
unchanging  reality  is  the  universal,  the  esscqtial  -and 
fundamentally  real  nature  which  ap-ppars  in  all  individual 
things,  speaks  out  of  their  mouth,  and  in  reality,  only 
works  and  lives,  in  them.  The  individual  human  soul  has 
its  identity  with  the  universal  that  re-rosents  itself  in 
it.  The  individual  forms  of  "ar-nearancet'  having  no 
inderendence  of  their  own.  9  cannot  normunently  abide"* 
1 
However  this  may  be,,  it  is  said  that  for  Anaxagoras5 
soul  is  moving  force2  and  has  two  forms,  the  moving  and 
1.  E.  Rohde.,  Psyche)  P-388;  sce  .  -lso  J.  Adam.,  The 
Religious  Teachers  of  Greece.,  p.  264. 
2.  Aristotle,  Do  Anim"-,  A  2,404  a  25;  also  in  DK  p.  29; 
E.  Zeller,  Pre-Socratic  Philosop  II.,  P-.  364. 29. 
the  Imoviingl  and  also  that-the  particular  consciousness 
2 
ceases  to  exist  when  the  soul  leaves  the  body. 
Psell.  d.  omnif.  doctr.  15  in  DK,  I,  D.  29;  and  in 
K.  Freeman)  Companion  to  the  Pre-Socratic  Philosoph-Qrs, 
A  101  a,  Oxford  (1946)  p.  274  n.  g. 
2.  A  103)  K.  Fr,  ieman,,  ibid.  p.  274,  n.  i;  Aat  V  25  2  (f).  43  ý)  in 
DK  P-30. 30.  *. 
SOCRATES 
It  could  h-  ced  that 
Introduced  the  notion  of  the  human  soul,  of  the  true 
self, 
' 
with  what  he  openly  said  to  his  follow  citizens  of 
Athens  about  the  soulls  care  and  ýts  perfection:  ..... 
. wr, 
,  O)C  ýuXT)r,  oTEwr,  6r,  &p(cm)  eiaraO 
but  -  us  leom 
., 
at  any  rate,  this  assertion  does  nn.  -.  .;.  -ever,  '. 
saying  that  Socrates  was  more  concerned  with  the  moral 
asrect  of  the  soul  and  its  perfection  than  with  the 
rational  and  philosophical  exDosition  of  the  soul's 
doctrine  as  a  whole,  which  great  achievement  belongs  to  his 
disciple,  Plato.  The  words  of  E.  W.  Simson  also  confirm 
this:  "As  we  consider  now  the  psychology  of  Socrates,  ae 
shall  find  it  comi)rehensible  by  his  forthcoming  interest 
in  ethics  that  there  is  with  him  no  developed  doctrine 
concerning  the  nature  of  the  soul  ...... 
J.  Burnet.,  ItThe  Socratic  Doctrine  of  the  Soul".,  Essays 
and  Addresses,  Lonaon  (1929)  pp,  126-62,  and  more 
particularly  for  our  case,  PP-1  7-61;  Idem,  Early 
Greek  Philosophy.,  p.  84;  Idem,,  "Soul",  ERE,  Vol.  XI, 
pp.  671  a-nd  741;  his  art1cle  "Philosor-hyll  in  The 
Legacy  of  Greece  (ed.  by  Sir  R.  Livingstone)  Oxford 
(1957)  P-76;  also  in  A.  M.  ArmstronS,  An  Introduction 
to  Ancient  Philosophy,  London  (1959  p.  29;  V.  De 
Magalhaes-Vilhena,  La  Probleme  de  Socrate.,  Paris  (1952) 
PP-51.,  52  n.  l. 
2.  Apol.  29E.  30A;  also  Xen.  Mem.  12  "1',  caUTTjv  pip 
E  obx  tp-noUýeLv  "ýLV  ....  TýV  TýC  4)UX-T)C  LnL4e%ELaV 31. 
But  a  scientific  instruction  and  development  in  his 
thoughts  about  the  soul  -and  its  nature  is,  as  we  have  said, 
not  available??. 
' 
Concerning  the  destiny  of  the.  soul  in  the  11-e  ,.  Itcr 
death  he  says:  IfFor  the  state  of  death  is  one  of  two 
things;  either  it  is  virtually  nothingness,  so  that  the 
dead  has  no  consciousness  of  anything,  or  it  is,  as  -eople 
say,  a  change  and  migration  of  the  soul  from  this  to 
another  place". 
2 
As  his  very  own  words  stand,  they  express  an 
uncertainty,  ignorance  m-d  caution.  However,  I  should 
not  like  to  imagine  for  a  moment  that  Socrates  nrofesses 
the  nihilist  or  even  the  ag-lostic  view.  I  think  his  views 
about  the  perfectlon  of  our  souls3:  Moreover,  thp  soul  of 
man.,  which  more  than  all  else  that  is  human,  n-rtakes  of 
the  divine,  reigns  manifestly  within  us,  and  yet  is  itself 
unseentf4.  It  .....  no  evil  co-.  n  comp,  to  a  good  man  Pither  in 
1.  Der  begriff  der  Seele  bei  Plato  (1889)  rn.  20)  21;  also 
in  A.  E.  Taylor,  Socrates,  Edinburgh  (1ý33)  T).  139: 
"The  Socratic  doct3zine,  we  must  note,  is  neither 
psychology,  in  our  sense  of  the  word,  nor  Psycho- 
physics.  It  tells  us  nothing  on  the  question  of  what 
the  soul  isý  except  that  it  is  in  us,  whatever  it  is  in 
virtuelf. 
2.  Plato  Apol  40C  6-11,  trns.  II.  N.  Fcwler,  Plato,  Apolog 
1  London  7ý38)  p.  141.,  in  LCL;  ibid.  29A. 
RI 
Plato  A-pol.  29E,  30A.  B. 
4.  Xen.  Mem.  IV.,  3,  t  14.  cf  4.  Cyro  .  VIIIY  7)  9.  trans. 
E.  C.  IMarchanty  Xenophon  Memorabilia  and  Oeconomicus., 
London  (2-MMIJI)  (1923ý.,  P-307  in  LCL. 32. 
life  or  after  death,  and  God  does  not  neglect  himtl.  l 
"I  go  to  die,  and  you  to  live;  but  which  of  us  goes  to 
the  better  lot*is  knoim  to  none  but  God".  2  "...  and  so 
why  should  I  not  be  justly  accounted  blessed  and  enjoy  an 
immortality  of  fame?  ".  3  in  an  appropriate  manner  combined 
and  interpreted  help  us  to  assume  that  Socrates  was  a  firm 
and  strong  believer  in  the  hereafter,  and  "for  his  Part., 
accerted  one  of  the  alternatives  as  his  uersonal  belief; 
and  this  alternative  Is  not  the  Homeric  idea  of  a  shadowy 
existence  in  Ln  unsubstantial  Hades,  nor  the  utter 
annihilation  in  death,  but  a  real  life,.,  in  blessedness., 
under  the  nrotection  of  the  godsty.  4 
Apol.  41D;  trans.  H.  N.  Fowler,  Op.  cit.  D.  145  in  LCL. 
2.  Apgl.  42A;  trans.  ibid. 
3.  Trans.  W.  Miller,  Xenorhon-Cyronaedia,  London  (MCMXIV) 
(1914)  Vol.  II,  p.  427  in  LCL.  - 
4.  E.  Ehnmark,  "Socrates  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul" 
: Ln  Eranos,  Vol.  XLIV  (44)  (1946)  P.  122.  Other 
interestIng  points  in  pp.  108,116  117,1192  120ý  121) 
122.  Also  &A  TaYlor,.  Elato  (Th2e-Man  and  his  Work), 
London  (1960)  P:  138  n.  2.  "The  caution  should  not  be 
understood  to  mean  that  Socrates  doubts  the  fact  of  immortality.  His  firm  belief  in  that  is  the 
assumption  of  the  Phaedo  and  is  really  Tzesupposed  by  Apolog.  40C-4lCff.  Also  somo  other  schoiars  hold 
moderate  views:  E.  Zeller.,  Socrates  and  the-Socratic 
School,  London  (1,968)  pp.  14ý-51 
-  1.,  3.,  4%  5; 
B.  Jowett.,  The  Works  of  Plato.,  Vol-  3.,.  N..  Y.  (Apol.  ) 
P-99;  J.  J.  '  Forbes  Socrates,  Edinburgh  (19Q5). 
,  pp.  232-5.9  62  7;  R'.  K.  Gaye.,  The  Platonic'Conception  of  Immortality.,  pp.  14-5;  B.  Russell,  History  of  Western  PhLl  oso  phy.,...  P,  109. 33. 
CINCLUSION 
From  what  has  been  said  so  far,  and  by  contrasting 
and  comparing  Plato's  teachings  with  those  of  his 
"p,  redecessors  concerning  the  human  soul  and  its  fate  in  the 
hereafter,  we  may  draw  the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  vCast 
difference  between  them. 
lost  of  his  forerunners  do  not  tackle  this  burning 
problem  as  a  separate  one  at  all,  and  when  they  do  deal  with 
It,  they  treat  it  in  connection  with  th,,,  universe  and  in  a 
mythical  ana  quite  incomplete  way. 
' 
Ploto  knows  his  precursors  and  refers  to  their 
teachings,  but  he  touches  first  the  psychologico- 
eschatological  nroblem  and  metanhysics  in  general  as  a 
whole  in  a 
ýA  diff'c-'r"-rlt  wVa 
For  mocLerate  views  on  Orphico-Pythagoric  influence  on 
Plato  one,  avoiding  of  course  the  extreme  and 
exaggerated  view  of  V.  D.  Macchioro  From  Orrheus  to 
Paul,  London  (1930)  P-176)  that:  11ýlatols  nhilosoT,  hy 
ar-ears  to  be  1,,  urified  and  enlarged  Orphism".  could 
reýer  to  the  following  scholars:  H.  C.  Moor  0,  Paga 
IdP-as  of  Immortality  during  the-Early  Roman  Emnire, 
Caxbrid.  g_e__Uqlb)  pp.  14-15,62-  11  E.  Smyth,  Conce-,,  tions 
of  Immortality.,  pp.  274-51  2ý2-y; 
GutH  Hi  ý'.  _ýLr  T  Q 
_1heus  and  Groek  Religion.,  rp.  242-4;  J.  Adam, 
The  Relig-17-o-us  Teachers  of  Greece,  DP.  113-4;  J. 
Ithurriague,  La  Croyance  do  Platon,  pp.  148-9. 
Their  views  might  be  summarized  as  follows:  Plato  gave  to  the  Orphico-Pythagoric  notion  "about  soul  and  its 
immortality  a  reusoning  and  nhilosorhic  blasis. 34. 
He  first  develops  the  theory  of  the  soul  and  its  life  after 
death  philosophically,  he  examines  it  in  ca  dialogue  forýa  r'nd 
searches  every  possible  asrect  in  a  dialectical  and  imagin- 
ative  fashion.  He  succeeds  in  many  ways;  even  when  he 
fails,  at  least  he  ventures  to  -'ut  problems  -and  logical 
questions  for  further  speculative  elaboration  by  his 
successors.  His  predecessors,  as  I  have  said,  exrressed 
themseives  obscurely  and  relied  on  vague  and  unreliable 
myths,  folklore  and  ropular  and  mythical  beliefs,  without 
any  effort  to  elaborate  and  ex-lain  them  logically. 
'i.  ý4azes  use.  of  the,, 
-l 
in  a  hi.,  self,  usus  : -,  yths,..  but.  he*% 
1,,  gicLI  ir,  y. 
l  n 
1.  The  difference  which  Cicero  discerns  between  the 
Pythagorean  and  the  Platonic  treatment  of  the  a*  uestion 
seems  to  be  quite  aT,  rlicable  here.  He  writes: 
"They  scarce  ever  gave  any  reason  for  their  opinion) 
but  what  could  be  explained  by  numbers  and  characters. 
It  is  renorted  of  Plato,  that  he  came  into  Italy,  to 
acquaint  himself  with  the  Pythagoreans;  and  that  when 
there,  he  learned  from  them  all  the  tenets  of  the 
Pythagoreans;  that  he  not  only  was  of  the  same  oninion 
with  Pythagoras)  concerning  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
but  he  brought  reasons  in  surport  of  it".  Cic.  Tusc. 
DiS7.1  I)  XVII.  Tvns-.  ed.  by  W.  H.  '23; 
See  -Uso  Gaye,  The  Platonic.  p1j" 
alld  its  COIriexion  w.  -A-h  the  Theory-of  I(,  fýas,  Lo..  q(ý:  )n  (190-4)  f).  16-n".  1.  He  qurc)tes  the.  rassage-:  -an-  Latin. 35. 
PART  II 
PLATO  ON  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  HUMAN  SOUL  f-',  ID  ITS 
DMORTALITY 
SOME  INTRODUCTORY  REIIARKS: 
(a)  PlIato's  Theology 
(b)  What  is  Man? 
(c)  A  general  defln`i'ýEon  of  the  human  soul. 
(a)  Pla,,  ',  ots  Theology. 
It  appears  necessary,  and  Indeed  unavoidable,  to 
preface  the  second  Part  with  a  few  general  remarks  about 
Plato's  theology,  as  this  is  closely  connected  with  It, 
notwithstanding  tho  fact  that  Plato  himself  exrressly 
admits  that  '?  The  maker  and  father  of  this  universe  it  is  a 
hard  tsask  to  find,  and  having  found  him,  it  would  be 
impossible  to  dcclare  him  to  all  mankind". 
'  And  It 
becomes  even  more  diffIcult  by  reason  of  Plato's  very  wide 
application  of  the  term  God  (Ock  ).  As  M.  Dies  says, 
many  things  are  called  "God"  or  divine.  The  Demiurge  is 
Tim.  2SC3-5;  trans.  F.  d.  cornford  Plato's  Cosmology, 
The  Tiracus  Of  Plato,.  Lon-don  (1956ý  p.  22;  comp.  with 
is  St.  John  1.1d: 
Oc6v  ob6cCc  Mpaxcv  n6noTc,  ýIOVOYEVT')C  Gc6c  6  6v 
ctc  T6v  x6Xnov  To-U  naTp6c,  txc-LvoC  ýýT)yýaauoll; 
John  of  Dam.  De  fide  Orthod,  MGP.  94,800B.  ý 
llýTccLpov  oN  T'6  OcZov  xat  &xaTdXljnTov  xaC  To"uTo 
g6vov  abTo-u  xaTaXT)nT6v,  fi  &nCLPCa  XL'&xa-raXij(ý(u". 36. 
a  Theos,  so  is  the  created  Universe  (Tim.  40E),  and  the 
possible  rlurality  of  good  souls  in  Laws  X;  the  adjective 
Divine  (OcZoc  )  Is  commonly  arrlied  to  the  forms,  and  if 
the  redding  at  Tim.  37CY  a  shrine  brought  into  being  for 
the  eternal  gods,  is  to  be  Kept,  the  forms  which  are 
com-i)rised  in  the  intelligible  living  creature  are  actually 
called  Gods.  ' 
However  coinDlicated  and  perplexed  it  is,  we  shall 
endeavour  to  nresent  a  clecar  iicture  of  it,  as  briefly  as 
i.  )ossible,  ind  es!  ýecially  of  the  identification  of  God  with 
the  idea  of  Good,  which  caused  so  much  argumentation  and 
disputation  among  the  Platonic  scholCars,  and  on  which  a 
great  deal  of  ink  was  used  un. 
It  ýnust  be  noted  from  the  beginning  that  the  following 
brief  survey  does  not  imnly  an  exhaustive  or  complete 
7enetration  of  the  entire  subject;  such  a  venture  would 
require  detailed  examination  of  all  the  Platonic  -assages 
and  careful  study  of  all  the  availeble  sources)  and  would 
cover  many  hundreds  of  pages. 
But  first  let  us  see  what  is  Platols  concention  of  God. 
M.  Dies.,  Antour  de  Platon,  Paris  (1927),  11)  P.  555;  see 
also  is  R.  C.  Hackforth.,  "Plato's  TheismIl.  in  the 
Ciassical  L,,  uarterly.,  (1936)  voi.  XXX,  n.  4;  see  also 
K.  F.  Doherty_,  t'God  and  the  Good  in  Platoll,  in  New 
ScOlasticism,  xxx  (1956)  p.  441. 37. 
Some  scholars  have  recently  arnroached  the  Droblem 
of  Deity  from  a  natural  and  ontological  roint  of  view  and 
have  sunported  the  opinion  that  the  soul  is  a  source  of 
movement  and  consequently,  God.  1  Indeed,  we  meet  such 
assertions  in  his  di., 
-:?. 
logues,  where  he  exrressly  st%ates  that 
11soul  is  identical  with  the  rrime  origin  and  motion  of  what 
is,  has  been  and  shall  be,,  and  of  all  that  is  orrosite  to 
these,  seeing  that  it  has  been  plainly  shown  to  be  the 
cause  of  all  change  and  motion  in  all  things  ...... 
lt  has 
been  proved  most  sufficiently  that  the  soul  is  of  all 
things,  the  oldest,  since  it  is  the  first  princirle  of 
J.  B.  ý,  `Skemp,  The  Theory  of  Motion  in  Platots  Dialogues, 
Ca4ibrldge  -(17q-42)-pp.  il2-115;  R.  D  os.,  "Plato's 
MetaphysicsIt  in  Journal  of  Philosophy  (1935)  XXXII, 
P-562,  he  says  (15haedrus  245e)  11  ...  we  thus  -nosit  a 
principle  of  inherent  spontaneity,  a  self-initiating 
motion,  and  this  is  the  ,:  syche  and  ultimately  God". 
H.  Cherniss,  Aristotle's  Criticism  of'  Plato  and-the 
Academy.,  Vol  .1 
(1944)  7)p.  606-7  (AF*o.  eiTd-Ei--X-IT-*, 
ý 
urnet.,  Grec-I..  Philosor  .  ?  )T)  3-ý-3-7;  mainly  see 
F.  Solmsen.  '  Platols  Theology  (1ý42ý  wh"o  I'denends 
largely  on  the  Tenth  Book  of  the  Laws".  (E.  Frank  in 
his  r(,  view,  in  Amcrict-An  Journal  of  Philolog 
, 
Vol.  4  XVI 
(1945)  P-93)  and  who  in  a  modified  way  remarks  -  P-113) 
"The  aspects  of  the  Physical  world  which  give  it  its 
ontological  status  and  dignity  are  Movement  (traced  to  a 
Perfect  prototype),  Life,  Order,  Design,  Rationality. 
When  focusing  on  the  first  two;  Plato  thinks  of  the 
divine  -rinciple  as  Soul  (which  in  order  to  bring  about 
the  other  three,  must  ally  itself  to  Mind).  On  the 
other  hand,  when  he  is  rrimarily  concerned  with  the 
rational  order-aind  structure  of  the  Cosmos.,  Plato  (like 
Anaxagoras)  conceives  of  the  Delty  in  terms  of  Mind. 
This  is  the  situation  in  Timaeus  P.  162.  The 
concept  of  a  divine  World-6oul  "-s  the  fountain  of 
movements  and  as  the  intelligent  Power  controlling  the 
world  of  Becoming  is  the  cornerstone  of  the  whole  new 
system'?. 38. 
motion". 
'  And  I'All  soul  is  immortal  and  this  is 
also  the  source  and  beginning  of  motion  for  all  other 
things  which  have  motion,,  02 
While  other  interpreters  are  quite  content  with  the 
equation  of  Soul  to  Deity,  the  late  Prof.  Taylor  goes 
further  in  identifying  God  with  Creator  and  Best  soul.  3 
This  identification  is  characterised  by  Solmsen  vs 
I  Lcws.,  X.,  896A7-10,  Bl-4;  trans.  R.  G.  Bury,  Plato, 
Laws,  Lonuon  (1926)  11)  P-337  in  LCL. 
2.  Phaedrus,  245C;  trans.  Ft.  Hackforth,  . Plato's  Phaedrus, 
Cambridge  U952)  o-,  ).  63-4.  I  shL11  give  my  attention 
to  the  apparent  contradiction  between  generated  or 
ungenerated  and  Timaeus,  Laws  cýnd  the  Phaedrus  later. 
3.  A.  E.  Taylor,  A  Commentary  on  Plato's  Timaeus,  Oxford., 
1926)  pp..  b2,  also  64,77  ff;  Idem.  Plato,  The  Laws,  ý1960) 
pp.  LIII,  LIV3  292;  Idem.  Plato,  the  Man  and  his 
Work,  London  (1960)  pp.  442-45)  490-93;  Idem.  critical 
note  on  F.  Solmsen,  Plato's  Theology,  in  Mind  (1943) 
LIIJ  We  inust  bear  in  mind,  although  Taylor  is 
in  favour  of  this  identification,  nevertheless,  A 
Commentary  on  Platots  Timaeus,,  -r.  678,  he  does  not 
ininimise  the  difficulties  of  the  wholc  matter.  F. 
Solmsen.,  PlCtoIs  Theologv,  T).  121  n.  43,  seems  to  suggest 
that  Bovet  and  Demos  are  of  the  same  orinion  as  Taylor., 
when  he  writes:  "Bovet  (Ch.  II,  n.  27)  looks  in  Timaeus 
for  confirmation  of  his  theory  that  the  Platonic 
definition  of  God  would  be  lun  dieu  est  ame  T.,  arfattet  (P-152  f).  Demos,  on  the  other  hand,  The  Ph'ilosonh 
of  Plato.,  London  (1939)  np.  99-125,  relies  as  far  as  I 
can  see,  xainly  on  Tlmaeusý,  and  fails  to  do  full  justice 
to  Lawstt. 39. 
arbitrary. 
1 
One  may  observe  here  that  the  late  Prof.  Cornford  not 
only  does  not  hold  such  a  view  as  those  above-mentioned., 
e 
regarding  the  Deflurge  not  as  a  religious  figure  (Deity), 
2  but  as  a  symbol,  a  mythical  one.  Even  he  finds  it 
difficult  to  identify  the  visible  Universe  with  the 
Demiurge  and  prefers  "to  hold  back  from  this  or  any  other 
conclusion  and  confines  his  attention  to  the  world  VýJth 
Its  body  and  soul  and  the  reason  they  contain".  3 
On  the  other  hand,  H.  Cherniss,  contrasting  and 
combining  various  Platonic  rassages,  quite  'ýiainly  says 
"Moreover,  the  work  of  the  Demiurge  is  the  work  of  Mind 
(  voZc,  )  (Timaeus  47E3-4)  and  Mind  (vOur,  )  can  exist  only 
in  Soul  (46D5-6.,  30B3;  cf.  Philebus  30C9-10;  Sonhist 
1.  F.  Solmsen,  plato's  Theology.,  P-113Y  particularly  n.  121 
n.  43.  It  must  be  stated  that  R.  flackforth,  "Plato's 
Theism",  in  Classical  Cuýrterl  (1936)  30.9  r.  6,  also  rejects  this  idea.  "however,  whether  we  believe  this 
or  not,  it  is  certainly  not  the  case  that  Laws  X 
asserts  the  doctrine  of  One  God.,  viz.  the  Best  Soul". 
2.  F.  IU.  Cornford,,  Plato's  Cosmology,  London  (1937)  nn-34)  35.  -  37.,  38,1977-  - 
F.  L.  Cornford,  ibid.  D-39. 40. 
249A),  so  that  the  Demiurge  must  be  a  soul. 
' 
Needless  to  say,,  we  are  not  at  all  ready  to  acce-,  t 
the  inferences  of  Prof.  Grube,  who,  without  any  difficulty, 
identifies  the  World  Soul-with  the  Demiurge 
2 
or  of  Theiler, 
who  also  equ(-.  tes  the  Demiurge  "with  the  ReCA,  son  in  the  World 
I  Soulit.  3  for  the  simple  reason  that  in  Plato's  eyes  World 
Soul  is  nothing  more  than  a  mixture  of  absolute  and 
4 
corporeal  beings. 
INhere-as  all  the  abovo-mentioned  Platonic  critics 
insisted  on  the  fact  that  Plato's  God  was  equal  to  Demiurge 
or  Best  Soul,  Prof.  Hacsforth,  on  the  other  hand,  took 
Aristotle's  Criticism  of  Plato  and  the  Acadom  Vol.  Ip 
timore  11944)  D.?  25-  See  also  some  other 
references  ......  for  it  is  Soul  that  is  the  yinciple 
of  all  motion  and  'arrangement'  and  so  the  artificer 
of  evurythiq  whether  ?  natural'  or  'artificial'"  (cf. 
Laws,  8)2A.  896A-D;  Phaedrus  245D  246B  6-7)  or.  cit. 
pp.  251p  603p  605,  esrecially 
907.  -  )God.,  therofore., 
must  be  "soul  having  vo%  or  "enlightened  soul'' 
(Laws  897B:  TKA  .......  voZv  npoaXapoZaa 
cf.  Timaeus  46  E4:  pcT&  vot. 
2.  G.  I.  I.  Grube,  Platols  Though 
,  London  (1935)  rX0.  See 
also  in  H.  Cherniss  op.  cit.  603  and  F.  Solmsen  op,  cit. 
p.  12l  n.  43-  A  diversity  of  a-ý,  T)roachment  is  found  in 
W.  Jaeger's  Paedeia  as  well,  Vol.  II,  p.  415,39a,  but 
for  that  later. 
3.  Iý.  Theiler.,  Zur  Geschichto,  der  telpologischen 
Ihaturbetrachtung,  ý.  72.,  "als  Verdo-,  -jelung  der  Weltseele 
o..  9..  als  HinausrroJektion  Gleichsam  ihser  Kunstlerisch 
wirz.  enaen  Seite"  qtd.  in  F.  M.  Cornford  op.  cit.  r.  197 
and  H.  Cherniss  oD.  cit.  !,.  6.  )3. 
4.  Tim.  35A. 41. 
exactly  the  opposite  view,  in  a  brief  but  very 
suggestive  and  interesting  article,  and  tried  to  Point 
out:  (a)  that  Mind  is  an  ultimate  rrincinle,  inde-endently 
existrant  and  an  entirely  sc-,  arate  entity  from  the  soul.,  and 
(b)  that  11di-rid  (  vo-uc.  ) 
-and  IMind  alone"  is  identified  with 
God,  not  the  soul  or  even  the  Bcst  Soul.  -L 
To  dismiss  Prof.  Rackforth's  assertion,  we  have  to 
turn  to  Plato  himself. 
., 
Plato  sneaks  quite  clearly  -and  As  a  matter  of*  fact 
emphatically  on  this  issue.  H,  ý  writes  that  Nous  - 
"Inteiligence,  cannot  be  -,:  resent  in  anything  arart  from  the 
soupt. 
2  It  cannot  exist  (--A.  7art  from  thp  soul.  "Surely 
reason  and  mind  could  never  come  into  being  without  soulT1  .3 
In  other  words,  here  it  is  rerfectly  oxnlicit  that 
Nous  is  neither  an  ultimate  orinciple,  nor  an  entity  distinct 
from  the  soul  and  identified  with  God.  It  is  simnly, 
according  to  Piato,  a  secondary  associate  of  the  Soul, 
"Just  the  soul's  abAity  (cf.  Republic  508E)  to  "see  the 
I.  R.  H4c4forth,  "Piatols  Tho-ismIl.  in  Classical 
Quarterly,  (1936)  30.,  T)-7;  Idcm.  Plato's  Phnedrus, 
P-71. 
2.  Tim.  30b3.,  trans.  F.  U. 
n-33. 
3.  Phiiebus  30  10;  also 
Aristoticis  CI-iticism 
J.  B.  Sxemp,,  The  Theor 
2L!  292.2s.,  Cambridge 
Cornford,  PlCatots  CosmologYy 
I 
Soph.  249k.  See  also  H.  Cherniss, 
of  Plato  and  the  Academy,  P.  425; 
of  Motion  in  Plato's  later 
(1942)  D.  112. 42. 
ideas  or  the  state  in  the  soul  (i.  e.  v6ijaLC  6  15.,  Re,  )  - 
511D,  Tim.  52A)  proauced  by  sight  of  them".  '  It  is,  as 
Taylor  rightly  called  it.,  "Its  vehicleii2  or  it  is 
11thinkable  as  a  function  of  the  immortal  Part  of  the  soull' 
an  intellectual  function.  Generally  sroaInftng,  Hackforth's 
whole  attempt  to  establish  the  fact  that  the  Platonic  Deity 
is  Nous,,  attractive  as  it  is,  "is  rerhans  rather  too 
Aristoto,  lian"-.  4 
It  would  be  of  great  Intcrest  and  henefit  to  add  a  few 
oore  words  about  Jaeger's  attitude  and  arnroach  towards  the 
Platonic  theological  T,  roblem,  although  the  late  Prof.  Jaeger 
C) 
did  not  write  any  single  work  on  this  subject  as  he  did  on 
H.  Cherniss,  ibid.  p.  607. 
2.  A.  E.  Taylor,  critical  notice  of  F.  Solmsen,  Plato's 
Theology,  in  Mind,  LII  (1943)  n-.  181. 
3.  J.  H.  M.  ýývl.  Loenen.,  Do  Nous  in  het  Systeem  Van  Ple.  tols 
Philosor,  hic.,  Dissertatie  Universiteit  van  Amsterd=, 
(1951)  Jasonners  Universiteitsners,  Amsterdam,  rP.  55, 
56Y  57j  58ý,  269  and  270.  This  is  a  very  informative 
ana  intcresting  terminological,  philological  and 
philosoý.  ýhical  investigation  of  the  vo-ur,  -(ýuXlj  "the 
develorment  of  the  teleological  cxT,  lai-iation  of'  naturc 
and  its  r1lace  in  the  system";  also  R.  C.  Lo'  e  1111ind 
in  Platonism",,  in  Philosonhical  Revicw.,  3  (1926) 
I)p.  201-20.,  "discusses  Mind  in  its  relation  to  movement.,  but  rather  as  we  now  understand  the  matter  than  as  Plato  understood  it".  (F.  Solmsen  on.  cit.  -7ý.  96  n.  25). 
4.  J.  B.  Skem:  ).,  OP-  Cit-  P-i13  and  Hý  Cherniss  o7).  cit. 
TD.  6oS. 43. 
"the  Theology  of  the  Early  Greek  Philoso7oherst'. 
Nevertheless,  he  drew  our  attention  to  the  f,,  ct  that 
Platol.  s  Ilprim%-.  ry  aT)proach  to  the  problem  was  the  Socratic 
and  not  the  pre-Socratic  onet'.  that  is  to  say  he 
approached  it  from  an  ethical  Cand  moral  angle,  admitting 
at  the  satae  time  the  diversity  of  aspects  and  forms  of  the 
Divine  in  Plato.  ' 
ý,  s  to  We  must  now  turn  our  attention  to  what  Plato  h. 
say  about  the  Idea  of  Good2  and  to  see  whether  the,. 
following  mathematical  equation,  so  to  speak,  The  IDEA  OF 
GOOD  =  GOD  is  proved  true  or  not. 
As  to  the  first  point,  Plato  describes  it  in  the 
first  rlace  as  the  source  of  knowledge  (science)  and  truth3 
and  of  the  very  being  (essence)4'  as  the  "causa  essandi  and 
causa  cognoscendi  of  all  that  isii5  and  secondly  that  it  is 
not  the  same  thing  as  being,  that  is  to  say  the  good 
itself  is  not  essence,  but  even  beyond  being,  surpassing 
1.  W.  Jaeger,  Paideia,  The  Ideals  of  Greek  Culture, 
Oxford  (1944)  Vol.  2.  p.  415  n-39b. 
2.  Rep.  505A  2  11  11h  -coU  &y(xoot)  t,  5&x  PýyLaTOV  460T)pail. 
3.  Rep.  508E  3-4. 
4.  Rep.  509B  5-8. 
5.  R.  F.  A.  Hoernle,  Studies  In  Philosop  London  (1952) 
p.  290. 44. 
it  in  dignity  and  power. 
1 
Next  we  come  to  consider  the  vexed  question,  whether 
God  can  be  Identified  with  the  Idea  of  Good  or  not. 
Both  theories  may  claim  the  support  of  eminent  and 
distinguished  scholars  who  profess  them  with  quite  strong 
views  and  arguments. 
Amongst  those  interpreters  who  are  in  favour  of  the 
identifteation  are  E.  Zeller  and  T.  Adam.  Both,  as 
great  lovers  and  scholars  of  Plato,  refer  to  various 
passages  of  Plato's  dialogues,  and.  particularly  to 
Philebus  22B  6-10,  C  1-3:  "1  remember  a  theory  ...  about 
pleasure  and  intelligence,,  to  the  effect  that  neither  of 
them  is  the  good,  but  something  else,  different  from  either 
and  better  than  both  ...  it  couldn't  continue  to  be 
identical  with  the  good,  could  it?  t',  2 
and  point  out  very 
strongly  that  the  Demiurge  is  identical  and  equivalent  to 
1.  Rep.  509B  8-10.  While  Plato  thinks  of  the  Form  of  the 
Good  so  highly,  others  either  complain  against  it  as 
obscure  and  a  source  of.  material  for  comic  poets: 
Auoy.  AaýpTLoc  111  27  ýn  K.  A.  rcwpyo6xT),  IIXdTwvoc 
rIoX  LcF-  Ca,  Athens  (11ýý3  )  p.  463;  also  V.  Goldschmidt, 
La  Religion  de  Platon,  P  ;  gris  (1949)  P-172  "Dbjp  chez 
les  anciens  2  ltobscurite  du  'Bien  de  Platont  etait 
proverbiale  et  fournissait  une  matiýre  a  plaisanteries 
abondamuent  exploitee  par  les  poetes  comiques  (n.  l. 
Diog.  Laest.,  111,26-27);  or  they  write:  ttthe 
emptiness  of  the  Platonic  Idea  or  Form  of  the  Good" 
(K.  P.  Popper  The  Open  Society  and  its  Enemies,  Plato, 
Vol.  I  (1963ý  (paperback)  np.  274-5  n-32.  See  also 
G.  Grote.,  Plato  and  the  other  Companions  of  Socrates, 
London  (16972)  Vol.  III,  pp.  241-2.  - 
2.  Trans.  h.  flacifforth,  Platots  Examination  of  Pleasure, 
Cambridge  (1945)  P-30. 45. 
the  Idez  of  Good.  ' 
E.  Zeller,,  Plato  and  the  Older 
.. 
tc 
J.  Adam,  The  Republic  of  Plat  ,  Cambridge 
63  01-IIY  PP-50-51,171  and  Idem.,  The  Religious 
Teachers  of  Greece,  pp.  442-8  ffý  This  notion,  that 
the  Idea  of  Good  is  equivalr;  nt,  to  God,  is  surported 
also  by  many  others,  vith  variations,  of  course,  such 
as:  B.  Jowett,  The  Works  of  Plato,  N.  Y.  p.  128; 
E.  Frank.,  It  in  American  Journal 
of  Philology,  Vol.  LXV1  (1945)-PP-23-6;  P.  Trutiger, 
Les  'jAythes  de  Platon,  111,  ris  (1930);  R.  'Auguier,  Les 
Sens  du  Mot  OcToc,  chez  Platon,  Paris  (1930)  PP-130-2; 
K.  I  A  06T  'H  pt  t6eMv  Ocwpfa  Tot)  r1XdTwvoC, 
Ath;  nsy?  190ý)ý'p.  il'fl  W.  F.  R.  Hardie  A  Study  in  Plato. 
Oxford  (1936)  i)P.  155-6;  R.  L.  Nettle'ship,  Lectures  on 
the  Lerpublic  of  Plato,  London  (1963)  pp.  232-3y-  R.  C. 
Loage.,  Platols  Theor;  ý  of  Ethics  (1928)  pn.  171  466  and  --  E-  'AvTWV  LabO  up  jq  -L  502  n.  14; 
-Y)ýE  -P-(6L0V-- 
IaTop-tar,  Ty 
, 
C,  )LXOaOQ(a  Athens  (1905)  TZýioc  A  pp.  228-9; 
W.  Jaeger,  Paideia.,  The  Ideals  of  Greek  Culture,  Vol. 
II,  Oxford  (1944)  pp-.  -2-33-5ff  and  414-6  n.  39b,  40,44; 
E.  Hoffmann,  Die  griechische  philosorhie  bis  Platon 
(1951)  Heidelberg.,  pp.  162  and  175;  L.  Robin,  Platon, 
Paris  (1935)'  pp.  248-52;  M.  Dies,  Autour  de  Platon, 
P'P.  550-1,553-5;  A.  J.  Festugiere,  Contemnlotion  et_y-jo 
contempiative  selon  Platon,  Paris  (1950)  F-26-4-5) 
265-6;  Victor  Goldschmidt,  La  Religion  de  Platon, 
Paris  (1949)  pp-17-62,  where  he  believes  that  he  has 
been  able  to  presup  ose  throughout  his  thesis  (and 
es-ecially  pp-17-M  what  Mgr.  Dies,  Festugiere., 
M.  Moreau  and  Jaeger  internret  in  different  ways: 
11ber)uis.,  les  travaux  de  Mgr.  Dies,  du  R.  P.  Festugiere, 
de  14.  Moreau,  de  IA.  Jaeger,  llont  renforcee  (tout  en 
ltinterrretant  dans  des  sons  differents)  ot  nous  avons 
cru  pouvoir  la  supposer  tout  au  long  notre  expose"; 
W.  Temple,.  Plato  and  Christianity,  London  (1916) 
pp.  28-30;  Vorn  V.  Von  'ailamowitz-14oellendorff,  Plato 
Berlin  (1919)  pp.  633.,  685-6;  K.  F.  Doherty,  God  cand  the 
Good  in  the  New  Scholasticism,  pp.  459-60,  where  one 
might  find  some  references  in  other  scholars.  We 
need  hardly  mention  here  that  determined  effort  was 
made  in  ancient  times  (Cp.  Philo,  De  Op.  1,11und.  IV  19; 
Albinus,  Epit.  IX  1.3;  Plutarch,  EDit.  ly  3;  Stobacus 
Ecl.  1,10,16;  Galen  Hist-. 
--Phil. 
25;  Hi-opolytus, 
Ref.  Omn.  Haer.  1.19;  Thoodoret,  Graec.  Affect.  Cup. 
IV  "  49  etc.  ).  and  in  recent  years  (Jackson,,  "Plato's 
Later  Theory  of  Ideas".  J.  P.  IIY  324;  Ritter  Die 
Kerngedanken  aer  Platonischen  PhilosoDhie,  3213; 46. 
This  identification  has  been  challenged  by  many 
equally  prominent  scholars  and  critics  of  Plato  on  the 
ground  that  the  idea  of  Good  is  not  a  soul,  or  a  nersonal 
being  at  all.  On  the  contrary  it  is  the  suDreme  form  of 
all  the  forms  and  the  cause  and  source  of  knowledge 
(Contd.  )  Archer-11ind,  Commentary  on  Timaeus,  P-95  n.  10, 
all  qtd.  by  A.  N.  Rich.,  "The  Platonic  Ideas  as  the  .'  thou,  ghts  of  Godli,  in  Mnemosyne,  Bibliotheca  Classica 
batara,  Series  IV,  Vol.  VII.,  Lugduni  (1954)  p.  123  n.  2, 
4.,  of  making  the  idea  de"  !.  endent  u-non  God  as  a  thought 
resiaent  in  his  mind.  It  will  take  us  too  far  to 
point  out  quite  the  opposite.  Nonetheless,  the 
following  words  of  A.  N.  M.  Rich,  ibid.,  I  should  think., 
are  to  a  great  extent  a  disapproval  to  it:  '?  To 
disprove  it  is,  however,  a  comnaratively  simple  matter, 
for  reference  to  the  Platonic  Dialogues  makes  it 
imm.  ediately  clear  that  any  concrete  evidence  in  favour 
of  this  inter,  ýretation  is  completely  lacking.  Plato 
never  describes  the  Ideas  either  as  the  thoughts  of  God 
or  as  the  content  of  God's  mind.  " 47. 
(science),  truth  and  being.  ' 
I  share  the  above  stand-point.,  with  some  reservations 
as  to  what  Plato  himself  meant  by  both  of  them:  (God  -  Good). 
In  view  of  Plato's  reluctance  and  hesitation  in 
describing  and  defining  exactly  his  Deity  (Tim.  28C,  Ren. 
506D-E,  Second  Epistle,  312E,  Seventh  Epistle  341C-D),  of 
the  clash  of  opinions  of  his  scholars  and  critics  and  of 
this  very  rapid  and  brief  survey,  it  would  not  only  be  a 
hard  and  unsuccessful  task  in  some  ways,  but  also  a 
venturous  one,  to  draw  any  definite  conclusion  on  Plato's 
theology  in  general  unless  Deus  ex  machina  iijýtervenes  or 
Plato  himself  gives  us  another  immortal  dialogue,  in  order 
Chief  sunporters  of  this  theory,  each  with  his  own  way 
of  interpreting,  are:  J.  Burnet,  Greek  Philosorhy., 
p  '536  P.  Shorey,  Wbat  Plato  Said.,  Chicago  (1933)  p.,  -7., 
T).  231;  Idem.  Republic  of  Plato,  pp.  102  n.  a;  Idem. 
"The  Idea  of  Good  in  Platots  Eerublic",  Univ.  of 
Chicago,  Studies  in  Classical  Philolog  (1895)  p.  239. 
Shorey  in  his  criticism,  I  gather,  is  going  too  far 
unjustifiably,  see  ibid.  pp.  26-7  n.  4;  A.  E.  Taylor, 
Plato,  the  Man  and  his  Work,  pp.  232  and  288;  P.  E. 
Moore,  The  Religion  of  Plato  (1921)  Princeton,  T'n-312  ff;  G.  M.  A.  Grube.,  Plato's  Though  ,  London  (1935) 
. )p.  168-9;  R.  Demos.,  The  Philoso-hy  of  Plato.,  London 
(1939)  p.  123;  J.  B.  Skemp,  o-  , 0-cit.  P-115;  F.  Solmsen, 
op.  cit.  PP-721  92  and  mOre  emphatically  in  192  and  195  n.  49;  H.  Cherniss,  op.  cit.  np.  604,606;  E.  Gilson., 
God  and  Philosoghy,  U.  S.  A.  (1959)  np.  26-28;  G.  C.  Field,, 
The  Philosophy  of  Plato,  London  1949  p.  61;  D.  Ross, 
Piatots  Theory  of  It.  eas,  Oxford 
R90 
np.  4-3-44;  F. 
Copleston,  A  History-of  Philoso-nhy,  London  (1961) 
pp.  191  ff;  A.  H.  Armstrong.,  An  Introduction  to  Ancient 
Philosophy,  London  (1959)  :  )-39;  J.  A.  Stewart,,  Platols 
Doctrine  of  Ideas,  Oxford  (1909)  P-59;  H.  Raeder, 
Platonts  Philosonhsche  Entwickelung.,  Leipzig  (1905) 
pp.  3bl-2.  Anart  from  the  above  references,  one  may  find  some  more,  in  the  brief  but  interesting  article  by 
K.  F.  Doherty.,  God  and  the  Good  in  Plato.,  XXX  (1956) 
po.  441  ff.  - 48. 
to  solve  the  riddle.,  things  'which  are  improbable,,  even 
impossible  and  mere  empty  words  and  wishes.  At  any  rate 
I  should  be  more  inclined,  with  Prof.  bodr-s,  "to  exrlain 
Plato's  lack  of  clarity  on  this  subject  by  the  cleavage 
between  his  mythical  or  religious  thinking  and  his 
dialectical  or  phi!  oSOT,  )hical  thinking,,  and  the  fact  thlat. 
the  former  was  not  bound,  or  not  bound  in  the  sa-me  degree 
as  the  iatter.,  by  the  requirement  of  logical  consistency. 
Our  confusion  about  Plato's  God  is.,  I  think,  an  instance. 
His  rhilosophical  thinking  about  the  nature  of  goodness  and 
the  truth  led  him  to  uosit  an  Absolute,  which  is  the  form 
of  the  Good.  This  Absolute  is  hardly  a  nossible  object  of 
worship,  and  he  nowhere  in  fact,  calls  it  or  any  of  the 
Forms.,  a  God.  His  religious  feeling,  on  the  other  hand, 
created  the  figure  of 
' 
qdg. 
omnipotent)  Father  -  God,,  father  and  maker  of  God  and  men 
and  of  the  world  itself.  If  we  try  to  identify  the  two, 
in  the  ho-pe  that  they  will  add  ur  to  the  equivalent  of'  One 
Christian  Deity  we  make,  as  I  think,  nonsense.  I  incline 
to  see  in  him  the  highest  Goif.  of  Platols  -inersonal  faith, 
whom  we  meet  also  ra  t  the  end  of  the  sixth  letter  (323D), 
and  whom  I  should  suDrose  plato  sreaks  of  in  the  singular 
without  further  exTdanation.  Plato  then,  if  I  am  right 
in  my  general  view,  admits  two  types  of  belief  or  two 
levels  of  truth,,  which  we  may  call  resnectively  truth  of 
religion  and  truth  of  reason.  The  former  are,  as  such., 
indemonstrable,  and  he  does  not  claim  for  tbom  moro  than 49. 
a  probubility  that  this  or  something  like  it  (PhacdP.  114D, 
82n)  is  true.  I  find  nothing  surT)rising  in  this:  Most 
men,  including,  I  susnect,  most  philosoT)hers,  believe  in 
practice  a  good  many  things  which'they  are  incapablc  of 
proving.  But  since  Plato  preferred  to  convince  his 
readers  by  reasoning,  if  possible,  rather  than  by  emotive 
eloquence,  he  continually  tried  to  transpose  his 
relidious  bcliofs  from  the  mythical  to  the  philosorhical 
ievel,  thus  transforming  them  into  truths  of  reason". 
' 
E.  R.  Doads,  TIPlato  and  the  Irrational",  in  the  Journal 
of  Hellenic  Studies  (1945)  pp.  231  24;  Idem.  ýhe 
Grecks  and  the  IrrLational,  Berkeley  and  Los  Angeles 
(1963)  pp.  221  and  232  n.  67-  I  quote  his  words  in  full, 
because  of  their  importance  and  because  they  hardly 
admit  of  summary.  See  also  similar  notions:  J.  A. 
Stewart,  Plato's  Doctrine  of  Ideas,  Oxford.  (1909) 
pp.  101-2;  K.  F.  Doherty.,  t'God  and  the  Good"  in  the  New 
Scolasticism,  pp.  459-60.  It  is,  however,  worth 
mentioning  hat  A.  E.  Taylor,  Plato.  the  Man  and  his  Worx, 
p.  289,  s,,  ý,  uanks  -bout  "Good  -  Christian  God  ......  ens 
realissimumll,  while  Ernst  Hoffm(-:  jn.  Griechische 
Philosonhie  bis  Platonj  Heidelberg  (1951)  P-175,  is 
neither  -, --:  rei,  -ared 
to  Identify  nor  to  reject  it.  He 
nevertheless  remarks  that  Plato,  as  a  philosopher, 
never  gives  a  result  in  his  Dialogues,  but  always 
shows  a  way  which  will  lead  to  a  result.  11  ......  Was 
Platon  in  Seinen  Dialogen  als  Philosophie  gibt,  ist 
niemals  ein  resultat.,  sondern  ist  immer  ein  ýJeg.,  der 
zum  Resultat,  hinfuhren  will 50. 
(b)  What  is  Man? 
What  then  is  man?  Anyone  who  would  take  nains  to 
go  through  the  Platonic  dialogues  would  receive  some 
answers  to  this  question,  such  as:  t1the  name  'man' 
indicates  that  the  other  animals  do  not  examine  or 
consider  or  looK  up  at  any  of  the  things  tliat  they  see  .... 
but  man  looks  up  at  and  considers  that  which  he  has  seen. 
Therefore  of  ail  the  animals  man  alone  is  rightly  called 
man,  because  he  looks  up  at  what  he  has  seen". 
'  In 
addition,  man  is  described  as  a  play-thing  of  the  Gods  or 
even  a  toy  for  God,  2  as  the  most  God-fea-ring  of  all  living 
cr,  6atures3  or  as  God  possessions4  etc. 
But  this  is  not  the  true,  the  real  definition  of  man 
for  Plato.  For  him,  man  is  something  more  than  that;  he 
is  something  deeper  and  more  significant;  something  of  a 
higher  and  nobler  nature,  not  a  mere  clay  toy,  but  a 
reasoning,  spiritual  creature;  something  which  does  not 
perish  or  disappear.  It  is  something  immortal  and  divine. 
cratYllv  399C  1-7;  trans. 
LCL2  comn.  Rpletete,  Dl--.  tribe  Ble-  1-14. 
qtd.  1  in  Prof.  q.  A.  EL&Voui  ""-l-PLO'vLavLcrp6c,  xaC  &vOp(j)TELav6( 
Athens,  (1962)  r.  8.,  q.  1. 
2.  Lawg;  VII,  803C  4-5. 
3.  Lawß  X.  902B5- 
4.  Phaedo  62B6-  Statesman  271E6-7.  2 51. 
Plato.,  then,  not  only  conceives  man  as  immortalY  but  he 
quite  clearly  declares  in  the  Laws  that  man's  true  self 
(the  real  man)  resides  in  the  divine  and  immortal  part, 
that  the  real  self  of  each  of  us  is  the  immortal  soul. 
The  same  notion  may  be  found  somewhat  elaborated  in  the 
Apocrypha,  Alcibiades  or  in  another  writer 
2 
who  echoes 
Plato's  views  and  emphatically  rejects  the  idea  that  man 
is  neither  the  body  alone  nor  the  body  and  soul  together 
(  cruva4y6,  ccpov  )  but  the  immortal  soul  in  itself.  3 
Laws  XII  U-C  C  vaL  [VOUV  959A8,  Bl-5:  "T)Ilwv  F-M-Ycr"')  TO-  ' 
ýýcbv-cq  hpw\)  E'xaauo\)  0'\j-uL0r,  )  T) 
p  voV. 
Comp.  Eth.  Nic.  128b34-35,1777b3O,  1178al-2 
also  in  F.  T.  A.  Cornford  "The  division  of  the  Soul"  in 
The  Hibbert  Journal,  XXVIII  (1929-30)  p.  209(n,  l; 
J.  Burnet.,  The  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  London  1  00) 
p.  423  on  1168bY5--,  among  other  comments  adds  It  ....  we 
are  not  entitled  to  say  that  this  is  Aristotlets  own 
view,  but  it  certainly  was  Platols1f;  P.  Shorey,.  Hbat 
Plato  Said,  Chicago  (1933)  p.  654'n.  on  Alcib.  I  1.  -,  '(,  C3. 
2.  It  is  not  for  us  to  decide  about  the  authenticity  of 
this  dialogue.  It  will  take  us  far  beyond  our  main 
scope  if  we  do  so;  we  simply  note  here  that  in 
favour  of  Plato's  authorship  are  Grote,  Hermann. 
Friedlander 
)  J.  'Adam  and  others,  and  against  it., 
A.  E.  Taylor,  Plato,  P.  522-3. 
3.  Alcib.  I  129E9-130A-C  11  .,. 
8T  Lh  ýVXT')  cILVOPWTEOC;  00000-0 
, 
[LOL  6OXCT  FEXCLV.  61  LXUVMC  Axiochus  36ý 
'p  CX  -Y  E  17'  b  aT  LV 
,  T6 
bTEOXEL(POýV  GM  )6Cr,  6v  xaC  hoyov,  o%c 
t  11 
IýLc  Lc,  ydp  tapýv  (ý  X  ID1  mnodorus  comMeritagy 
avgRwyfý 
sI 
Ij  TUI 
on  tet  Alcibiades  of  Plat 
2F  ct 
WesternJk)  Amsterdam 
-L 
)T 
Ed. 
ctby 
L.  G. 
(.  1956)  Pp.  127-133,202)  1-115. 52. 
It  must  also  be  said  that  "the  standing  Academic 
definition  of  man  is  a  soul  using  a  body".  1or 
as  Plato 
himself  has  it.,  a  "composite  structure  of  soul  and  bodyý1.2 
But  this  does  not  affect  our  assumption  that  for  Plato 
the  true  self  is  the  soul.,  that  is,  the  soul  is  the  man. 
This  statement  is  Droved  true  time  and  again  in  almost 
every  Platonic  dialogue.  After  all,,  the  soul's  union 
with  its  body  is  a  temporary  one,  the  body  is  mortal,  of 
the  earth,,  and  in  time  passes  away.  The  Soul  on  the 
contrary,  is  an  immortal  senior  and  T)crmanent  entity. 
3 
We  maintain  then  that  Plato  regards  man  Individually  as  a 
soul,,  that  the  true  self,  the  real  man,  is  soul. 
1.  A.  E.  Taylor,  Plato.,  3).  27  n.  l. 
2.  Phaedrus  246C5;  trans.  R.  Hackforth,  Platols  Phaedrus, 
P-70-* 
3.  Phaedo  80D;  Timaeus  34C;  Laws  892A.,  959A.,  967D. 103. 5 
(c)  A  General  Definition  of  the  Human  Soul. 
Since  we  have  alre,  --dy  accerted  that  the  real  man  is 
soul,  we  must  turn  our  attention  to  it  and  see  in  a  very 
brief  and  general  manner  how  T'lato  speaks  of  the  human 
soul,  how  he  describes  its  oim  nature. 
In  the  first  place,  the  main  characteristic  of  the 
soul,  its  essence,  very  idea,  is  self-motion. 
' 
Further,  soul  is  the  self  mover  and  the  source  and 
first  principle  of  motion  for  all  other  things  that  are 
moved., 
2  the  source  ond  origin  of  the  life,  "for  a  living 
thing  controls  its  motion  from  within  itself  and  initiates 
motion  in  its  relation  to  the  environment". 
3  In  other 
words  we  could  say  soul  is  not  only  the  source  of  life,  or 
the  c&use  of  it4  but  the  life  itself,  soul  and  life  are 
Phaedrus  245E2-4:  II6c,  5av&Tov  66  TEcyaapevov  'uo-u  bcP'ýau'VO-u 
XLVOUPeVOU,  T)  obcy(av  -rF-  )ta(  X6yov  TOZ)TOV  (X?  JT(SV  TLr.  I)X  r 
11  IC  ON  aTCFXVVCTTaL"  j  Uwws\'  896Al-3;  comp.  also  with  Aristotle,  de  Anima 
A2  403b2O-28  and  in  V.  Goldschmidt,  La  Religion  de 
Platon,  Paris  (1959)  P-51,  where  he  observes:  "Th 
soul,  according  to  the  unanimous  observations  of  the 
ancients,  gives  animation  to  the  movement  and 
sensation  of  that  which  lives". 
2.  Phaedrus,  245C6-9:  "----  ý16vov  6ý  -z6  ab-u6  xtvoZv  ... 
&Xxd 
HUCL  TOZLC  WOLC  8aa  %LvcZTaL  TOZTO  Rnyý  XaC  &PXý  XLVýaCWC1191 
Laws  895B2-4;  Laws  896A7-9- 
3.  Phaedrus  245C7-10. 
4.  Cratyl.  399DIl-12  and  El-2:  TOVC-  TýV  Oxý\j 
I-  6VOpdaaVTaC  ... 
a'L'TLO'J  LOTL  TO-U  QIjV  CtUTW,  TýV  TO-U 
&vanVCTV  6ývapLV  napCXOV  Xa(  &VUYI'UXOV"; 54. 
one  and  the  same  thing.  ' 
Furthermore,  the  soui  is  characterised  by  'Plato  as 
divine,  indestructibie  of  a  single  form,  accessible  to 
thought  and  changeless,  ever  constant  and  abiding  true  to 
itself.  2  ihimortal,  3 
without  birth,  ungenerated.  4  and  the 
like. 
Realising  that  it  is  not  enough  merely  to  set  out  the 
various  references  to  the  soul  as  they  occur  in  the 
Dialogues  -  since  Piatols  theory  of  the  soul  is  not  rigidly 
uniform\and  occasionally  is  even  contradictory  -  we  nrorose 
to  treat  the  whole  subject  under  the  following  headings, 
Rei).  353D7-9:  IITC  ö'ae  T6  Z,  ýv;  dýUxýC  ylaogcv  r)  T)  cpyov 
ElVa  L  LCYTU  Y 
2.  Phaedo  80B1  W  F-  L  vonTw 
-3:  'u  l"v  15ECw  x(-YC  &eavdTw  xa' 
xat  liovoF-L6ý  xci[  68LaXý,  uw  nat  h(  (baaý,  rwG  xaT6  TabTd 
F'-'Xov-uL  bgoL6TaTov  EivaL  ý),  uX'v".  T) 
3.  Phaedo  80B1  It 
.9 
105E6,  lo6Eq:  "&-Ddva-vov  apa  (ýuXýo 
Phaedrus  245C5:  "OXII  Tcaaa  Wvauor_ý'  -  or  if  ibid.  246Al:  "tC  &v6yxT)C.  ----  &O(Ivauov  av  E  Ln" 
Republic  608D3:  "---  O'T  L  6,5&v(xTor-  kL03V  h  (ýuXf*)  ;  ca( 
oWnoTc  &n6XXuTaL"!, 
Renublic  611B9:  11  ... 
8TL  Pb)  -UOC\)I)V  &,  5dVa'UOV  (ýUXý11. 
4.  Phapdrus  245D1 
ibid.  246Al-2: 55. 
viz:  - 
1.  Tho  Origin  of  the  soul:  generated  or 
ungenerated? 
-.  2.  The  Division  of  the  soul 
Soul  -  body:  their  relationship 
4.  The  Inunortality  of  the  Soul. 
The  Origin  of 
- 
the  Soul:  generated  or  ungencrated? 
The  soul  is  described  in  the  TimC-.  eus  as  follows:  - 
The  De.  niurge,  the  divine  craftsman  who  made  the  cosmos 
and  the  gods,  took  the  same  bowl  wherein  he  had  mixed  and 
blended  the  World  Soul,  poured  into  it  what  was  left  of  the 
former  ingredients  of  the  World  Soul's  comnosition  (same  - 
other,  being  -  existence)l,  mingling  it  somewhat  after  the 
same  manner,  yet  not  as  pure  as  before  but  coming  second 
Timaeus  35A-B.  To  this  obscure  passage  "intelligent 
accounts"  are  given  by  the  following  scholars:  A.  E. 
Taylor,  A  Commentary  on  Plato's  Timaeus,  Oxford  (1928) 
(1962)  pp.  106-36;  P.  Shorey.,  "The  Timaeus  of  Pl"-toll, 
American  Journal  of  Philolog  .X 
(1889)  w).  531-54; 
Idem:  "Recent  interretations  of  the  Timacus", 
Classical  Philolog  .  XXIII  (1928)  n-352;  G..  MI.  A.  Grube, 
I'The  Com,.  osition  of  the  World-Soul  in  Timaeus  3  A-BII) 
Classical  Philology,  XXVII  (1932)  n.  81;  Idem.  Plato's 
Though 
.  London  (1935)  pp.  142-3;  F.  M.  Cornford, 
Platots  Cosmology  (The  Timaeus  of  Platol  London  (1937) 
C-1956)  -PP-59-66.  Also  in  Procli  Diadochi,  in  Platonis 
Timaeum  commentzj.  ria,  ed.  by  E.  Diehl  Lipsiae,  ICMIV, 
p.  156-.  I 156 
and  third  in  purity. 
1  An(f  when  he  had  comnounded  the 
whoic  he  divided  it  into  souls  equal  in  number  with  the 
2  stars  and  aistributed  them  each  soul  to  its  scveral  star. 
Besiaes  this  rcassage  in  the  Ti-nacus.,  Plato,  charging 
everyone  as  ignorant  and  knowing  nothing  of  the  origin3  Cý 
repeatedly  sýtates  in  the  Laws  that  soul  has  been  produced 
first,,  came  first,  she  is  the  first  born  of  all  things  and 
Comp.  Phiiebus  30,  h;  Rene  Schaerer,  Dieu,  Ithomme-et  la 
vie  d-lapres  Platon,  Neucha.  tel  (1944)  : r..  42  agrees 
also  that  the  human  soul  retains  d  small 
ýuantity 
of 
nure  principle  but  that  this  rrincirle,  however,  is  now 
ousted  by  the  Other,,  wbercas  in  the  cosmic  soul,  on  the 
contrary,  it  w&s  that  which  involved  it.  Further, 
ibid.  n.  42  n.  l,,  he  illustrates  the  difference  of  the 
ingredientst  quantity  as  follows: 
"La  formule  de  l1ame  cosmique  est:  - 
Mem  +  Autre  +  IMeme  + 
Autre 
ý22) 
coile  de  11'ame  humaine  est: 
Autre  +  /Meme  t  Autre 
k22 
F.  Soliasen,  Plato's  Theolog 
.  Now  York  (1942)  P-93)  is 
of  the  opinion  that  the  individual  souls  are  either 
parts  of  the  Universal  Soul  or  at  least  of  the  same 
stuff.  E.  W.  Simson,  Ler  Begriff  der  Seele,  r-85Y 
reviewing  what  Plato  in  Timaeus  writes  about  the  soul's 
formation,  discovors  in  a  gcneral  way  that  the  ground 
of  the  origin  of  the  human  soul  is  the  same  as  that  of 
the  World-Soul  and  that  its  origin  occurred  in  the  same 
,  manner  as  the  Worid-Soul. 
Timaeus  4lD4-E2. 
3.  Laws  892A4. 
4.  ýUXý  6L  tVnp6TOLC  YEYCVT)p6Vn  ... 
li  ý  -npcapu-r6pav  AcTav  a6gauoq  ..  99 
(ýUxý  Trov  &R(i\)'UWV  nPeapuTaYTT);  YEVOgC'V-Q  &PXý  XLVýaCWC  T) 
q)uXT)v  g6v  npoT6pav  ycyovývaL  (56gaTOC  hp-LV 
'V  YC'VECYLV  &7t6VTWV 
...  (ýUXT)  CTV(XL 
OXTý)v  tXE'Yogcv,  6q  npcap6,  raTov  TE  XaC 
OCL6TaTov 
bYTLV 
... 
ýuxý  Te  d)C, 57. 
prior  to  body.  1 
Onels  task  of  internreting  the  soul's  origin  would  be 
easier  and  less  complicated  if'  Plato  himself  either  had 
not  taKen  the  diametrically  oprosite  -:  4nd  contradictory  view 
in  the  Phaedrus'that  the  soul  is  &yc'vT)TOC  absolutely 
2 
without  beginning,  uncreated  and  ungenerated,  or  if  he  had 
not  declared  that  soul  is  ýan  incomposite  being,  something 
which,  since  it  has  no  constituent  parts,  as  the  body  hasj 
will  not  be  liable  to  dissolution  or  death,  63  it  is 
related  to  the  eternal  forms  and  there  is  a  great  affinity 
1.  Laws  892C3-8: 
ibid.  896A-C: 
ibid.  899C7: 
966D9-10,1-2: 
ibid.  9671ý6-7: 
aiso  Timaeus  34C4-5: 
2.  Ph,  -edrus  245C6-246A2:  IlTu',,,  ý  nUcra  &OdvaToc. 
...  TOUTO  TE%71 
nac  &W  XLVýacwc,  apxý  U  hyývljTov,  Lý  &pxýc  ydp 
&vayx?  l  nUv  T6  yLyv6Vcvov  y(yvcaOaL,  abTýv  pT)6'ýý  ýv6c 
... 
f'  XXOTL  ClVaL  -c6  ab-u6  ýavr6  ;  CLVOZ\J  "  (ýUX'V;  PT)  a 
T)  T) 
&VdY7CT)C  &YC'VT)T6v  -cc  ;  cc,.  C  &OdvaTov  OXTý)  6v  clcv". 
Phaedo  78C1-4:  ,....  i;  uyx(ivF- 
L 
8v  &ý6\jouuov, 
Tou'To  p6wo 
'RpoaýXe  4  [tý  Tt(ICYv,  \.  C  L  Ta-UTa  ..  0. 
" 58- 
between  them.,  ' 
while,  soui  is  said  to  exist  italwa.  7st,  2  or 
"for  all  timell.  3 
The  apparent  or  real  discre,  lancy  between  the  above- 
mentioned  oassages  has  disquieted  all  the  Platonic  scholars 
(ancient4  and  modern)  and  has  forced  them  to  give  it  a 
considerable  amount  of  thought. 
With  regard  to  Timaeus'  theory  of  the  creation  of  the 
human  soul,  I  think  we  may  justifiably  T-,  ass  it  over  end 
leave  it  out  for  the  simnle  reason  that  Plato  himself  warns 
us  not  to  take  his  account  of  the  creation,  and  consequently 
of  the  soul's  com,  ),:  )sition  as  well.,  scriously  -  -,,  u  nied  do.  la 
1.  Phaedo  79B8-12:  11  ... 
611OL6,  ucpov  ULpa  (ýuXý  (j6jAaTo(; 
p  ibid.  Ml-,  ý:  llbTav  66  *yc  COTLV  TM  at5CT 
Ctb,  ul  RcLolab'zl  cyxoTt-,  olXuraL  ctr,  T6  ;  caocLp6\i  -cc  T)  T)  T) 
. 
týXF  L  _T  FL 
XUL'  &F-L'  '()\)  &O(i\)a'rOV 
...  xaC'  ý)c,  auyycvýr,  oýcya  abuo-u  &cC 
ýICT'  tXC  NOU  TE  Y  L'Y\)F-'Ua  0. 
2.  Ileno  86A-B  "5-T)%OV  *y6p  8TL  T6v  ndvTa  Xp6vov 
VV COT  LV  1r)  Ob%  E"(YT  LV  U'VO  PWTCOr,  "  . 
3.  Re'ý,  ublic  611iii  ff  ....  , 
it  6ýkov  o',  uL  &va-y)cT)  &cC  b\j  elvaL. 
4.  We  may  note  herein  passing  that  Plutarch  first  tried  to 
reconcile  the  relevant  statements  in  the  Phaedrus  and 
L&ws  about  the  soul's  origin  with  a  litoral  inter- 
. 
ý-retati-an  of  the,  Titaeus,  without  success,  of  course, 
as  his  exposition  i.  -)  entirely  illogical  and  untenable, 
in  ",  I-IF-p(  uý(;  ýv  TLIla(W  1i'UXOYOV1GLC.  "q  or  "Do 
animae  procreatione  in  Timaeo.,  1016C-D,  5-15  in 
Plutarchi  1111oralia,  Vol.  Vj,  fasc.  1  (ed.  by  C.  Hubert  and 
H.  Drexler,  Lipslae  in  Eadibus  B.  C.  Teubucri  WCMLIX, 
P-153;  see  also  in  R.  MA.  Jones,  The  Platonism  of 
Plutarchý  PP-81-85;  A.  E.  Taylor,  A  Commentary  on 
Plqtols--Timaeusý  PP-117-8;  H.  Cherniss,  Aristotle's 
Criticism  of  Plato  ana  the  Academ 
.  D.  426  n-360. 59. 
lettre.  He  claims.,  through  Timaeust  mouth  that  his 
exposition  is  neither  a  logical  premise  nor  a  scientific- 
ally  accurate  statement,  but  a  4ZOOC  a  mere 
myth,  a  probable  tale,  and  as  such  claims  no  further 
investigation.  ' 
The  late  Prof.  R.  Hackforth,  despite  Plato's  warning, 
refers  to  34C4  and  seems  to  suggest  that  in  Timaeus,  Plato 
would  have  kept  in  mind  a  soul  uncreated  and  nrior  to  the 
Timaeus  29Dl-3.  Scholars  supporting  the  mythical 
exposition  are  E.  Zeller,  Plato  and  "he  Older  Academ 
New  Y,  ork  (1902)  p.  405  n-40;  E.  '  Rohde,  Psyche,  p.  479 
n.  18;  G.  Grubey  Plato's  Though 
y  p.  142;  F.  M.  - 
Cornfordy  Platots  Cosmology,  pp.  28-32;  F.  Solmsen, 
Plato's  Theology,  .  PP-108-9;  H.  Cherniss,  Aristotle's 
Critidism  of'  Plato,  pp.  426  n.  359,430-31;  A.  E. 
Taylor,  '  Commentary  on  lato's  Timaeusy  P-73;  Idem. 
Plato,  pp.  '440-1  gives  somewhat  different  view;  Ernst 
Howald  in  his  paper  11eikos  logost'  Hermes  57  (1922) 
pp.  63-79,  seems  to  make  considerable  exaggerations  and 
in  F.  Solmsen  I  ibid.  p.  120  n-32;  R.  Hackforth, 
"Platols  Cosmology  (Ti=aeus  27D  ff)"  Classical 
Quarterly,  N.  S.  Ix  (1259)  p.  21;  *  E.  W.  Simsony  Der 
Begriff  der  Seeley  P-d5-  It  may  be  noted  on  the  other 
hand  that  G.  Vlastos,  T'Theýdisorderly  motion", 
Classical  Guarterly  I  XXIII'(1939)  pp.  71-83,  arguing 
for  a  literal  interpretation  of  the  pre-cosmical 
disorderly  motion,  supports  the  view  that  the 
inconsistencies  are  "symptomatic  of  the  contradiction 
inherent  in  Plato's  donceTition  of  yeveUK"  and  P. 
Frutiger,  Mythes  de  Platon,  Paris  (1930)  P-173  ff, 
di.  -Ptinguishes  two  sensesof  the  myth  or  story;  see  also 
F.  M.  Cornford,  Plato's  Cosmology.,  PP-31-32  n.  l. 6o. 
body.,  or  to  use  someone  elsets  words.,  he  "still  retains  a 
basic  appreciation  of  the  really  uncreated  status  and 
priority  of  the  soult'. 
1  IfThe  words  YCVeaEL  UPOTC'pa 
must,  however,  be  interpreted  in  accordance  with  the 
general  scheme  of  the  creation  myth  in  which  an  analysis  of 
factors  in  the  universe  is  ý--lresented  in  the  guise  of  a 
cosmogonyll.  2 
Next,  HackfQrth)  again  in  an  article  published  shortly 
after  his  death,  maintains  that  Plato  in  the  Timaeus  is 
still  holding  a  view  about  the  soul  similar  in  some  degree 
to  that  of  Orphics,  Pythagoreans  and  even  Phaedo,  that  is,  a 
soul  divine  or  semi-divine,  wholly  spiritual  and  rational 
and  11rartly  discriminated  from  Mind  or  heason".  3 
Reasonable  though  H-ackforthts  exrosition  seems,  It 
-,  se.  does  not  Drove  his  cCA  Plato's  statement  of  ctxk  pZOoc 
I  think  is  the  answer  to  the  soul's  creation. 
We  must  not,  therefore,  worry  about  Timacust  theory 
and  may  ignore  it  altogether. 
1.  H.  D.  Rankin,  Plato  and  the  Individual.,  p.  28. 
2.  R.  Hackforth,  Platols  Phaedrus,  Cambridge  (1952)  p.  62; 
also  In  H.  D.  Rankin,  ibid.  D.  28  n.,  1. 
3.  R.  Hackforth,  "Plato's  Cosmogony  (Timaeus  27D  ff)tlin 
Classical  ýIuarterly,  N.  S.  IX  (1959)  p.  21;  E.  Rohde, 
Psyche,  p.  479  n.  ld.,  remarks:  I'The  creation  of  the 
soul  in  Timaeus  is  only  intended  to  represent  the 
origin  of  the  spiritual  from  the  6111ILoupy6c  not 
the  coming  into  being  of  the  soul  in  timelt. 61. 
Nevertheless,  the  greatest  difficultyp  as  I  have 
already  said,  lies  between  the  Laws,  where  Plato 
categorically  declares  soul  as:  892C4  first  born  (Lv  npW'ToLC 
896Cl-2  prior  to  body 
(7tpoTepav  ycyov6vaL  a6ýtawr,  )  967ID67 
11the  soul  is  oldest  of  all  things  that  Dartake  of 
generation"  (trans.  R.  G.  Bury',  Plato,  Laws,,  II.,  P-563  In 
LCL).  (npcap6TaTov  &Ttdvrwv  oka  yovT)r,  VeTe  CXT)ycv) 
and  in  Phaedrus  245C6-246A2  in  which  we  read  soul  as 
uncreated,  ungenerated  (  &y6voTov). 
Now  in  view  of  this  ai*lrarent  conflict  between  the  two 
dialogues,  any  linguistic  and  literary  attempt  to  remove 
the  difficulties  and  find  a  satisf",,  ctory  solution  is  going, 
I  incline  to'think.,  to  fall  completely. 
Plato's  commentators  intervene  at  this  -point  and  each 
one  separately  offers  his  oým  resn,  ective  solution  of  this 
apparent  antithesis. 
Since  Prof.  Cherniss'  reconcillatory  effort  is  clear, 
well-founded  and  succeeds  in  many  ways.,  it  woijld  be  better, 
I  believe,  to  allow  the  scholar  himself  to  develop  his 
arguments  . 
Lnd  defend  his  case  with  his  own  words: 
I'The  scope  of  the  argument  in  the  Laws  is  determined  by  the 
thesis  which  it  is  meant  to  refute,  namely  that  fire,  water, 
earth  and  anir  are  npw-Ta  and  that  soul  is  Lx  ý06Twv 
VaTepov  (891C).  To  refute  them  he  need  say 
nothing  as  to  whether  soul  is  absolutely  without  beginning., 62. 
but  has  only  to  prove  that  it  is  -npeapuTepav  a6paToC  ........ 
.0.0..  In  other  words,  Plato  does  Tiot  oxy-licitly  draw 
the  concl.  ision  here  that  the  soul  is  absolutely  without 
beginning  simply  because  that  point  is  suTerfluous  to  his 
present  arguýaent  and  like  a  skilled  debater,  he  confines 
himself'  both  In  assumption  and  rroof  to  the  minimum 
necessary  for  establishing  his  case". 
1  He  goes  on  to  say 
that  11there  --re  clear  indications  in  the  course  of  the 
argument  that  he  has  not  abandoned  the  rosition  of  the 
Phaedrus.  In  894E-895B,  he  argues  first  that  moving 
ýly  self-motion,  as  the  ultimate  things  necessarily  im, 
princi7le  of  their  motion,  and  secondly  that  if  all  things 
should  be  assumed  at  rest.,  a  first  motion  would  have  to  be 
self-motion,  for  since  there  is  no  change  in  the  thi,:,.  gs  at 
rest,  change  induced  by  something  other.  than  self-motion 
(i.  e.  by  a  moved  mover)  could  not  be  prior  to  this. 
H.  Cherniss,,  Aristotle's  Criticis,  -,  j  of  Plzýto  ancl  the 
Acaaegy,  p.  430-1  n-365;  compare  with  Procli  Diadochi 
in  Pi:.,  tonis  Timucufn  commentarla,  ed.  by  E.  Diehl, 
Lipsiae.,  P11CMIV.,  Vol.  1j.,  175DII-23  'n-117,  whom  Churniss 
foliows  in  his  conclu6ing  remarks: 
if  It CaTL  66  Y6VCaLC  ýn(  cýc,  (ývXýc  o1bX  h  )cqv6  Xp6\)ov  T) 
, 
(246A)  (&y6vTj,  uov  y6p  )caL'  &V6XEOPOV  IY6CL&CV  ýV  ýU(6PW 
Tijv  (ýuXýv),  &XX'h  %aT'ObOL'aV  ndpo6or,  &Tc6  -rw-v  voT)T-wv 
at,  uCwv  ........... 
EXXT)  ýnC  -c-T)r,  ý-)uXýr,  -yc\jcaLc,  xuC 
&XXT)  h  LTEI  co-U  a6[taTor,  pb)  TtpoT6pa  xaC  npcapur6pa 
TEPWCXcaTýpa  y6p  tuTL  TW-  TCdVTWV  6T)JILOUPYrO.  " 63. 
44 
In  this  passage,  which  is  simply  aýr  exr.  ansion  of  Phaedrus 
245D7-F,,  21  the  first  part  implies  that  ttgenerated  self-motion" 
is  a  contradiction  in  terms,  and  the  second  that,  If  soul, 
as  inotion.,  were  t1generatedtI.,  not  it  but  its  generator 
would  be  self-motion  and  the  &PXT)  %LVT)CF_wr,  RaGMV  ......... 
That  soul  is  called  TCP6TT)  'YbJCaLr,  does  not  at 
all  imply  that  it  ever  did  not  exist  or  was  ever 
tigenerated"  in  the  sense  of  being  t1now"  after  not  having 
been  Itbefore".  The  soul  is,  of  course,  a  fIrroccss", 
though  not  a  physical  rrocess,  being  intermediate  between 
the  ideasand  the  -physical  universe;  it  too  is  de;  -;  rndent 
upon  the  real  being  of  the  ideas,  but  the  very  fact  that 
it  is  called  np6TT)  y6vcaLC  of  all  things  that  are  or 
have  been  or  will  be  and  of  all  their  contraries  (Laws  896A, 
899C6-7)  shows  that  Plato  did  not  here  envisage  any 
productiontt  or  t1creation"  of  it".  1  I,  - 
. 
The  late  Prof.  Hacifforth  also  attearted  two  different 
ex-ilanations  of  the  "puzzling"  passages  in  the  Laws. 
1.  In  an  e-rlier  article'.  which  he.  later  believed  'to 
have  been  wrong.,  though.,  "  he  thinks',  "the  main 
conclusions  of  his  Paper  may  stand  without  ittt,  ""-  he 
I.  H.  Cherniss  ......  piease  see'at  rage  62  n.  l. 
2.  R.  Hackforth,  Plato's  Pliae-drus,  Cambridge  (1952)  P.  67 
n-3. 64. 
suggests  that  the  words  11  8aa  YO\)-T)c.  IIF-TC(X7IcPCv'1 
(Laws  967D)  mean  t1no  more  than  Y6VECT  LC  oldest 
of  all  things  that  are  generated"  and  that  I'soul  then 
is  a  YC'VCaLC  or  ycyov6c  or  11rarticipates  in 
birthl'.  This  ycyov6c,  does  not  imnly  any  creation 
in  time.  They  are  simrly  derivative  existents 
de-oe,  aaing  on  something  more  ultimate. 
2.  Later,  he  holds  that  Plato  rereats  and  ex,  -ands  in 
the  Laws  the  theory  of  the  self-moving  soul,  and  as  it 
is  quite  znCaltural,  everyone  would  have  ex-ected  hiin  to 
reaffirm  its  ungenerated  nature.  Unfortunately,  he 
refrains  from  doing  so  and  instood  tries  "to  confute 
the  atheistic  materialists  who  make  body  rrior  in 
origin  to  soul,  he  ado,  -)ts  their  tomroral  category  and 
confines  himself  to  demonstrating  the  reverse  riority".  2 
Next  Rankin.,  taking  up  the  roint,  argues  that  it  is 
aý,,  -)arent  from  the  Timc,,  -.  us  (371D)  -  and  this  accords  with 
Hackforth's  oninion  -  that  Plato  recognized  an  inadequacy 
in  the  use  of  language  employing  ordinary  time  -  concerts  of 
R.  Hackforth.,  'Piutols  Theism?,,  Ciassical  Cuarterly,  XXX 
Ca,  iibriage  (1936)  P.  5'ff. 
2.  Idem. 
, 
Plato's  Phaedrus,  n.  67.  It  m-sy  be)  of  interest  to 
note  that  in  his  1--osthumous  article  "Plato's  Cosmogony", 
Classical  (uLrterly  N.  S.  IY-  (1959)  r.  213  he  sees 
Phaedrus'  ungenerated  soul  as  "the  necessary  nre- 
sup-rosition  of  ail  movements  that  occur  in  the  Universe, 
coeval  with  the  Universe". 65. 
cosmological  ideas.  The  time  divisions  of  the  "temporal" 
world  are  seen  as  irrelevant  to  the  11  extra-  temporal"  and  as 
the  ?  'temporal"  world  is  a  created  thing,,  so  also  is  its 
character  of  temporality,  a  flickering  shadow  of  the  endur- 
ing  substance  of  eternity.  In  this  context,  only  the 
present  tense  can  have  any  force,  and  Das  and  future  alike 
are  meaningless.  This  is  not  to  say  that  Plato  never  uses 
the  ?  'irrelevant"  tenses  in  writing  of  the  timeless  cosmos. 
He  acknowledged  that  men  were  conditioned  to  thinking  in 
such  terms,  and  regarded  it  as  a  work  of  sunererogation  to 
avoid  tensed  language  completely.  This  "conditioning"  was 
expressed  in  the  idea  that  man  and  time  were,  as  it  were, 
twins  -  an  idea  inherent  in  much  Greek  writing,  and  found, 
particularly,  in  the  Laws  (721C).  Time,  in  this  system, 
exists  alsongside  a  man,  paralleling  his  oým  age  at  each 
juncture,  young  when  he  is  young,  old  when  he  is  old,  and 
born  when  he  is  born.  This  way  of  thinking  smooths  over 
the  apparent  contradiction  in  the  Timaeus  of  saying  that 
something  which  is  ungenerated  was  "made"  at  a  srecific  0 
moment,  although  that  Itmoment"  is  really  outside  of  time. 
In  the  same  way,  one  can  describe  the  soul  as  "older"  than 
all  other  things'.,  or  to  say  that  something  11  ex  tra-  temporal  Tt 
existed  "before?  '  time.  If  time  is  "born".,  the  extra- 
temporal  already  existed  when  time  was  born.  According 
to  the  Timaeus,  time  (3?  C)  actually  began.,  had  a  point  of 
origin.  It  is  in  such  terms  that  the  extra-temnoral 66. 
soul  can.  itself  be  said  11to  be  born".  ' 
Idulier.,  on  the  other  hana,  is  of  the  oninion  that  in 
-1 
the  Laws,  soul's  creation  has  no  n1ace,  as  in  Timaeus,  and 
the  words  itpo-cC"pa  and  nPF-aGuT6PU  have  by  no 
mcc-ns  a  tewporal  sense:  ("Das  ware  im  Timaios  vielleicht 
möglich  wo  mindestnes  die  Seele  geschaffen  wird;  in  den 
Nomoi  aber  hat  die  Schohpfung  keine  Stelley2  and  ...... 
Daher  die  Begriffe  npoTEpa  und  npeapuTc,  pa  die 
in  den  Nomoi  keinooc*"'  falls  zeitlichen  sinn  haben") 
In  au(ýition  to  the  above  nicntioned  -ýoints  of  view,  some 
other  scholars  exrressed  quite  contrary  opinions  as  to  the 
soul's  origin.  VILstos,  for  instance,  ad6uces  some 
passages  and  claims  that  Plato  had  assumed  the  soul's 
creation,  "but  prudently,  refrained  from  presenting  it  as 
a  vroblem". 
4 
In  other  words  he  claims,  so  to  s-eak,  that 
when  he  wrote  the  Laws  Plato  belOved  the  ýcul  tD  be  crot  . ýtod 
i.  e.  to  have  had  a  begiming. 
1.  H.  D.  Rankin,  Plato  and  the  Individual.,  T),,  ).  28-9. 
., 
Studen  zuden  Platonischen  Nomoi,  Munchen  2.  G.  I.,  luller  -L  (1951)  (in  Zetemata,  monogra,  -ýhien  zur  Klassischen 
Altertums  Wissenschaft,  fleft  3)  r.  86. 
3.  G.  i'., Auller,  ibid.  'ý-85  n.  l. 
4.  G.  Vla:!  stos,  "The  disorderly  motion  in  the  Timaios" 
Classical  Quarterly,  XXXIII  (1939)  P.  -79  n.  2.  and  T).  82 
n.  1;  see  also  fl.  Cherniss,  Aristotle-is  Criticism  of 
Plato  ang  the  Academy,  p.  430  n.  36-5-. 67. 
Prof.  Skemp  for  his  , ý.  zart,  charges  Plato's 
commentators  with  being  slow  to  ack-nowledge  that  the  soul 
is  a  created  thing,  "except  6L6aCXCL%[CLr,  XdPL'O' 
and  this,  of  course,  in  virtue  of  the  a-pparent  &VTL'yaaLC 
of  Phaedrus  and  Laws.  Further,  in  a  footnote,  he 
observes  that  Laws  X  sreaks  of  the  OXý  as  YEYEV  CV71 
at  U092C;  cf.  892A.  896A  and  at  the  "crucial"  nassege 
XII  967D. 
1 
In  conclusion,  we  may  say  this:  - 
The  key  answer  to  the  arrarcnt  discrerancy  lios  not 
in  the  narrow  grammatico-lexicological,  or  liter3l, 
exiýositiony  but  in  the  main  -urrose  of  the  Laws  book  X. 
Those  who  have  already  worked  in  this  direction 
(Proclus,  Cherniss.,  H.  ac.  -,  forth  and.  Raný-,  in)  succeeded  in 
many  ways,  while  those  who  have  aT)proached  the  rroblem 
differently  have  failed  to  rroduce  results  leading  to  a 
s"-tisfactory  solution  (G.  Viastos  and  S.  &emp). 
Lhile  we  must  exclude  any  creation  of  the  human  soul 
in  time  as  contrary  to  what  Plato  teachesi,  we  are  obliged 
to  endorse  the  view  of  Proclus,  Cherniss,  Hackforth  and 
Rani:  in  as  well  founded  and  convincing,  that  the  human  soul 
J.  B.  Sxemp.,  The  Theorv  of'  Iviotion  in  Pla-tols  later 
Dialogues,  Cambric)ge  (1942)  D.  112  n.  l. 68. 
is  a  "process",  not  necessarily  a  -)hysical  one,  being 
Intermediate  between  the  Forms  and  the  Universe;  the  soul 
is  a  derivative  existent',  as  the  physical  universe, 
denending  on  something  more  ultinate.,  more  transcendent, 
indeed  upon  the  real  being  of  ideas. 69. 
THE  DIVISION  OF  THE  SOUL. 
The  statement  under  consideratLon  could  be  ex-ressed 
as  foliows: 
Is  the  human  soul  simple,  of'  one  form  or  kind 
(POVOELVr')  uncouipounded  (&Uv-DETOC  T)  )  -L  or 
tri-vartite 
2 
and  composite,  or  in  other  words,  is  soul  a 
differentiated  unity  or  a  simpie  unity  or  both,  a  one  and 
many? 
The  whole  question,  as  it  is  uný.  Frstood,  is  neither  :.,  n 
easy  one  nor  without  its  complexities.  Since  this  is  so, 
an6  if  we  wish  to  gain  the  cle"orest  possible  view,  then  we 
have  to  go  round  a  ionger  way.  3 
Thus  our  proposed  investigation  falls  into  the 
following  sections:  - 
Origin  of  the  doctrine:  Pythagorean  or  PiC-tonic? 
2.  TripartItion  of  the  Soul: 
a)  in  the  Re-ublic 
b  in  the.  Phaedrus 
c  in  the  Timaeus 
d  in  the  other  dialogues. 
Conclusion:  nroposed  solution. 
1.  Phaedo  78c,,  -1-7.80BI-4; 
Renublic  6llBl-(q-. 
2.  Cf  Ee-..,  ublic  IV  4350)  435C-441;  611B-612A;  also 
PERK,  25A)ff;  Tim.  69C-72D. 
Republic  435D4-5. t- /o. 
1.  Originof  the  doctrine:  Pythagorean  or  Platonic? 
While  Pythagoreans  did  not  nroDound  any  clear 
statement  about  a  tri-partitc  soul,,  nevertheless  some 
modern  scholars  favour  the  notion,  that  tho  origin  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  threefold  soul  is  Pythagorea:  n  r.,:,.  th(-.  r  than 
Platonic. 
Burnet,  for  instanco,  rcgarding  the  Ph.  -edo  68C2,  as 
imvdying  the  triT,  artite  division  of  the  soul,  rrcfers  this 
"somewhat  T)rimitive  -psychoiogy"  as  being  older  than 
Socrates.,  for  it  stands  in  intimvte  connection  with  the 
famous  Pythagoroan  apologue  of'  the  three  ILves  -  comnared 
to  the  three  classes  of  uien  who  go  to  01y.  -,  nia.,  (1) 
-D6ar 
41 cvcxa 
sell  (  x6p6or,  ) 
(2)  to  comr,  ete  (  66Ca  (3)  to  buy  and 
(Iambl.  V.  P.  58).  Furthor,  in  sunport 
of  his  view,  he  quotes  Poseidonius  and  I"amblichus,  as 
saying  that  the  doctrine  of  the  throe  rarts  of  the  soul 
goes  back  to  Pythagoras  himself  and  that  it  originally  was 
Pythagorean  indeed  and  Piato  himself  1rori.  -m-d  out  and 
completed  it.  1 
J.  Burnet  Platots  Phaedo  Oxford  (19':  9)  n.  on  68C2; 
Early  Greez  Philoson  98  cf.  296  n.  2;  Idem  I  Glý,  c  M)  ý, ý  I  rz  I  nn 
Gree&  Philosophy,  pp.  42  n.  2  and  177;  A.  E.  Taylor,.  A 
Commentary  on  Plato's  Timeaus,  pp.  497-8'and  n  1ý  Idem 
his  n.  1  d,  W.  jTr,  I  Plato; 
- 
the  iil-ci  .,  i(, 
Jý  Study  LnPj-ýto.  Oxford  (1936)  P-138.,  --,  re  m  -)  -v  in  g  In 
tne  sa,.  ie  direction  in  mi-itaining  the  Pyth,!,  gnrean  ý)l  ig  i 
of'  the  doctrine;  C.  J.  Clacsen,  S-rývcb]-Lcleie  doutung  ,,  Is 
triebiýcrý-if  t  Pi&to-nisclhen  unci 
r-  ir,  0  1.,  j;.  i-qLch.,  p.  21.  n.  A,  on  thý-  hand  -rr%f'o  -i  gt 
the  above  scholars  til-alt  'Ibestohe;  i  E!  uf  Pyt  . h--  g  ,,  re.  Isc 
nosprun,  der  Lreiteilung  deýr  SeE,  Ie  6 71. 
In'an  exceilent  article,  J.  L.  Stocks,  following 
Burnet's  line  of  thought,  finds  it  unnocessary  to  search 
the  records  of  Greek  philosoi)hy  for  further  detailed 
evidence  of  the,  1ý.  rofouna  and  continued  i:  nfluonce  of  the 
uoctrine.,  and  he  is  content  to  remark  in  conclusioti  that 
all  -orobabilities  favour  the  truth  of  the  tradition  of  its 
Pythaagorean  origin. 
' 
Cornford,  on  the  other  hand,  remarks  that  he  is  not 
sure  that  the  doctrine  of  the  three  lives  irirliesa 
definite  division  of  the  soul  into  three.,  narts.  He  rather 
suggests  that  the  natural  imrression  -,  roduced'  by  this 
passage  is  that  the  three  iives  were  a  common.  place,  but  no-- 
one  had  at  least  based  the  doctrine  on  a  tri-c,  artite 
psychology.  ")  Further,  he  argues  that  the  tripartite 
psychology  iras  as  Its  final  basis  a  social  structure  oldor 
than  Pythagoras  himseif  and  it  does  not  matter  at  what  date 
or  in  whose  hands  interpretation  in  terms  of  -psychology 
took  place. 
3 
1.  J.  L.  Stockc,,  "Plato  anrý  the 
Mind,  XXIV  (1915)  London, 
2.  F.,,,!.  Cornford,  "Psychology 
Re,  public  of  Plato".  The  C 
p.  247  n.  2. 
3.  F.  I.  Cornford,  ibid,  p.  247 
TriT,  artite  of  the  Soul", 
rp.  2095  210  an6  219. 
and  Social  Structure  in  the 
lassical  (,  uarto.  rlv,  VI  (1912) 
n.  2. 72. 
The  above  view  that  the  doctrine  of  the  three  rarts 
of  the  soul  is  rooted  in,  the  Pythagoreans)  has  recently 
been  challenged  by  two  equally  eminent  scholars,  Grube  and 
Hac.  &forth. 
Professor  Grube,  charging  Burnet)  Taylor  and  their 
the  whole  roint  in  giving  such  faulty  foiiowers  as  missing 
explanation  concerning  the  divine  soul)  writes  that  the 
difference  lies  in  this:  ? "Whereas  the  Phaedo  (with  the 
Pythagoreans)  sl:  ýcaks  of  three  different  tyres  of'  men,  in 
the  Re,  )ublic  and  the  Phaedrus  these  becomo  three  parts  of 
the  same  soul".  The  passions  of  the  philosorher  in  the 
Phaedo  are  not  parts  of  his  soul. 
Professor  Hackforth  also  s.  r)Qaks  against  it,  ascribing 
with  the  late  Piofessor  W.  Jaeger  (-tiristotle)  E.  T.  19482, 
p.  96)  the  origin  of  the  three  tyj)es,  of  man  to  tho  Academy 
rather  than  to  Pythagoras  and  re.  jects  the  suggestion  that 
the  F-0--public  Iký  581,  has  its  origin  in  Pythagoi-asand  rules 
out  Burnetfs  implication  of  a  tri,  -)artite  soul  on  Phaedo 
68C.  1-4  and  in  the  whole  dialogue  as  impossible  and 
2  groundless. 
1.  Grube￿  Platols  Thoughtj  n.  1. 
2.  R.  Hackforth,  Plato's  Phag(ýo.,  P-56  n.  l.  Here 
Hackforth.,  n.  4,  in  supT)ort  of  his  opinion,  cites 
Frutiger,  ilythes  de  Platon,  rn-77  ff;  G.  Grube.  7  Plato's  Thought,  p.  1)3;  E.  F.  Dodds,  The  Groeks  and  the  Irrationals,  T)-,  ).  22ý  f. 73.  i 
Grube  and  Hacicforth  may  be  right  as  far  as  the  aileged 
tripartite  soul  found  by  Burnet  in  the  Phaedo,  but  not,  I 
think,  as  regards  the  origin  of  the  three  ty-rýes  of  i-ilen 
which,  according  to  Burnetts  evicýences,  seems  to  belong  to 
an  older  gen-eration  than  that  of  Plato. 
2.  The  tri-oartition  of  the  soul: 
(a)  in  the  Renublic. 
Plato  had  ",  iready  shown  that  justice  and  a  just 
society  exist  when  each  of  its  three  classes  keers  to  its 
own  proier  business,  does  not  interfere  with  others  works, 
and  prorerly  and  rightiy  performs  its  oum.  1 
"Since  the  quaiities  of  a  community  are  those  of  the 
comp,  onent  individuals,  we  may  expect  to  find  the  three 
corresnonding  elements  in  the  individual  soul.  All 
three  will  be  nresent  in  every  soul,  but  the  strticture  of 
society  is  basea  on  the  fact  that  they  are  developed  to 
1.  I-,,  -:,  T)ublic  434C6-10. 74. 
different  degrees  in  different  types  of  character?  '.  ' 
Plato,  having  accerited  the  tentative  rro-nosition  that 
the  three  -psychological  kinds  or  forms  correspond  to  the 
three  orders  of  the  city,  proceeds  now  to  consider,  "from 
a  common  human  experience.,  that  of  conflict  in  the  mindtf,  2 
F.  Id.  Cornford,  The  Reriýblic  of  Plato,  Oxford  (1961) 
p.  126;  also  H.  E.  P.  Lee.,  Plato  The  hrrublic  (Penguin 
-9  and  edition)  (1955,1964)  182;  Penublic 
434D3 
,  435B3-8.  On  the  jarallelism  between  state  and  soul 
and  esreciaily  on  the-question  "which  is  T,  rior,  the 
triT)artition  of  state  or  the  trirartition  of  soul?  ", 
which  does  not  concern  us  directly.  We  may  add,  in 
passin6,  of  course,  the  following:  F..  d.  Cornford, 
IfPsychology  ana  social  structure  in  the  fienublic  of 
Pia,  to".  Classical  (1)arterl  (1912)  VII  pn.  241-7-265., 
. iroves  that  the  uivision  of  the  state  came  fii  -st 
rather  than  that  of  the  soul;  R.  Hackforth,  tfThe 
Modification  of  Plan  in  Plato's  Repubiicli,  Classical 
(,,  uarterly  (1913)  VII,  p.  265,  on  the  contrary,  rcrlying 
to  Cornford's  assertion,  believes  that  "Plato  to  have 
had  a  triTartite  psychology  in  his  mind  frora  the 
beginning  of  Book  II  -a  nsychology,  indeed,  which  is 
, ýrior  to  the  building  up  of  the  rolitical  structurct'; 
R.  C.  Cross  and  A.  D.  Woozley,  Plzatols  Ronublic,  London 
(1964)  PP-130-2,  are  of  the  same  orinion  as  Hacitforth; 
C.  J.  Classen,  Sprachliche  dpiitung,  etc.,  or.  elt.  iq).  22-23,  argues,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  rroblcm 
worth  solving  is  not  where  the  tripartition  first 
arrears,  but  where  the  larallel  between  state  and  soul  has  its  origin.  Generally  on  the  question  one  may 
consult  also  E.  G.  Ballard,  "Plato's  movement  from  an 
ethics  of  the  individual  to  a  science  of  narticulars", 
Talane  Stu6ies  in  Phiiosor, 
,  Vol  VI  (Studies  in  Ethics) 
Tulanne  University,  New  Orleans  (i957)  pp.  14,15-16  and 
more  iýarticuiarly  in  the  excellent  article  of  the  late 
H.  W.  B  Josenh,  "Plato's  fie.  -Iiublic:  the  comparison 
betweýn  the'  soul  and  the  state",  in  Essays  in  Ancient 
and  Modern 
_13hilosonhy, 
Oxford  (1935)  nr.  ý!  2-121. 
2.  G.  I.  A.  Grube,  Plato's  Though 
,  T).  130. 75. 
the  question  whether  the  three-I)arts"  or  better  elements 
or  faculties  concerned  are  distinct  or  identical  or  the 
same  or  different?  1 
Plato.,  to  prove  his  case,  aplies  first  the  so-called 
Law  of  Contradiction,  vid--.  the  general  rrinciple  "that  the 
same  thing  can-not  act  in  two  orposite  ways  or  be  In  two 
opposite  states  at  the  same  time,  with  resnect  to  the  same 
.2  The  .  art  of  itself,  and  in  relation  to  the  same  object" 
better  to  illustrate  this  general  ý,  rincirle,  he  e.  iscusses 
it  at  some  iength  by  giving  some  examplos  (standing  man, 
moving  his  head  and  arms,  etc.,  Re-ublic  4--ý6C9-11  and  a  neg-  . ol 
top,  spinning  etc.,  436D-E  etc.  ).  But  the  mo.,  ýt  outstond- 
Ing  exami,  -,  le,  which  better  fits  and  ex-nlains  his  1. -,  oint.,  is 
that  of  a  thirsty  man. 
3  Every  thirsty  man  desires  to 
drink  4  but  If  there  is  something  which  holds  him  back  -nd 
forbids  him  drink.,  this  something,  according  to  the  law  of 
contradiction,  must  be  an  element  in  the  soul  other  than 
the  thirsty  impulse. 
5 
Remblic  436B5-6. 
2.  Ibid.  436B8-9  and  436E9-10; 
Rerublic  of  Plato,  p.  12o". 
3.  Cf.  Republic  437B7-439D. 
4.  Ibid.  439A9-4.39Bl. 
5.  Ibid.  439B3-6. 
trans.  F.  ',:.  Cornford,  The 76. 
So  far.,  Plato  has  pointed  out  that  the  elements  in  thf-- 
human  soul  are  two,  different  and  distinct  of  each  other: 
I 
the  rational  %principle  (  XoyLa-uLx6v  )2  with  whic'.  -, 
the  soultAanlLtShle 
'I%rlýr`ational 
appetite  (  &XOY  Lau6v-uc  xu  L' 
tInL,  5upr),  uL%6v  )3 
f  which  is  closely  connected  witliý 
pleasure  and  satisfaction. 
Plato  next  turns  his  attention  to  the  "sririted" 
element  in  the  soul. 
This  spirited  element  (  Oup6c  )4  manifested  in 
indignation  and  anger,  Is  different  from  the  desire  or 
avretite  and  sometimes  opposes  it.  5  Further,  the  spirit, 
although  akin  to  reason  and  its  ally, 
6 
nevortheless  is 
distinct  froal  it.  7 
The  f(act  that  the  sririt  is  not  identical  with  the 
reason  can  be  seen  either  in  children  or  animals,  who  are 
full  of  passionate  feelings  from  their  very  birth,  but 
8  nVer  become  reasonable,  or  in  the  man  described  by 
Odysseus:  "StriKes  himself  on  the  chest  ond  calls  his 
1.  Republic  439D4-5. 
2.  Ibid.  439D5. 
3.  Ibid.  439D6-8. 
4.  Ibid.  439E3 
5.  Ibid.  439E6-4,0D. 
6.  Ibid.  440E5. 
7.  Ibid.  440E8-lo  -  441A1-6. 
8.  Ibid.  441A7-10  -  441BI-3. 77. 
heart  before  to  orc:  er",, 
' 
where  the  one  element  rebukes 
another. 
Thus.,  Plato  has  established  his  case  and  arrived  at 
the  concisuion  that  there  are  the  same  three  elements  in 
the  human  soul  as  in  the  state. 
2 
In  adaition,  Piato  ma.,  ýces  use  of  his  threefold 
distinction  of  the  soul  in  two  other  occasions,  in  a  rath(.  --, 
summary  fashion:  (i)  in  the  inter-iretation  of  the  four 
virtues.  Here  wisdom  is  of  the  reason3  and  courago  of  the 
s-,  rr)irit.,  when  s-Arit  is  subordinated  and  ideally  under  the 
control  of  the  rational  faculty)  4 
while  self-control  and 
temperance  exist,  when  ail  these  three  elements  not  only  are 
in  full  harmony  amongst  themscives  -  without  any  internal 
conflict  whatsoever  between  the  rational  faculty  and  the 
other  two,  but  when  all  are  unanimously  agreed  that  the 
reason  should  be  the  ruler  and  controller  of  the  ar-etito 
through  the  agency  of  the  siýirited,, 
5  Ju-itice,  finally,  is  a 
virtue  which  is  concerned  no  longer  with  man's  external 
1  Republic  441B4  -  441C1-3;  Homer, 
. 
2Ldyss, 
_g_us, 
Book  XX,  17; 
in  W.  lvv.  Alerry,  Oxford,  !  ADCCCCI,  p.  126  n.  XXl  17 
p.  124  and  in  H.  L.  P.  Lee,  Plato,  the  heTlublic,  r-193  n.  l. 
2.  Ibid.  4-,  UC5-7- 
3.  Ibid.  441E,  1-5. 
Ibid.  441E. 
Ibid.  442CIO-111,  Dl. 78. 
sections,  but  with  man's  inward  self. 
'  And  (ii)  in  the 
discussion  of  )leasure.  In  Book  IX  he  clearly  states  that 
each  faculty  (element)  of  the  soul  -not  only  has  its  own 
s7ecific  pleasures.,  peculiar  desires,  but  any  one  of  the 
three  may  govern  the  soul. 
2 
Earlier,  Plato  has  described  the  soul  as  constructed 
of  three  tý,,  artstl  or  funtions.  Now,  in  the  course  of  the 
discussion  of  immortality  in  Book  X  he  advances  a  now, 
extremely  sketchy,  and  "rather  suggested  (612A)tt3  argument. 
He  argues  that  we  cannot  think  of  the  true  nature  of 
the  soul  as  full  of  diversity  and  full  of  internal  conflicts,  ' 
as  a  composite  substance5  for  such  a  com,,  )osite  entity 
6  cannot  easily  be  eternal.  He  adds  besides  that  if  we 
want  to  have  as  clear  a  picture  as  possible  of  the  true 
nature  of  the  soui,  we  must  view  her  a-,,  )art  from  the  body.  7 
Rerublic,  443c9-10,  D  ff. 
2.  Ibid  58oD6-8;  also  in  581C5- 
3.  J.  AuLm,  The  Republic  of  Plato  , 
2)  Vol.  II  Cýmbridgc  (1963 
p.  427  n.  on  612B  v.  12.  ,  . 
4.  Ibid  6llBl-3- 
5.  Ibid  611B5-6;  COMP-  cf.  Ph,  -,  eclO  -  - 
78c;  Plotinus, 
Enneades  1,  1,12,  T)lotfn  ,  o,  -,  i  era,  Tomus  I,  ed.  by 
P.  Henry  et  Homs  R.  Sch-dyzer,  Paris  (1951). 
6.  Ibid  611B5- 
7.  Ibid  6llBlO-C  i-2  ff;  Ph--cdo  82  E.  83D-E,  81C. 79. 
The  apparent  disagreement  between  the  above- 
mentioned  passages  and  of  the  IV  and  IX  books,  has  been 
interpreted  differentiy  by  various  scholars,  who,  however, 
with  a  few  exceptions,  arrive  at  more  or  less  the  same 
conclusion. 
For  P.  Shorey,  the  question  debated  by  psychologists 
since  Aristotle's  time  (Eth.  Nic.  1102a3l)  to  the  present 
day  is  unimportant  and  of  a  secondary  nature,  and 
consequently  it  does  not  deserve  detailed  study  and 
scientific  deve.  lopment;  it  is  simply  a  matter  of  rhetoric, 
poetry  and  point  of  view. 
For  some  purposes  we  may  describe  the  elements  of  the 
soul  as  distinct  entities,  for  others,  we  may  again  treat 
them,  not  as  separate  "narts",  but  as  mere  aspects  of  the 
same  thing. 
Plato  himself  was  very  concious  of'  this  and  on 
different  occasions  iays  emphasis  on  the  aspect  which  suits 
and  serves  his  purpose  better. 
Further,  he  sees  no  contradiction  at  all  betwoon  the 
Rorublic  436AB  passage  and  X  611-12  and  Phaedo  68C.,  82C.  1 
P.  Shorey,  Plato,  the  Rerublic,  N.  Y.  (1930)  in  LCL,  Vol.  1, 
PP-380-1  n.  d;  Idem.  Unity  of  Platols  Though 
,  np.  42-3; 
Idem.  What  Piato  Said,  the  University  of  Chicago  Press 
(1962)--p-.  5)T3-  n.  on  435BC,  where  he  rereats  the  same 
observations  In  other  words  and  gives  references  in 
differont  diaiogues  for  non-co-itradiction. 8o. 
Two  other  eminent  scholars,  E.  Rohde  and  A.  E.  Taylor, 
one  after  the  other,  give  the  following  explanation: 
E.  Rohde,  on  the  one  hand,  argues  that  the  reason 
which  forced  Plato  to  abandon  his  conceptions  of  the 
natural  trichotomy  of  the  soul  into  parts.,  given  in  the 
Republic  and  still  maintained  in  the  Phnedrus.,  was  "the 
consideration  of  its  immortality  and  vocation  to  Inter- 
course  with  the  Divine,  immortal  and  everlasting  (  OCTLOV 
xa(  606vaTov  Xac  &cc  6V  )  tt.  1  Emotions  and  passions 
are  due  to  the  communion  of  the  soul  with  the  body  and  this 
is  proved  by  reason  that  if  they  "were  indissolubly  linked 
to  the  soul  the  latter  could  never  escape  from  the  cycle  of 
rebirthsl, 
2 
and  if  only  the  XOYLaTL7t6v  "as  the  only 
independently  existing  side  of  the  soulit3  passes  into 
judgment,  then  it  would  not  be  necessary  really  for  the 
incomposite  and  uniform  soul  to  attempt  a  new  LvawpdTwaLC 
since  this  "process  implies-materiality  and  desire".  4 
Taylor,  on  the  other  hand,  similarly  suggests  that  for 
the  philosopher,  who  earnestly  desires  the  supreme  good, 
I 
1.  E.  Rohde.,  Psyche,  p.  491  n.  29. 
2.  Ibid.  op.  cit.  p.  461  n.  29. 
3.  Ibid.  p.  481  n.  29. 
4.  Ibid.  p.  481  n.  29. 81. 
draws  nearer  and  nearer  to  it  every  day  and  "makes  progress 
towards  the  goal",  towards  his  objective,  such  a  theory  of 
a  tripartite  division,  of  the  human  soul  into  distinct  parts., 
is  of  little  importance,  incomprehensible  in  many  ways  and 
t1becomes  increasingly  impossible".  ' 
Next  J.  Adam,  regarding  the  "so-called  lower  partst' 
not  of  the  nature  of  the  soul,  but  "only  incidontal  to  its 
association  with  body",,  clings  to  a  simple,  uncompounded 
and  JIOVOCL6ý  soul. 
2 
The  acute  critc,  Frutiger,  applying  the  traditional 
interpretation,  seems  to  deny  on  the  one  hand  the 
simplicity  of  the  soul'on  the  grotinds  that  (1)  he  uses  the 
lengthy  negative  periphrases  (T-T)  &X1jOcaTdTQ  y6acL 
instead  of  using  the  word  110VOC  L671C  (2)  he  takes  the 
trouble  to  tell  us  that  a  composite  thing  can  with 
difficulty  be  eternal  and  (3)  the  words  (  L;  vo-u  h4T%j 
tydvT)  h  (ýUXT)  )  allude  not  to  Book  IV  but  to 
Books  VII  and  I.  A'.  On  the  other  hand,  he  seems  to  favour  a 
1.  A.  E.  Taylor,  Plato,  Thc:  -v.  n  his  ý4jrk-,  pp.  281-2  and  n.  1 
J.  Adam  Plato's  Republic,  II,  p.  426  on  611B  v.  8;  ibid. 
p.  427  on  611  v.  12;  i-b-I"a.  p.  428  on  611D  V-30;  ibid. 
p.  429'on  612A  v-3- 82. 
differentiated  unity,  capable  of  immortality.  1 
Professor  W. 
-K. 
C.  Guthrie,  moreover,  in  a  very  brief 
paper  discussing,  among  other  aspects  of  the  soul.,  also 
the  passages  Republic  IV  and  X.  infers  that  the  soul,  for 
Plato.,  in  essence  is  still  simple,  and  only  appears 
composite  as  the  result  of  its  association  with  the  body.  2 
Frutiger's  interpretation  and  atteMDt  at  reconciliation 
of  the  two  passages  of  the  R,  -.  public  as  indicating  a 
differentiated  unity  soul,  though  it  is  ingenious  and 
attractive  and  has  some  truth  in  it,  nonetheless  does  not 
remove  difficulties  involved  with  it.  For  this  reason, 
we  favour  the  view  of  those  who  regard  the  tripartite 
theory  of  the  Republic  as  leading  towards  a  simple  unity- 
soul. 
3 
1.  P.  Frutiger,  Les  Mythes  de  Platon,  Paris  (1930)  P-93. 
It  shculd  be  noted  also  that  Dr.  R.  H.  Hall,  Plato  and 
the  Individuqlý  PP-150-1,  influencedby  Frutiger,  as  it 
is  obvious,  insists  that  a  careful  analysis  of  the 
passage  (x  611B-612A)  will  reveal  that  there  is  a 
fundamental  consistency  between  it  and  the  account  in 
Book  IV,  if  we  regard  both  as  presenting  at  least  as 
probable  an  account  of  the  soul  as  a  complex  or 
differentiated  unity. 
2.  W.  K.  C.  Guthrie,  tIPlatols  views  on  the  nature  of  the 
soul"  in  Recherches  sur  la  tradition  Platonicienno 
Entretiens  sur  l1antiQuitErclassigue,  Tome  III., 
Geneve  (1955)  pp.  6-7. 
More  reasons  for  this  view  we  shall  give  below  in  the 
general  conclusion  of  the  whole  tripartite  problem. 83. 
(b)  in  the  Phaedrus. 
The  soul's  triplicity  occurs  also  in  the  Phaedrus  in 
an  extremely  sketchy  account.  Its  image  is  described  in 
a  myth  as  foilows: 
The  human  soul  is  likened  "to  the  union  of  powers  in 
a  team"l  consisting  of  a  winged  charioteer  and  two  winged 
steeds  which  he  is  attempting  to  drive.  In  the 
case  of  gods  the  driver  and  the  two  horses  are  all  good 
and  of  noble  breed,  but  in  the  case  of  other  species,  and 
most  particularly  with  us  men,  it  is  not  quite  the  same. 
The  fact  that  the  charioteer  has.  to  arive  and  rule  over  two 
steeds  of  a  different  strain,  one  of  noble  stock  and  the 
other  of  ignoble,  makes  his  task  difficult  indeed,  not  to 
say  wearisome  and  unmanageable.  2 
This  aliegory  clearly  implies  that  the  charioteer 
stands  for  the  reason,  the  horse  of  good  stock  for  the 
spirited  element.  -and  the  horse  of  bad  stock  for  the 
irrational  appetite. 
A  few  pages  later  he  makes  use  of  this  analogy  in 
R.  Hr-ackforth,  Plato's  Phaedrus,  p.  67;  A.  E.  Taylor, 
Plato,,  P-307  n.  1.5  comments  on  Phaedrus  246A6-7: 
as  follows: 
Itforming  a  single  living  whole  .  ......  It  is  inserted 
in  order  to  insist  on  the  unity  of  the  individual  mind. 
We  are  to  think  of  the  driver  and  his  horses  as  a 
single  organism". 
2.  Phaedrus  cf  246A5-B4. 84. 
I 
order  to  eiucidate  the  conflict  which  is  going  on  in  the 
soul  of  the  lover-charioteer.  In  this  struggle.,  while 
the  good  horse  which  is  the  lover  of  honour  and  glory 
combined  with  modesty  and  temperance,  needs  no  whip  but  is 
contolled  by  the  word  of  command  and  by  reason,  its  fellow, 
on  the  contrary,  which  is  deaf,  hot-blooded  and  the 
companion  of  insolence  and  wantonness,  is  conquered  only 
with  great  effort  and  force,  that  is  with  whip  and  spur. 
1 
Now  the  new,  the  startling,  point  which  Plato  makes 
here  is  that  he  attributes  the  lower  t1parts"  to  the 
discarnate  soul  as  well. 
2 
We  could  pass  over  the  tripartite  theory  of  the 
discarnate  soulfairly  easily  on  the  grounds  that  the  whole 
setting  of  246A-253C-254E  is  "a  myth,  and  rigid  exactitude 
of  doctrine  is  not  to  be  expected",, 
3  but  since  some  critics 
dealt  with  the  problem  and  exnress  their  own  views  on  the 
issue,  following  one  of  the  two  courses,  It  is  most 
desirable  to  recapitulate  their  statements. 
Taylor  categorically  rejects  the  idea  about  tripartite 
discarnate  souls  and  even  gods  who  are  never  embodied  at 
1.  Phapdrus,  253  -254E. 
2.  Ibid.  24-6A-E,  24SC-249D. 
3.  D.  A.  Rees,  "BipLrtition  of  the  soul  in  the  early 
Academy",  Journal  of  Hellenic  Studies,  LXXVII  (1) 
(1957)  p.  112. 85. 
all.  His  reasons  are  that  (1)  such  a  doctrine  would  be 
at  variance  with  the  hints  of  the  Republic  and  the  express 
teaching  of  the  Timaeus,  and.  (2)  we  are  not  allowed  by  any 
means  to  draw  hard  and  fast  lines  on  metaphysical  theories 
from  imaginary  tales,  from  myths, 
' 
Wilamowitz  observes  that  the  picture  of  the 
charioteer  of  the  soul  with  the  two  steeds  -  complicated  as 
it  is  -  is  only  devised  for  the  condition  of  the  soul  in 
human  life,  when  it  is  at  its  best.  He  further  finds  that 
the  Divine  soul  in  the  Phaedrus  is  equally  complex. 
2 
Hackforth  argues  that  Plato  wavers  to  tho  end  between 
two  conceptions  of  the  soul;  the  Orphic-Pythagorean  notion 
of  soul,  divine  and  complete,  free  from  all  physical 
functions  and  the  scientific  conception  of  a  soul  as  self- 
mover  and  source  for  other  things  too.  3  He.  contrary  to 
what  A.  E.  Taylor  and  WilamowitZ4  said,  goes  on  to  say  that 
the  explicit  statement  of  the  Phaedrus  about  the  triDart- 
ition  of  the  human  soul  before  and  after  its  incarnation., 
1.  A.  E.  Taylor.,  Plato,  P-307. 
2.  V.  0.  Willainowitz,  Plato  ,  I.,  p.  467. 
3.  G.  E.  L.  Owen.,  "The  place  of  the  Timaeus  in  Platols 
dialogues",  ClassicCal  (garterl  .  111.0.  Vol.  III  (1953) 
P-95,,  takes  the  view  thatIthe  contradiction  in-Timaeus, 
Phaedrus,,  246A  ff  and  Laws  897A  is  apparent  and  not 
real.  tl  Wc  avoid  the  conclusion  that  Plato  "wavered  to 
the  end"  between  these  alternatives,  if  we  set  the 
Phaedrus  after  Timaeus. 
4.  See  pp.  84  and  85. 86. 
must  be  taken  "as  seriously  meant". 
' 
Guthrie,  devoting  in  his  recent  article  a  somewhat 
lengthy  paragra-ph  to  the  matter,  poses  a  different 
solution.  He  points  to  Empedocles  as  a  source  for  the 
complex  eschatological  system  of  Plato,  in  terms  of  which 
the  soul  is  seen  as  essentially  divine,  but  involved  in  a 
rcincarnational  cycle  -us  a  "punishment  for  sin"  -  although 
the  nature  of  the  sinfulness  is  left  rather  vague.  The 
Phaedrus,,  asserting  that  this  "sin"  has  cost  the  soul  its 
purity,  goes  on  to  describe  how  it  spends  ton  thousand 
years  circling  the  cycle  of  punishment.,  from  which  it 
cannot  be  released  unless  it  succeeds  in  living  the 
philosophic  life  for  three  incarnations  in  succession. 
The  point  is  made,  however,  that  a  thousand  years  elapse 
between  the  start  of  one  incarnation  and  that  of  the  next, 
so  that  the  greater  part  of  the  cycle  is  actually  spent  In 
a  discarnate  state.  This  makes  it  impossible  to  identify 
the  soull.  s  t1impurity"  entirely  with  its  incarnate  condition, 
and  with  that  alone,,  for  during  its  "inter-incarnational" 
period  It  is  still  tainted  with  the  stain  of  the  t1sin" 
which  imprisoned  it  within  the  circuits  of  the  wheel.  The 
concept  of  immortality  thus  assumes  shape  quite  distinct 
from  a  more  opposition  between  imprisonment  of  the  soul 
within  a  body,  and  the  soul  released  from  the  bodyts  thrall; 
1.  R.  HacKforth,  Plato's  Phapdrus,  P-76  n.  3. 87. 
the  disability  which  binds  the  soul  is  from  within,  and  the 
soul  would  never  experience  a  bodily  existence  if  it  had 
not  by  prior  sin  incurred  the  punishment  of  incarnation. 
Here,  immortality  gains  a  moral  meaning,  and  no  longer 
implies  mere  durability. 
Guthrie  does  not  acceDt  the  common  statement  that  the 
psychology  of  the  Phaedo  denies  the  survival  in  the 
discarnate  state  of  the  lower  parts  of  the  soul  -a 
survival  which  the.  Phaedrus,  per  contra,  asserts.  He 
admits  that  the  Phaedo  declares  these  lower  parts  to  be  no 
true  attribute  of  the  soulls  proper.  nature,  but  proceeds  to 
point  out  that  we  are  then  told  Iltbat  a  soul  that  has  given 
itself  over  to  bodily  desires  and  pleasures  while  in  the 
body  is,  when  it  leaves  it,  still  Permeated  by  the 
corporeal".  This  view  is  found  again  in  the  Gorgias., 
which  considers  the  soul  as  something  of  a  Picture  of  Dorian 
Gray,  marked  inescapably  with  the  character  of  the  life  Icd 
in  the  body,  a  character  which,  however  well  it  has  been 
disguised  by  the  body.,  becomes  known  beyond  any  pretence  or 
concealment  on  death,  and  on  the  basis  of  which  the  soul  is 
Judged. 
Guthrie  therefore  finds  no  contradiction  between  the 
statements  of  the  Phaedo  and  Plato's  other  references  to  the 
matter.  He  finds  it  "particularly  difficult  to  agree"  with 
Hackforth's  conclusion  that  "even  'pure'  soul  iso,  uýjocjý,  5ý,  (. 
and  btu-DujiTrvLx6c,  as  well  as  XOYLanx6q  Ity  for  he 88. 
sees  the  aim,  of  the  philosophic  life  as  being  to  attain 
beyond  the  reach  of  such  taints,  thus  beyond  the  grin  of 
the  wheel_,  and  thus  "like  unto  a  god",,  regaining  the  soul's 
original  condition. 
Platols  imagery  is  aimed  at  describing  a  state  of  a 
affairs  which  is  known  empirically  -  viz,  that  the  nature 
of  man  is  mixed,  good  and  evil  being  both  present.  It  is 
not  intended  to  explain  this  fact,  or  to  indicate  the 
origin  of  the  evil  aamixture.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be 
adduced  in  evidence  for  suggesting  that  the  content  of  the 
image  -  the  chariot  and  its  team  of  horses  -  necessarily 
implies  anything  about  the  nature  of  the  souls  of  the  gods 
themselves,  and  whether  they  are.,  like  those  of  men, 
peccable.  Plato,  like  Empedocles,  is  concerned  with  the 
effects  of  the  condition  of  sinfulness,  rather  than  with 
that  conditions  source.  He  finally  remarks  that  Plato 
turned  to  a  myth  in  order  to  illustrate  better  a  religious 
truth  which  he  passionately  believed,  "but  of  which  noither 
he  nor  any  other  man  can  give  a  rational  explanation". 
' 
1.  -W...  i.  C.  Guthrie,  "Plato's  views  on  tho  nature  of  the 
soul"  In  Recherchos  sur  la.  tradiong  Platonicienne,  in 
Entretiens  sur  l1antiquite  classique,  Tome  III, 
pp.  10-14. 89. 
(c)  In  the  Timaeus. 
Timaeusts  account  concerning  the  triplicity  of  the 
soul,,  fascinating  and  fanciful  as  it  is,  runs  in  j-'ar';  - 
respects  on  the  same  lines  as  those  of  the  Rer.  ublic.  1 
Here  Plato  deciares  that  only  the  rational  part  - 
anima  rationalis  -  was  created  by  the  Demiurge  out  of  tho 
same  ingredients  as  the  world  soul. 
2 
This  part  is  located  in  the  head3  and  alone  enjoys  the 
4 
privilege  of  being  immortal. 
Further,  he  speaKs  of  the  mortal  parts  of  the  soul, 
together  with  the  body  itself.,  as  made  by  the  celestial 
gods. 
5 
Now.,  the  apparent  bipartition,  immortal  -  divine  - 
mortal,  becomes  tripartite  by  the  analysis  of  the  mortal 
OV-OTOZ  )  in  spirited  and  appetitive  olement. 
6 
The  spirited  elemcnt  on  the  one  hand,  is  situated 
A.  E.  Taylor.,  A  Commentary  on  Plato's  Timaeus,  p*496  n.  or.  69C7,  finds  Timaeusts  teaching  of  the  threefold  soul 
corresponding  precisely  t-D  that  of  the  Republic,  witlý 
the  difference,  of  course,  that  the  inferior  ti-ro  rarts  I are  mortal  and  iocated  in  the  body. 
2.  Tiinaeus  4lD4-El;  69B8-cl-3;  comp.  also  34BC  and  90A5-8. 
3.  Ibid.  44D4-6;  45Al-2;  69D6-7,  El. 
4.  Ibid.  44D5-6;  45AI-2;  69C5-6;  69D5;  69D6;  90Al-9. 
5.  Ibid.  42D6-El-4;  69C3-Dl. 
Aristotle,  Eth.  Nic.  1,13Y  10,  prefers  (is  in  favour 
all  the  way  of).  t  bipartition:  "olov  x6  ýtcv  u'xoyo\j 
abTýr,  ClVaL,  To  66  X6-yov  E'Xov".  'Q go. 
between  the  midriff  and  the  neck,  that  is,  in  the  hear.  t,  l 
and  the  appetitive  one  is  placed  in  the  belly,  viz.  bolow 
the  midriff. 
2 
Platols  concluding  remarks  that  what  has  becn  said 
before  is  provisional  and  tentative  and  would  be  an 
accurate  scientific  statement  if  only  a  god  would  havo 
confirmed  and  proved  it  is,  I  am  inclined  to  believe,  of  a 
greater  significance  and  weight  than  the  proceeding 
discussion  about  the  immortal  and  mortal  parts,  which,  aftor 
all,  as  has  already  been  noted,  is  a  mythical,  popular 
doctrine,  as  the  whole  creation  is,  and  belongs  to  the 
sphere  of  myth,  probable  account,  rather  than  to  the  sphore 
of  scientific  truth.  3 
So  far,  we  have  been  dealing  with  the  threefold  theory 
of  the  human  soul  as  it  is  set  forth  most  fully  in  the 
Republic  and  Timaeus  and  mythically  only  in  the  imposing 
allegory  of  the  Phaeurus.  However  that  may  be,  we  still 
feel  something  must  be  said  also  about  the  doctrine  in  the 
Phaedo.,  the  Statesman  and  the  Laws. 
In  the  Phaedo  we  cannot  trace,  I  believe,  a  soults 
division.,  for  Plato  clearly  speaks  of  a  simple,  uniform, 
1.  Timaeus  ýOA-L'6- 
2.  Ibid.  70D7-El-3;  the  appetitive  form  belongs  also  to  the 
trees,  plants  and  seeds.  Timaous  77AB. 
3.  Ibid.  72D4-8;  couip.  also  with  PhaedruS  246AI-4  and 
Republic  435CD. 91. 
incomposite  and  immortal  soul. 
' 
In  the  Statesiman  a  vague  distinction  of  a  divine  and 
a  human  or  animal  elemont  of  the  soul  occurs.  2 
Phaedo  ý8cl  and  8OBl-3;  with  regard  to  Phacdols 
teaching  on  the  triplicity  of  the  soul  some  scholars 
argue  as  follows:  R.  H.  Ar-cher-Hind  (  RX&uwvor,  i5aCbwv) 
the  Phaedo  of  Plato,  London  (*  18942)  pp.  XXXIII,  XXXIV-V 
opposes  the  division  of  the  soul  in  general  and 
particularly  here  (in  Phaedo)  and  is  in  favour  all  the 
way  of  a  simple  and  uniform  soul.  He  rejects  the 
lower  "parts"  as  different  and  adopts  the  milder 
expression  "modes  of  the  soul's  activity";  Wilamowitz., 
Platon,  1,  P-341,  that  Plato  wanted  to  avoid  over- 
loading  his  exposition;  P.  Shorey,  The  Unity  of  Platots 
Though  .  and  W.  &.  C.  Guthrie,  ?  'Plato's  views  on  the 
nature  of  the  soul"  in  Recherches  sur  la  tradione 
Piatonicienne,  in  Entretiens  sur  l1antiouite  classique., 
p.  12,  maintain  that  Phaedo,  (79BCE  ff)  does  not  affirm 
that  the  soul  is  simple  and  uncompounded,  but  that  the 
body  is  more  akin  to  the  composite,  and  the  soul  to  the 
simple  and  unchanging;  P.  Frutiger,  Mythes  do  Platon, 
P-77,  on  the  other  hand,  holds  that  the  soul  was 
composed  of  three  parts,  of  which  one  only  was  immortal. 
He  would  certainly  no  have  given  to  this  last  the 
generic  name  of  &UM  nor  passed  in  silence 
completely  over  th  -  other  two  (It 
......  ni  passe  les 
deux  autres  entri7rNement  sous  silencell);  R.  Hackforth, 
. 
Plato's  Phaedo,  'pp.  11-12,  notes  that  the  simplicity  -and  incomposite  nature  of  the  soul  is  categorically 
asserted  in  the  dialogue  of  the  Phaedo. 
2..  Statesman  309Cl-3-  J.  B.  Skemp,  Plato's  Statesman, 
London  (1952)  pp.  223  n.  l.  229  n.  1  and  239,  obser-ves  that 
the  tripartite  psychology1js  explicitly  supplanted  in 
the  Politicus".  He  is  followed  by  J.  Gould,  The 
Development  of  Plato's  Ethics,  Cambridge  (19557-nP.  214-5; 
'd.  E.  L.  Owen,  Min  .  N.  S.  62  (19  3).  pi272  and  J.  Tate, 
Classical  Review,  N.  S.  4  (1954  p16,  reviewing  Skempt,  s 
book,  speak  against  his  assertion. 92. 
As  far  as  the  division  of  the.  soul  in  the  Laws  is 
concerned.,  it  couid  be  asserted  right  from  the  outset  that 
Plato  says  nothing  specific  there;  notwithstanding  D.  A. 
Rees  and  T.  J.  Saunders,  the  former  referring  mainly  to 
Laws  IX  863E-864A5  626E.,  630A-B,  689A-E.,  696c,  840B-C., 
Magna  Moralia  I,  1182A  213  ff.  Protrerticus,  Nic.  Eth.  IXI 
1168B28  -  1169A3)  X,  1177B31  -  1178A3ý  Nic.  Fth.  1)  13) 
1102A26-28  and  De  Anima  III  432Q24-26,  claim  that  "the  L,  -ýws 
in  fact  suggest  a  bipartition  of  the  soul  more  naturally 
than  a  tripartition,  as  is  confirmed  by  IX,  863E-F64A111  and 
the  latter,  repeating  the  same  passages  again  and  adding 
some  new  ones  (869E,  93A,  731ABj  717D,  770D  and  783A) 
reaches  the  general  conclusion  that  the  soul  in  thelaws 
can  be  analysed  into  the  three  elements  equivalent  to  thoso 
of  the  Republic,  2 
One  cannot,  I  should  say,  expect  accuracy  and  rrecisior,  3 
1.  D.  A.  Rees,  "Bipartition  of  the  soul  in  the  Early  Academy" 
Journal  of  Hellenic  Studies,  LXXVII  W  (1957)  112-18. 
2.  T.  J.  Saunders,  I'Soul  and  State  In  Plato's  Laws".  Erangs) 
Vol.  LX  (1962)  PP-37-55i  p.  41  (here).  See  also  Rittor, 
. 
Platon,  Vol.  II,  p.  451  where,  by  referring  to  I.  644C 
IX.  d63B,  notes  that  the  Laws  treats  the  soul  as 
tripartite.  Ritter  does  not  succeed-in  his  argumpnt', 
as  neither  of  the  above  passages  proves  his  voint.  (cf 
also  in  Reest  op.  cit.  p.  112). 
3.  This  point  seems  to  be  admitted  by  both  Rees  op.  cit.  PP-113  and  particularly  115,  Saunders  op.  cit-  PP-38  and  41. 93. 
from  these  general  considerations  and  conclusions,  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  both  paT)ers  are  very  informative, 
interesting  and  'Ingenious,  for  the  simple  reason  that  in 
the  Laws  there  is  no  one  single  clear  statement  about  the 
threefold  soul  as  in  the  other  dialogues  (Republic.  Timaeus, 
Phaedrus). 
Coming  to  the  end  of  our  survey  of  "the  problem  of  the 
tripartite  soul?  '  which.,  indeed.,  ?  'is  amongst  the  thorniest 
of  all  Platonic  problemslt)l  and  replying  to  the  opening 
question,  whether  the  soul  is  simple  and  incomposite  or 
composite  and  compound,  we  may,  now.,  gcnerally  say  (1)  that 
the  human  soul  is  in  its  true  nature  incomposite, 
uncompounded  and  simple  (  &ýVvOcToc  xal  POVOEL6ýC) 
and  that  the  so-called  lower  two  pC-:  Arts  or  elements  are  not, 
by  any  means.,  distinct  or  real  parts,  but  are,  on  the 
contrary,  its  temporary  and  transitory  manifestations, 
mental  aspects,  activities  and  rhases,  owing  their  own 
existence  in  its  connection  with  the  corporeality  and  they 
1.  R.  Hackforth,  Platots  Ph-aedrusy  P-75. 94.. 
last  as  long  as  the  soul  is  related  to  the  body.  ' 
Our  -preference  for  a  simple  and  uncomnounded  soul  with 
mental  energies  and  activities,  while  it  is  connected  with 
the  body,  is  based  on  the  following  reasons: 
1.  It  elucidatesinore  satisfactorily  and  throws 
enough  light  on  the  issues:  soul's  -  body's  relation  and 
soulls  immortality. 
2.  Plato  himself  hardly  uses  a  word  donoting  "part" 
in  its  true  literary  sense  and  material  force.  On  the 
contrary,  he  employs  such  terms  as  C  L6'0  in  435B2,  Cl, 
A  view  of  a  simple  and  incomposite  soul  with  montal,  so 
to  s-neak,  ex-)ressions,  impulses,  spiritual  functions, 
tendencies,  faculties,  modes,  motions  or  phases,  is 
strongly  and  consistently  held  by  others:  R.  D.  Archer- 
Hind,  "On  some  difficulties  in  the  Platonic  r)sychology", 
Journal  of  Philology,  Vol.  X  (1882)  -np.  129-31;  J.  Adam, 
Renublic.,  II,  p.  426  n.  on  611B8;  427  on  611B12;  p.  429 
on  612A3;  J.  L.  Stock's  "Plato  and  the  trinartite  of  the 
Soul"  Mind,  XXIV  (1915)  n.  218;  P.  E.  More,  PIntonism 
(1917ý  p.  123;  U-V-  Wilamovitz.,  Platon  Berlin  (1919  1., 
p.  470;  C.  Ritter,  Platon,  Munich(19163  I.  pp.  22  -7;  E.  Zeller.,  Plato  and  the  Older  Academ  ,  pp  .  389-000; 
P.  Shorey,  Unity  of  Plato's  Thought,  r.  42;  A.  E.  Taylor, 
The  Mind  of  Plato  (paperback)  Michigan  (1960)  rn-RO.  - 
83; 
F.  U1.  Cornford.,  "The  Division  of  the  Soul",  in  Hibbert 
Journal,  XXVIII  (1920-30)  rp.  213-5;  Idem. 
-The 
Poctrino 
of  Eros,  The  Unwritten  Philosop  Cambrid  e  F7 
. 
71-;  j  au6  (1-)a-L9P0(t?  iR  WVOC  ýI;  J.  eco6wpaxonouXou,  cLaaywy'n 
xcCpcvo  pý  aX6%La)  C)aTL6poc,  ctaaywYý,  &PXaTO  XCLC  Vý0 
Athens  (1948)  p.  8;  H.  Gaus, 
Philos,  ophischer  Handkommentar  zu  don  Dialogen  Platos, 
Bern  (19  2  1/1  p.  143;  H.  D.  P.  Lee,  Plato,  the  henuýlic 
(PC  W.  k,  nguiný  p  184;  K.  C.  Guthrie.,  "Platols  viows  on  the 
nature  of  the  soul',  in 
, 
Recherches  sur  latraditione 
Platonicienne,  in  Entretiens  sur  l1antiquite  cl_assique, 
pp.  18-19. 95. 
51  E2,,  439E2,  y6v-o  441C4,443D5.,  in,  a  metaphorical  and 
convenientl  way,  signifying  forms  or  functions  or 
principles  of  action.,  not  as  parts  in  the  material  sense. 
The  word  p6por,  is  used  when  the  whole  trinartite 
discussion  comes  to  an  end,  and  only  once  in  442B11  and  B3, 
which  cannot  be  translated  literally  "part"  as  it  does  not 
suit  the  context.,  meaning  rather  Ifelementt',  Iffactor",  etc. 
After  all.,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  Plato  never  develoned 
a  preclse  terminology.  2 
We  would  perhaps  do  well  to  remind  ourselves  of 
his  warning  that  his  accounts  concerning  the  triT)artite 
soul  are  provisional  and  tentative  and  that  scientific 
precision  must  not  be  expected. 
3 
4.  It  should  be  noted  that  Plato's  main  concern  hore 
is  evidently  the  ethical  and  political  theory,  not  the 
psychology  itself,  as  a  special  branch  of  science,  or  the 
scientific  analysis  of  the  mind.  He  found  the  tripartite 
division  of  the  soul  helpful  and  according  to  the 
N.  R.  Murphy  The  Internrotation  of  Plato's  Rcrublic. 
Oxford  (19407--p-.  -33T-;  also  -in  J.  Gould,  The  Devcloný 
of  Plato's  Ethtcs,  Cambridge  (1955)  D-151  n.  2.  - 
2.  H.  W.  B.  Joseph.,  Essays  Ancient  ýand  Modern,  p.  48,  romarks  that  "Plato  is  not  i:  ledantically  rigid  in  his  use  of  terms  It. 
3.  Timaeus  72D4-7;  Phaedrus  246A3-6; 
zLio4jublic  435CD  ff. 96. 
circumstances,  the  context  and  discussion  matter  he  adants 
the  doctrine  in  each  dialogue  to  suit  his  purpose.  1 
Finally,  it  might  be  said  that  it  is  held  by  somo 
2  scholars  as  a  "popular,  non-scientific"  doctrine,  a 
4  flmythicti3  one,  "of  little  im-nortancell,  and  consequontly 
"too  much  reliance  should  not  be  placed115  on  it. 
1.  It  should  perhaps  be  observed  here  that  the  following 
scholars  strongly  emphasize  that  point:  P.  Shorcy, 
The  Unity  of  Plato's  Thought,  pp.  42-43  (168-169);  Idem 
Plato's  Republic,  LCL)  P-3el  n.  d;  Idem  What  Plato  Said, 
P-563  n.  on  43BC;  W.  Jaeger,  Paideia:  The  Ideals  of 
Greek  Culture,  Vol.  II,  Oxford  (1944)  Dr-199  ff)  400  n.  6; 
A.  E.  Taylor.,  A  Co-imientary  on  Plato's  Timaeus,  r.  496  n. 
on  69C7;  G.  Grote,  Plato  and  other  ComTanions  of 
Socrates,  London  (1F9-7)  Vol'.  II,  p.  160;  C.  Ritter, 
Platon,  I,  p.  227;  '  P.  Erutigger,  Mythos  de  Platon,  p.  81 
n.  i;  F.  Copleston,  A  History  f  Philosoph  ,  1)  D.  210. 
2.  A.  E.  Taylor.,  A  Coj,, 
-mentary  on  Plato's  Timaeus,  p.  497  n. 
on  69C7;  Idem.  Plato,  p.  2'-Ii. 
P.  Frutiger,  Mythes  de  Platon,  p.  96. 
4.  R.  C.  Cross  and  A.  E.  Woozley,  Plato's-Republic,  p.  127. 
W.  F.  R.  Hardie.,  A  Study  in  Plato,  T)-138-  It  should  be 
borne  in  mind  here  that  E.  Zeller,  Plato  and  the  01(lor 
Academ  .  p.  417  and  R.  Hackforth,  Plato's  Phaedru  p  P-75  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  tripartite  doctrine  is 
unsolved  in  Platots  mind. 97. 
10.  SOUT4-BODY:  THEIR  RELATIONSHIP 
Corresponding  to  Plato's  metaphysical  dualisml  is 
his  psychological  dualism. 
Thus  Plato  in  the  Phaodo  maintains  that  the  soul  in 
every  way  resembies  the  invisible  (  &(OLUc  ),  the 
immaterial  and  everlasting  world.,  while  tho  body  has  much 
more  affinity  with  the  visible  (  6paT6v  )  and  bclongs 
to  the  material  world. 
2 
With  regard  to  the  soul,  we  have  sald  above  at  length 
what  was  necessary  and  we  need  not  renmt  what  has  been 
noted  there. 
Dealing  here  most  ?, oarticularly  with  the  question  of 
the  soul-body  relationship.,  we  Luay  add,  in  passing,  a  note 
about  the  body  itself,  as  it  is  described  In  Platonic 
dialogues. 
In  the  first  place,  it  is 
scald 
that  the  body  is  zade  up 
of  four  elements  or  xinds:  -  Earth,  Firo,  Wster  and  Air.  3 
This  body,  because  it  belongs  to  the  world  of'  senses  and 
materiality,  is  very  like  it.,  viz...  human,  linblc  to  death 
and  dissolution,  manifold,  unintelligent,  changing  and 
1.  Phaedo  79A7-8. 
2.  Ibid.  79B16-17- 
3.  Timaeus  82A2-3;  also  in  Timagus  42E5-43Al-6. 98. 
never  constant. 
' 
As  far  as  the  relation  of  the  soul  to  the  body  is 
concerned,  we  have  to  note  the  following:  - 
Whereas  the  soul  gives  to  the  -body  the  -power  to 
breath,  and  is  the  cause  of  its  living  and  its  reviving 
force  '2  the  body,  on  the  other  hand,  is  represented 
in  the  Dialogues  as  its  nrison-house 
or  tomb  (according  to  the  Orphic  Poets)  In  it,  the  soul 
is  buried  in  the  present  life;  it  undergoes  punishments  for 
any  misdeed,  and  in  it  it  remains  until  the  penalty  is  paid. 
3 
In  addition,  Plato  writes  that  the  body  is  the  source 
of  evil  and  exerts  an  evil  influence  upon  the  soul.  To  be 
more  precise,  and  use  his  own  words;  the  body  and  its 
appetites  cause  disturbance  and  confusion  to  the  soul; 
they  prevent  its  acquisition  of  truth  and  wisdom  and  its 
pursuit  of  true  being.  4 
Furthermore,  the  body  and  its  appetites  not  only  act 
as  perpetual  impediments  to  the  higher  activities  of  the 
soul,  which  they  fill  with  passions,  desires,  fears, 
1.  Phaedo 
, 
8OB3-5;  Phaedo  106E5-6;  Craty  399El-2; 
Axiochus  365E5. 
2.  CratYl,  399D11-12,  El-3;  Phaedo 
* 
105C9-10,  D1-5- 
3.  Cratyl  40OB10;  comp.  also  with  Gorg.  493A3;  Phaedo 
82E.,  91E8,92;  Phapdrus  C5-6;  -Axiochus  365E5-366A. 
4.  Phaedo  66A4-7.,  66Cl-2,66D5-7)  79C. 99. 
imaginations  of  all  sorts  and  foolishnoss,  but  they  are  also 
the  real  cause  of  war,  discord  and  strife. 
' 
While  Plato  expressly  attributes  desires, 
passions,  fears,  wars  and  the  like  to  the  body  and  its 
aT,  )petites_,  2  in  the  Philebus,  where  he  develops  the  doctrine 
of  the  bodily  pleasures  and  painS3  most  fully,  he  quite 
openly  denies  this  and  characteristically  remarks  that  'fit 
is  to  the  soul  that  all  im7pulse  and  desire,  and  Indeed  the 
1, 
determining  principle  of  the  whole  creature.,  belong".  ' 
One  wonders  whether  we  are  faced  with  another  real  or 
apparent  contradiction. 
The  whole  question  has  been  taken  up  and  worked  out 
by  a  number  of  scholars,  whose  argumonts  and  deductiond 
are  generally  conclusive  and  quite  convincing. 
Two  points  emerge  from  Hackforth's  discussion  of  the 
1.  Phaedo  66C2-8;  Republic  6llCl-2,611D;  Timaeus  MB-87B 
and  also  82AB.  For  a  full  discussion  of'  Timeaus.,  see  86B-87B  section.,  which  is  not  without  its  intracacies; 
see  A.  E.  Taylor,  A  CommentarZ  on  Plato's  Timeaus,  Pn.  599 
ff  and  more  specifically  pp.  610-1b;  F.  M.  Cornford, 
Platols  Cosmology,  T)P.  343-9. 
2.  See  p.  98. 
3.  The  above  doctrine  is  exrounded  also  in  Republic  IX 
ý  583B-587c);  Timaeus  64.  A'-65B;  Gorg.  479-3B-494ý;  Pbaedo 
-OB3-C7,66c;  A.  E.  Taylor,  A  Commentary  on  Platols 
Timaeus,  pp.  445-65,  deals  with  this  doctrine  at  some  length;  F.  11M.  Cornford,  Plato's  Cosmology.,  rp.  266-9, 
makes  some  very  brief  remarks  as  well. 
4.  Philebus  301-3,  trans.  R.  Hackforth)  Plato's  Examin- 
ation.  of  Pleasure  (The  Philebus) 
)  Cambridgo  (1945ý7.67- 1100. 
Philebus  3  B:  - 
1.  ,  Plato  here  wished  to  correct  misconceptions  which 
might  have  arisen  with  regard  to  the  role  which  both 
soul  and  body  play  in  Pleasure  and  desire. 
2.  Aithough  the  'Philebus  spcaks  of  pleasure.,  pain  and  even 
desire  as  psychical  events,  35D1-3  and  55B1-3,  other 
passages  of  the  same  dialogue,  45A,  46B  and  cf  41C  aný'. 
especially  RoT,,  ublic  584C  (similarly  Aristotle  sjýcaks 
of  bodily  pleasures  E.  N.  1104b53  1154a.  8)  cf  1173b7-13) 
where  Plato's  real  belief  Is  expressed,  seem  to  Imply 
quite  the  opDosite,  namely  that  desire,  -Pleasure, 
pain',  are  all  in  the  body,  are  bodily  exreriences  and 
reach  the  soul  through  the  body.  1 
Shorey  sees  no  contradiction  at  all  in  so  far  as  the 
nature  and  seat  of  desire,  rleasure  and  nain  aro  concerned 
and  reminds  us  of  Plato's  statement  that  only  a  careless  or 
captious  rcader  would  misunderstand  him. 
Further  defending  his  case  by  citing:  - 
Philebus  '133,34)  43B,  C  cf;  Rerublic  462C.  584C)  ef  Laws 
673A;  Timaeus  451  and  again  Philebus  39D.  45B;  Phaedo  65A; 
Timaeus  64A;  Re7ublic  584C.  485D;  Philebus  45A,  41C)  436C, 
33D;  Timaeus  64ABC;  Theat  186C,  Shorey  reaches  the 
R.  Hacxforth,  Piato's  Examination  of  Pleasure  (The 
Philebus),  Cambridge  (1945)  p.  61.  -- 101. 
conclusion  that  the  bodily  states  produce  pleasure  and 
pain  only  when  they  cross  the  threshold  of  conciousness. 
1 
Similarly  Archer-Hind  finds  no  disagreement  at  all 
between  Phaedo  66D  and  Philebus  35CD  and  holds  that  the 
apparent  discrepancy  between  the  Phaedo  and  the  Philebus  is 
reconcilable.  In  the  Phaedo.,  desires,  etc.,  are  attributed 
to  the  body  as  the  result  of  the  conjunction  between  soul 
and  body;  in  the  Philebus  Plato  ascribes  more  carefully 
and  precisely  the  desires  etc.  to  the  soul,  because  they 
are  an  affection  of  the  soul  through  the  body.  2 
As  we  are  coming  ncar  to  the  cnd  of  this  chapter,  one 
unhurried  inference  could  be  dravm  that  Plato  thinks  of  the 
body  in  general  as  the  tomb)  prison-house,  enemy  of  the 
soul,  and  finally  as  its  source  of  evil,  disorder  and 
I.  '  P.  Shorey,  The  Unity  of  Platots  Thought,,  pp.  45-6 
171-2  n.  32'8-,  -330.333- 
2.  R.  D.  Archer-Hind.,  "On  some  difficulties  in  the  Platonic 
Psychology1l,  The  Journal  of  Philology  (1882)  X  pp-130-1- 102. 
corruption.  1 
I  have  not  mentioned  any  other  notion  of  the  soul-body 
relationship  for  I  believe  there  is  no  other  in  the 
Platonic  dialogues  than  that  with  which  I  have  already 
dealt  above.  However  this  may  be,  R.  C.  Lodge, 
Platols  Theory  of  Ethics,  London  (1ý28)  nP.  175-2163 
produces  a  different  and  startling  theory  of  the 
nature  and  inter-relation  of  soul  and  body  which  he 
charact 
, 
erises  as  "thoroughly  Platonic"  (!!.  f)  The 
central  points  of  his  theory  are: 
(1)  the  nature  of  the  body  as  an  instrument,  as 
adapted  to  sipiritual  purposes, 
(2)  the  function  of  the  soul  as  director  of  the  body 
to  the  sniritual  ends,  and 
soul  and  body  being  regarded  as  correlates.  In 
his  eýfort  to  interpret  the  Platonic  nassages  in 
such  a  way  in  order  to  suit  his  purpose,  I  think, 
he  misinterprets  them  and  goes  too  far  in  his 
concl,  U-Sions. 103. 
11  DUVIORTALITY  OF  THE  SOUL 
I  As  we  are  coming  to  the  end  of  this  section  dealing 
with  the  immortality  of  the  soul.,  two  things  stand  out  for 
consideration: 
The  doctrine  of  the  iLimortality  of  the  soul,  as  it  is 
reprosented  and  set  forth  principally  in  the  Phaedo., 
ReT-)ublic  and  Phacdrus,  and  very  briefly  and  quite 
incidentally,  in  some  of  his  other  dialogues. 
Whether  Plato,  with  what  he  says  about  the  immortality 
of  the  soul,  proves  his  case,  viz.  that  the  soul 
survives  death  and  continues  to  be  intelligent  and  to 
exist  in  some  consciousness  after  the  death  of  the 
individual 
(a)  Immortality  in  the  Phaodo. 
Plato.,  as  is  well  known,  discpsses  particularly  the 
soul's  immortality  -a  theme  of  universal  and  Perretual 
interest  In  the  Phaedo. 
His  whole  theory  may  be  summarised  into  the  following 
Phaedo  70B2-4:  (ýC  E'CYT  L  TE  h  (ývxý  &nooav6vToc 
T'LVa  HV(XýILV  F5-XCLV  XCCC  cpp6V  T)CY  LV  Tou  &Opwhou  xaL' 104. 
three  arguments. 
The  first  of  the  three  arguments  (69C-78B)  consists 
of  two  parts,  (a)  69C-72E  and  (b)  72C-78B. 
The  first  part,  the  so-called  "cyclicalv  doctrine,  or 
the  doctrine  of  the  cycle  of  oprosites,  rests  upon  the  r-;  -,  birtii 
the  physical  law  of  (  y6vcaLC  Lý  LvavTE'wv  )  runs  as 
f  ollows:  - 
Socrates,  wishing  to  prove  that  the  belief  in  the 
existence  of  the  soul  after  death  and  its  retention  of 
intelligence  beyond  the  grave  is  sound,  adopts  and  reminds 
Cebes,  of  the  old  Orphic  doctrine,  according  to-which  souls 
which  have  come  to  this  world  exist  in  the  other,  and 
conversely  souls  come  and  are  born  into  this  world  from  the 
world  of  the  dead.  If  that  is  true,  if  the  living  are 
born  from  the  dead,  this  clearly  imnlies  that  the  souls 
must  exist  in  the  world  beyond.  ' 
Further.,  Socrates,,  noticing  that  his  companion  Cobes 
is  not  satisfied  at  all  with  his  earlier  argument  and 
wanting  to  establish  his  point,  turns  Cobets  attention  to 
2  the  whole  animal  and  vegetable  world. 
1.  Phaedo  70C5-10,  D1-5- 
2.  Ibid  70D8-9. 105. 
Here,  he  makes  two  points: 
1.  that  contraries  are  rroduced  from  contraries)  as  from 
bigger  to  smal.  16r,  from  stronger  to  weaker  and  from 
slower  to  faster.  1 
2.  as  there  are  Pairs  of  opposites,  there  must  also  be 
pairs  of  two  becomings  or  processes  of  generation 
from  the  one  to  the  other  and  back  again. 
2 
Socrates,  turning  now  the  discussion  to  his  first 
argument  of  rebirth  or  11cyclely  and  applying  to  It  the 
previous  analogy  of  the  opposites  and  their  bocomings,  in 
conclusion  demonstrates  what  in  the  beginning  he  had  put  as 
a  problem,  that  is,  the  souls  of  the  dead  must  cxIst  in 
some  placc  from  which  they  will  bo  reborn. 
3 
The  second  part  (72E-77A)  of  the  first  argument 
depends  upon  the  doctrine  of  &VdPV7JGLC,  and  on  the 
existence  of  forms  which  are  the  objects  of  reminiscence. 
According  to  Cebes,  Socrates'  theory  that  learning  is 
in  itself  recollection,  is  another  indication  that  the  soul 
is  something  immortal.  4 
1.  PhaedR  71A3-4. 
2.  Ibid  71A12-13)  Bl-2. 
3.  Ibid  72A4-10. 
4.  Ibid  72E2-3,73A1-3- lo6. 
Socrates..,.  discussing  the  doctrine  of  recollection 
once  more,  finds  that  the  content  of  sense-perception 
resembles  the  ideas,  although  with  a  certain  degree  of 
defectiveness. 
This,  of  course,  implies  that  our  limowledge  of  the 
form  of  equality  must  have  been  acquired  before  our  birth 
(.  the  sameý  could  be  said  for  the  ideas  of  the  good,  the 
1  beautiful,  the  just  and  the  Holy) 
If  these  objects  (the  beautiful  and  good  and  all 
reality  of  that  sort)  do  exist  if  we  relate  all  the  data  of 
our  senses  and  compare  them  to  this  reality,  it  must 
follow  that  our  souls  do  exist  before  we  are  born  and 
possess  intelligence  as  those  principles  do.  2 
Further,  Socrates  places  em-,  jhasis  on  the  utmost 
significance  of  the  existence  of  the  surreme  and  absolute 
entities,  the  ideas  for  the  existence  of  the  soul  as  well. 
The  existence  of  forms  and  that  of  souls  before  their 
incarnation  are  interrelated  and  in  onc  word  stand  or  fall 
together.  3  Now  in  view  of  the  first  argument  (opposite 
1.  Phaedo  75B-76cl-9. 
2.  I.  bid  76P7-g-El-4  and  76C11-13- 
3.  fbid  76E4-9  -  77A1-5- 107. 
from  opposite,  the  living  from  the  dead  and  conversely) 
the  soul  must  exist  also  after  death. 
2.  Second  argument  from  the  affinities  (78B-84B) 
A.  E.  Taylor,  opening  the  second  argument,  writes  the 
following:  "This  argument  goes  much  more  to  the  root  of  the 
question,  since  it  is  based  not  on  any  current  general 
philosophical  formula,  but  on  consideration  of  the 
intrinsic  character  of  a  soul". 
'  I 
This  is  true,  because  P131to,  in  order  to  refute  Cebe's 
assertion,  that  the  soul  may  be  dispersed  at  death2  and 
established  the  fact  that  soul  survives  death,  is  immortal, 
divine  and,  as  he  put  it  in  his  own  conclusion:  "absolutely 
indissoluble  (indestructible)  or  nearly  soi,. 
3 
attempts  to 
prove  his  argument  this  time  not  from  outside,  but  from 
within,  namely,  from  the  soul  itself,  from  the  nature  and 
essence  of  the  soul  from  a  detailed  study  of  its  nature  as 
a  whole  and  more  particularly  from  its  affinities  to  the 
invisible  world.,  to  the  unseen  order,  to  the  Forms. 
1.  A.  E.  Taylor,  Plato,  p.  109. 
2.  Phaedo  78B5-6. 
3.  Ibid  8OB9-10. lo8. 
Since  Plato  refers  us  to  the  soul's  affinities  to 
universals,  to  laws  and  spiritual  nrinci-,  nles.,  to  his  famous 
theory  of  Ideas.,  let  us  see  how  he  develmns  this  soul's 
relation  to  the  Forms. 
1.  While  composite  things  are  liable  to  be  srlit  uP 
into  their  comronent  parts,  the  incomposite  are  not.  Again 
composite  things  are  mutable  and  incomposite  constant  and  C. 
- 
unchanging,  but  Socrates  says  such  things,  which  never  admit 
any  sort  of  alteration  or  undergo  any  change  whatsoever,  are 
the  Forms,,  which  at  the  same  time,  are  invisible  and 
intelligible,  in  contrast  to  particular  things  of  the  world, 
which  are  ever  changing  and  never  constant. 
This  leads  Socrates'  remarks  to  the  point  that  there 
are  two  classes  of  things  visible  and  invisible.  This 
distinction  again  hely;  s  Cebes  to  agree  with  Socrates)  that 
the  soul  is  akin  to  and  belongs  to  the  invisible  and  the 
body  to  the  visible. 
1 
2.  Again  when  the  soul  seeks  truth  all  by  itself,  it 
passes  to  that  other  world  of  -pure,  immortal  and 
imperishable  Forms;  it  always  remains  there,  and  comes  in 
close  and  constant  contact  with  these  unchanging  realities. 
Cebes  admits  that  this  is  another  reason  which  forces  us  to 
believe  that  the  soul  resembles  and  is  more  akin  to  the 
1.  Phacdo  78C,  D,  E  -  79AB. log. 
everlasting  and  unchanging  being.  1 
Furthermore,  it  is  in  the  soul's  nature  to  rule  and 
be  maste  r  of  the  body  and  the  body's  always  to  serve  and 
obey.  Since  it  is  also  the  function  of  the  divine  to  rule 
and  to  lead  and  of  the  mortal  to  be  ruled  over  and  serve2 
it  implies  then  that  the  soul  is  like  the  divine  and  the 
body  like  the  mortal. 
2 
The  result  of  the  whole  discussion  amounts  to  Socratest 
affirmation  that  the  soul  is  vcry  like  the  Forms,  viz. 
dývlne,  immortal,  inteiligible.,  indestructible  and  uniform3 
and  also  it  is  COMT)1(',  telY  indissoluble  or  nearly  so. 
4  - 
Between  the  second  argument  and  the  third  and  final 
one.,  Plato  discusses  on  the  one  hand,  Simmias's  and  Cebes' 
objections  that  the  soul  is  a  "harmony"  or  an  llattunetmenttl 
of  the  bodily  constituents  which  may  exist  bcfore  birth, 
but  finally  disappear  and  perish  when  wp  die,  and  on  the 
other  hand,  Socrates'  refutation. 
I  do  not  think  we  have  to  make  any  comment  on  them,  as 
they  have  nothing  to  add  to  our  immediate  concern. 
1.  Phaedo  79D,  E. 
2.  Ibid  80A. 
Ibld  8OBl-4;  seralso  84B2-3. 
4.  Ibid  80B9-10. 110. 
This  implies  that  we  must  deal  with  the  third  and 
last  argument. 
3.  The  crowning  and  final  argument  (102A-107A) 
relatively  long,  and  with  its  difficulties  as  stands,  is 
based  also  on  the  existcnce  of  the  Forms  and  could  be 
expressed  very  briefly  as  follows: 
Socrates  proves  the  genercal  rrincipal  by  means  of 
analogies  of  tallness  -  shortness,  hot  -  cold,  snow  -  fire, 
even  -  odd,  that  OT-,  [)osites  exclude  each  other,  cannot 
coalesce  with  one  another  or  arise  out  of  one  another. 
In  other  words,  neither  a  transcendent  idea  not  a  form-cony, 
an  immanent  character,  can  take  upon  itself  the  nature  of 
its  opposite. 
1 
Socratcs,  now  applying  the  already  established 
princi-ole,  argues  that  life  is  a  necessary  concomitant  of 
the  Presence  of  a  soul)  the  vehicle  of  life)  for  soul  isy 
by  definition,  that  which  gives  life  to  the  body.  Hence 
the  Soul  will  not  ad.  -arit  death  and  consequently  since  it 
excludes  its  opposite.,  death,  we  may  call  it  "immortal" 
deathless  UdvaTov  )2. 
Plato,  discussing  a  further  point,  that  of 
1.  Phaedo  102B-105B4. 
2.  Ibid  105B5-E. Ill. 
imperishability  or  indestructibility  1  in  the  remainder  of 
Phaedo  106A-E.  This  additional  examination  of  the 
indestructibility  of  the  proposition  soul  has  variously 
been  connected,  inter7reted  by  different  scholars: 
Williamson,.  E,  haedo  (1904)  commenting  on  105E7,  writes: 
"It  is  a  very  curious  turn  of  logic  by  which  Plato, 
having  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  QuXI"AdvaToc 
and  wishing  to  nrove  that  It  is  also 
Wheopoc  assumes,  for  the  rurrose  of  his  proof 
the  very  point  he  is  proving,  viz.  that  T6  WdvaTov 
Xac  0600pov  haTtv 
.....  The  step  from  AdvaTor, 
to  Wxcopoc  is  unwarranted.  It  may  have 
probability  on  its  side,  but  logically  it  is  worthless"; 
qtd.  by  R.  S.  Bluck,  Platols  Phaedo,  r.  188.  J.  Burnet, 
Plato's  Phaedo,  Oxford  (1959)  n.  on  105ElO  holds  that 
the  AdVaTov  is,  ipso  facto  &WAPOV 
also  L.  Robin,  Phaedo  (Budeled  194')  n.  on  106D.  9 
remarks,  "non-mortal  ...  est  par  definition 
indestructable";  A.  E.  Taylor,  Plato,  r.  206,  argues  as 
follows:  "He  is  not  actually  called  on  to  argue  this 
fresh  voint,  since  his  auditors  at  once  assert  their 
conviction  that  if  what  is  'undying?  is  not  imTerish- 
able,  nothing  can  be  supposed  to  be'so,  whereas  there 
are,  in  fact,  imperishables,  such  as  God  and  'the  form 
of  life'.  Thus  in  the  end,  the  imperishability  of  the 
soul  is  accepted  as  a  consequence  of  that  standing 
conviction  of  all  Greek  religion  that  A  WAyToy  = 
A  Mov  .  T6  UyOapTov".  Next  Prof.  J.  B. 
Skemp,  The  theory  of  Motion  in  Platols  later-Dialogu6s, 
p.  8,4  -it  a  Nbiatant  retitio  princirli". 
R.  Hackforth,  Pidtols  Phaedo,  p.  164,  sees  "at  106D  on 
the  surface,  no  more  than  a  rhetorical  flourish  which 
dismisses  the  question  at  issue  as  if  it  should  never 
have  been  raised;  but  it  may  be  that  beneath  the 
surface  there  is  an  anneal  religious  faith  if  the  soul 
is  deathless  it  is  divine  and  therefore  aMov 
everlasting".  Finally,  R.  S.  Bluck,  ibid,  discussing 
the  whole  question  of  imperishability  in  a  (very)  brief 
appendix,  PP-188-194,  quoting  the  rrevious  scholars  and 
some  others  and  complaining  against  some  of  them  as 
treating  the  roint  under  consideration  in  a  "cavalier 
fashion"  (P-194)  makes  the  point  that  the  implication 
of  the  rresent  arguement  and  the  kernel  of  the  last 
part  of  this  final  proof  of  the  soulfs  indestructibility, 
is  that  destruction  is  a  contradiction  of  soul  &.  193). 
Further,  The  whole  proof  that  the  soul's  &v6Xc0poc 
like  the  particular  of  the  admissibility 
or  non-admissibility  of  opposites  and  hence  ....  uDon 
his  theory  Forms 
...  ." 
WA94).  Furthermore,  he  Is  of  the  opinion  that  "Plato  regarded  this  final  proof  as 
_______,  _both 
sound  and  conclsuive  (p.  l94m__,  2)__and  alap-(-_, 
_18,9_n, 
0--- 112. 
the  present  argument,  infers  categorically  and  firmly  that 
the  soul  is  deathless,  imuortal  and  imperishable  and  that 
our  souls  will  exist  in  the  other  world. 
' 
With  the  reference  to  the  Phaedo's  preceeding 
arguments  for  immortality,  it  may  perhaps  be  said  that  they 
are  not  scientific  proofs  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word  and 
are  very  puzzling  and  hard  to  follow,  though  intelligent 
2  in  philosophical  study  and  research.  However,  it  is,  I 
believe  with  Eodier,  incontestableý  that  if  one  admits  the 
theory  of  Iaeas,  they  are  conclusive,  and  that  if  it  is 
true  that  the  old  theology  had  inspired  Plato  to  belief  in 
immortality.,  "it  is  not  the  least  matter  that  he  has  made 
his  own  in  establishing  thus  validly  these  most  fundamental 
doctrines.  from  his  point  of  vieV  the  immortality  of 
reason  is  validly  demonstrated".  3 
,,  yt)Xý  &^5'\)auo\j  xa'  Phaedo  106E9,107A:  Lp  CL  L  &V6XCOPO\J  XaC 
qLC 
IL60W, 
4  TCO  OVTL  E"GOWML  T)UMV  aL  YUXOL'  "V  " 
comp.  also  106EI-'8.  It  must  be  noted  hero  that 
Simmias  107B  remains  still  in  doubt  about  their 
assertions  concerning  the  soul's  immortality.  To  his 
doubts,  Socrates  recommends  a  fuller  and  more  thorough 
going  examination  of  the  matter.  Socrates'  suggestion  here  does  not  imply  that  Plato  himself  doubted  the 
validity  of  his  previous  arguments. 
Nemesius,  de  Nat.  Homi.  n.  C.  2.,  10-55p.  /124, 
G.  Rodierý  Los  preuves  dr 
-Itimmortalite  d'arrýs  Ile 
Phodont,  Etudes  de  philosoyýhie  Grequol,  ý  Paris  (1957) 
p-  154. 113. 
(b)  Immortality  in  the  Re-nublic. 
In  the  Fe-public,  Plato  produces  a  now,  straight-forward 
and  persuasive  proof,  which  must  be  rather  regarded  as  a 
supplementary  one  to  the  already  existing  nroof  in  the 
Phaedo  of  the  inmiortality  of  the  soul. 
According'to  this  new  argument  nothing  can  be 
destroyed  and  perish  except  by  its  ol-m  specific  and 
peculiar  evil  or  disease,  by  its  (  a6pyuTov  xux6\)  %aC  v6anpcx) 
for  example,  ophthalmia  for  the  eyes,  disease  for  the  body 
in  general,  mildew  for  grain,  etc, 
1 
Now  the  sreciai  evils  or  vices  of  the  soul  are 
injustice,  intemperance,  cowardice,  ignorance.  But  these 
do  not  destroy  the  soul  at  all;  far  from  it,  as  exrorience 
shows  that  the  truth  is  surely  just  the  opT"Nosite;  they 
fill  the  wic.  Ked  and  unjust  man  with  life,  vigour  and 
vitality.  But  if  the  particular  evil  or  wickedness  of  the 
soul  is  incarable  of  diminishing  and  destroying  it.  2  then 
we  may  safely  arrive  at  the  natural  conclusion  that  the 
soul  must  exist  for  ever  and  since  it  exists  for  ever  the 
logical  sequence  demands  that  it  must  be  immortal  as  well. 
3 
1.  Renublic  609A. 
2.  Ibid.  609B9-61OE10. 
it  6ý%O\j  8,  rL  &\jdyXT)  cfb'rO  &F-C  OOV  F-T\)CLLIO  3.  Ibid.  611A1-2:  T) 
E';  W&C  L'  8V,  &06\JCLTC)V" I  114. 
(c)  Immortality  in  the  Phaedrus. 
In  the  Phaedrus,  the  argument  for  inmortality  is 
stated  and  re-,,  resented  in  a  general  and  dogmatical,  so  to 
speak,  way  and  relies  on  the  conce-ýtion  of  the  soul  as 
scif-mover  ana  originator  of  all  movement  and  consequently 
of  all  life. 
The  self-mover.,  Plato  argues,  never  leaves  its  motion, 
never  abandons  its  own  nature.  It  is  the  source  and 
origin  (beginning)  of'  motion  for  all  other  things  that  are 
not  self-moved.  In  addition,  it  is  ungenerated,  that  is, 
without  source  or  beginning,  and  indestructible  and 
immortal. 
But  these  same  attributes  may  easily  and  precisely 
apply  to  the  essence  and  the  very  idea  of  the  soul. 
1 
Now  if  this  analogy  is  correct',  namely  that  which 
moves  itself  is  nothing  else  but  soul,  then  an  unhurried 
inference  is  deduced  that  soul  is  ungenerated  and  immortal. 
A  parallel  concertion  of  the  soul,  as  we  have  already  I 
said.,  as  the  self-moved  source  of  all  motion,  we  find  also 
in  the  tenth  Book  of  th-e  Laiý,  -s  and  more  sTecifically  in 
Laws  894,895  and  896.  However,  we  must  remark  with 
Haczforth  that  here  the  "indestructibility  of  the  soul  is 
1.  Phaedrus  245C5-246Al-2. 
2.  Ibld  246Al-2:  &,  v6Ly;  jnr  , 
&ybiTyý6v  cc  xa6  &,  Mlva'uov 
(ýVV)  6V  Clbo"  . 115. 
not  explicitly  asserted  but  the  conclusions  of  the 
Phaedrus  argument  are  clearly  implied.  111 
Arart  from  the  above  mentioned  dialogues,  on6  hardly 
finds  any  ciear  view  about  the  soul-Is  immortality  in  the 
other  dialogues  of  Plato.  It  could  be  said  that  the  Q, 
Meno  and  the  Timacus,  and  the  Symposium  contribute  some- 
thing.  But  if  we  like  to  look  at  them  a  little  closer  we 
shall  notice  that  these  dialogues  do  not  contribute  very 
much  to  the  problem  we  are  investigating. 
The  Meno,  for  instance,  examines  the  rre-existence  and 
i=ortaiity  of  the  soul  only  with  reforance  to  tho  doctrine 
t 
of  recollection  and  a  rrior  knowledge2  but  such  an 
argument,  which  is  completed  later  in  tile  Phagdo,  hardly 
withstands  any  criticism  and  "survives  logical  scrutinyit. 
3 
Ap  to  the  Timacus,  it  should  be  observed  that  no 
serious  student  of  Plato  could  exrect  to  trace  any  concrete 
and  solid  material  concerning  the  immortality  of  the  soul, 
other  than  that  which  has  already  been  noted,  viz,  the 
mythical  distinction  of  the  immortal  part  of  the  soul 
1.  R.  Hacrforth)  PIAols  Phaedo.,  p.  23. 
2.  Meno  80D  ff  I 
81C  ff  and  the  inference  86BI-2: 
"bbx:  o-uv  Ct  &CC  h  &Xý-acLa  hpL\)  Toýv  5VTWV  ECT(V  ýv 
1ý  OXT)o  &OdVaTOC  6V  h  ýVXIO  CILIT)"  ... 
3.  R.  Hackforth,  P1,9to's  Phaedo,  p.  19. 116. 
fashioned  by  the  Demiurge  (41D)  and  (69C2)  mortal  parts 
created  by  the  celestial  gods  (42D),  and  the  location  of 
the  three  parts  in  certain  organs  of  the  body,  i.  e.  the 
immortal  situated  in  the  head.,  the  snirited  in 
the  heart  and  the  appetitive  part  in  the  belly  (69D-70E). 
The  Symposium  next,  seems  to  recognize  only  the 
immortality  of  procreation  and  the  subjective  Immortality 
of  fame.  '  It  does  not  recognize  personal  immortality, 
only  a  "vicarious  survival.,  not  an  Immortality  of  the 
Sym-posium  20M  20BA7-81  B1-3;  212A6-7. 117. 
personal  self".  1 
Before  we  reply  to  the  second  question  dealing  with 
the  soul's  survivallafter  death,  we  must  make  some  general 
remarks  on  two  points:  - 
1.  Whether  the  immortality  of  the  soul  refers  to  the 
entirety  of  the  soul  or  only  to  its  rational  Dart. 
2.  What  is  the  precise  meaning  of  TuXý  nuaa  &OdvaTor. 
(Phaedrus  245CB). 
R.  Hackforth,  Plato's  Phaedo,  p.  20.  It  must  be 
further  noted  that'Hackforth.,  "Immortality  in  Platoo 
Symposium"  in  Classical  Review,  LXTV  (  19  50)',  )  P-  -3  -3  ip 
and  again  in  Iiis  Platots,  Phaedo,  pp.  20-21,  maintains 
that  t1the  Symposium  shows'us  a  relapse  into  temporary 
scepticism;  it  drops  the  claim  that  soul,  collective 
or  individual,  is  imperishable";  comp.  also  G.  1 
, 
q.  A. 
Grube,  Plato's  Thought,  p.  149,  note  on  Symposium  K5C, 
208C;  J.  V.  Luce.  '  in  his  reply  to  Hackforth  "Immort  -al- 
ity'in  Plato's  Symposium"  in  Classica-1  Review,  N.  S,  11 
(1952)  PP-137-41  (PP-135-7  here)  isagree  Is  iýi-',,  h 
Hackforthts  view  and  holds  that  there  is  not  cleavage 
between  Phaedo  and  Symposium  on  the  tmmortality  o:  '  the 
soul.  He  further  remarks  that  their  apparent  incon- 
sistencies  are  reconcilable  when  one  remembers  that 
the  Phaedo  lays  more  emphasis  on  the  immo.  -tality  of 
OEC?  l  ýUx 
6VOPW 
and  the  Symposium  on  the 
ality  of 
1he 
TE  ['V'O  y6a  L  r,  ;  He  is  followed"in 
his  view  by  R.  S.  Bluck,  Plato's  Phaedo.,  p.  28  n.  1; 
Prof.  H.  Cherniss,  in  a  note  in  "ýlcassical  Review,  N.  S. 
111  (1953)  P-131)  points  to  Laws  712BC.,  ths  by  itself 
proving  the  invalidityll  of  Hackforth's-conclusion  and 
as  alluding  to  a  personal  survival.  ,  Two  othe--  inter- 
preters  of  Plato,  A.  B.  Taylor,  Plato,  p.  228  n.  1,  on 
the  one  hand,  insists  that  there  is  not  a  single  word 
in  Symposium  which  speaks  of  the  perishabilýty  of  tjo 
soul;  I  EuxquTpýc,  11X6Twvoc  Eupn6aLOV;  CL  L1.  E  %)  0V 
ýY)  C'UAthens  (19509  pp.  210-11  n.  l.,  distinguishes  bebween 
. 
6ivine  and  human  immortality  and  sees  no  disagg.  -comen. 
or  discrepancy  between  Symposium  and  Phaedo. 118. 
For  the  first  point  we  say  this.  Consistent  with  what 
we  have  earlier  said  about  the  soul.,  as  being  simple, 
uniform  and  incomposite,  but  in  connection  with  the  body 
assuming  certain  phases  (LnL,  5U[ITjTLx6v  OupocL66r.  ) 
which  are  temporary  and  only  exist  as  long  as  they  are 
connected  with  the  body,  we  shall  do  well  to  note  that  the 
immortality  applies  to  the  entirety,  wholeness  of  the  soul, 
as  a  rational  and  spiritual  entity,  as  a  vital  nrinciple 
and  acting  force. 
1 
R.  K.  Gaye,  The  Platonic  Conception  of  Immortalit 
PP-371  41)  dealing  with  this  point  refers  to  11ir.  Archer- 
HindIs  '?  On  some  difficulties  in  the  Platonic  PsycholoC--rli 
Journal  of  Zhaldlogy)  X  (1882)  pp.  120-131  cf  129-31; 
Phaedo  (Ib944)  London,  pp.  XXXII-XXXVII;  and  concludes 
that  is'is  as  a  single  nature  that  soul  is  immortal; 
W.  C.  K.  Guthrie.,  "Plato's  views  on  the  nature  of  the 
Soullf,  Recherches  sur  la  traditione  Platonicienne, 
-i  Entr(itiens'sur  liantiguite  classiqu  , 
Tome  III.,  p.  19 
and  J.  Adam.,  '  The  Republic  of  Plato.,  II.,  p.  427  n.  on 
611B12  are  of  the  opinion  that  soul  in  its  true  nature 
is  the  highest  part.,  the  XOYLCTL%6v  and  this 
XOY  LCT  Lx6v  alone  is  perfect,  divine  and  immortal. 
K.  F.  Hermann  takes  up  this  point  in  his  instructive 
dissertation:  "Praemissa  est  disputatio  do  -,  artibus 
animae  immortalibus  secundum.  Plat  . onemll.,  in  Index 
Scholarum,,  publice  et  Privatium  in  Academia  Georgia 
Augusta  per  semestre  hibernum,  anni  YiDCCCL-,  MDCCCLI 
A-die  XV.,  Octobris  usque  ad  XV  Martii,.  habentarum, 
Gottingae,  pp.  8-9;  and  claims  that  Plato  intended  to 
represent  only  the  rational  part  as  immortal  and  the 
other  two  parts  as  mortal.  He  is  charged  by  G.  Grote, 
Plato  and  the  other  Companions  of  Socrates,  London 
(1667)  14  p  n.  a.,  that  he  failed  to  realize  that 
Plato,  when  he  used  the  various  pass,  -iges,  sometimes 
held  one  language,  sometimes  the  other,  and  that  there 
is  a  big  discrepancy  between  Phaedo  and  the  other 
Platonic  dialogues. lig. 
The  exact  meaning  of  OXT)  aca  which  troubled  I  7M 
and  embarassed  both  ancient  and  modern  scholars  is 
particularly  discussed  by  Frutiger  and  Hackforth  at  some 
length.  The  former,  while  he  examines  the  usage  of  IUC 
with  and  without  the  article,  finally  rejects  it  as 
involving  us  in  difficulties  and  leading  us  nowhere;  he 
adopts  the  distributive  meaning  and  characteristically 
wants  to  see  ýuXý  nUaa  translated  not  Into  naaa  h  ýUxf) 
but  into  1'every  soul"y  parallel  to  its  correlative  TEav 
aMpa.  "In  conclusion,  is  it  not  very  7robable 
that  (ýVxý  11aaa  ought  to  be  translated,  not  in  the 
same  fashion  as  naaa  h  ýuXý  from  which  it  differs 
grammatically,  but  conformably  to  nUv  a-w[ta,  -its 
correlative,  that  is  to  say  for  each  soul,  no  matter  which 
soul?  Ill 
The  latter,  on  the  one  hand,  argues  that  there  is  no 
distinction  here  between  collective  and  distributive  senses 
before  Plato's  mind 
2 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  he  Drefors 
the  rendering  of  OXý  ndaa  UdvaTOc.  into  "all  soul  is 
immortal,  because  the  collective  sense  is  that  rrimarily 
1.  C.  Frutiger,  Mythes  de  Platon,  P-134. 
2.  R.  Hackforth,  Platots  Phaedrus,  p.  64. 120, 
demanded  by  the  logic  of  the  argument". 
' 
Further,  whereas  Hackforth  admits  that  the  Phaodrus 
argument,  245C-246A,  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  direct 
argument  and  32roof  for  the  Immortality  of  individual  souls, 
he  is  convinced.,  "that  Plato  regarded  any  d, 
--monstratlon  of 
the  immortality  of  'soul'  In  general  as  aprlicable  to 
individual  soulsit.  2 
The  whole  question  of  the  Individual's  immortality  is 
well  stated  in  the  words  of  Gaye:  '?  So  f  ar  as  rersonal 
immortality  is  concerned,  it  supplies  at  most  a  negative 
argument;  that  is  to  say,  it  creates  a  cortain  nresum-ýtlon 
in  favour  of  ý,  ersonal  immortality  In  so  far  as  it  tends  to 
inv"-lidate  the  -popular  view  of  the  finality  of  death. 
There  is  certainly  a  sense  in  which  the  soul  survives  the 
.  death  of  the  individuai  E111OXOvi  but  whether  this 
soul  continues  to  exist  as  a  conscious  nersonality  isy  of 
course,  a  different  question)  and  there  is  nothing  in  the 
1,,  roof  of  iamortality  which  we  have  been  considering  that 
R.  Hackforth, 
is  in  favour 
it  nav  arova 
ývXf)  ixaaa 
anproximatin A  246B". 
, 
Platofs  Phaedrus_,  p.  64  n-3;  J.  B.  Skemp, 
P-3  n.  l. 
of  the  collective  translation  and  wrItes: 
at  245E4 
....  seenis  the  counterrart  of 
here  and  both  seem  to  ave  a  meaning 
g  to  Tt-dcya  h  ýUxf 
ka 
and  TE  "J  'ý6  "(W(Ov 
2.  R.  Hackforth,,  ibid.  pp.  64-65. 121. 
can  be  said  to  furnish  a  direct  argument  in  favour  of  it 
From  whatever  source  he  may  have  derived  his 
justification  for  believing  in  personal  immortality,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  he  did  believe  in  it,  and  moreover 
that  he  considered  the  proof  that  all  soul  is  immortal"  to 
give  some  support  to  the  belief".  1 
Furthermore,  it  should  be  observed  that  the  myths  of 
Phaedo,  107C  ff.  Republi  614  ff,  Gorgias  524  ff,  assume 
individual  immortality. 
R.  K.  Gaye,  The  Platonic  Concention  of  Immortalit  ,  P-39- 
A.  E.  Taylor's  view  on  personal  immortality,  Plato,  p  207ynlj 
is  quite  convincing  and  worth  quoting:  "If  the  quesiion 
is  asked  whether  the  faith  defended  in  the  Phaedo  is  a 
belief  in  1personalf  immortality,  I  can  only  reply  that 
though  the'language  of  philosophers  was  not  to  acquire 
a  word  for  'personality',  for  many  centuries  the  faith 
of  Socrates*is  a  belief'in  the  immortality  of  his  ýuXý 
and  by  his  ýuXý  the  seat  or  supDositum 
of  all  we  call  'personal  character  and  nothing  else', 
ftendence  of  the  soul'  is  precisely  what  we  call  the 
development  of  moral  *  rsonalitylt.  G.  M.  A.  Grube, 
. 
Ej1ýato1s_Thoy&ht,  p,  149eand  B.  Bosanquet,  A  Co'mranion  to 
Platots 
- 
Renubiic.,  p.  406-7.  argue  that  the  soul's  immortality  involves  comDlete  loss  of  personality  together  with  a  merger  of  the  rationafelement  with  a 
world  or  cosmic  mind  or  soul.  One  wonders  whether 
such  views  do  not  lead  towards  a  pantheistic  inter- 
pretation?  MN  A  reply  refuting  their  mistaken 
assertion  is'that  of  R.  D.  Archer-Hind,  The  Phaedo  of  Plato,  p.  XXXII:  "Plato  knew  very  well  that  neither  he 
nor  anyone  else  could  demonstrate  the  immortality  of  Individual  souls,  yet  he  was  strongly  disposed  to 
believe 
....  that  every  soul  on  its  senaration  from 
the  body  will  not  be  reabsorbed  in  the  universal,  but 
will  survive  as  a  concious  rersonality  even  as  it 
existed  before  its  present  incarnation". 122. 
Arriving  at  the  end  of  this  chaptery  we  must  draw  a 
conclusion  by  replying  to  the  second  question3  the  survival 
of  the  soul  after  death;  but  what  kind  of  infentilce  may  be 
deduced  from  the  above  Dages?  The  answer  lies  in 
HackforthIs  words:  III  believe  that  both  Rerublic  X  and 
Phaedo.,  he  (Plato)  thinks  he  has  7roved  it;  in  Phaedo 
particularly  the  re7,  -eated  use  of  &no6T)xvUvaLj  %6yov  6L66vaL 
and  the  like  ......  tazen  together  with  Socrates'  emphatic 
conclusion  at  106E  navT6r,  [IUXXov  ýuXý  &Odva-rov  xat  &v6XEOpov 
xaC  cCj  o'vTL  EcrovTaL  ýIiM\j  at  ýUXCLC  b)  "AL(SOU 
seems  conclusive,  despite  Socratest  encouragement  of 
"honest  doubt"  at  107B.  The  final  argument  of  Phaedo  no 
less  than  Phaedrus  appears,  however,  to  regard  personal 
immortality  as  a  corollary  of  the  immortality  of  ".  soul".  * 
For  Plato  the  immortality  of  the  soul  in  general  and 
of  the  individual  particularly,  was  not  a  -ý.  ious  hore  and 
an%  thical  postulatell.  -- 
2 
On  the  contrary,  it  was  a  firm 
belief,  a  strong  and  unshaken  conviction,  a  certainty  and 
reality,  a  serious  problem,  which  urges  us  to  accept  it,  3 
1.  R.  Huckforth,  Platols  Phaedrus,  P.  65  n.  l. 
2.  P.  Shorey,  The  Unity  of-Platols  Thou  gh  ,  p.  40  (or  166). 
3.  C.  Ritte  The  Essence  of  Platols  Philosophy3  PP-119,301- 
See  also  a  very  interesting  and  illuminating  article  of  the  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  P.  Duncan,  "Immortality  of  the  soul  in 
Platonic  Dialogues  and  Aristotlet'  in  Philosorhy  Vol.  XVII 
(1942)  London,  rp-304-323.,  where'he  trie's  to  Justify  and  endorse  Ritterts  conclusion  as  "irresistablelt. 123. 
but  not  a  dogma,,  ' 
a  fundamental  and  very  im-,.  ortant  issue.  2 
Thus  Plato  passionately  and  firmly  belived  not  broadly 
in  the  unseen,  in  the  spiritualp  in  the  ideal,  but  in  the 
immortality  of  the  soul  and  more  particularly  in  rersonal 
immortality,  self  existence  after  death  and  survival  with 
full  conciousness  and  continued  self-identity. 
E.  Zeller,  Plato  and  the  Older  Academy,  ,,  ).  397,408  on  the 
other  hand  argues  that  the  doctriH-e-  of  the  immortality  is  the 
point,  the  strictly  dogmatic  signification  of'  which 
can  least  be  doubted.  "Not  only  in  the  Phaedo  but  in 
the  Phacdrus  and  Rerublic  too,  it  is  the  subject  of  a 
comr,  lete  philosophic  demonstration 
...... 
but  also  in 
the  strictest  scientific  enquiries?  '. 
2.  Imrortant  and  fundamontal,  yes,  but  not  to  the  extent 
which  M.  F.  Sciacca,  "Il  problema  dell1immortalita 
dell'anima  et  metemrsicosin  Platonelt,  Studi  Sulla 
filosofia  antica.,  Napoli  (1935)  p.  221,  would  have  it 
when  he  write  hat  the  whole  of  Plato's  rhilosophy 
addresses  itself  to  the  rroblem  of  the  immortality  of 
the  soul  and  of  the  destiny  of  man.  IfDopo  cio  el 
ovidente,  che  attorno  al  1)roblema  delltimmortalita 
delifanima  cal  destino  dell1nomo  si  articola  tutta  la 
filosofia  di  Platone,  il  cui.  fondOlmento  come  resta 
confermato  eticorcligiosoll. 124. 
PART  III 
ST.  PAULI  S  THEORY  OF  THE  HUMPOI.  50UL'. 
-O-DITS 
II-4MORTALITY. 
Preliminary  Remarks. 
It  is  customary  and  fashionable  for  everyone  who 
deals  with  St.  Paul's  theology,  and  more  particularly  in 
our  case  with  his  psychology  or  anthropology,  to  preface  it 
with  something  about  its  difficulties. 
Since  a  great  decal  has  been  written  by  others  which  we 
do  not  wish  to  repeat  here,  we  turn  right  away  to  our 
i&mediate  task,  which  is  to  investigate  the  real  meaning  -and 
nature  of  the  human  soul  and  its  immortality  in  St.  Paul's 
mind,  as  we  dict  with  Plato.  But  we  must  say  from  the 
beginning  that  our  task  in  discussing  it  is  not  an  easy  one. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  trace  the 
soulf.  s  true  meaning,  for  two  simple  reasons: 
1.  'the  word  j2syche  is  not  of  very  frequent  occurence 125. 
in  Pauline  letters.  ' 
2.  He  uses  other  parallel  synonyms  and  interrelated 
terms  of  equal  and  great  importance  (or  even  of  greater 
significance,  i.  e.  nve-Upa 
)  such  as  nvc-Upa,  cyMpa7crdp&  etc. 
However,  if  we  wish  to  get  the  best  possible  picture 
of  the  Pauline  human  soul,  it  is  of  the  utmost  necessity 
to  consider  the  above  terms  as  well.  Thus  our  inquiry 
may  come  under  the  following  headings:  - 
Psychological  terms  or  anthropological  concepts. 
12.  TuXý  or  Soul;  a  note  on  Imago  Dei  Gen.  1.26,27  and 
Gen.  2.7. 
13.  rivc-Upa  or  Spirit;  a  note  on  TuXLAc-I1vcupaTLx6c. 
14.  Mpa  or  Body. 
15.  Trichotomy?  Some  general  remarks  on  1  Thess.  5.23. 
16-  A---CbMiA9ratlviT-Llf'A-t4  resurTectierniýody-Llyfil-;.  ý',  ' 
'35`58  and'  2  Corinthians  5.1-10.  Corinthians  15.  W 
H.  W.  Robinson,  I'Hebrew  Pyschology  in  relation  to 
Pauline  Anthropology1l,  Mansfield  College  Essays) 
London  (1909)  p.  279-80;  ItThe  most  significant  point 
in  regard  to" 
, psyche  (continuing  nephes  )  is  the  limited 
use  of  the  term'made  by  Paul";  also  in  hi  The 
Christian  Doctrine  of  Man.,  Edinburgh  (192653  5.108- 
E.  D.  W.  Burt6n. 
-Spirit, 
Soul  and  Flesh,  Chicago  (1918) 
p.  1886-7,  "..  Yug?  T-  is  now  much  less  frequent  than 
either;  R.  Bultmann,  The  Theology  of  the  New  Testament, 
London  (1965)  1)  p.  203.,  '  11the  term  psyche  (Soul)  ....  occurs  relatively  seldom'in  Paul"  W.  D.  Stacey,  The 
Pauline  View  of  Man,  London  (1965i  p.  121:  "The  first 
fact  thdt'emerges-u-nder  this'heading  is  the'infrequency 
of  the  word";  The  Expository  Times,  Oct.  1965  -  Sept. 
1967.,  Vol.  68  p-1  notes  of  recent  exposition.,  "In  St. 
Paul  the  important  term  is  not  Soul,  which  occurs 
comparatively  seldom  in  his  letters  but  spirit  (pneuma)". 126. 
12.  TYXH  OR  SOUL. 
The  very  infrequency  of  the  occurence  of  this  term 
in  St.  Paul  (13  times.,  against  the  disproportionate  use  of 
nvct)ýLa  )  makes  it  difficult  to  reach  a  firm 
conclusion  as  to  which  of  its  various  uses  gives  the  best 
clue  as  to  the  word's  real  meaning  and)  indeed,  to 
distinguish  clearly  from  each  other  the  uses  themselves. 
In  view  of  this  fact,  we  are  invited  to  build  up 
St'.  Paul's  theory  of  the  soul  exclusively  on  the  13 
passages. 
For  a  better  understanding,  clarification,  and 
clearer  view,  we  may  classify  these  passages  according  to 
their  own  various  meanings  and  connotations  into  three 
groups.,  as  follows: 
(a)  Soul  C-.  s  life,  vitality.,  life  principle. 
(b)  Soul  as  the  seat  of  the  feeling,  will,  emotion 
and  thought. 
(c)  Soul  as  individual. 127. 
(a)  Soul  as  life,  vitality,  life  principle... 
The  meaning  of  the  word  psyche,  which  denotes  life) 
life-principle,  vitality  or  principle  of  the  physical 
life.,  "without  psychological  content'll  occurs  in  Pauline 
letters  6  times. 
In  Romans  he  twice  uses  the  word  psyche  instead  of 
life.  In  11-3.  where  he  freely  and  no  doubt  from  memory 
quotes 
2 
the  LXX  I  Kings  10.10,14ý  183  and  he  recalls 
Elijah's  words  that  they  are  seeking  I'my  life"- 
and  in  16,4,  he  speaks  about  Prisca  and  Aquila  his  fellow- 
workers,  who  risked  their  own  necks  to  save  his  "life". 
Further  passages  are,  e.  g.  "For  he  (Epaphroditus) 
nearly  died  for  the  work  of  Christ,  risking  his  life  to 
1.  H.  W.  Robinson.,  I'Hebrew  psychology  in  relation  to  Pauline 
anthropology"  in  Mansfield  College  Essays,  p.  280;  idem 
The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Man,  p.  10b. 
2.  F.  I.  Leenhardt,  The  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  London  (1961) 
. pp.  278-9. 
3.  F.  Godet,  CommentarX  on  St.  Paults  Epistle  to  the 
Romans.,  Edinburgh  (lbbl)  Vol.  '  2,  p.  224;  also  W.  '  Sanday 
and  A.  C.  Headlam,  A  Critical  and  Exegetical  Commentary 
on  the  Epistle  to  the  Eomans.,  'Edinburgh  (ICC)  (18985)' 
p-11;  William  Barclay,  The  Letter  to  the  Romans, 
Edinburgh  (1960)  P-155;  C.  X.  Barrett,  A  Commentary  on 
the  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  London  (1957ý  -p.  20d;  F.  I. 
Leenhardt,  ibid.  p.  278;  F.  F.  Bruce,  The  Epistle  of 
Paul  to  the  Roman_s,,  London  (1963)  p.  213;  P-M-J- 
Lagrange.,  St.  'Paul--Epttre  aux  Romains.,  Paris  (1950) 
ýj268-  V  Taylor,  The  Epistle  to  the'  Romans,  'London 
955ý  P-ý3;  K.  Barth, 
-The 
Epistle  to  the  Romans, 
Londori  (1933)  P-395. 128. 
complete  your  service  to  me?  '; 
11 
fiso  ....  were  ready  to 
share  with  you  not  only  the  gospel  of  God  but  also  our 
own  selvesIt. 
2 
must  be  understood  and  interpreted  exactly 
in  the  same  way  as  in  their  own  preceding  context. 
There  remain  two  other  cases,  the  words  "The  first 
Adam  became  a  living  soultO  are  taken  from  Gen.  2.7  and 
-ft 
are  an  exact  translation  of  the  Hebrew-jý 
In  2  Corinthians]-23  St.  Paul  in  a  very  emphatic  and 
solemn  statement  appeals  to  God  to  witness  on  his  psyche 
why  he  did  not  visit  Corinth  not  because  of  caprice  or 
cowardice  or  selfishness  but  out  of  consideration  and 
compassion  towards  them.  The  exact  translation  of  the 
word  psyche  is  slightly  problematic  here,  as  there  are 
Philip.  2.30  RSV;  comp.  also  with  I'latth.  2.20;  6.25; 
10-39;  16.25;  20  .  28;  Mar  8.35-36;  Luke  12.20-23; 
John  10.11;  15-17;  12.25;  13.37;  Acts  5.26;  20.10-24; 
27*10;  22;  1  Pet.  4.19;  1  John  3.16;  Apoc.  12.11. 
2.1  Thess.  2.8;  RSV;  I'Vulg.  "  etiam  animas  nostras";  AV 
"our  own  souls";  NEB  "our  very  selves";  JB  'four 
whole  livestf. 
3.15.45  "  WvF-To  6  7xPw-Toc  'A6(ip  ctr,  OXýv  ZMCFCLV" 
ing  being";  Vulg.  "animam  viventem";  AV 
"a  'living  soul";  NEB  "an  animate  being";  JB  "a  living 
: ýOulft. 
4.  It  must  be  noted  here  that  we  do  not  fully  discuss  the 
ineaning  of  living  soul  (  (ýuxý  ýWa  )  for  we  are 
going  to  consider  it  later  in  a  special  additional  note 
at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 129. 
different  renderings  of  the  original.  1  Moreover,  Stacey, 
while  he  does  not  rule  out  other  possible  translations,  is 
in  favour  of  "life?  '  as  the  most  likely  here.  2 
From  the  above,  it  becomes  clear  that  when  St.  Paul 
spealks  of  the  word-psyche,  in  the  preceding  examDles  he 
simply  uses  it  to  express.,  as  It  has  been  already  said, 
life,  life-principle,  vitality,  principle  of  the  physical 
life. 
AV  "upon  my  soullf;  RSV  t1against  mell;  NEB  "I  stake  my 
life  upon  itt';  , Aoffatt  and  ES  "against  my  Soul"; 
also  Vulg.  ItIn  animam  meamll.  Aug.  I'super..  anto-am  meam" 
quoted  in  A.  Plummer,,  2  Corinthians,  '(ICC)  p.  43. 
2.  W.  D.  Stacey,  The  Pauline  View  of  Man,  p.  122;  R.  V.  G. 
Tasker,  2  Corinthians,  Tyndale  Press,  London  (1958) 
p.  49.  It  apipears  from  his  comments  on  5.23,  as  if  he 
inclines  to  the  RSV  rendering. 130. 
Soul  as  the  S  0 
To  the  use  of  the  "soul"  as  the  seat  of  the  will., 
feeling,  St.  Paul  refers  us  only  in  three  cases.  He 
exhorts  the  slaves  to  do  the  will  of  God,  not  in  the  way 
of  eye-service  as  men  pleasers,  but  heartily,  with 
singleness  of  heart,  "not  grudgingly  or  formally,  but  ex 
2 
animo,  with  recadiness  of  heart'?.  ' 
as  servants  of  Christ. 
In  Col.  3.23ý,  the  same  exhortations  are  rereated  and 
the  meaning  of  tx  TuXTc,  is  similar  to  that  of  Eph.  6.6. 
The  -oresence  of  the  ýv  ývc  nvcýJIUTL  in  the  same 
sentence  (Phil.  1.27),  '  makes  the  [tLa  YuXý,  susceptible 
of  more  than  one  meaning.  AV  and  RSV  have  it  "in  one 
spirit,  with  one  mindtf  and  NEB.,  "one  in  spirit,  one  in 
mind".  Chrysostom  compares  it  with  ItIcts  4.4,,  11  ýv 
xap6ta  xa(  h  ýuXý  ýtta  and  with  Theodore  of 
1-S.  D.  F.  Salmond,  The  Er)istle  to  the  Enhesians  in  EDT 
(1903).  D-378. 
2.  Eph.  6.6;  Vulg.  'lax  animoll;  AV-  and  RSV  lifrom  the 
heart";  NEB  "whole-heartedly";  cT).  Matt.  22-37; 
Ilark  12-30;  Lu 
. 
Ltke  12.27. 131. 
Mopseuestia  joins  pLZI  (PuXig  with  H.  W. 
Robinson  considers  that  it  means  "desiret,  2  and  R.  Smith 
treats  it  as  lllifett3.  Bultmann  and  Stacey  elaborate  and 
add  a  few  lines  more  on  this  point  than  the  previous  one. 
Here  is  what  they  say  one  after  the  other:  "The  phrase 
'with  one  psyche'  (lirce  in  one  spirit)  means  in  agreement 
i.  e.  having  the  saine  attitude  or  the  same  orientation-of 
will;  and  there  is  no  difference  between  psyche  here  and 
other  expres§ions  that  mean  tendency  of  onets  will,  one's 
intention  (cf.  I  Cor.  1.19  funited  in  the  same  mind  - 
nous  -  aiad  the  same  judgment').  Words  compounded  with 
the  root  psyche,  indicate  the  same  thing.  Sym-psychos 
faeans  Ibeing  in  agreetaent'  (of  one  mind)  Phil.  2.2  RSV; 
the  isops  chos  (Phil.  2.20)  is  the  like  minded,  Eunsychein 
The  of  good  cheer.,  hopeful,  confident,  (Phil.  2.19),  offer 
also  in  H.  A.  A.  Aennedy,  The  Enistle  to  the 
Philipnians  (MT)  London  (1903).  p.  4  3  n.  on  5.27; 
M.  R.  Vincent.,  A  Critical  and  Exegetical  Commentary  on 
the  Epistles  to  the  PhiliDpians  and  to  Philemon  'ýICC) 
Edinburgh  (1.697)  PP-33-4  n.  on  5.27  connecting  on 
-lie  ýtLq  (pUX-Tj  and  regarding  it  as  "the  mind  as  1. 
seit  of  sensation  and  desire,  on  the  contrary  suggests. 
that  I'Here[LLa  ývVg  is  not  to  be  construe;  d  wich 
a,  UT)%C.  Ut  but  only  with  cTu%ja-&XOZvTEC"- 
2.  "Hebrew  Psychology  in  relation  to  Pauline  Anthror), 
--)iogy"  In  Mansfield  College  Essays,  p.  280;  Idem  The  Christian 
Doc7trine  of  Man,  p.  10b. 
3.  R.  Smith,  The  Bible  Doctrine  of  Man,  P-138. 132. 
a  somewhat  different  nuance.  It  does  not  mean  the 
willing  of  something,  it  is  true,  but  it  does  also. 
express  the  intention  element  of  that  vitality  which  is 
denoted  by  nsychell.  Stacey  on  the  other  hand  remarks: 
I'The  key  is  that  it  is  meant  to  emphasize  Lv  ývC  nvc6jiaTL. 
Paul  wanted  a  word  that  would  repeat  the  sense  of  nvetpa 
and  he  used  Oxý  because  in  one  sense  nvcvjýta 
and  ýUxýj  are  synonyms.  In  doing  so,  he  draws 
into  a  meaning  which  it  does  not  usually  bear,  but  which 
.2  n\jcupa  often  bearst' 
In  three  other  instances  the  word  psych  stands  for 
everyo  ne,  for  the  living  person,  for  the  self  and  the  like.  3 
1.  R.  Bultmann.,  Theology  of  the  New  Testament,  I,  pp.  204-5. 
2.  W.  D.  Stacey,  The  Pauline  Doctrine  of  Man,  T)P-122-3; 
F.  W.  Beare  The  Eýistle  to  the  Philippians  in  BTqTC, 
London  (195-9-ý  p.  67.,  seems  to  oppose  here  any  distindt- 
ion  between  "soult'  and  "spirit"  and  to  emphasize  the 
demand  f  or  the  flentire  inward  unity". 
3.  In  favour  of  this  meaning  are  the  following:  H.  Cramer., 
*Biblico-Theoiogical  Lexicon  of  N.  T.  )  P-5-5;  G.  Bauer 
Lexicon-  Cambridge,  --,:  ).  q0L-3;  W.  F.  Arndt  and 
G.  W.  Gingoich,  Ei.  T.  Greek-English  Lexikon  of  the  New 
,  Tesýtament  and  other  Early  Litgra-ture,  PP-901-3;  W-J- 
-t.  I..  a-  ,  -ýn  ý-  "S.  -ul"tL-  s7he'  Nevr.  Bjble-  Dictiý)nary,  e(II.  by  J.  D. 
, D,:,  u61as  IVYý9-62-Tjý  ;  'H.  14.  Robinson,  Hp.  br'ew  PSycholog 
in  relation  to  Pauline  finthro  1  p.  2dO;  Idem  The  0 
Christian  Doctrine  of  Man,  "D.  15  E.  D.  W.  Burton,  SDirit, 
Soul  and  Flesh)  P-163;  W.  Guthbrod,  Die  Paulintsche'' 
Anthrolologie,  1,07;  C.  R.  Smith,  The  Bible  Doctrine  of 
.!,,  ýIan-,  P-13d;  '  W-D-.  Stacey  The  Pauline  View  of  Man,  p.  123; 
F.  T.  Lord  The  Unity  of  Body  and  Soul,  *-London  (lc2q)  P-56;  C.  Spicq  Dieu  et  lihomme,  Paris  (1961)  P-156  n.  1;  H. 
Mehl-Koehnlein  L-1homme  selon_llaTiotre  Paulý  Neuchatel  -  Paris  (1951)  p.  -f1r-;  -R.  Bultmann,  The  Theology  of  the  New 
Testament,  p.  204;  W.  Barclay.,  Flesh  and  ST)irit 
( 
.19 
2)  pp'.  12-13.  _,, 
London 133. 
St.  Paul  affirms  that  there  is  no  favouritism  with 
G  od.  Everyone,  every  single  man,  every  human  being,  every 
i  ndividual, 
1 
either  Jew  or  Greek,  who  commits  sin  and  is 
doing  wrong  or  is  against  God.,  will  be  punished.  Here  it 
is  apparent  that  the  word  psyche  implies  the  whole  man, 
-j  -)  -  ).  2  the  total  man,  the  whole  person,  the  self  (like 
The  expression  naaa  (ýuXý 
3  is  a  Hebraism,  4 
which 
emphasizes  the  individuality  in  general,  and  moans  simply 
every  person  everyone,  every  individual5 
.9. 
or  as  we  inight 
say,  a  living  person  or  simply  a  soul. 
6 
Romans  2.9;  11'En(  naaav  (PuXývll  Vulg.  "in  omnem 
adimEn  hominis";  AV  "every  soul  of  man".  RSV,  NEB 
flevery  human  bbing1l;  *13.1;  see  also  Acts  2.41,43; 
3.23;  7.14;  Rev.  18-13;  etc. 
2.  R.  Bultmann,  Theology  of  the  New  Testament,  p.  204;  also 
in  W.  D.  Stqcey  op.  cit.  p.  '123;  H.  M.  Koehnlein  Lthomme 
selon  lIa,  0tre  Paul,  p.  21. 
3.  Romans  13  1*  comp.  also  with  references  of  p.  16  n-1  and 
Epict.  1:  2L4;  Lev.  7.27:  naaa  gXýI  ý  dv  y6LyTj  alpa; 
Rev..  16-31  xa(  nUaa  (ýuXý  CwQC  &n  Oave;  see  also  for 
references  only  in  F.  J.  Leenhardt,  Romans,  P-325  n.  i. 
4.  W.  Sanday  and  A.  Headlam,  Romans  in  (ICC)  P;  366  n.  on 
5.1;  also  in  J.  Denney,  Romans,  in  (BGT) 
. 
695  n.  on  1; 
V.  Taylor,  To  the  Romans,  p.  T4-;  K.  Barrett  riomans  in 
BNTC  p.  245- 
5.  AV  ?  'every  soully;  RSV,  NEB  "Every  person";  F.  F.  Bruce., 
Romans  (TNTC)  p.  236. 
6.  W.  Barclay  Flesh  ---,  nd  Snirit.,  pp.  12-13. 134. 
Another  example  having  exactly  the  same  meaning  as 
its  two  previous  counterparts  is  the  passage  in  which 
St.  Paul  emphatically  says  to  the  Corinthians,  I  will  most 
gladly  and  willingly  spend  all  I  have  (money,  property, 
time,  etc.  )  and  even  be  spent  out  myself  for  you, 
1 
for 
your  soulst  sake. 
Stacey  detects  here  the  possibility  of  ascribing  to 
Tsyche  the  force  of  spiritual  state,  but  goes  on  to  say 
that  such  an  interpretation.,  though  possible,  is  not 
exclusive,  referring  self  consciousness  rather  to  rneuma. 
2 
There  remain  to  be  considered  1  thess.  5.23  and  the 
adjectives  ýUXLx6c-nvcUJlaTLx6cq  but  hero  we  say  nothing 
about  them  as  we  are  going  to  discuss  them  later  in 
special  chapters. 
Arriving  at  the  end  of  this  chapter,  the  first  thing 
we  have  to  note  is  that  for  St.  Paul  the  word  psych  is 
2  Cor.  12-15  "bTt4  'rW-v  OX05v  ý4v;  Vulg. 
"animabus  vestrlsll;  AV  and  RSV  Iffor  your  souls"; 
NEB  "for  you";  see  also  R.  Bultmann.,  Theology  of  the 
New  Testament,  I,  p.  204;  W.  H.  Robinson,  The  Christian 
View  of'  Man,  p.  10b. 
2.  W.  D.  Stacey,  The  Pauline  View  of  I-Ian,  p.  123;  J.  H. 
Bernard.,  2  Corinthians  in  IDT  P-113  n.  on  5-15,  says 
something  similar  'to  it:  it  'YuXr*)  is  here  used  (as 
at  fleb.  13-11-17,1  Pet.  2.11)  of  the  spiritual  part 
of  man,  the  interests  of  which  are  eternalt'. 135. 
neither  a  significant  term  or  idea  (dass  ýuXý  bei  Pls. 
Kein  bezeichnender  Begriff  ist)'  nor  a  word  determining 
his  thought., 
2 
far  from  it. 
The  least  we  could  say  for  its  meaning  is  to 
summarize  what  has  been  already  set  out. 
What  emerges  from  the  foregoing  pages  is  this: 
It  is  evident  that  St.  Paul  thinks  of  the 
.-i*.  along  the  lines  of  the  Old  Testamentfs  teaching. 
In  other  words  the  Pauline  concept  of  nsyche  is  equivalent 
to  the  and  mainly  denotes  life,  the  breathing, 
the  vital  rrinciple.,  the  principle  of  physical  life,  of 
the  human  li*fe,  "man  as  a  living  beingt'.  3  Further,  by 
metonomy,  psyche,  on  the  one  hand,  designates  the 
individual.,  the  human 
.' 
being,,  and  in  other 
cases,  on  the  other  hand,  stands  for  a  conscious  being, 
thinking,  feeling  and  acting. 
W.  Gathbrod,  Die  Paulinis  nk  t, 
2.  W.  D.  Stacey.,  Contributions  and  Comments.,  a  reply  to 
R.  Laurin's  article,  HThe  Concept  of  Man  as  a  Soul") 
The  Expository  Times,,  'VO.  L.  72,  Oct.  i960  -  Se-,  A.  1961, 
P-349. 
R.  Buitmann,  Theology  of  the  New  Testament,  I,  p.  204. 136. 
Bultmann's  words  well  state  the  case,  but  do  not 
readily  admit  of  su,  -iiraary  and  are  quoted  as  they  stand: 
"Hence  it  is  incorrect  to  understand  nsyche  in  Paul  as 
meaning  only.  "the  principle  of  animal  lifell  and  as  standing 
in  close  relation  to  11flesh"  understood  as  the  matter 
enlivened  by  that  DsYche.  Rather  psych  is  that 
specifically  human  state  of  being  alive  which  inheresin 
man  as  a  striving,  willing,  purposing.,  self1f. 
1 
R.  Bultmann,  Theoiogy  of  the  New  Testametn  ,  I,  p.  205; 
see  also  H.  ,,. iehl  -Kochlein,  LIhomme  selon  L'An5tre 
Paul,  p.  21,  who  anrears  to  follow  and  adopt  Bultmann's 
views  throughout  his  treatment;  W.  D.  Stacey,  The 
Pauline  View  of  Man,  *o.  125  n.  1,  who  cuotes  the  first 
and  gives  only  the  reference  of  0.  Pfleiderer, 
Primitive  Christianity,  Vol.  I,  N.  Y.  (1906)  pp.  271-2; 
Pfleiderer  seems  to  express  a  somewhat  similar  view  to 
that  of  Bultmann's  with  what  he  remarks  below:  "We 
must  not  conclude  however 
......  that  Paul  thought  of 
the  latter  (viz.  soul)  as  a  purely  animal  principle 
with  the  exclusion  of  spiritual  functions,  rather  he 
uses  "Soul"  as  well  as  spirit  for  subjcct  of  personal 
states  of  consciousness,  especially  feelings,  in  which 
the  whole  undivided  man  is  concernedif.  See  also 
C.  Spic  .  Dieu  et  11homme  Selon  le  Nouveau  Testament, 
?  P-155-ý- 137. 
A  note  on  Gen.  1.26,27  and  Gen.  2.7. 
Gerhard  Von  Rad  observes  that  there  is  absolutely  no 
unity  in  the  ideas  of  the  Old  Testament  about  the  nature  of 
Man. 
1  In  view  of  this  statement  we  regard  it  as 
unnecessary  to  deall  with  the  Hebrew  psychology  (Old 
Testament.,  the  Apocrypha  and  the  Rabbinic  teaching)  as  a 
whole.  It  is  sufficient  for  us  to  investigate  the  true 
and  exact  meaning,  as  far  Ls  rossible,  of-Gen.  1.26,27 
and  Gen.  2.7  which  are  mentioned  by  St.  PC--ul  and  are 
relevant  to  our  thesis  and  of  great  importance,  not  at 
length,  as  this  would  take  us  far  beyond  the  limits  Of  our 
present  inquiry,  but  briefly. 
G.  Von  Rad,  E.  T.  trans.  by  O.  M.  G.  Stalker,  Old  Testament 
'Theology,  London  (1963)  PP-152-3;  Germaed.,  Theologie 
des  Alten  Testamentsý  B"nd  I.,  D5.156-7;  see  also 
J.  Pederson,  Isreal,  1-11  (1926  Dp.  99  ff;  A.  R. 
Johnson,  The  Vitality'of  the  Individual  In  the.  Though 
of  Ancient  Isr-bal,  Cardiff'(1964)-  rn.  1-2;  L.  Koeher, 
Ola  Testament  Theology,  London  (19ý7)  PP-131  ff; 
W.  E4,.  chrodt,,  Theology  of  the  Old  Testament,  II,  rp.  69 
ff. 138. 
(a)  Imago  Dei;  Gen. 
- 
1.26,2ý. 
Among  the  various  passages'  in  which  we  meet  the  word 
imag  e,.  c  tx6v,  two  T,  assages,  at  least,  stmid.  out  for 
the  aescription  of  every  man,  man's  humanity  in  a 
marginal  sense2  and  directly  refer  to  Gen.  1.26,27. 
The  two  Piiuline  passages  which  refer  to  Gen.  1.26,27 
run  as  follows: 
"For  a  man  ought  not  to  cover  his  head,  since  he 
is  the  image  and  glory  of  God".,  3  dnd 
(ii)  "and  have  Tut  on  the  new  nature,  which  is  being 
renewed  in  -unowledge  after  the  image  of  its  creator". 
(RSV) 
. 
1.  Passages  referring  to  image  in  general  are  the 
following:  Rom.  1.23;  8.29;  1  Corinthians  11.7  and 
15-49; 
.2 
brinthians  3.18;  14:  4;  Col.  1.15  and  3.10. 
2.  D.  Cairns,  The  Image-of  God  in  Man,  London  11953)  P-32. 
3.1  Corinthians  11.7;  see  also  S.  V.  McCasland  ''The  Image 
of  God  accoiding  to  Paul".  The  Jou1nal  of  Biblical 
Literature,  MIX  (1950)  0-652  87;  C.  R.  Smith,  The 
Bibie  DocErine  of'Man,  p.  182;  and  aiso  in  the 
following  commentaries:  A  Denney,  I  Corin  .  in  MT 
(19083)  Vol-II2  P-873  n.  on  5.7;  H.  L.  Goudge,  The 
First  Elistle  to  the  Corinthians,  A,  London  (19113) 
p.  96  n.  on  5.7;  L.  lorris,  1  Corinthians,  TNTC,  London, 
(1958)  1).  153  n.  on  5.7, 
Col.  3.10;  also  in  S.  V.  McCasland,  ibid.  PP-85.,  88; 
TT7.  F.  Smith  ibid  .  182;  T.  K.  Abbot,  Rrhis.  Colos.  (ICC) 
Lonuon  (1909)  p:  294  n.  on  5.10;  L.  B.  Radford,  Colos. 
and  Phil.  in  WC  London  (1931)  p.  268. 139. 
Now.,  to  trace  the  true  meaning  of  the  word  Image,  we 
have  to  go  back  and  consider  the  Gen.  1.26,27*1 
St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa  underlines  the  difficulty  of 
2 
understanding  and  interpreting  this. 
To  most  of  the  Greek  Fathers  the  terms  image  and 
likeness  do  not  have  the  same  meaning,  but  are 
distinguishable.  The  interPretation  of  one  of  the 
greatest  and  most  eminent  systematic  theologians  of  the 
Greek  Orthodox  Church,  St.  John  of  Damascus,  who  epitomised 
and  systemized  in  a  scientific  way,  the  doctrinal  teaching 
of  his  Tredecessors,  may  be  regarded  as  representative  of 
all  the  Greek  Fathers. 
His  exposition  may  be  rounded  off  into  defining  irmago 
in  terins  of  rationality  and  freedom  and  likeness  as 
1.  ComT).  also  with  Gen.  5.1-3  and  9.5-6. 
2.  St.  Grogory  of  Nyssa:  Ad  Imaginem  Dei  et  ad  2-IPG  -14.,  1328A 
Similitudinem  11"EaTL  y6p,  F'-crTLv  ý)c  ElioC  ye  5OxcT,  h 
To"u  &vop6nou  xaTaaxcuý  yopcpd  TLC  xaC  8vcycpp.  'O'VcvTOC,  xac 
noUd  xaC  &n6xpuya  puavopLa  OcoZ  LýcLxovCýouaa;  '? 
also  ibid.  1340B. 140. 
appertaining  to  assimilation  to  God  through  virtue. 
' 
John  of  Damascus,  De  fide  orthodoxa,  2,,  12;  IAPG  94,920) 
To  p6v  y6p  xaT"r-tx6va  T6  \)ocp6\)  671NOT  Xa[  abTCý06CJLOV 
T6  66  %aO'6j10(WaLV,  Týv  Týc  &pcTýc  xaTc'x  T6  6uvaT6v  ^0 
6POCWCTL\)"  ; 
see  also  in  the  following: 
1.  ctn6v  as  signifying  the  rational  faculties 
and  freewill: 
(a)  rational  part:  Origen,  Commentary  in  Joan,  Tom. 
2,75;  MPG  14)  153B;  Clement  of  Alexandria, 
Strom.  Lib.  5.  cap.  14;  MPG  91  140A; 
Athanasius,  Orat.  de  incarnatione  Verbi,  3,40; 
MPG  25.,  101B;  St.  Gregoryýof  Nyssa,  in  verbay 
Fad.  hom.  ad  imag.  Ot  simil.,  orat.  I;  MPG  44y 
273A  BCD;  St.  John  Chrysostom  (sever.  )  De 
mundi  creatione  oratio,  2.4y  IOG  56y  443; 
C  il  of  Alexandria,  in  John  Evangcli1.1.  -.,  i.,  Lib.  9 
(ýr2l)  MPG  74,276Dy  277A. 
(b)  freewill:  *  Justin  the  Martyr,  Apologia  I  7)ro 
Christ  43,  !  APG  6.,  393B;  St.  Basil  de  Hominis 
structura,  oratio  1.20,  MIPG  30)  32BC;  Y-lacarius 
of  Egypt,  Homiliae,  Hom.  15,22-23.  ý  MPG  34)  592A; 
St.  Gregory  of  Nyssa,  De  Hominis  opificio,  16, 
2APG  44,184A-D;  St.  John  Chrysostom,  in  Cap.  IV, 
Genes.  homil.  19,  ij  IMPG  53)  158D;  Cyril  of  ' 
Alexandria.,  in  Joannis  Evang.  Lib.  9)  14  (822)y 
MPG  74y  277D. 
2.  "OPO(WaLc,  as  denoting  similarity  through 
virtue:  Origen.,  De  Principis,  Lib.  3.  Cap.  6  (152), 
MPG  113  333  BCD-  Clement  of  Alexandria,  Strom.  Lib. 
2  Cap.  22  AIPG  ý,  108OC;  Methodius  Symp.  (Conviv. 
dec  Virg.  orat.  1,4,  MPG  18,44CD;  St.  Basil.,  de 
hominis  Struct.  orat.  I,  21-22p  IjIPG  30,32D-33A-C; 
Gregory  of  Nyssa,  in  verba.,  fac.  hom.  orat.  I,  MPG 
44,273A-D;  St.  John  Chrysostom,  Genes.  flomil.  9-3) 
MPG  53)  78. 141. 
For  the  Latin  Fathers  we  quote  first  of  all  Irenaeus, 
who  first  attempted  to  define  in  a  systematic  way  the 
meaning  of  imago.  He  writes:  "Homo  vero  rationabiliset 
secundum  hoc  similis  Deo".  1 
secondly,  Augustine.,  who 
relates  the  image  to  mental  and  intellectual  part  of  man: 
t'Ubi  imago  Dei?  In  monte,  in  intellectu!  yt2  and  lastly 
St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  who  deals  with  the  question  under 
consideration  at  some  length3  and  finds  that  the  image  of 
God  is  impressed  on  his  mind;  as  a  coin  is  an  image  of  the 
King.,  as  having  the  image  of  the  King.  4  Further,  he  makes 
a  subtle  distinction  between  image  and  likeness  as  that  of 
John  of  Damascus.  5 
Luther  appears  to  regard  the  imag  as  comprehending 
the  moral  faculties  and  thus  as  being  lost  by  the  Fall,  and 
Irenaeus,  Contra  haereses  4,4  (ef  3),  Ml-PG  7)  231,232A 
(98o-984). 
2.  St.  Augustine,  in  Joan.  Evang.  tract  3.1,4,  ALP  35, 
1398. 
The  Su, 
-.  qma  Thoolog4,, 
-Qa  of  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Pa5t  I.,  OQ 
LXXVCII,  'trans.  by  Dom.  Fathers.,  London  (1922 
XCIII,  Art.  91  Pp.  282-304. 
4.  Summa  Theologica,  ibid.  GXCIII,  generally  art.  6  and 
more  particularly:  Reply  to  obj.  I)  pp.  292-96. 
Summa  Theologica,  QXCIII,  generally  art.  9  and 
especially  h  answer  and  reply  to  obj.  1-4,  pp. 
302-304. 142. 
restored  by  Redemption. 
Calvin  aligns  Imago  Dei  with  the  totality  of  human 
nature.  As  this  nc-,  ture  is  totally  depraved  in 
consequence  of  the  Fall,  so  it  is  the  imago  defaced  - 
though  not  effaced.  It  is-the  fruit  of  Redemption  that 
the  imago  is  restored  in  like  totality.  2 
The  position  of  modern  exegesis  and  scholarship  is 
that  there  is  no  distinction  whatsoever  between  image  and 
likeness,  but  simply  a  straightforward  case  of  Hebrew 
parallelism,  in  which  a  second  phrase  repeats  the  meaning 
of  the  phrase  that  has  gone  before.  3  Or  as  Th.  C. 
Vriezen  puts  it:  TIBesides  'The  image  of  God'  we  also  find 
Ithe  likeness  of  God'.  This  latter  phrase  is  a  further 
definition  of  the  former,  it  does  not  add  a  new  element. 
Those  dogmatice  which  have  founded  certain  speculation  upon 
this  view  are  therefore  on  the  wrong  track;  the  expression 
'after  our  likenesst  is  no  more  than  a  further  explanation 
1  SermmiGe.  n.  33)54)G7. 
2.  J.  Calvini,  Institutio  Christianae  Religionis,  ed.  by 
Tholuch.,  Edinburgh.,  IMCCCLUIV,  Vol.  1.15,45  pp. 
343-4. 
3.  Alan  Richardson,  Genesis  I-  XI,  SCAI,  London  (1959)  P-54; 
see  also  J.  Laidlaw,,  *-The  Bible  Doctrine  of  1.1an,  pp. 
142-3;  Idem.  "Imaget'  in  J.  Hastings,  A  Dictionarv  of 
the  Bible.,  Vol.  '  II.,  Edinburgh  (1906)  3.452;  also  J.  * 
Orr.,  Godts  Image  in  Ijan,  London  (1907  )  PP-36Y  54,  n.  l. 143. 
of  the  words  'in  our  image  (1.26.,  v-3ý"'-l 
The  position  of  G.  von  Rad  may  be  taken  as 
characteristic  of  that  of  modern  scholarship.  Starting 
. 
from  the  foregoing  premise,  he  takes  into  consideration  the 
primitive  concept  of  a  demiurge  literally  fashioning  an 
"image"  of  himself  from  clay.,  as  the  fIrst  step  towards 
creating  a  man,.  Von  Rad  points  out  that  Hebraic 
anthropology,  in  its  very  refusal  to  make  a  firm  dichotomy 
between  bod  and  soul.,  must  have  taken  account  of  the 
primitive  concept,  applying  its  own  theological  genius  to 
interpet  imago  in  terms  neither  merely  physical  nor  solely 
2 
spiritual.  Again,  it  Is  a  totality  to  which  imago  refers. 
Here,  it  is  highly  relevant  to  quote  Driver,  who 
suggests  that  "both  words  refer  here  evidently  to  spiritual 
resemblance  aloneO  and  Skinner,  who  holds  that  Ilit  may  be 
truer  to  say  that  it  denotes  primarily  the  bodily  form  but 
Includes  those  spiritual  attributes  of  which  the  former  is 
1.  Th.  C.  Vriezen,  kn  Outline  of  Old  Testament  Theolog 
Oxford  (1958)  p.  208. 
2.  G.  Von  Rad,  Genesis,  London  (1951)  PP-56-7- 
3.  S.  R.  Driver.,  The_Book  of  Genesis,  in  WC,  London  (1904) 
P-15. 144. 
the  natural  and  self-evident  symbol". 
1 
It  falls  outside  the  scope  of  the  present  note  to 
discuss  als.  o  the  theological  development  and  treatment  of 
the  subject.  It  would  be  sufficient  to  observe  that  this 
wholesome  task  has  been  undertaken  by  E.  Brunner  in  his 
great  book,  Man  in  Revolt  and  K.  Barth,  in  his  Chulch 
Dogmatics.,  Vol.  111,11  1112  2.2 
J.  Skinner.,  Genesis  (ICC)  London  (1930  see  also  some 
other  various  views  more  or  less  along  the  same  lines. 
W.  Eichrodt,  Theologie  des  Alten  Testaments,  Berlin 
(1950)  11,  P.  62;  "Image  in  the  Conscious  Personality" 
E.  Jacob,  Theology  of  Old  Testament,  London  (1958) 
p  172-  L.  Koehler,  Old  Testament  Theolog  ,  London 
(i957J  p.  147;  Dr.  Paul  Heinisch,  Theology  of  the  Old 
Testament,  2inn6sota,  U.  S.  A.  (1955)  p.  170  (A*Romayl 
Catholic  view):  "The  basis  of  man's  sovereignty  over 
animals  lies  in  his  creation  ?  in  the  image  of  God, 
conformable  to  his  Ilikenosst.  This  can  refer  only 
to  man's  spiritual  Ondowments,  it  consists  in 
intelli,  -,,  ence,  which  distinguishes  man  from  the 
remaining  visible  creation.  Man  excels  not  in  bodily 
strength,  in  fact  he  is  inferior  in  this  to  many 
animals,  but  in  mental  capabilities".  And  two  quite 
opposite  views.,  C.  R.  Smith,  The  Bible  Doctrine  of  11-an, 
pp.  29-30Y  95-7y  182-5,  maintain  throughout  all  these 
pages  that  Gen.  1.26.,  27.,  refer  to  "man's  outward 
formiyand  that  this  form  must  be  understood  as 
Ilphysicallt  and  not  I'material't  It  I  The  same  line  of 
thought  P.  '  vari  Imschoot.,  Theoi6gie  De  L'ancien  Testa- 
ment,  Tome  II,  LIhomme  )  Paris  (1956)  pp.  5-9  follows: 
I'Several  exdg*etes  maintain  that  for  the  author  of 
Genesis  1.26,27;  5.1;  9.6;  man  is  the  physical, 
corporeal  image  of  Elohim  (God).  This  -ýresur-,  oses 
that  the  author  conceives  God  under  a  human  form". 
2.  See  also  E.  Brunner's  article  "The  New  Barth"  in 
Scottish  Journal  of  Theologyl(1951)  2,  pp.  123-35.  A 
very  brief  account  and'analysis  of  Brunner's  and  Barth's 
views  is  given  by  D.  Cairns.,  The  Image  of  God  in  Man., 
pp.  146-205. 145. 
G  en.  2.7. 
'IuXýv  As  far  as  the  second  noto  on  "etc, 
(71  St.  Paul  quotes  Gen.  2  ^Lj)  which  -7-  i 
j.  T 
primarily  we  could  say  with  R.  Bultmann,  donotes  a  living 
being,  an  animate  person  and  in  contrast  with  11n\jc-D[ia 
ýWOROLO-UV.  11  life  giving  spirit,  that  is,  to  the 
divinely  given  capacity  for  eternal  life,  psyche,  is  now 
the  merely  natural  earthly  vitality.  2  Butthe  case  is  not 
as  simple  as  it  anpears  and  cannot  be  dismissed  with  a 
single  sentence.  It  needs  further  treatment  and  the  best 
we  can  do  is  to  go  back  to  Gen.  2.7  and  recaDitulate  its 
true  meaning  as  briefly  as  possible,  confining  ourselves 
to  some  of  the  modern  scholars. 
1.  I-Cor.  15.45. 
2.  R.  Bultmann,  Theology  of-the  New  Testament,  I.  p.  204; 
comp.  also  with  John  5.21:  Ou"'T  wraC6  Yt6r, 
014  OeXCL  ýWOROLETL"; 
see  also  W.  D.  Stacey,  The  Pauline  View  of  Nlan,  p.  122, 
"In  I  Cor.  15.45  (ýUxý  ýMau  is  an  exact 
translation  o-l"  the  Hebrew  of  Gen.  2  .7  11  ly,  i.,  and 
clearly  conveys  the  natural  taliveness'  lo  man-,  Part 
from  what  might  be  called  spiritual  life.  Tuxý  Zwaa 
add  to  and  interpret  each  other";  John  6.63;  20.22; 
Acts  11-33;  2  Cor.  3,6.17.  One  may  find  more  or  less 
or  similar  or  slightly  different  views  also  in  the 
following  commentaries:  G.  G.  Findlay,  I  Corinthioný, 
in  EGT)  P-397-8;  F.  Codet,  I  Corinthians,  Vol.  2. 
pp.  417-23;  H.  L.  Goudge,  I  Corinthians,  in.  WC, 
_P. 
57 
n-1;  L.  Morris,  I  Corinthians.,  in'TNTC  pp  22  9. 146. 
Verse  7.  "Then  the  Lord  God  formed  man  of  dust  from 
the  ground  and  breathed  into  his  nostrils  the  breath  of 
life,  and  man  became  -  living  boing"..,  1 
which  describes 
anthropomorphically  and  mythologically  the  origin  and 
creation  of  man  and  which  is  a  locus  classicus  of  Old 
,  must  be  conceived  and  interrreted  Testament  anthropology.  2 
according  to  many  modern  scholars  not  in  the  analytical 
old  Greek  fashion  or  way,  but  more  in  the  modern  one,  that 
isý  the  synthetical.  In  other  words,  the  infusion  of 
breath,  which  exists  also  in  the  an-imal  worldý  by  God  into 
2 
the  nostrils  of  man  does  not  stand  for  an  independent 
element  and  distinct  spiritual,  divine  and  immortal  entity 
or  a  kind  of  mants  hieher  part  and  principle,  as  with  the 
Plato)  it  simply  denotes  life,  animal  life,  the  vital  power 
which  gives  life  to  the  body  and  cannot  exist  outside  and 
without  it  or  as  A.  R.  Johnson  expresses  better.,  "The  term 
V  .  -I 
is  obviously  being  used  to  indicate  not  something 
conceived  as  but  one  (albeit  the  surerior)  part,  of  man's 
being,  but  the  complete  personality  as  a  unified 
Vulg.  "animam  viventemll;  JB  "a  living  being";  AV.,  RV, 
t1a  liVing  soultt;  A.  R.  Johnson,  The  One  and'the  rdany'in 
the  Isrealite  conception  of  God,  Cardiff  (1961)  p.  2; 
The'Vita-iity  of  the  Individual  in  the  Thought  of  Ancient 
Isreal,  Cardiff  (179-4-2T  p.  19  n.  1,  regards  AV,  RV's 
rendering'  as  misleading,  prefers  that  of  RSV  and'trans- 
lates  it  as  '?  a  living  person". 
2.  T.  Skinner,  Genesis  in  ICC  P-56;  also  in  G.  von  Rad., 
Genesis.,  P-75. 
3.  Gen.  2.19;  6.17;  7.15,22. 147. 
manifestation  of  vital  power,  it  ropresentowhat  Pedersen 
has  called  "the  grasping  of  a  totality". 
It  must  be  noted  that  L.  Koehler  seems  to  differ  from 
the  undermentioned  scholars  by  holding  the  gerieral  state- 
ment  that  "It  does  not  say  man  has  a  living  soul.  Soul 
is  the  nature  of  man,  not  his  possession  ....  man  is  a 
soul". 
2 
Dr.  Laurin,  rolying  on  L.  Koehler,  takes  up  again  the 
roint  and  tries  to  establish  more  or  less  the  fact  that 
man  is  a  soul,  on  the  grounds  that  nephesh  very  often 
signifies  the  man  and  rejýresents  the  courlcto  individual 
and  on  the  exegesis  of  the  creation  story  (cf.  Gen.  2.7. 
Job  27-3.33-4).  3 
1.  A.  R.  Johnson,  The  One  zýnd  the  gony  in  the  Isrealite 
Conce'Ption  of  God,  '  1).  2  *.  There  is  a  consensus 
of  opinion  to  this  effect  among-the  following  scholars: 
J.  Pedersen,  Isreal,  I-II,  pp.  106-33;  H.  W.  Robinson, 
"Hebrew''Psychoiogy"  in  The  Peonle  and  thp  Book,  ed..  by 
A.  S.  Peake,  London  (1925)  P-368;  A.  E.  Davidson,  The 
Theology  of  the  Old  Testament,  Edinburgh  (1904)  p-.  -fj4; 
J.  Skinner.,  Genesis  in  WC  P-56;  Th.  Vriezon,  An 
Outline  of  Old.  'Testament  Theolog 
)  p.  202;  G.  Pidaux, 
LIhomme  dans  Itancien  Testament,  Paris  (1953)  r-17; 
E.  C.  Rust,  Nature  and  Ilan  in  Biblical  Though 
. 
London 
U953)  P-105;  Gerhard  Von  Rad.,  Genesis,  P-75;  A. 
Richardson  in  SCIIA  Genesis,  I-XI  London  (1959)  P  b2; 
G.  Pidaux,  ?  'Llhomme  dans  l1ancien  Testament"  -P-15ý  ill 
J.  Bleeker,  AnthroDologie  Religiouse,  Lieden  (1955ý- 
2.  L.  Koehler,  01cji  Testament  Theolog 
,  n,.  142. 
3.  R.  Laurin.,  '?  The  Concept  cof  Man  as  a  Soýilll  in  the  Exnos., 
Times,  Vol.  72,  Oct.  1960  -  Sept.  1961,  PP-131-32  ff; 
also  New  Testament  Abstracts.,  Vol.  5.  Srring  1961, 
No.  37Y  P-321  n.  d26  or  NTA  5  (3y  61). 148. 
His  statement  that  "man  is  a  soul".,  which  is  a  curious 
and  ambiguous 
1 
one.,  and  some  other  of'  his  conclusions,  have 
been  chalienged  by  W.  D.  Stacey  and  dismissed  with  the  words 
that  Mel2hes  is  thus  just  one  of  a  dozen  words  that 
represent  both  a  constituent  element  in  man  and  an  Casnect 
of  his  whole  T-erson". 
Ne-phesh,  therefore,  when  it  is  not  referring  to  the 
whole  person,  means  nothing  more  than  the  animal  vitality 
that  first  came  upon  man  in  Gen.  2.7  and  that  distinguishes 
the  living  from  the  dead. 
Ne'Phesh,  therefore,  does  not  have  special  function  of 
representing  the  body-spirit  unity  "except  in  the  sense  that 
all  the  terms  for  the  constituent  elements  in  'man  represent 
it.  Consequently,  it  is  misleading  to  say  that  man  is  a 
soul 
2 
Coming  to  an  end  of  the  present  paragraph,  we  shouic' 
note  two  things: 
Wý'D.  Stacey,  Contributions  and  Comments,  "A  Reply  on 
Man  as  a  Soul".,  Exp.  Times,  ibid.  P-349. 
2.  W,  D.  Stacey,  "A  Reply  on  M-en  as  a  Soul",  in  ExI2.  Time.  Z. 
72  (196o-61)  P-349. 
11 149. 
1.  That  in  Israelite  thought  man  is  conceived,,  not  so 
much  in  dual  fashion  as  body  ond  soul.,  but 
synthetic-ally  as  a  unit  of  vit,,  l  power  or  (in 
current  torminology)  a  psycho-phy-sical  organism 
1, 
ar,  -1. 
So  to  sum  up  with  an  emphasis  upon  the  tlextensions"  of 
the  personality  we  may  say  of  the  IsrcW-,  Iite  conceptLah 
of  man  that  it  was  so  diffuse  that  Heraclitus  might 
I  well  have  been  speaking  in  Hebrew  rather  than  Greek 
terms  when  he  said,  ItThough  thou  shouldst  traverse 
every  path,  then  could  it  not  discover  the  boundaries 
of  ?  soul,,  it  hath  so  deep  a  meaning". 
2 
A.  R.  Johnson,  The  Vitality  of  the  Individual  in  the 
Thought  of  Ancient  Israel,  p.  87;  _  Idem.  The  ", )ne  and 
the  Ilan  )  pp.  1-2;  H.  Vj'.  Robinson  '?  Hebrew  Psychology" 
in  The  People  and  the  Book,  P.  36ý,  also  defines  HebreLr 
man  as  follows:  "What  is  man?  and  try  to  answer  it,, 
not  in  the  old  theological.,  but  in  the  new  psychological 
fashion,  we  shall  say  that  for  the  Hebrew,  man  is  a 
unity,  and  that  unity  is  the  body  as  a  complex  of  parts 
drawing  their  life  and  activity  from  a  breath-soul, 
which  has  no  existence  apart  from  the  body". 
2.  H.  Diels.,  Die  Fragmente  de  Vorsokratiker  (19224)  1, 
p.  86  (No.  45);  and  also  in  G.  van  der  leeuw, 
Religion  in  Essence  and  J-1-mifestation,  London  1938) 
ET  p.  275;  A.  13.  'Johnson,  The  One  and  the  M,,  mY-.,  P-13 
n-3- 150. 
13.  Spirit  or  Evel4la  The  Concert  of  Spirit. 
To  trace  the  true  and  -,  recise  meaning  as  far  as 
possible  of  thelkeyword"l  pneuma.,  which  after  all  is  "the 
most  im-rortant  word  in  Paults  psychological  vocabulary, 
perhaps  in  his  vocabulary  as  a  wholeit2  is  not  an  easy 
thing.  It  is,  on  the  contrary,  an  extrmely  difficult  and 
complex  one  because  of  the  large  number  of  c-,  ses  when  there 
is  doubt  as  to  whether  it  refers  to  God  or  to  man. 
The  difficulty  is  aggravated  by  the  simnle  orthographic 
fact  that  the  Greek  texts  of  the  Pauline  writings  do  not 
em,  ploy  the  distinction  used  in  rresent  day  English  of 
signifying  "Spirit"  with  a  caT)itai  letter  when  the  11, 
ý-)iy 
Sririt  is  meant,  and  leaving  Isririt"  of  man  with  a, 
minuscule.  In  whichever  sensc  the  word  is  used,  howc  -ver, 
the  thing  signified  is  "the  link  betwecýn  God  and  Man"  from 
one  side  or  the  other.  Further,  it  is  to  man  alone,  of  all 
living  creatures  in-the  world,  that  -,  neuma  is  attributed. 
3 
While  we  acknowledge  the  difficulties  and  COMTVleXities, 
and  however  hard  is  the  task,  we  must  note  right  from  tho 
beginning  that  we  do  not  intend  here  to  discuss  all  the 
1.  H.  W.  Robinson,  t'Hebrew  Psychology  in  relation  to 
Pauline  Anthropology'T  in  Mansfield  College  Essays, 
p.  281. 
2.  H.  W.  Robinson,  The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Man,  p.  109. 
3.  W.  barclay,  Flesh  and  Sniri  (1962)  T".  13. 151. 
as-ects  of  Paul's  use  of  IIST-drit".  1  but  the  psychological 
The  word  s7irit  occurs  in  Pauline  epistles  146  times 
(H.  W.  Robinson)  in  The  Christian  Loctrine  of  Man, 
p.  109;  Idem.  Hebrew  Psychology  in-relcation  to  Pauline 
Anthropology, 
,  ).  2bl;  (Jacquier)  as  he  is  quoted  by  Le. 
P.  E.  -  B.  Ailo,  Saint  Paul,  Premiere  eriýtre  aux 
Corinthians,,  Paris  U9562)  p.  91,  I'Le  mot  nvcUýla 
apparait  foiS  (Jacquier)  dans  les  ecrits  de  Paul"  and 
it  is  distinguished  in  various  senses;  H.  W.  Robinson., 
ibid2  pp.  109-10;  and  ibid.  pri.  281-2,  classifies  them 
as  follows:  11(l)  In  the  natural  sense  of  "wind"  it  is 
not  used  by  Paul.,  who  employs  anemos  in  this  sense 
(Eph.  4.14))  (2)  Most  of  the  ca-s-e-T7116)  fall  into  the 
second  class,  namely,  "super-natural  influences"  .... 
we  read  of  the  pneum  of  God  or  Christ  (hom.  8.23)  in 
Hebrew  psychology  etc.  p.  281,  (3)  the  use  of  ruach 
to  denote  the  principle  of  life  or  breath  (in  man)  is 
hardly  represented  amongst  the  usages  of  T)n'cuma  The 
Christian  Doctrine  of'  Man,  p.  110  n.  ý),  2Y_he_1s-s-. 
11.8  (of  Isa.  11.4)  belongs  to  the  second  group).  This 
connotation,  like  that  of  "mind'?  has  been  displ,,  ý,: ),  ced  by 
the  higher  associations  of  the  term.  (4)  There  remain 
30  cases  of  the  psychical  use  of  rno.  uma,  in  the  narrower 
scnse,  of  which  14  refer  to  the  higher  nature  of  a 
Christian  man  and  are  hardly  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  result  of  the  divine-,  neuma,  whilst  16  denote  a 
normal  element  in  human  naturetf.  W.  D.  Davics,  an 
eminent  N.  T.  scholar  himself,  also  lists  different 
meanings  of  the  word  s-.  3irit  in  his  article:  "Paul  and. 
the  Dead  Sea  Scrolls:  Flesh  and  SpiritIt  in  The  Scrolls 
and  the  New  Testament,  ed.  by  K.  Stendahl,  London 
1956)  P-176,  as  follows:  11  ....  of  the  s-nirit  of  man 
22  instances),  of  the  spirit  ýs  t,  )  thc;  flosh 
6),  of  the  Spirit  of  God  (Holy  6-pirit,  72).  of  the 
sT)irit  as  o-,  ý,,,  osed  to  the  Law  and  the  letter  (4);  of  the 
spirit  denoting  a  uality  or  disT,  osition  (13);  of  the 
Spirit  of  Christ  (9);  of  the  soirit  of  evil  or  the 
world  (2);  W.  D.  Stacey',  The  Pauline  View  of  I'Aan,  -Or. 
128-9,  similarly  sel,,  arates  and  defines  six  senses  of 
pneum  in  the  Pauline  corý 
- 
-us  (ibid.  p.  128).  For  the 
various  meanings  of  the  sririt  in  general  see  the 
following  works:  W.  P.  Dickson  St.  Paults  use  of  the 
ternis  Flesh  and  Srýiri  ,  Glaa 
Scott 
Sgow  TI-87-3-Tr5 
-  13  0-97E.  F. 
., 
The  StArit'in  the  New  Testament,  London  (1923) 
pp  127-86;  E.  D.  W.  Burton,,  Spirit,  Soul  and  Flesh.,  -p. j,  17ý-82;  Le  P.  E-B.  Allo,  Saint  Paul,  Premiere  ewftre 
aux  Corinthians,  pp.  91-4,101-15.,  "Les  sens  divers  de 
nvcupa  11  and  most  rarticularly  the  excellent  treatment  of  the  term  -, -.  ne'uma  by  E.  Schweizer,  if  nveZiia". 152. 
one.  and  more  particularly  we  could  put  it  this  way:  we 
are  going  to  deal  with  two  things:  (1)  to  discover  as 
thoroughly  as  possible  the  true  and  precise  meaning  of 
those  Pauline  rassages  which  d1rectly  refer  to  man  and 
then  (2)  to  assess  the  relationship  between  the  spirit  of 
man  and  Spirit  of  God  or  as  Prof.  #Barclay  would  -ut  it, 
ItBut  the  real  Lroblem  is  to  know  whether  the  7neuma,,  the 
spirit,  is  part  of  man  as  such,  or  uhcther  it  is  only 
part  of  a  man  after  he  has  become  a  Christian,  whether 
the  pneum  is  Dart  of  human  nature  or  whether  it  is  the 
gift  of  God  to  redeemed  human  nature". 
2 
Since  we  acCeT'ted  that  the  two  -,,  oints  are  sufficient 
to  give  us  a  clearer  view  of  the  second  psychological 
term  pneuma,  we  may  take  this  as  one  point  of  departure 
for  considering  that  term  -s  applied  to  man.  The 
different  meanings  of  these  passages  may  be  classified  as 
1.  (Contd.  from  page  151).  In  Kitte's  TAT  Vol.  VI  (1959) 
pp.  413-36,  ET,  under  the  title  "Spirit  of  God",  in  the 
series  Bible  Keywords,  London  (196o)  v-54-88. 
2.,  W.  Barclay.,  Flesh  and  S-ririt,  p.  14;  See  also  W.  Bawer., 
Worterbuch  zum  Neuen  Testament.,  ET  by  W.  F.  Aindt  and 
F.  M.  Griridrich.,  p!  ).  660-E5. i 
153. 
f  ollows: 
1 
1.  spirit  denoting  the  whole  man.,  the  self,  the  ego,  the  I. 
spirit  as  synomymous  with  soul. 
spirit  as  the  seat  of  emotion  and  will,  (rneum  in  the 
psychological  sense  of  an  ensemble  of  faculties, 
dispositions,,  tendencies,  good  or  bad,  or  indeed  the 
subjective  princiPlc  of  these  attributes). 
4.  pneum  in  the  strictly  moral  sense,  spirit  as  o-j-,,  )osed 
to  the  flesh,  which  signifies  weakness  and 
human  vices. 
pneuma  as  the  seat  of  (human)  consciousness  and 
intelligence  (or  the  human  soul  or  its  Psychological 
faculty  in  gencral  intelligence  or  rsychological 
perceTtion). 
-pneuma  signifying  the  sririt  of  man  sanctified,  united 
with  God.,  divinised. 
Now  let  us  have  a  closer  look  at  these  categories  one 
We  are  well  aware  of  the  questions  and  doubts  arising 
about  this  classification,  and  we  . --dmit  with  P.  E.  -B.  Allo,  op.  cit.  p.  94,  "Nous  essayons  une  classification, 
quoique  .  dans  tel  ou  tel  passage,  l1assignation  du  mot  ,  I.,  -  a  telle  ou  telle  des  categories  que'nous  indiquerous 
reste  douteuse,  ou  qutil  puisse  rentrer  dans  plusiours  A  la  foist'. 154. 
by  one  and  the  corresponding  Pauline  passages: 
1.  When  St.  P"nul,,  at  the  closjýg  of  his  first  letter  to 
the  Corintians,  1  Cor.  16.18,  expresses  pleasure.,  his  Joy 
and  gladness  at  the  arrival  of  Stephanas,  Fortunatus  and 
Achaicus,  representing  their  own  church,  and  adds 
characteristically  that  "they  refreshed  my  spirit  as  well 
as  yourls",  it  can  simply  mean  Itme  and  yoU'I., 
'  the  person's 
very  self  or  ego.  The  same  thing  may  be  said  for  the 
following  passages.  2  Cor.  2,13,  "But  my  mind  (Vulg. 
I'spiritui  meoll,  RSV  and  NEB.,  llsTiritll,  AV,  JB,  "I  in  mind") 
Itould  not  rest  because  I  did  not  find  my  brother  Titus 
there".,  2 
and  also  2  Cor.  7.13.,  "and  besides  our  own  comfort 
we  rejoiced  still  more  at  the  joy  of  Titus,  because  his 
mind  (Vulg.  I'Spiritus  ejus'l.,  RSV  and'NEB  v1spiritt'  AV)  has 
been  set  at  rest  by  you  all".  Furtherý  in  the  concluding 
greetings  or  in  the  concluding  benedictions  like  this.  -- 
if  [tevi  ro'O  nvF-Zýta-uor,  lbýtMv  lt3  are  used  instead 
1.  R.  Bultmam,  Thcolo  y  of  tbe,  New  Tostament,,  13  T-ý0'206.4 
2.  Comp.  with  2  Cor.  7-  ýCaV  F)-ICIX'QHF-V  aVECYLV  h  cj6pý 
hpo5v  "our  bo21csOb(8RFS  .  NEB:  flesh  AV)  had  no 
rest";  see  also  R.  Bultmann,  ibid.  p.  206;  also  A. 
Plummer.,  2  Corinthians  in  JQQ  P.  65  and  217. 
3.  Gal. 
_ 
6.18;  Phil.  4.23;  2  Tim.  4.22;  Philem.  25. 155. 
of  the  usual  11  tic.  &  'bp-w\)  or  pcT6  TEdVTWV  bpU)\J 
(because  of  the  rhetorical  pathos); 
2 
what  is  meant  is 
exactly  the  person  as  a  whole,  the  man,  the  self,  just  the 
IIIII  and  ityoutt.  3 
2.  St.  Paul  uscd  the  pneuma  and  psyche  together  at  least 
in  two  cases,  Phil.  1.27)  "1  may  hear  you  that  you  stand 
I 
I  Cor.  16.24;  2  Cor.  13-13;  Eph.  6.24;  Colos.  4.18; 
I  Thess.  5.28;  2  Thess.  3.19;  1  Tim.  6.21;  Tit. 
3.151 
R.  Bultmann,  Theology  of  the  Now  Testament,  I.  p.  206. 
3.  The  first  paragraph's  above  mentioned  passages  with 
their  respective  meaning.,  are  mentioned  mainly  in  the: 
W.  Bawer,  Ivorterbuch  zum  Neuen  Testament  (1958) 
P-1339.,  ET  by  W.  F.  Arndt  ana  F.  W.  Gringrich.,  p.  681; 
E.  Schweizer,  11  Ilve-Uvall  in  Kittel's  TVXIT  r-433 
and  E.  T.  IIS-pirit  of  God"  (in  the  Bible  Keywordsý  pp. 
84-85;  R.  Bultmann,  Theology  of  the  New  Testament,  I. 
p.  206;  also  W.  D.  Davies.,  "Paul  and  the  Dead  Sea 
Scrolls:  Flesh  and  S-irit"  in  the  Scrolls  and  the  New 
TestamQnt,  PP-177,281  n. 
46; 
and  in  some  of  the 
commentaries,  such  as: 
1.  A.  Robertson,  A.  Plummer,  I  Corinthians, 
-ICC,  396-7;  A.  Plummer,  2  Corinthians,  ICC  pp.  '65.,  2267 
H.  L.  Goudge.,  I  Corinthians  in  14C  (19113)  P-170;  F. 
Godet,  I  Corin 
' 
thians,,  Vol  II)  pp  .  467-8;  E.  D.  W.  Burton, 
Galat  *  in  ICC  (1921)'  rr-3L-2;  M.  R.  Vincent,, 
Philippians  and  Philemon  in  ICC  -  W.  E. 
,, 
T,  P.  154  and  192; 
Oesterley,  Philemon  in  EnT,  p.  217;  L.  B.  Radford, 
Philemon  in  WC.  P-367;  E.  F.  Scott,  Philemon  in  the 
Moffat  NTC,  P-115;  F.  W.  Beare,  The  Epistle  to  the 
Philipnians  in  Black's  NTC.  j  P-158;  W.  Lock,  The 
Pastoral  Epistles  in  ICC,  '7,..  112  and  elsewhere. 156. 
firm  in  one  spirit,  with  one  mind  (ýv  ývC  nvcWaTL, 
40  TUXý  )land  in  I  Thess.  5.23) 
synonymously  and  as  equivalent  to  each  other.  "  Further., 
E.  Schweizer  points  out  that  the.  nneuma-psyche  in  the 
above  mentioned  Dassages  and  also  the  Hebrew  4.12  11riercing 
to  division  of  -soul  and  spirit"  (  dXpL  pepLapo-V  (ývXýýC. 
XaC  TEVE:  16ýta-CO(;  )  must  not  be  regarded  as 
inde-rendent  and  distinct  rarts  for  the  man;  but  in"his 
own  words:  "In  4.12  Tsririt?  and  'soul'  are.  distingUished 
in  rurely  psychological  terms,  as  two  closely  inter- 
dependent  rarts;  in  other  words  the  distinction  is'a 
cliche". 
2 
According  to  E.  Schweizer  then,  we  have  not 
here  a  distinction  of  the  rarts  of  human  i-ersonality  but 
simply  a  stereotyped  literary  Dhruse,  a  cliche,  but  more 
of  this  later. 
St.  Luke  1.46,47;  Jn.  11-33;  Comp.  12.27;  1  Cor. 
'2.11;  see  also  E.  Schwiezer,  11  nvc-Wall  in 
Kittel's  TIMT,  p.  433  E.  T.  IISrIrit  of  God",,  in  Bible 
Keywords,  p.  -84;  C.  RI.  Smith.  '  The  Bible  Doctrine  of 
Man,  n.  141;  R.  Bultmann,  Theology  of  the  New  Test- 
agent,  -,,.  ).  205;  !.  R.  Vincent,  To  the'  Phili-n7-Aans  and 
to  Philemon  in  ICC,  P-33;  F.  F.  Bruce,  The  Eristle  to 
the  'Romans,  'j).  47;  Cramer.,  Lexico 
,  ol,  ).  cit.  T)-74; 
Le  P-B  Allo.,  op.  cit.  p.  92. 
E.  Schweizer, 
"Spirit  of  Gi 
Lleiýitre  aux 
are  also  the 
33-4.,  "there 
and  Ilve-upa 
they  are  not 
11  rIve'Upa"  in  TWNT, 
_p-. 
444,  E.  T. 
: )d")  n.  100;  to  the  same  effect  C.  Sricq, 
Hebrewx  (1953)  ad  loc;  worth  mentioning 
foiiowing,  M.  R.  Vincent,  o7.  cit.  pp. 
are  cases  where  the  meanings  of  TuXý 
approached  very  nGarly,  if  indeed 
practically  synonymous 157. 
3.  St.  Paul,  using  1  Cor.  2.11,  an  argument  "a  minori  ad 
majus",  ' 
a  human  comparison  and  analogy,  writes  that 
"there  are  certain  things  which  only  a  man's  own  spirit 
knows,  there  are  feelings  which  are  so  personal,  things 
which  are  so  private,  experiences  which  are  so  intimate 
that  no-one  knows  them  except  a  manIs  ow-n  sDirit.  2  No-one 
can  really  see  into  our  hearts  and  know  what  is  there 
except  our  own  spirits.  Now,  Paul  goes  on  to  argue,  the 
same  is  true  of  God.  There  arc  deeD  and  intimate  things 
in  God  which  only  God's  spirit  knows  ...  it.  3 
We  are  not  far  away  from  the  truth  if  we  observe  that 
4  the  pneuma  is  used  here,  as  elsewhere,  in  the  purely 
psychological  sense,  and  denotes  the  seat  of  human 
1.  A.  Robertson  and  A.  Plummer,  1  Cor.  in  ICC,  p.  44; 
also  G.  G.  Findlay,  I  Cor.  in  EDT,  p.  ý82  n.  on  2.11. 
2.1  Cor.  2.11.,  It  -u(r,  ydp  ol5ev  &vDp6nwv  Td  To-D 
&v0pWhou  ctp'  T6  nvcZpa  ToZ  &vopwhou  T6  Lv  abTVI; 
3.  W  Barclay.,  Tho  Letters  to  the  Corinthians,  Edinburgh  ý1961) 
P-31. 
4.1  Cor.  5.5;  7.34;  2  Cor.  7.1;  1  Thess.  5.23;  comP. 
also  Matt.,  5.3;  Mark  2.8;  Luke  1.80. 158. 
consciousness,  intelligence,  nsychologica-l  rerception, 
and  the  intellectual  faculties,  or  as  Bultmann.  would  rut 
it  11pneum  ap-,.  )roaches  the-modern  idera  of  consciousness". 
2 
4.  In  the  following  passages  Pneuma  stands  for  (a)  the 
source  and  seat  of  feeling,  exrrcssing  a  sriritual  state 
of  mind,  a  disposition  or  tenire-ament,  or  as  Allo  has  it: 
1111ve-lipa  or  sens  j.  -,  sychilogique  d'  une  ensemble  de 
i 
., 
de  dispositions.,  de  tendencies  bonnes  ou  facuities 
mauvaises,  oubien  de  principe  subjectif  de  ces  attributstt3, 
Rom.  1.4.  flana  declared  to  be  the  Son  of  God  with  power., 
according  to  the  spirit  (S7irit  RSV)  of  holiness"  (AV); 
8.15.,  "for  you  did  not  receive  the  spirit  of  slavery  to 
fall  back  into  fear,  but  you  have  received  the  spirit  of 
sonshIp",  RSV,,  AV,  TTIEB  1111ve-Wa  8oliXeCar 
.  ......  11  VC  _U  ý1  CL 
UtOOEGL'aq,  12.11  "With  unflagging  energy.,  in 
ardour  of  snirit  (Spirit  RSV),  serve  the  Lordt'  (NEB,  AV 
E.  D.  Burton.,  Silirit,  Soul,  Flesh,  r-179;  F.  Godet) 
.1  Cor.  II)  p.  11ý0;  A.  B.  D.  Alexander,  The  Ethics  of  St..  ' 
Paul,  Glasgow  (1910)  n.  64;  W.  P.  Dickson  St. 
- 
Paul's 
use  of  the  terms  Flesh  and  STirit.,  pn.  16ý  Tnd  427ý;  J. 
L,  ýidlaw 
., 
The  Bible  Doctrine'  of  L-1-an,  -,  -,.  133;  E 
Schwiezer  !  IvF--Wa  in  TWNT,  p.  433,  E:  T.  n-85; 
W.  R.  Schoemaker,  t'The  Use  of  Jý  ,I  -ý  (  in  the  O.  T.  and 
of 
nV  E  -I)  [I  CL  in  the  N.  T.  11,,  A  study) 
in  the  Biblical  Literature 
,, 
Vol.  XXIII  1004)  11ass.  pp.  64-5;  Le  P.  E-B.  Alio,  or.  cit.  n.  46  andmore  part-'- 
icuia-riy  1).  92;  H.  Ciavier.,  "Breves  Remarques  sur  ia  notion  de  aW-jja  nVEU[ta-6  L7C()V  "  in  the  Back- 
ground  of  the  New  Testament  -n6  its  Eschatology,  ed.  by 
W.  D.  Davies,  Cambridge  (1956)  r-351  n.  2. 
2.  R.  Bultmann,  Theology  ---)f  the  IN(.  -,  w  Testament,  I,  p.  207. 
3.  Le  P.  E.  B.  Allo_,  St.  Paul  1-.  remiereerTtre  aux 
Corinthians,  p.  92. 159. 
Vulg.  bpiritu  ferventes;  "Tw-  Trve6paTL  Z! 
ffoovTcr, 
11  ) 
.1 
1  Cor.  4.21  "Shall  I  come  to  you  with  a  rod  or  with  love 
in  a  soirit  of  gentieness?  "  (RSV)  2  Cor.  4-13  "Since  we 
I, 
Gal.  6.1  if  ....  in  a  s:,  irit  have  the  same  s,,  Irit  of  faith" 
of  gentienessff  (RSV)  Ephes.  1.17  "that  the  God  ....  may 
give  you  a  spirit  of  wisdom  and  of  revelation  in  the 
knowledge  of  him"  (RSV),  2  Tim.  1.7  "For  God  did  not  give 
us  a  s,,,  irit  of  timidity  but  a  sTirit  of  rower  and  1,  )ve  and 
self-control"  (RSV);  I 
or  (b)  Pneuma  may  be  placed  in 
For  the  above  references  ; and  their  res-ective  meanings 
'oul  and  see  the  following:  E.  D.  Burton,  S,  -irIt,  fIj 
Flesh.,  r  .  179.  Td.  P.  Dickson,  St.  Pau'Lls  use  of  the 
terms  Flesh  and  Spirit,  p.  4.29;  W.  Beuer.,  '-.,  IZNT,  E.  T. 
p.  6FI;  Le  P.  B.  B.  Ailo,  o-.  cit.  p.  92;  W.  D.  Davies, 
"Paul  and  the  Dead  SeC.  Scrolls:  Flesh  and  Sririt"  in 
The  Scrolls  and  the  Neir  Testament,  )-,  ).  177  and  280  n.  65; 
F.  Godet,  St.  Paul's  Fristle  to  the  Pomans,  Edinburgh 
(1880)  Vol.  I2  pp.  26-3,  -)  Vol-II.,  rT)-dl-3;  W.  Sanday  and 
A.  C.  Headlam  ,  Eowans  in  ICC.,  Ectinburgh  (1898)  -,  M,  202-3) 
361;  C.  H.  Dodd,  The  Eii,  stie  of  Paul  to  the  Fornt,,.  ns., 
'ristle  to  Fontana  edition  (1ý60)  r).  14,1;  X.  BL-rth,, 
- 
The  L", 
the  Romans,,  Oxforu  (1933)  i,,  p.  296-8.,  456;  Lo  P.  M.  J. 
Lagrange,  0-3int  Paul  opitre  aux  homans.,  Trl;  ýris  (195o7) 
pl)-7-9.,  20i-2ý,  302;  W.  J.  Cameron.,  IISS-Arit"  in  thc  Now 
Biblo  Dictionz:.,  r  IVF,  London  (1962)  r'  1212;  V.  Taylor, 
Tho  Q,  istle  to  the  f-,  omrý,  ns,  Lonuon  (19ý5)  rp.  20.,  52; 
F.  J.  Leenhardt,  Romans,  rT.  37,,  213,314;  F.  F.  Bruce.  ' 
Romans  in  TNTC,  r.  165;  0.  Kuss,  Der  Romer  brief 
Vortrag  Regc.  nsbujg,,  Erste  Lieferung  (1957)  TIT.  -7., 
,  weite  Lieferung  ý1959)  rr.  6oi-4;  A.  Robortson  and  A. 
Plummer.,  I  Corinthians  in  ICC.,  T).  93;  G.  G.  Findlay, 
.1  Corinthians  in  EGT.,  p.  806  n.  on  v.  21;  H.  L.  Goudge,  I 
Corinthians  in  WE.,  p.  n.  on  v.  21;  J.  H.  Bernard,.  2 
Corinthians  in  LUT,  71 
CorilithiL.  ns  . 
ýý3 
n.  . -,  n  v.  13;  ii.  Plu=.  jQr,..  2, 
.1P.  -L33;  E.  D.  Burton,  The,  E-  istic,  t-.  the 
G&I.,,  tiý)is  in  ICC,  *  Cý.  Iriburdh  (1921)  v-328;  -  T..,  K.  PI)b,  2tj..  F,,  istic 
-. 
s  tr)  tho  Fý,,  hcsians  vnd-to  tho  Col,,  )ssians  i"n  ICC 
Et-Ainburgh  ý1909)  j-..  2U_;  T_-F.  Wý;  stcott  st,  P.  Iulls  t,,  the  F,  '--hf_-;  sip.  ns,  Lon(on  (190t)ý-*).  23  n.  -,  n 
v-17;  W.  Lo'cki-j-Pastoral  Epistlesin  ICC.,  T).  86.  - 160. 
contrast  (a)  with  the  flesh  in  Rom.  8.4-6; 
not  according  to  the  flesh  but  according  to 
(RSV,  AV,  NEB.  Vuig.  11spiritum".  JB  "as  the 
dictates").,  Rom.  8.9.,  13:  bpeTc  6C  01 
aapxC  &W  tv  nvEupa-uL  ........  xard  a6.  pxa 
CW  TCVF-6jIaTL.  " 
....  who  walk 
the  Spirit 
spirit 
h  ýCYTC  Ev 
(Vulg.  "spirituit,  AV,  ESV.,  INEB  "Spirit"),  1  Cor.  5.5 
for  the  destruction  of  the  flesh,  that  his  sp-Lrit"  (RSV), 
2  Cor.  7.1  11  ...  let  us  cleanse  ourselves  from  every 
defilement  of  body  and  spirit  (  &no  navT6c  ýtoXvaýtoýj 
crapx6c,  %a(  nvcUpuTor,  )II. 
(RSV).  (b)  with  the  body,  Rom,  8.10  it  ...  although  your 
bodies  are  dead  because  of  sin,  your  spirits  are  alive 
because  of  righteousness",  1  Cor.  5.3  "For  though  absent 
in  body  I  am  present  in  Spirit  TW-  C6PUTL 
66  )q  7.34  "how  to  bo  holy 
in  body  and  spiritt',  Col.  2.5  "For  though  I  am  absent  in 161. 
body,  yet  I  am  with  you  in  spirit"-. 
1 
The  second  and  final  point  of  this  chapter  is  the 
relationship  between  the  Snirit  of  God  and  the  spirit  of 
man. 
See  also  for  the  above  references  and  their  resnective 
meanings  and  a  andbin  the  following:  W.  IP.  Dickson., 
op.  cit.  pp.  169  and  429;  W.  Bauers,  WZNT,  E.  T.  D.  683; 
P.  E.  B.  Allo  op.  cit.  pl.,.  92-93;  F.  Godet,  Romans, 
Vol.  II,  pp.  67,80;  W.  Sanday,  A.  Headlam,  Romans  in 
ICCI  pp.  194-199;  J.  Denney.,  Romans  in  EGT,  -p-r.  674-7; 
K.  Barth,  Romans,  pp.  283-295;  Le  P.  11.  J.  Lagrange, 
Romans,  PP-195ý  201;  A.  Pallis,  To  the  Romans, 
Liverpool,  (1920)  pp.  98-101;  C.  H.  Dodd,  Romans,  pp. 
137-143;  A.  Nygren,  liomans,  T)P.  312-325;  C.  -K.  Barrett, 
Romans,  in  Black's  NTC,  PD-157-60;  E.  Brunner.  The 
T  Letter  to  the  Romans,  ýJondon  (1959)  pp.  68-71;  'V. 
Taylor,  *Romans  in  EPC,  pp.  49-52;  E.  F.  Scott.,  Paul's 
Epistle  to  the  Romans,  London,  in  SCM  (1947)  pp-.  49-50; 
A.  M.  Hunter.,  The  Enistle  to  the  Romans  in  TBC,  London 
(1955)  pl)  -12;  ,.  79-80;  F.  J.  Leonhardt.,  Romans,  pp.  205 
F.  F.  Bruce.,  Romans,  pp.  163-5;  F.  Godet,  I 
Corinthians,  Vol.  I,  pp.  255-60;  A.  Robertson  and  A. 
Plummer,  I  Corinthians  in  ICC.,  D  .  99-100;  G.  G. 
Findlay.,  I,  Corinthiana  MT.  pp'. 
ý08-9; 
H.  L.  Goudge., 
I  Corinthians  in  WC,,  ")-P-38-339;  L.  Morris.,  I 
Corinthians  TNTC,  pp-88-9;  A.  Plummer,  2  Corinthians 
in  ICC,  p.  211;  J.  H.  Bernard  I  Corinthians  in  MT., 
p.  80  n.  on  v.  7-1  and  more  T,  arj'ticularly  P-50  on  v.  12, 
13;  R.  V.  G.  Taslkcr,  2  Corinthians  in  TNTC,  pp.  100-111; 
E.  D.  Burton,  Galatians  in  ICC,,  p.  148  on  3.3,  pp.  297- 
304;  for  Romans  8.10  and  1  Cor.  5.3;  7.34,  all  the 
above  mentioned  commentaries  ad  loc;  Col.  2.5:  T.  K. 
Abbott,  Colosians  in  ICC,  np.  242-3  n.  on  2.5;  E.  F. 
Scott,  Romans  in  SCII.,  PP-38-9  n.  on  2.5;  other  uses 
of  pneuma  such  as  in  contrast  with  the  ypdppa 
wisdom  of  men,,  etc.  see  at  the  above  mentioned  dictionaries  and  especially  to  W.  Bauer's  WZNT,  E.  T. 
p.  683- 162. 
This  relationship  or  difference  becomes  most  clear 
In  Paulls  most  famous  and  richest  passage  about  the  Holy 
Spirit,  and  the  snirit  of  man  in  Rom.  8.1-17  1 
and  in  Cor. 
2.112  where  the  sririt  of  man  and  the  spirit  of  God  are 
expressly  distinguished  from  each  other  and  set  over 
against  each  other. 
Here  then,  in  Paul's  mind  the  distinction  and  contrast 
between  the  two  spirits  is  obvious  and  fundamental.  3  it 
rules  out  any  kind  of  absorption4  and  signifies  fellowship 
and  communion  between  them.  5  Finally,  it  would  not  be 
natural  with  men  who  identified  man's  pneuma  with  God?  s,,. 
6 
1.  W.  Barclay,  Flesh  and  bT,  irit,  TI-15. 
2.  R.  Bultmann,  Theology  of  the  New  Testament,  Vol.  I, 
pp.  205,207;  see  aiso  W.  D.  Davies,  Paul  and  Rabbinic 
Judaism,  London  (Paperbacks  196;  )  p.  186;  S.  C.  Smith, 
The  bible  Loctrine  of  Man,  p.  14  ;  II.  W.  Robinson,, 
, 'Hebrew  Psychology  in  relation  t  Pauline  Anthrorologyf,! 
5-.  27-72  ;  Idem.  The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Man,  p.  110; 
W.  L.  Stacey,  The  Pauling  VIew 
' 
of  Man  )  P-132;  N.  H. 
Snaith,  The  Distinctive,  Ideas  of  the  Old  Testament, 
London  (i-9-44IT  Pp-lb3-4;  J.  G.  Machen  The  Origin  of 
Paul's  Religion.,  New  York  (1921)  g.  296;  W.  Sanday  and 
A.  C.  Headlam,  Tomans  in  ICC,  p.  19  . 
3.  W.  D.  Stacey,  The  Pauline  View  of  Man. 
4.  W.  D.  Stacey,  ibid.  P-133;  N.  H.  Snalth.,  The  Distinctive 
Ideas  of  the  Olcý  Testament.,  p,  184;  J.  G.  Machen,  The 
Origin  of  Paul's  Er,,  ligiol.,  P.  56;  S.  C.  Smith.,  The 
Bible  Doctri_-io  of  Man. 
5.  S.  C.  Smith,  ibid;  W.  D.  Stacey,  ibid.  P-133. 
6.  S.  C.  Smith,  ibid.  p.  149. 163. 
Further  while  it  is  true  to  say  that  St.  Paul  has 
inherited  the  O.  T.  double  use  of  ruach  (after  the 
ezUle)  for  a  supernatural  influence  and  for  a  natural 
elemcnt  in  human  nature,, 
l  that  he  is  thinking  in  terms  of 
the  Hebrew  ruach 
2 
and  that  his  framework  of  belief  about 
spirit  is  exactly  the  Old  Testament  framework,  3 
we  must 
not  overlook  the  very  fact  that4  since  his  conversion  at 
Damascus  where  he  met  the  risen  Christ  and  found  himself 
In  a  new  situation,  his  personal  and  intimate  knowledge  and 
exrerience  of  our  Lord  enabled  him  to  look  at  and  inter- 
T,  ret  everything  and  this  is  , -)articularly  relevant  for  our 
case,  here,  "not  through  some  soaring  imagination,  not  in 
the  midst  of  some  demonic  exrerience  ......  through  the 
Srtiritj  who  is  neither  rational  nor  irrational,  but  who  is 
the  LOGOS.,  the  beginning  and  the  end  ...... 
Jesus  Christ 
in  his  particularity  and  existentiality  from  life  to  death 
1.  H.  W.  Robinson,  Hcbrew 
-Psychology, 
T).  282;  Idem.  The 
Christian  Doctrine  of  Man,  -p.  110. 
2.  S.  C.  Snaith,  The  Distinctive  Ideas  of  the  Old  Testament, 
p.  184. 
3.  W.  D.  Stacey,  o-.,  t,.  cit-  Pný-137.,  138,  ý 
144-5. 
4.  Compare  also  with  S.  C.  Smith,  The  Bible  Doctrine  of  Man, 
p.  142p  "the  differentia  of  the  New  Tcstament,  however 
under  the  doctrine  of  the  spirit  of  man.  does  not 
appear  so  long  as  the  pneuma  of  man  is  considered  alone, 
but  only  when  it  is  related  to  the  pneuma  of  God";  W.  D. 
Stacey,  ibid.  n-133.,  Itthe  true  nature  of  the  human 
spirit  is  discovered  only  in  the  sight  of  God's  spirit"; 
see  also  E.  Schweizer.,  "Spirit  of  God"  in  Bible  Key- 
words,  pp.  86-7- 164. 
and  from  death  to  life".  1  As  we  may  notice  throughout 
Aters  or  again  as  W.  D.  Stacey  has  it,  "Paul's  his  le 
-knowledge  of  the  Spirit  was  first  hand.  Paul  did  not 
gather  ideas,  he  met  a  person  and  in  intimacy  with  that 
person,,  his  knowledge  of  both  Spirit  and  spirit  grew. 
Knowledge  can  only  be  communicated  in  words,  and  in  the 
Epistles  we  see  Paul  bursting  to  express  what  he  had  seen 
and  known".  2  Now  if  this  is  the  case  we  may  be  allowed 
to  conclude  with  two  well  known  New  Tostament  scholars  that 
the  s,  -,  irit  of  man  is  that  element  within  him  which  is,  by 
its  nature,  accessible  to  the  Snirit  of  God3  or  "in  Paul 
the  human  spirit  may  perhaps  be  described  as  the  God- 
conscious  element  in  man,  which  is  dormant  or  dead  until 
it  is  stirred  into  life  by  the  Sririt  of  God,  or  it  may  be 
thought  of  as  "the  Christian  personality"  of  t1men  who,  if 
we  may  put  it  so.,  are  not  only  alive,  but  'Christianlyt 
1.  K.  Barth,  The  EListle  to  the  Roman2,  p.  298. 
2.  W.  D.  Stacey,  The  Piuline  View  of  Man,  p.  145. 
3.  W.  Barclay,  Flesh  and  SrirQ,  p.  16. 165. 
alivet'.  1 
Furthermore,  it  would  be  a  mistake  if  we  did  not  add 
a  comment  about  an  admittedlythorny  point  and  rroblem 
about  which  many  scholars  keep  silent,  that  is.,  the  inter- 
ralationship  of  the  spirit  of  believer  and  unbeliever  or 
"whether  the  entry  of  God's  Spirit  createsanihilo  a  new 
snirit  in  the  Christian,  which  exists  side  by  side  with 
his  natural  spirit.,  or  whether  the  SiArit  recreates  t1--3 
natural  spirit,  sothat  the  Christian  possesse-s  only  ons 
Spirit  diferent  in  quality  that  of  unbcli(-,  vcrs11. 
'1 
1.  F.  F.  Bruce,,  Romans  in  TNITC.,  p.  48;  com-p.  also  C.  Snicq, 
Dieu  et  lthomme  selon  le  N.  T.,  p.  161  n.  2  and  5., 
Biblicral  writer  i,  4.  )uld'  r  ef  Lne  man  as  a  rcas-:  )nrable 
(ra  ti,  )nal)  animal.  Thoy  all  conceivo  him 
essentially  as  a  religious  being??.  St.  P'..  ul  ý,::  -lone 
would  have  subscribed  to  Platols  affirmation  I'm-an  is 
(a)  soul  (  (ýVxý 
)11  but  he  would  have  -added,  "the 
Christian  is  0.  spirit  RVE-Wa  )-  ff  In  the 
order  of  words  (  pneuma  in  the  first 
place)  and  the  movement  of  the  rhr.  -se  in  the  rrayer 
of  1  Thess.  5.23,  Paul  begs  from  God  the  full, 
accomplished  and  complete  sanctification  of  Christians". 
E.  Schweizer.,  "Spirit  of  God"  in  Bible  Keywords.,  P-87., 
"Consequently  the  Spirit  remains  entirely  God's  and  is 
never  merged  in  the  spirit  which  is  never  given  to  the 
individual  (cf.  Bultmann,  Theology  of  the  New  Testament 
Vo.  12  pp.  206-7)  yet  at  the  same  time  it  can  be  the 
deepest  "I"  of  the  man  whose  life  no  longer  procedes 
from  his'ovin  being  but  from  God's  being  on  his  behalf1l. 
2.  W.  D.  Stacey.,  The  Pauline  View  of  Man.,  P-134. 166. 
This  is  not  the  place  to  deal  with  it  in  detail.  Stacey 
treats  it  at  some  length  and  rej)roduces  some  of  the  views 
of  various  scholars. 
Some  of  the  scholars  hold  the  first  view,  although 
from  our  point  of  view  Stacey's  two-fold  question  is  a 
more  scholastic  and  technical  one,  that  is.,  they  insist  on 
the  distinction  and  regard  "the  Sr.  irit  asýa  srecial  gift  of 
God,  not  "s  pronerty  of  the  soul  of  mc.  n  as  such". 
' 
Stevens,  with  wh="  we  would  like  to  associate  our- 
selves,  concludes  that  11the  human  nVE_UýLa  is  not  a 
donum  sureradditum  which  is  conferred  in  regeneration. 
It  is  a  factor  of  man's  nersonality  which  is  develored  and 
2  assumes  dominance  in  the  Christian  Life".  Sanday  and 
Headlam3  share  his  viow  in  spite  of  the  unjust  criticism 
of  Snaith  in  some  ways. 
4 
However,  6naith's  conclusion  is  that  "the  word 
1.  W.  L.  Knox.,  St.  Pc-ul  ana  the 
- 
Church  of  the  Gentiles., 
Cambridge  FI,  19  49ý7  p.  117;  a  lso  W.  D.  Davies.,  Plul  and 
Rabbinic  Judaism,  pp.  186  ff;  W.  D.  Stacey,  ibid.  pp. 
4  133  n.  3.,  "  134  n 
_, 
5,6;  D.  P  fleiderer,  Paulinism.,  Vol.  I  ,  )  Edinburgh  (169i  p  . 
64  ff;  .  H.  A.  A.  Kennedy,  St.  Paul  and 
the  Mystery  Relig  ions.,  Lon  don  (1913)  P-135  f. 
2.  G.  B.  Stevens,  The  Theology  of  the  New  Testament, 
Edinburgh  (19-5)Z7  -p.  344. 
3.  W.  Sanday  and  A.  C.  Headlam,  Romans.  in  ICC.,  pp.  196-7. 
4.  N.  Snaith,  The  Distinctive  Ideas  of  the  Old  Testament, 
PP-185-7- 167. 
pneuma  used  of  the  natural  man  is  not  the  same  thing  at 
1 
all  as  the  pneuma  of  the  spiritu"-l  man,,  "and  further.,  "All 
men  have  TLVF--Upa  from  birth  but  the  Christian 
TtvcZpa  in  fellowshiT)  with  the  Sririt  of  God  takes 
on  a  new  character  and  a  new  dignity  (Rom.  8.10).  112 
P.. 
1.  N...  Thý,  Eiýý  jUctlYe..  the  016  Testament, 
2.  W.  D.  Stacey,  The  Pauline  View  of  Man,  P-135. 168. 
A  Note  on  TuXLx6r,  -IIvcupcx'uLx6r, 
The  word  -)sychicos  is  set  in  shar-Dest  contrast  to 
p,  neumC.  'ticos  in  the  etymological  sense  and  nearly  so  in  the 
ordinary  sense  in  1  Cor.  2.14-15  and  15.44-46.1 
The  -psychicos  (AV  Natural;  Vulg.  Animalis  homo;  RSV 
and  NEB  unspiritual)  is'the  Ifunrenewed",  2  the  "unregener- 
ateO  and  is  contrasted  with  the  rneumaticos  on  the  ground 
that  the  former  does  not  welcome  the  things  of  spirit;  he 
refuses  them,  he  rejects  them.  Such  a  man  is  not 
equipped  to  discern  tho  actIvities  of  Godfs  6pirit.  To 
him  they  are  no  more  than  foolishness.  4  Morris,  however, 
goes  on  to  point  out  that  nsvchicos_  is  what  might  be 
described  as  a  biological  rather  than  an  ethical  term,  and 
that  it  is  not  to  be  taken  as  equivalent  to  sinful. 
5  This 
view  is  taken  by  Robertson.,  also,  who  sees  no  need  to 
regard  the  word  as  stemming  from  a  surposed  "trichotomous" 
psychology.,  but  rather  as  designating  11the  mere  correlative 
of  organic  lifell.  He  goes  on  to  say  that  psvchicos  is  the 
1.  A.  Robertson  and  A.  Plummer,  1  Corinthians  in  ICC,  p.  48. 
2.  A.  Robertson,  ibid.  p.  49. 
3.  John  Laidlaw,  The  Bible  Doctrine  of  Man,  Edinburgh 
(1895)  P-93. 
4.  L.  Morris,  1  Corinthians,  TNTC,  P.  60. 
5.  L.  Morris,  ibid.  p.  60. 
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unronewed  man.,  the  natural  man,  as  distinct  from  the  man 
who  is  actuated  by  the  Spirit,  l 
none  the  less,  Psychicos 
must  be  taken  as  synonymous  with  sarkinos  or  sarkitos. 
2 
This  antithesis  is  still  more  clearly  expressed  in  Jude. 
J.  9,  (ývxLxoc  P, 
TcVF-10pa  "XOV'CF-r,  T)  E3  While  the 
unspiritual  man  is  more  concerned  with  the  things  about 
this  life  and  cannot  and  does  not  appreciate  the  things  of 
the  Holy  Spirit'.,  the  -pnouigiaticos  on  the  contrary.,  who  is 
gifted  with  the  Spirit.,  "has  an  insight  into  the  meaning 
of  everything"  (Phillips).  This  communion  with  God's 
A.  Robertson,  A.  Plummer,  I  Corinthians  in  ICCp.  4.0;  Comp. 
also  H.  Clavier,  IlBrbves  remarques  sur  la  notion  ue, 
awpa  the  Background  of  the 
New  Testamen  and  its  eschatology,  -p.  30-44remarks, 
TUX  Lx6v  the  ending  x6v  as  in  aap%Lx6\) 
seems  to  indicate  that  this  adjective  does  not 
designate  a  composition.,  a  psychic  formation,  in 
(ýVxý  but  a  derendence  or  a  direction. 
2.  A.  Robertson,  ibid.  p.  49;  E.  D.  Burton.,  Snirit,  Soul 
and  Flesh,  p.  205;  R.  H.  Charles.,  Eschatolog 
, 
London 
Fl  9-13  ý-)  ;  the  proposition  that  the  I'soulish  man"'  and 
"fleshly  man"  are  used  as  kindred  and  interchangeable 
terms  over  against  the  spiritual  man,  finds  full 
support  and.  a-Tr 
. 
proval  in  the  following  as  well:  0. 
Pfleiderer,  Primitive  Christianit 
,  I,  r.  271;  G.  B. 
Stevens,  Theology  of  the  New  Testament.,  P-341. 
However  there  is  this  difference  between  j)sychicos  and 
sarkicos:  "Yet  the  TuXLx6cq  ýLý  ýXwj  nveUlid 
(Jude.  19)  may  be  lower  than  tho  aaPXLx6c,  where 
the  latter  as  in  3.3  and  Gal.  5.17,25  is  already 
touched  by  the  lifegivi  t?  G.  G.  Findlay,  ný  nvcupa 
1  Corinthians  in  B3T  P-7  3  n.  on  v.  12.,  14. 
3.  See  also  E.  D.  Burton,  Snirit,  Soul  and  Flesh,  D.  205;  E. 
Schweizer.,  "nvF-ZIIOL"  TWNT  p.  435  n-701,446-,  432  ff., 
E.  T.  D.  87  n.  2  and  pp.  102-3.  ' 170. 
STArit  and  fellowshilN,  which  must  not  be  thought  of  as  a 
different  natural  endowment  from  that  of  the  -nsychicos.. 
l 
"enables  him  to  penetrate  the  divine  mysteriestt2  and  "to 
acknowledge  GodIs  saving  worktY3  for  him  personally.  The 
distinction  between  the  two  adjectives  is  still  better 
illustrated  in  the  words  of  Prof.  Barclay;  Paul 
distinguishes  two  kinds  of  men  (a)  there  are  those  who 
are  pneum"-tikoi.  Pneua,,  a  is  the  wordfor  the  Spirit;  and 
pneumatikos  is  the  man  who  is  sensitive  and.  obedient  to 
the  S-pirit;  the  man  whose  life  is  guided  and  directed  by 
the  Spirit;  the  man  who  makes  all  his  decisions  and 
exercises  all  his  judgments  under  the  influence  of  and  the 
guidance  of  the  Spirit;  the  man  who  lives  in  the 
consciousness  that  there  are  things  beyond  the  things  of 
this  world;  that  there  is  a  life  beyond  the  life  of  this 
world  ......  ......  and  (b)  thcre  is  the  man  who  is 
psychikos.  Now  psyche  in  Greek  is  often  translated  soul 
but  that  is  not  its  real  meaning;  rsyche  is  the  princirle 
of  physical  life.  Everything  which  is  alive  has  rsyche; 
but  it  has  not  got  7neum  PsYche  is  that  physical L. 
1.  L.  Morris,,  1  Corinthians  in  TNTC,  T.  61. 
2.  W.  Bawer,  WZNT,  E.  T.  685. 
E.  Schweizer,  ITINE-upall  in  TWNT.,  ',  ).  4ý5,  E.  T. 
t'Sririt  of  God"  in  tho  Bible  Keywords,  p-07. 171. 
life  which  a  man,  shares  with  every  living  thing,  but 
-neum  ,  spirit,,  is  that  which  makes  man  a  man.  The 
psychikos  is  the  man  who  lives  as  if  there  was  nothing 
beyond  physical  life;  as  if  there  were  no  needs  other 
than  physical  and  material  needs;  whose  values  are  all 
physical  and  material  values;  who  judges  everything  from 
purely  physical  and  material  standards.  A  man  like  that 
cannot  understand  spiritual  things  ......  and  a  man  who 
has  never  a  thought  beyond  this  world  cannot  understand 
the  things  of  God.  To  him  they  look  mere  foolishness". 
Dr.  E.  White  takes  the  same  view,  affirming  that  in 
the  New  Testament  "soul  stands  for  the  animal  life,  the 
life  of  the  mind  and  body".  This  life  man  acquires  by 
natural  inheritance,  so  that-psychico-s  can  be  translated 
in  this  context  as  "natural",  whereas  the  nneum  is  a 
supernatural  gift,  derived  directly  from  God. 
Dr.  White  describes  the  natural  man  as  living  on  the 
temporal.,  material  plane.,  with  "no  insight  into  sT,  iritual 
thingstf.  These  t1belong  to  a  different  realm  ....  a  new 
realm  of  truth",  which  Is  the  level  at  which  the  sniritual 
W.  Barclay,  The  Letters  to  the  Corinthians,  PP-31-32. 172. 
man  experiences  existence.  1 
The  distinction  which  we  are  examining  becomes  yet 
clearer  in  1  Corinthians  15.44,  where  St.  Paul,  nresent- 
ing  to  his  fellow  Christians  of  Corinth  his  arguments 
about  resurrection,  sets  in  contrast  the  aropa  (PUXL%6v 
(natural  AV;  physical  RSV;  NEB  animal),  the  rresent,  the 
ordinary  body  with  the  C-Wpa  RVCUVaTLx6v  ,  the 
spiritual,  the  post-resurrection  body.  2  Further  I'the 
term  is  associated  (v.  45)  with  the  fact,  t3  that  "Just  as 
the  first  Adam  had  introduced  the  order  of  animate  life  on 
the  physical  or  earthly  plane,  so  Christ,  the  second  Adam, 
4  had  introduced  a  Tiew  order  of  life  in  the  S-ririt",, 
We  have  said  enough,  I  think,  to  -point  out  the 
distinction  between  these  two  opposing  epithets.  It  is 
E.  White,  "The  Psychology  of  St.  Paul's  Epistles"  in 
Journal  of  the  transaction  of  the  Victoria  Institute 
or  rhilosophical  Society  of  Gt.  Britain,  Vol.  LXXXVII., 
71955)  P-8;  Prof.  F.  K  Bruce  in  his  written  comwun- 
ication  Dr.  E.  White's  parer  and  in  the  same  Vol. 
p.  110,  describes  as  psuchicos  the  man  who  is  ''self- 
centred,  self-dominated"  and'his  spirit  is  uniesrons- 
ive  to  the  Divine  Spirit"  and  pneumaticos  the  man  who 
'Is  responsive  ana  obedient  to  every  prompting  of  the 
Holy  Spirit''and  ''whose  Spirit  is  en  raDport  with  the 
Spirit  of  God". 
2.  Vie  shall  consider  the  Doint  further  and  at  some  length 
in  its  proper  place. 
W.  D.  Burton,  Spirit,  Soul  and  Flesh,  p.  205. 
4.  W.  D.  Davies.,  Paul  and  Rabbinic  Judaism,  p.  49 173. 
no  part  of  our  purpose  to  trace  their  whole  Pauline 
background,  beyond  saying  that  Reitzenstein'claimed  that 
satisfactory  paraiiels  to  St.  Paul's  usage  could  be  found 
in  the  Hellenistic  Mystery  Religions  (cults). 
1 
He  has 
been  sucessfully  refutet,  at  some  considerable  length  by  a 
number  of  scholars  and  more  rarticularly  by  Kennedy2  and 
G.  vos3  and  W.  D.  Stacey  too  (although  very  briefly  but 
s  kilfully).  4  Kennedy  and  Davies  argue  that  the  relation 
of  psuche  to  pneum  and  psuchicos  to  T)neumaticos  are  best 
explained  in  the  Old  Testament  usage., 
5  in  the  light  of  Old 
Testament  anthropology. 
6 
Bultmann  likewise  rules  out  a 
Greek  or  Old  Testament  influence  -:,,  nd  sees  only  a  Gnostic 
one. 
7 
We.,  for  the  reasons  given  ad  loc.  and  explained 
R.  Reitzenstein,,  Die  Hellenistischen  Mysterien 
Religiono  ,  Leipzig,  mund  Berlin  (1910)  PP-43-46  in 
general  and  here  cf.  1D.  43. 
2.  H.  A.  A.  Kennedy,  St.  Paul  and  the  Mystery  Religions., 
pp.  142-9. 
3.  G.  Vos.,  ''The  eschatological  aspect  of  the  Pauline 
conception  of  the  Spiritj  in  Biblical  and  Theological 
Studies  by  the  Members  of  the  Faculty  of  Princeton 
Theological  Seminary  (1912)  pp.  24d-50  n-55;  also  in 
J.  G.  Machen,  The  Origin  of  Paulls  Religion,  pp.  265-8 
cf.  265  n.  l. 
4.  W.  D.  Stacey,  The  Pauline  View  of  Man,  PP-150-52. 
5.  H.  A.  A.  Kennedy,  St.  Paul'and  the  Mystery  Religions., 
P-156. 
6.  W.  D.  Davies,  Paul  and  the  Rabbinic  Judaism,  P-193. 
7.  R.  Bultmann,  Theology  of  the  New  Testament,  I,  P-176. 174. 
by  the  critics  themselves,  prefer  to  endorse  the  two 
following  conclusions:  "To  begin  with,  it  may  be  noted 
that  these  all-important  adjectives  are  really  the 
apostleys  own  coinage.  No  light  can  be  shed  on  them  from 
the  Old  Testament  ......  The  t(,,  rms  can  only  be  understood 
from  the  apostle's  own  use  of  them".  1 
and  another.,  "The 
general  background  of  (ýUxll  and  ixvE-u[La  is 
the  Old  Testament,  and  in  an  indirect  way,  the  Old 
Testament  lies  behind  the  adjectives5  but  if  Paul's  view 
of  71VEIUýIa  showed  an  advance  on  previous  conceptions, 
his  views  on  nvEupaTLx6r,  showed  an  even 
greater  one  ......  lorcovor,  Paul  himself  gave  to  the 
adjective  subtle  shades  of  meaning,  all  derived  from  his 
conception  of  ITVF-Zpa  -  Consequcntly,  the  word  is 
Paults  word,  and  the  force  and  effect  of  the  contrast  must 
be  largely  attributed  to  his  own  religious  insight't.  2 
H.  A.  A.  Kennedy,  St.  P-Dults  Conception  of  the  last 
Things.,  London  (1904)  pp.  251-2;  also  W.  D.  Stacey'., 
OP.  '  Cit.  P-153  n.  2. 
2.  W.  D.  Stacey,  op.  cit.  P-153. 175. 
14.  E(C)'Ua  or  Body. 
While  we  do  not  overlook  or  minimise  the 
significance  and  relevance  of  the  fles  by  omitting  it., 
Passing  over  that  very  important  and  "much  discussed" 
(H.  W.  Robinson,  Christian  Doctrine  of  Man,  u.  111)  term, 
one  way  be  ailowed  to  mention  the  double  natural  and 
moral  meaning  by  referring  to  some  definitions  of 
others:  J.  A.  T.  Robinson,  in  his  excellent  and  concise 
r  book,  The  Body,  Uondon  SCId  Press  (1961)  pp.  19)  25Y  31) 
defines  flesh  as  denoting  man  in  his  character  of 
creature,  i.  e.  as  belonging  to  the  temporal,  and 
therefore  ?  by  definition,  decaying  order,  as  contrasted 
to  God.,  "in  his  distance  from  God";  see  also  W.  D. 
Davies,  "Paul  and  the  Dead  Sea  Scroll:  Flesh  and 
Spirit",  in  The  Scrolls  and  the  New  Testament,  pp.  162, 
278  n-32;  Prof.  W.  Barclay  defines  it  as  follows: 
IlThe  flesh  is  exactly  the  bridgehead  through  which  sin 
invades  the  human  ý)ersonality  ....  The  flesh  stands 
for  human  nature  weakened,  vitiated,  tainteO  by  sin. 
The  flesh  is  man  as  he  is  apart  from  Jesus  Christ  and 
L  -and 
Spiri  his  SDirittl  (Flesh  t)  pp.  21-22;  Ambassador 
for  Christ.,  Edinburgh  (1960)  P-150).  He  returns  to 
this  in  -another  outstLAnding  book  of  his,  The  Mind  of 
St.  Paul,  Fontana  (1954)  emphasising  the  idea  of  flesh 
as  meaning  human  nature's  helplessness  in  the  face  of 
sin,  its  proneness  there  to  all,  deriving  from  the 
very  fact  of  its  "Christlessnessli.  C.  H.  Dodd  writes 
"The  flesh  is  the  common  stuff  of  human  nature  which 
we  inherit.  P-ul  does  not  think  of  it  as  necessarily 
evil  but  as  powerless  for  moral  ends.  A.  Scheatter, 
Der  Theologie  der  kpostel  (19222)  p.  272:  "The  Spirit 
is  the  mark  of'  God'  and  71e  agent  of  his  activity. 
Flesh  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  mark  of  man  in  all  his 
dissimilarity  from  God".  From  the  wide  rang  e  of 
bibliography,  studies,  papers,  articles,  etc.  on  this 
topic  we  mention  here  only  the  following,  some  of 
considerable  length,  some  short:  A.  W.  Robinson,  The 
Christian  Doctrine  of  '224an,  pr.  111-122;  G.  B.  Stevens, 
The  Theolo,  of  the  New  Tr-stament,  PP-338-48  (Flesh 
and  Spirit  J.  ii.  T.  Robinson,  The  Body,  PP-17-26;  W.  D.  Stacey,  The  PLuline  View  of 
_14_an) 
PP-154-173;  R 
Bultmann,  Theilogy,  Vol.  j,  pp  *  232-3;  8  (the  term  fleshj 
and  also  239-Z6-7flesh  and  sin);  -K.  G.  *  Kuhn.,  Mew 
Light  in  toLiptation,  sin  and  flesh  In  St.  Paul',  (he 176. 
it  is  almost  necessary  to  confine  ourselves  only  to  the 
examination  of  the  word  soma  which  is  11the  Keystone  of 
Paults  theology.  In  its  closely  interconnected  meanings 
of  the  word  soma.,  laiits  tog.  ether  all  his  great  themes  ... 
Here  with  the  exception  of  the  doctrine  of  God  are 
represented  all  the  main  tenets  of  the  Christian  faith  - 
the  doctrines  of  Man,  Sin,  the  Incarnation  and  Atonement, 
,  it2  the  Church,,  the  Sacraments,  Sanctification,  and  Eschatology 
even  although  we  might  not  be  preDared  to  go  so  for  as  Dr. 
Robinson.  His  words  do  indicate  the  im.,,:  )ortance  of  the 
terms  we  for  our  part,  shall  more  srecifically  pay  closer 
attention  to  those  passcages  only,  which  will  serve  our 
purpuse. 
I 
1.  (Contd.  from  page  175).  finds  great  similarities)  in 
the  Scrolls  and  the  New  Testament,  ed.  by  H.  Stendahl, 
pp.  101-106;  also  W.  D.  Davies.,  "Paul  and  the  Dead  Sea 
Scrolls:  Flesh  ana  Snirit"  PP-159-171  (he  discusses 
it  as  Kuhn  L,  oes);  W.  Barclay.,  Flesh  and  Spiri 
,  Dp. 
17-22;  Idem.  The  Mind  of  St.  PLul.,  pp,  147-55;  F.  F. 
Bruce,  The  Ei,  istle  to  the  Romans,  pp.  4  -46;  F.  Prat, 
The  Theology  of  St.  Paul,  London  (1957)  Vol.  II,  ý)p.  402-4; 
an  excellent  treatment  and  account  is  given  by  E. 
Schweizer,,  TI  a6pC  11  TVRIT)  pp.  124-38. 
J.  A.  T.  Robinson.,  The  Body.,  pp.  1 
author:  In  the  aid,  God  ....  C.  Davis,  The  Study  of  Theolo 
and  n.  1;  H..  "L.  A.  Kennedy,,  '  on 
Paul's  Conception  of  the  Last 
soma  Alcolourless"  in  contrast 
9,,  26  ;  of  the  same 
London  (1950)  P-83;  and 
ly,  Londbn  (1962)  P-318 
the  other  hand,  St. 
Things,  p.  146,  calls 
with  the  sarx. 177. 
Leaving  aside  811  the  passages  which  denote  either 
the  external  man  I'llorganisme  physique".,  the  physical 
body,  i.  e.  Gal.  6.17  "1  bear  on  my  body  the  marks  of 
Jesus"  (ESV),  1  Cor.  9.27  "1  Ponniel  my  body  and  subdue" 
(  SV)  !  LId  I  Cor.  13.3  ......  ý  if  I  deliver  ray  body  to  be 
'24  11 
....  to  the  dishonoring  of  their  burned"  (RSV),  hom.  1. 
bodies  among  themselves"  (ESV),  Rom.  4.19  "He  did  not 
wea-&-en  in  faith  when  he  considered  his  own  body"  (RSV);  1 
or  the  whole  man:  2  Cor.  10.10  11  ....  but  his  bodily 
presence  is  weak"  (RSV).,  1  Cor.  5.3.,  11  ...  absent  in  body 
I  am  present  in  spirit"  (RSV),  Col.  2.5  2t? 
....  absent  In 
body,  yet  I  ain  vjith  you  in  s-pirit"  (RSV),  or  is  used 
instead  of  11tantot  la  personne  elle-meme".  a  personal 
pronoun  in  the  following  cases:  ET)h.  5.28  "Even  so, 
husbands  should  love  their  wives  as  their  oim  bodiest' 
1.  J.  A.  T.  Robinson.,  The  Doýy)  p.  27;  C.  Spicq.,  Die  et 
11homme  io  N.  T.,  P-170  and  n.  3;  R.  Bultmann,  Theolog 
of'  the  New  Testament,  I,  PP-193-4;  W.  Barclay,  Flesh 
and  Snirit,  pp.  16-17  cf.  One  should  add  here  that  a 
general  presont4tion  of  the  different  shades  of 
meanings  of  tho  word  amývx  arart  from  "des 
Leibes  Christill  is  found  in  Kittel's  TýM  (by  E. 
Schweizer)  Vol.  VII,  PP-1057-1064. 
2.  J.  A.  T.  Robinson, 
_Zhe 
Bog,  -8.  , y)  pp.  27 178. 
(RSV),  also  in  Rom.  6.12  f,  12.1ý  1  Cor.  6.15,1  cor.  12. 
21  Philip.  1.20;  or  may  stand  for  man  as  being  "in  the  71 
world"  in  contrast  to  God:  2  Cor.  12.2  f  11  ....  whether 
in  the  body  or  out  of  the  body  I  do  not  know,  God  knows" 
(trans.  RSV)  and  in  2  Cor.  5.3,  6,  8.1o.  2 
We  are  coming  to  consider  whether  the  body  in  its 
nature  is  evil,  imperfect.,  weak  and  resronSible  for  the 
sin  of  man  or,  to  put  it  in  another  way,  whether  the  soma 
is  identical  and  synonymous  with  the  sarx  and  whether  it 
I  differs  from  it. 
The  identification  and  synonimity  of  the  body  with 
the  flesh  aprears  to  be  almost  complete,  when  we  are 
confronted  with  St.  Paul's  own  words:  in  Romans  he 
refers  to  it  as  sinful  body  (  T6  aMpa  TýC  &[tapT(aC  6.6 
mortal  body  (b)  T-W  OVT)TW"  bpW-V  C6paTL  6.12 
Td  OVT)Td  c6paTa  8.11)  or  a  body  of  death 
(.  tx  uotý  c6l.  tauor,  uoZ  Oooyk-COV  7.24)  and  of  humiliation 
(.  Phil-  3.21  r6  crolia  T-9c,  TanCLV6CCWC  )3.  Besides 
1.  J.  A.  T.  Robinson,  The  Body,  p.  29;  also  C.  Spicq,  Dieu 
11homme  selon  le  N.  T.,  P-170  n.  4. 
2.  J.  A.  T.  Robinson,  ibid.  p.  29. 
3.  J.  A.  T.  Robinson,  ibid.  P-30;  W.  Barclay,  Flesh  and 
Spirit,  P-17;  Sanday  and  Headlam,  Romans  in  ICC, 
pp.  M-9  on  6.6;  F.  F.  Bruce,  Romans,  TNTC.  $  PP-138-9 
n.  on  6.6. 179. 
it  must  be  noted  that  Dr.  J.  A.  T.  Eobinson  begins  by 
stating  the  case  for  this  identification  between  flesh 
and  body  and  it  is  only  fair  to  give  his  insissima  verba: 
"So  there  is  a  aMpa  Týc  &papTCac  (Rom.  6.6), 
a  body  that  belongs  to  sin.,  just  cas  there  is  a 
crdg  ailap-rcac,  as  (Rom.  8-3) 
....  Like  the  cdpýj' 
the  aMlia  is  mortal  (Rom.  6.12;  8.11);  IfThe  deeds  of 
the  body"  in  Rom.  8.13  are  none  other  than  the  results  of 
living  xaTd  adpxa.  In  Rom.  8.10,  "the  body" 
that  "is  dead  because  of  sin"  is  but  a  -periphrasis  for  the 
flesh;  while  in  Rom.  7.22-25,  we  have  the  following 
equivalents;  my  members  (i.  e.  my  c'Mia  )=  that  which 
is  in  captivity  under  the  law  of  sin  =  the  flesh  =  the 
opposite  of  the  votuc  or  inner  man  where  I  delight  in 
the  law  of  God.  Col.  3.5  makes  the  identity  of  a-wua 
with  sin  even  more  complete:  I'Mortify.,  therefore.,  your 
members  which  are  upon  the  earth;  fornication  etc.  "  It  is 
here  not  merely,  as  in  Roma-is,  "Sin  in  your  members?  ': 
ttYour  members  are  themselves  sin". 
' 
This  may  well  be  so,  but  there  are  Pauline  passages 
which  speak  against  this  identification  and  suggest  note- 
worthy  difference. 
A.  Robinson,  The  Bod  ,  op.  cit.  P-30;  F.  Pratt,  The 
Theology  of  St.  Paul.,  Vol.  II)  PD-52-3,  surports  this 
synonemety'of  both  and  more  srecifically  supplies  in 
a  foot-note  (n.  1)  four  rairs  of  exnressions  for 
comparison. 18o. 
This  difference  becomes  clear  and  the  basic  contrast 
comes  out  sharply  when  St.  Paul  declares  quite 
categorically  in  1  Cor.  15.50  that:  III  tell  you  this, 
brethern;  flesh  and  blood  cannot  inherit  the  Kingdom  of 
God.,  nor  does  the  perishable  inherit  the  imnerishable". 
(RSV).  And  again  in  1  Cor.  6.13-20  "Food  is  for  the  belly 
and  the  belly  for  food  .....  and  one  day  God  will  rut  an 
end  to  both  ....  the  body  is  for  the  Lord  and  the  Lord  for 
the  body  ......  R.  Bultmann  poses  the  sarx-body 
distinction  clearly.  He  recognises  that  the  flesh  is 
that  which  must  die;  the  body  is  that  which  will  rise  with 
Christ 
1 
and  Dr.  hobinson  adds  "Paul  rromises  no  re- 
surrection  of  the  flesh,  he  proclaims  it  for  the  body.  " 
2 
In  addition  Prof.  Barclay  observes  that  the  body  as 
such  is  accessible  to  God,  and  indeed  can  be  the  Temple  of 
Holy  Spirit.  I-1  support,  he  quotes  the  following 
passages:  "The  body  can  be  redeemed  (Romans  8.23)  and 
transformed  (Phii.  2.21).  The  body  can  be  taken  and 
R.  Bultmann,  Theology  of  the  New  Testament,  I,  p.  201.  g; 
see  also  0.  Pfleiderer,  Paulinism,  1,  p.  49;,  J. 
Baillie,  And  the  Life  Everlasti  (1961)  r.  194;  R.  C. 
Smith,  Bible  Doctrine  of'  Man,  p.  165:  H.  II..  A.  Kennedy, 
St.  Paul's  conception  of  the  Last  Things,  pn.  244-8- 
ýv.  D.  Stacey,  op.  cit.  The  Pauline  View  of  'IAan,  1:.  1ý8 
ns.  1.,  4. 
2.  J.  A.  T.  Robinson.,  The  Body,  P-31. 181. 
offered  as  a  aacrifice  to  God  (Rom.  12.1).,  and  with  it 
and  in  it  a  man  can  glorify  God  (1  Cor.  6.20;  Phil. 
1.20).  The  body  can  be  and  for  the  Christian  is,  the 
temple  of  the  Holy  ST.,  irit  (1  Cor.  )  "Equally",  he 
points  out,  "the  body,,  as  such  is  accessible  to  evil,,  and 
is  of  course  involved  in  man's  physical  mortality  but  it 
is  not  of  itself  evil,  and  its  fate  depends  on  whether 
the  powers  of  good  or  these  of  evil  are  allowed  to 
dominate  it,  it  has  tremendous  potentialities  for  good 
and  evil,  according  as  It  is  dominated  by  sin  or 
dedicated  to  God:  for  Paul  the  body  itself  is  quite  neutral 
Finally  the  difference  between  soma  and  sarx  is  well 
stated  in  J.  A.  T.  Robinsonts  words.  Dr.  Robinson  with 
his  usual  lucidity  has  It:  "Whiie  adpý  st,  -ands 
for  man,  in  the  solidarity  of  creation,  in  his  distance 
aw[la  stands  for  man  in  the  solidarity  of  from  God 
W.  Barclay,  Flesh  and  the  Snirit,  P-17. 182. 
creation.,  as  made  for  God".  '  There  remains  to  be 
examined  how  two  great  and  prominent  N.  T.  scholars  have 
understood  the  meaning  of  soma.  It  is  defined  and 
described  by  R.  Bultmann:  as  the  real  Self,  ego,  as  the 
very  essence,  the  "I"  (p.  194):  "Man  ....  can  be  called 
soma,  that  is,  as  having  a  relationship  to  himself  .... 
Or,  more  exactly,  he  is  so  called  as  that  self  from  whom 
he,  as  subject,  distinguishes  himself,  the  self  with  whom 
he  can  deal  as  the  object  of  his  own  conduct,  and  also  the 
self  whom  he  can  perceive  as  subjected  to  an  occurence 
that  springs  from  a  will  other  than  his  own. 
The  B2d  We  must  mention  here,  and  by  the  way,  !  Yi  P-31- 
'that  Pfleiderer  building  on  the  assumption  that  St. 
Paul  is  a  dichotomist,  distinguishes  and  calls  "the 
outer  manff  body  in  reference  to  its  form  as  an 
organism.,  'ttflesh"  in  reference  to  its  material  sub- 
stance.,  Primitive  Christianit  ,  VoI,  E.  T.,  p.  270,  or 
as  again  he  has  it  in  Paulinism,  E.  T.  Vol  i., 
YýAq:  "The  adpý  is  the  material  of  the  (earihl  body, 
but  the  body  is  the  organized  form  in  which  this  matter 
exists  as  a  concrete  earthly  individual".  (R.  Bultmann 
op.  cit.  p.  192  f.  ),  such  a  distinction  regards  it  as 
flun-Paulinell  and  argues  against  it.  To  us  also  this 
appears  highly  Aristotelian  in  formulat,  104  and  worthier 
of  Mediaeval  scholasticism.  J.  A.  T.  Robinson,  The 
Bod  Y  PP-31-2  n.  1,  insists  that  Sarx  and  Somo  do  not 
rerresent  different  parts  of  man's  make-up,  Eut  that 
each  stands  for  the  whole  man  differently  regarded  -  ffman  as  wholly  ý.  erishable,  man  as  wholly  destined  for 
Godt'.  He  further  quotes  Prof.  P.  Althaus  to  supnort 
his  case  and  condemns  the  tendency  to  discuss  this 
relation  sarx-soma  flin  terms  of  the  modern  and  un- 
Hebraic  category  matterfl,  P-32  n.  l.  Further.,  W. 
Stacey.,  oT).  cit.  p.  186,  concludes  as  follows:  ItIn 
its  most  highly  developed  meanings  ,  a4a  is  far 
away  from  adpý  but  in  the  simnlest  sense,  they 
are  interchangeablefl. 183. 
It  is  such  a  self  that  man  is  called  somall.,  l 
and 
further  and  in  conclusion  he  goes  on  to  say,  "More 
accurately,,  man  is  soma  when  he  is  objectivized  in 
relation  to  himself  by  becoming  the  object  of  his  own 
thought,  attitude,  or  conduct;  he  is  man  in  that  he  can 
separate  from  himself  and  came  under  the  dominion  of  out- 
2 
side  powers"  Dodd  puts  it  in  his  descriptive  way  as 
"the  individual  self  as  an  organism  ....  But  his 
conceT)tion  of  the  body,  as  the  organised  individual  self, 
may  be  illustrated  by  the  6onceT)t  of  the  sentiment  in 
modern  psychology". 
Bishop  Robinson  comes  out  against  them,  controverts 
them  and  rejects  their  own  way  of  thinking  as  "essentially 
un-Hebraic  and  indeed  post-Cartesian". 
4  He  holds  for 
himself  the  view  that  "Soma  is  the  nearest  equivalent  to 
our  word  "persconality"IT.  5  He  further  admits  that  he  has 
1.  R.  Bultmann.,  Theology  of  the  N(-w  Testament,  T)P-195-6; 
see  also  H.  Mehl-Koehnlein,  Llhomme  selon  l'a7otre 
Paul)  (1951)  pp.  10-11,,  who  follows  and  re-roduces 
R.  Bultmann  on  this  point. 
2.  R.  Bultmann,  ibid.  pp.  202-3. 
3.  C.  H.  Dodd,  The  ET,  istle  of  Paul  to  the  Romans.,  Fontana 
ed.  ('1960)  -polio. 
4.  J.  A.  T.  Robinson,  The  Body,  D.  12  n.  l. 
5.  Ibid.  p.  28. 184. 
been  mistaken  in  his  olc-ý  view  about  man  as  made  up  of 
sarx  and  psyche'  and  adopts  a  new  one:  It  a-wpa  ,  a6pý 
and  Tuxý  all  represent  the  whole  man  under 
2  different  aspectsIt. 
J.  A.  T.  Robinson,  The  Body,  P-13  n.  1  and  his  In  the  End, 
God,  London  (1950)  p.  d4  and  cf.  P-K  with  F.  J. 
Leenhardt.,  exposition  of  aM[ta  The  Eristle  to 
the  Romans,  n.  162,  as  11aprropriate  organ  through  which 
the  rersonality  expresses  and  realises  litself".  We 
are  in  general  agreement.  His  subsequent  attemnt  at 
a  more  lapidary  statement  secms  to  succeed  only  in 
seriously  over-simplifying:  I'My  body  is  myself;  I  am 
my  Body". 
J.  A.  T.  Robinson.,  The  Body,  P-13  n.  l.. 185. 
15.  Trichotomy:  Some  General  Remarks  on  1  Thess.  5.23. 
The  only  genuine  Pauline  passage,  and  this  probably 
applies  to  the  whole  New  Testament,  which  clearly  and 
directly  sneaks  out  about  man's  throefold  nature, 
trichotomy,.  is  anC.  above 
mentioned  passage  which  runs  as  follows:  '  TIMay  the  God  of 
peace  himself  sanctify  you  wholly;  and  may  your  spirit  and 
soul  and.  body  be  kept  sound  and  blameless  at  the  coming  of 
our  Lord  Jesus  ChristTl. 
Since  the  present  chapter  is  not  a  detailed  and 
eikhaustive  study  but  a  general  survey  of  this  quotation,  I 
see  no  better  and  more  profitable  way  of  dealing  with  it  - 
by  saying  this  we  do  not  exclude  other  ways  of  course  - 
than  that  of  a  very-very  brief  historical  review  of  this 
question,  in  some  ancient  and  modern  scholars  who  are  in 
favour  of  trichotomy  and  those  who  are  against  it,  with  a 
short  concluding  discussion. 
We  do  not  refer  to  the  early  Fathers  -  Greek  and 
Latin  -  at  length,  for  we  believe  that  they  do  not  say  much 
directly  concerned  with  the  text  under  consideration;  and 
1  Thess.  5.23: 
"AbT6c  66  6  Ge6c  T-T)c  CtpýVT)C  &yLdCaL  b[laC  6XOTCXC-LCq  T) 
%aC  6X6%Xnpov  bpMv  T6  TcvcZpa  xaC  h  OXý  xaC  T6 
awpa  &pc'pnTwC  ýv  Tý  napovaCa  T60 
KuPL'OU  T')ýLW-V 
anaotý  XPLGTOZ  T71pnoeL,  T)II., 186. 
when  they  deal  with  the  matter,  either  directly  commenting 
on  1  Thess,  5.23,  or  in  a  general  manner  thinking  of  the 
trichomistic  problem.,  they  express  themselves  in  a  vague 
and  ambiguous  way  and  it  could  be  said  that  their  views 
resemble  more  the  Platonic  and  the  Aristotelian. 
However,  it  must  be  observed  that  some  of  the 
Fathers  favour  a  dichotomistic  view, 
1 
some  a 
In  favour  of  the  dichotomistic  view  are:  Athenagoras 
de  fiesur.  15  (12)  B.  4.322-23  and  320-21,  MPG  1004A-D. 
1005A;  Cyril  of  Jerusalem  Catech.  4,18)  IMPG  33,477; 
Athanasius  oratio  contra  Gentes..,  33.,  MPG  25,65B-D; 
Gregory  of  Nazian.  (Theolog.  )  Orat.  45  in  Sanc.  Pdscha, 
7,  MPG  36,632AB;  Gregory  of  Nyssa,  De  hom.  Opificio, 
29,  *MPG  44,,  233D;  St.  Basil,  Comment.  in  Isaiam.  Pro7h. 
cap.  l..  '  13)  IAPG  30A,  140A;  St.  Chrysostom.,  in  Cap.  1., 
Genes.  *  homil.  14,5)  MPG  53s  117;  Idem.  in  Epist.  ad 
Rom.  homil.  13,2,  MPG  602  510;  St.  Augustine's  and 
St.  John  of  Damascus  views  are  quite  relevant,  well 
stated  and  reipresenting  the  consensus  of  opinion  of  all 
the  above  mentioned  Fathers  and  for  that  reason  are 
worth  quoting:.  St.  Augustine,  The  City  of  God,  London 
(1945)  a  rev.  and  translation  by  R.  V.  Tasker,  in  Dent's 
Everyman's  Library,  Vol.  2,  book  13  cf.  24,  p.  22: 
"This  man  therefore  being  frame  of  dust  or  loam  .... 
'When  it  received  a  soul  was  made  an  animate  body  .... 
being  neither  soul  only,  nor  body  only.,  but  consisting 
of  both.  It  is  true,  the  soul  is  not  the  whole  man 
but  the  better  part  only;  nor  the  body  the  whole  man 
but  the  worse  part  only,,  and  both  conjoined  make  man; 
Yes,  it  both  calls  (the  H.  Scripture)  the  body 
and  the  soul  conjoined  by  the  name  of  man  St. 
John  of  Damascus,  exp.  of  the  Orthodox  faith,  book  2. 
ch.  12.,  trans.  by  S.  D.  F.  Salmond,  in  the  Nicene  and 
Post-Nicene  Fathers,  Oxford  (1898)  Vol-T  "OP-30-31; 
It  ...  He  creates  with  his  own*hands  man  of  a  visible 
nature  and  an  invisible  ...  on  the  other  his  reason- 
ing  and  thinging  soul  He  bestowed  upon  him  by  his  in- 
breathing  ...  Further,  body  ahd  soul  were  formed  at 
one  and  the  same  time". 187. 
trichomistic.  1 
Amongst  the  modern  writers  who  hold  the  trichomistic 
view  of  man  and  are  in  favour  of  it  without  any  hesitation 
2 
are  the  following:  C.  Vitriuga,  Olshausen3  and 
In  favour  of  trichomistic  view  are  the  following 
Fathers:  Justin,  fragmenta,  8  and  10,  MPG  1585  and 
1589;  Irenaeus.,  contra  hereses,  5.8.,  2;  5,6,1; 
2.,  33  chaps.  4  and  5;  5y  9y  1;  5)10Y  ly  MPG  7, 
114)  833,1137  and  1144;  Justin:  Apol.  I  pro*Christ 
Clement  of  Alex.  Strom.  6,12;  MPG  93  283;  Idem. 
Paedag.  3.1;  MPG  8,92; 
Origen,  comment  in  Joan.,  tom.  22,2;  AIPG  741-5; 
_  Idem.  Comm.  in  Epist.  ad  Rom.  Lib.  13  18  IMPG 
865  8; 
Tertullian,  Adv-.  Marc.  Lib.  4,  ch.  37,  also  Lib.  5.  ch. 
15;  MPL3  2.483AB3  552;  Tatianus,  Orat.  adv. 
Graecos,  1,4)  123  MPG  61  829C;  St.  Didimus  of  Alex. 
De  spiritu  Sancto  MPG  393  1079-82;  Idem. 
.p 
54.  "  55.,  593 
De  Trinitate  3.,  313  MPG  39.,  956-7. 
2.  C.  Vitriuga.,  Observationem  Sacrarum,  Am.  stelodomi, 
MDqC.  XXVIIy  PP-549-50. 
3.  "The  TEvc-upa  being  vis  surerior,  agens,  im,  ýerans 
in  homine;  the  vis  inferior  quae  agitur 
movetur,  in  imperio  tenetur;  I  Olshausen:  de  naturae 
humanae  trichotomia  in  Opusc.  P-154,  qtd.  in  (as  we 
have  not  been  able  to  trace  it  anywhere)  C.  Ellicott's 
St.  Paul's  Enistles  to  the  Thessalonians,  London 
(1866.  ))  P-d5  n.  on  5.23;  see  also  H.  Olshausen, 
Thessalonians,  E.  T.  in 
T.  T.  Clark.,  Edinburgh  (1851)  pp.  457-8. 188. 
1234  Ellicott.,  A.  T.  Mason.,  J.  Hutchison  F.  Delitzsch, 
C.  Ellicott,  Destiny  of  the  Creature  Sermon  5,  Pn-99- 
120  and.,  discussing  the  text  at  some  length  and  citing 
some  Scriptural  and  patriotic  -oassages.,  draws  the 
general  conclusion  Itthat  a  body.,  soul  and  s,  ýirit  are 
the  three  component  T)arts  of  man's  nature.  That  the 
spirit  is  the  realm  of'  the  intellectual  forces,  and  the 
shrine  of  the  Holy  Ghost.  That  the,  soul  is  the  region 
of  the  feelings,  affections,  and  impulses,  all  that 
peculiarly  individualizes  and  rersonifios.  Lastly, 
that  these  three  Tarts,  especially  the  two  incornoreal 
parts,  are  intimately  associated  and  united,  and  form 
the  media  of  communication,  both  with  each  other,  and 
with  the  higher  and  the  lower  clements";  further  in 
his  Epistle,  ibid.  p.  85  n.  on  5.23,  he  maintains  the 
same  view;  rejects  D.  Wette's  assertion  as  rhetorical 
ennumerations  and  Joweett's.  who  argues  against  any  kind 
of  distinction.,  as  setting  aside  "all  sound  rules  of 
scriptural  exegesis",  finnally  finds  Lunemann's 
attribution  to  Plato  unsatisfactory  and  remarks'  "And  if 
Plato  or  Philo  have  maintained  (as  ai)pears  demonstrable) 
substantially  the  same  view,,  then  God  has  rermitted  a 
heathen  and  a  Jewish  philosopher  to  advance  conjectural 
opinions  which  have  been  since  confirmed  by  the 
independent  teaching  of  an  inspired  A7,  ostleff.  T.  I.  1 
2.  Thessalonians,  Lonuon,  ed  by  C.  I.  Ellicott,  Cassell  & 
Co.  Ltd.,  Vol.  VIII,  p. 
06 
n.  on  5.23,  "This  is  St. 
Paul's  fullest  and  most  scientific  psychology,  not 
merely  a  rhetorical  piling  up  of  words  without  any 
particuiar  meaning  being  assigned  to  them".  (???  III) 
3.  Lectures  on  the  ET)istle 
, 
to  the  Thessalonians.,  Edinburgh 
(i6d4)  pp.  238-246  and  cf.  Dp.  239-242,  where  he  favours 
such  a  view. 
4.  A  System  of  Biblical  Psycholog 
,  Edinburgh  (18692) 
p-110:  "It  apT-)ears  therefore.,  '  that  Paul  distinguishes 
three  essential  elements  of  man,  to  everyone  of  which  the  work  of  sanctifying  grace  extends  in  its  manner". 189. 
J.  B.  Hcard..  '  G.  Lunvnan.  2  B.  F.  Westcott., 
3 
W.  Borneman,  4 
J.  B.  Lightfoot.  5  With  all  due  respect  to'their  views,, 
weight  of  scholarship  and  learning,  at  least  of  some  of 
them.,  the  fact  remcains  that  they  have  not  seriously 
discussed  the  subject  and  "their  statements  are  more  in 
the  nature  of  incidental  reflections  ,6  or  as  the  late 
The  tripartite  Nature  of  11an,  Spirit,  Soul,  Body, 
Edinburgh  (lb66).  Its  title  is  indicative  enough 
but  special  for  our  case  see  pp.  67-70. 
2.  Thessalonians  in  H.  A.  W.  Meyer's  critical  and  exeg.  comm. 
T.  T.  Cla-r-k-T1880)  pp.  163-4,  who  argues  that:  "the 
totality  of  man  is  here  divided  into  three  parts  .... 
we  are  not  to  assume  that  this  has  a  purely  rhetorical 
signific-ntion  ....  The  orig  n  of  the  trichotomy  is 
Platonic  (!!!  );  but  Paul  has  it  not  from  the  writings 
of  Plato  dnd'his  scholars,  but  from  the  current 
language  of  Society;  into  which  it  has  passed  from 
the  narrow  circle  of  the  schoolit. 
3.  The  Epistle  to  the.  Hebrews,  London  (1889)  pp.  114-15., 
add.  note  on  v.  4.12  where  he  equate's  the  analysis  of 
man's  constitution  of  Heb.  4.12  to  1  Thess.  5.23. 
4.  Die  Thessalonicher  briefe  ....  von  H.  A.  W.  Meyer, 
Gottingen  (1894)  p.  247.,  while  he  admits  that  the  origin 
of  trichotomy  is  Platonic  and  in  its  present  form  St. 
Paul  did  not  derive  it  directly  from  Plato  and  his 
School  of  Writers.  Nevertheless,  he  adds:  "TEve"UýLa 
ist  dann  die  hohere  rein  geistige  Seite  des  inneren 
Lebens  (  Vour, 
j,  IYUXT)  die  niedere, 
physischanimalische  Seite  des  nichtsinnlichen 
Wesensteiles,  Welche  mit  dem  Gebiet  der  Sinnlichkeit 
in  Beruhrung  trittty. 
Notes  on  ET)istles  of  St.  Paul,  London  (1895)  rp.  88-9 
n.  on  5.23;  he  sees  here  a  tripartite  division  of  man,  he  does  not  like  at  all  the  idea  of  treating  it  "as  a 
mere  rhetorical  exTiression". 
6.  A.  McCaig.,  "Thoughts  on  the  tripartite  theory  of  human 
naturelf  in  The-Ev,  -,  ngel_ical  Quarterly.,,  3  (1931)  p.  122. 190. 
Prof.  J.  Laidlaw  puts  it,  "Yet  their  utterances  on  this 
point  are  little  more  than.  obiter  dicta".  ' 
In  our  own  day  Festugiere  and  Allo  hold  some  form  of 
tripartite  view  and  "rattachment  la  pensee  de  lf.  apotre  a 
une  conception  Grecque". 
2 
Festugiere's  research, 
3 
although  Iýnfest  pas  toute  vainefI4  and  well  worth  it,  very 
informative  and  in  an  excellent  way  developed,  does  not 
succeed  in  its  purpose  to  internret  1  Thess.  5.23  in  a 
trichotomisti  ,c  Greek  way,  that  is,  to  discover  borrowings 
from  Plato  and  Aristotle  through  their  posterity  down  to 
St.  Paul.  He  fails  in  his  effort  and  misses  the  whole 
point,  on  the  ground  that  his  findings  and  conclusions  are 
unbiblical  and  entirely  un-Pauline. 
Alio,  on  the  other  hand,  excluding'Paulls  borrowings 
from  Pa  gan  Hellenic  psychology  and  oven  from  Philb,  he 
thinks  (along  with  Festugiere)5  "that  the  two  h,  -zd  a  common 
The  Bible  Doctrine  of  Man,  p.  67. 
2.  B.  Rigaux,  S,  aint  P"  pul  les  Epitres  aux  Thossal-onians, 
P-ris  (1956)  P-597  n.  on  5.23.  ' 
A.  J.  Festugiere,  La  trichotomie  de  1  Thess.  5.23  et  la 
philosophie  grecque.,  in  Recherches  de  science 
Roligieuse,  930. 
XIX  13  PP-386-415. 
4.  Ibid.  P-388. 
Le  P.  E.  B.  Allo,,  S--int  Paul  Premiere  Epitre  aux  Corinthians,  p.  104. 191. 
source,  and  that  the  St.  Paul's  trichotomy,  like  that  of 
the  older  philosopher,  is  'a  Jewish  conceptI.,  or 
-  of  elaborated  af0ter  jeurish  conceptions  based  on  the  tex-'Ll 
Genesis".  Further,  he  does  not  feel  very  sure  and 
happy  about  trichotomy  and  says  that  for  the  Apostle, 
there  exists  in  1  Thess.  5.23  TIa  model  difference  only 
between  TuXý  as  the  soul  in  the  totality  of  its 
functions,  above  all  living  and  conscious,  and  nvc-UýLa 
as  the  same  soul  in  its  high  intellectual  functions., 
without  implying  two  creative  acts  by  Godjj.  2 
Contrary  to  these  trichotomistic  views  are  those 
who  see  the  Divine  bpirit  in  the  believer  and  relate 
pneuma  here  to  the  Divine  Spirit  granted  to  Christians.  3 
In  the  Martyrium  of  Polycarpus  we  read  the  following 
words  11  Etr,  "A\)d(jTaaLv  Zwý(;  atwv(oi)  TuXýrq  Tc  xaC 
a6liaTor,  ýv  6youpala  RvcýpaToc  'AyCou".  4-  The 
Antiochene  Fathers  speaking  against  Appollinarius 
1.  Le  P.  E.  B.  Allo,  Saint  Paul  Premiere  Enitre  aux 
Corinthians5  PP-103-4. 
2.  Ibid.  p..  104. 
3.  We  may  mention  here.,  that  about  the  relation  between 
human  spirit  and  divine  spirit  and  the  believer's 
spirit  to  an  unbeliever,  we  have  spoken  carlicr*in 
the  chapter  ;  >f  0-n  nve-Wa  or  Spirit. 
4.  Týc,  EpvpvaCwv  'ExxXrg(ar,  nept  papTup(ou  'AYL'OU  rIOXUXdPROU 
15-17  in  Patres  ADostolice  ed.  by 
G.  Jacobson,  Tom.  II.,  Oxonii  (1863)..  p.  640-. 
- 192. 
heresies  advance  this  explanation: 
Thus  "Regards  býL-wv  T6  nvc-upa  as 
equivalent  to  LnLXopr)youpC'vn  ý[LN  h  XdPLC  TOZ 
TEVe6pa-roc.  So  Chrysostom:  T6  nve-Upa  TC  yT)atv 
, r6  XdpLaVa  and  Thdt..,  to  the  same  IvTau.  &a; 
effect. 
'  Next  another  anonymous  exegete  explains  very 
accurately  the  thought  of  the  Apostle:  I'God  has  never 
placed  the  three,  soul,  spirit,  and  body  in  an  unbeliever, 
but  only  in  believers.  Of  these,  the  soul  and  the  body 
are  natural,  but  the  spirit  is  a  special  benefit 
(energesia)  to  us,  a  gift  of  grace  to  those  who  believe".. 
(Trans.  from  W.  Barciay.,  Flesh  and  ST)irit,  p.  14).  2 
11OWTEOrc  btc  &n6arou  vi  upCa  -uýOcLxcv,  Tcvcvpd, 
TvXýv,  xaC  a-wpa,  &WýnC  p6vwv  TMv  nLaTcv6v-uwv 
1v  TuXý  pCv  xaC  aw-pa  Týc  yuacwc,  T6  U  nve-upa  Týc 
cbcpycaCac,  xobTCaTLv  T6  Xdpwpa  Tw-v  TELcrrc-u6vrwv". 
H.  B.  Swete.,  Theodori  Episcopi  Mopsuesteni  in  epistolas 
B.  Pauli,  Commentarii,  Cambridge  (1882)  Vol-ITY  P-39; 
J.  E.  Frame.,  Thessalonians,,  p.  212  n.  on  5.23.  * 
2.  J.  A.  Cramer,  Catenae  Graccorum  Patrum  in  N.  T.,  Oxonii., 
(1644)'P. 
-374. 193. 
E.  von  Dobschutz, 
1 
J.  E.  Frame, 
2 
E.  Fuchs, 
3 
and  W.  G.  Kumme,  4 
1.  Die  Thessalonichen  briefe,  Gottingen  (1909)  in  Meyerl.  s 
Commentary  on  N.  T.,  Vol.  10,  especially:  Exkurszur 
.  Trichotomic,  pp.  230-32.  The  author  insists  that 
trichotomy  is  not  biblical  at  all,  alien  to  Josephus, 
Philo,  Aristotle;  that  it  appears  for  the  first  time 
clearly  in  the  Neoplatonists  from  whom  it  passed  to 
the  Christian  Neoplatonists  (Origen,  Apollin,,  -,  ris). 
Further,  he  believes  soma  and  nsych  and  pneuma  is  the 
new  living  element  from  God.,  which  enters  intothe 
Christians.  To  prove  his  case  he  cites  Chrystostom's 
Theodoret's.,  anonymous  writerls  Cramer,  Mart.  Polycs.,  * 
Ambrosiasterls,  Pel--1gius?  and'Ambrosels  word.. 
2.  Thessalonians  in  ICC.,  p.  212.,  "The  divine  in  man  and  the 
the  human  individuality  must  be  keDt  Intact)-an 
undivided  whole". 
3.  Christus  unter  Geist  bei  Paulus,  Leipzig  (1932)'in 
un-tersuchutgen.,  zual  NT  Heff.  23,  pp.  42-44.,  cf.  p.  44 
where  he  ends  as  follows:  "When  Paul  speaks  of  the 
body  and  the  soul,  means  the  border  lines  of  the 
respectively  human  and  Christian  dealings  and  not  the 
constitucnt  parts  of  human  nature.  This  shows  itself 
already  previously  in  exposition  of  the  passage  1 
Thess.  5.23.  Consequently  the  word  pneuma  -  where  it 
signifies  the  Christian  ego,  has  nothing  to  do  with 
trichotomical  anthropology,  but  it  stands  in  the  last 
analysis  for  an  entirely  different  thing  ....  it  is 
related  to  the  Holy  Spirit". 
4..  Man  in  the  New  Testament,  London  (1963)  pp.  44-45: 
"There  appears  to  be  a-trichotomy  here,  with  a 
distinction  between  psuche  as  the  lower  and  pneuma  as 
the  higher  function  of  mants  inner  life.  But  that 
would  be  very  strange,  and*one  must  either  accept  that 
Paul,  without  furhter  thought,  places  psuche  and 
pneuma  beside  one  another  herein  a  liturgical  form, 
without  the  pneuma  being  distinguished  in  any  way  as 
standing  closer  tO'  God,  or  else  one  must  (which  Is 
more  probable)  relate  pneuma  here  to  the  Divine  Spirit 
accorded  to  Christians".  '' 194. 
share  the  same  view. 
Neither  the  trichomistic  view  nor  the  view  of  the 
Divine  Spirit  in  the  believer  satisfies.  Others,  taking 
the  moderate  view,  put  it  better:  they  think  that  either 
St.  Paul  flis  not  writing  a  treatise  on  the  soul.,  but 
pouring  forth,  from  the  fulness  of  his  heart,  a  prayer  for 
his  convertsyl 
1 
or  "the  enumeration  is  not  systematic  but 
hortatory,  to  emphasize  the  completene 
preservation.  It  should  be  coinpared 
similar  enumeration  of  Dcut.  6-,  k.  5(cf. 
"Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with 
(leb)  and  all  they  soul  (nephesh),  and 
ss  of  the 
with  the  somewhat 
4.29,10.12  etc.  ): 
all  thine  heart 
with  all  thy 
B.  Jowett,  -The  E-Asties  of  St.  Paul  to  the  Thess-,,  lon- 
ians,  Galatians,  and  Romans,  A  Tran6ldtibn  and 
'Co=entary,,  London  (1894)  P-51  n.  on  5.23;  G. 
Milligan,  St.  Paul's  ET)istles  to  the  Thessalonians 
London  (19-3-2)-p.  -7-TT  n.  on  5.23;  E.  J.  Bicknell,  The2 
First  and  the  Second  Eýistle  to  the  Thessalonians., 
London  (i952-Y  -in  WC  p.  64  n.  on  5.23.,  while  indirectly 
refers  to  Jowett.,  he  remarks  that  "St.  Paul  is  not 
giving  a  lesson  in  psychology.  It  is  a  complete 
misunderstanding  of  the  nature  of  the  passage  to  b,  --..  se 
on  it  a  system  of  trichotomy  ....  What  he  is 
concerned  with  is  the  preservation  and  consecration  -)f 
the  whole  man.  There  is  an  element  of  rhetoric  in 
his  description  of  the  totality  of  human  nature". 195. 
might", 
1 
or  they  regard  it  II.  as  a  popular  statement,  and 
not  as  an  expression  of  the  Apostle's  own-o.  T 
2 
,  chology'l.,  or 
as  an  eminent  biblical  scholar  and  original  thinker  h"-s 
it.,  as  a  formulation  coming  from  liturgical-rhetorical 
W.  Robinson.,  "Hebrew  psychology  and  its  relation  to 
Pauline  Anthrýopologylt,  Mansfield  College  Essays, 
p.  280;  idem.  The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Man,  p.  108; 
J.  A.  T.  Robinson,  The  Bod  ,  p.  27  n.  2;  E.  Schweizer 
TEveluopa  in  TWINT,  p.  433  n.  685,  E.  T.  OP-  cit- 
65 
n.  1;  Comp.  also  with  D.  Pfleiderer,  Primitive 
Christianity,  p.  272  n.  2.  asserting  that  soul  and 
spirit  are  not  different  parts,  but  only  different 
names  for  the  one  human  being,  adds:  I'Even  1  Thess. 
5.23  is  not  inconsistent  with  this,  since  here  the 
apparent  trichotomy  nvc-upaj  (ýUxý  and 
ampa  is  only  a  rhetorical 
emphasising  of  the  completeness  of  the  man  just  as 
in  Phil.  1.17  tv  Lv(  nvCvPaTL,  PLa  OX-T)  3 
and  in  Luke  1.46  h  (ýuXý  pou,  T6  nvc-upa  pou 
are  placed  in  rhetorical  parallelism  without  any 
reference  to  different  subjects  being  intended; 
Similarly  F.  Prat,  The  Theology  of  St.  Paul.  Vol.  II., 
P-54  n.  4.,  writes  11the  enumeration  (-  r6  TEvet)'Pa,  h  OXý 
xaC  T6  aMpa  )  seems  to  prove  that  it  is  a  question 
here  of  grandeurs  of  the  same  orderlt  and  B.  Rigaux, 
Thessalonians,  P-597  n.  on  5.23  adds  also:  III1  ya 
un  element  de  rhetorique  dans  ces  fins  de  develop.  Der-cnt 
Paulinien.  on  ne  doit  pas  y  chercher  une  doctrine 
sur  la  psychologic.,  qutil  nta  pas  voulu  y  mettret'. 
2.  R.  H.  Charles,  Eschatol2gy,  London  (1913)  P-468;  see 
also  J.  E.  Frame,  Thessalonians,  in  ICC,  p.  213  n.  on 
5.23. 196. 
(perhaps  traditional)  diction. 
1 
In  addition  the  liturgical-traditional-rhetorical 
origin  and  nature  of  the  uassage  under  discussion  is  well 
stated  by  Masson:  Placing  side  by  side  similarly  worded 
Pauline  texts  Gal.  6.18,  Phil.  4.13,  Philemon  25  and  2 
Tim.  4.22  -  he  draws  the  conclusion  that  tI.  e  formula 
lic,  ud  uo"u  nveupauoc  b[iMv  is  simply 
R.  Bultmann  Theology  of  the  Now  Testament,  Vol.  I,  pp. 
205-6;  comp.  also  with  M.  Dibelius,,  Iin  die 
'I  and  die  Philipre  ,  in  HZNT  Thessalonicher  I,  I 
Tubingen  (1937T  P-32,  who  says,  "we  have 
heietoaccept  it  .... 
'that  the  Arostle  here  follows'  the 
customary  liturgical  terminology  usage.  11  W.  Gutbrod 
op.  cit.  90-91,  arguing  that  St.  Paul  in'all  T)robab- 
ility  has  not  considered  the  question  whether  man 
consists  of  a  trichotomy  or  dichotomy,  that  employs 
these  particular  expressions  wholly  unemphasised  and 
that  it  will  be  best  to  see  here  a  description  of  man 
which  shall  be  the  most  concrete  possible,  and  which 
most  likely  by  the  names  man  comprised  in  the  further 
elements  of  his  being,  says  characteristically,  p.  91, 
"So  werden  wir  nvelOpa  auch  hier  als  das 
Innenlebendes  Menschen  zuverstehen  haben,  ohne  'p,  doch 
diesen  liturgischen  brief  schluss  terminologisch  j 
ausbenten  zu  wollen;  1'  see  also  Prof.  F.  F.  Bruce,  from 
his  written  communication  to  Dr.  White,  naper  on.  cit. 
p.  67,11 
....  i  Thess  5.23.  It  is  not  U  -  certain  that  Paul 
is  protounding'a  formal  trichotomy  in  these  words.  it 
would  be  equally  Valid  to  deduce  a  formal  tetrachomy  Of 
heart,  soul,  mind  and  strength  from  Mark  12.30";  Dr. 
A.  McCaig,  op.  cit.  P-136)  arrives  at  the  same' 
conclusion.  *aul  without  further  thought,  places 
psyche  --and  pneuma  beside  one  another  here  in  a  litur- 
gical  form;  11  E.  Schweizer.,  TWNT,  ').,  433  n.  685,  E.  T.  or). 
Cit.  P-85  n.  1,  goes  on  ras  follows'..  "The  greeting  is  - 
very  likely  traditional,  if  not  liturgical  and  so  tells 
us  little  about  Paults  conception  of  man  (Dibelius 
Thess.  3  ad  loc);  ori  the  other  hand.,  W.  Noil.,  The 
Enistle  of  Paul  to  the  Thessalonians,  In  the  Moffat  NT., 
London  (1950)  1  3.  observes,.  "The  tri*ple  combination 
may  indeed  have  been  a  current  liturgical  formula  in 
Christian  or  Jewish  circles.  At  all  events,  Paul  is 
certainly  as  unconcerned  about  psychology  as  was  our 
Lord  when  he  gave  us  the  chief  commandment  to  love  God 
with  heart,  soul.  mind  and  strenTth  Ollark  I 197. 
"another,  more  solemn  manner  of  saying  jicO'bPMv 
and  goes  on  to  equate  ftvC-VjIa  in  this  context  with 
person  -  11  bli-Wv  r6  nvc-Upa  to  youp 
-personally".  From  this,  he  is  able  to  render  the  cognate 
phrase  WxXT)pov  b4Mv  T6  nvc-upa  , 
"your  whole  rersonfl,  indicating  its  two  constituent 
elements  -  the  soul  and.  tho'body. 
1 
What  conclusions  shall  we  draw  amidst  so  many  different 
views  and  various  opinions?  The  reply  would  be  simply 
this:  St.  Paul  is  not  a  scientific  psychologist  or  a 
philosopher  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word  and  he 
consequently  does  not  use  his,  so  to  sreak.,  anthropological 
-  terminology  with  literary  accuracy  and  precision,  he 
C.  Masson,  Les  Deux  Epitres  aux  Thessolonians,  Paris 
(1.101,57)  in  CNT,  Ila,  PP-77-7b)  whilo  we  agroc  with  and 
accept  his  given  account  on  the  text  as  liturgical  etc. 
nevertheless,  we  are  unhapg  with  his  last  words  of 
the  present  paragrapl  and  his  other  words  too, 
(P-77):  "Llesprit  erait  l1element  surcrieur,  nurement 
spirituel.  '  psychologique,  ýlus  directement  on  rarrort 
avec  le  corps1l,  which  suggest  that  the  pneuma  would  bo 
the  surerior  element  of  the  inmost  being  of  man  and 
consequently  could  mean  the  whole  person,  the  whole 
man,  and  soul  and  body  its  inferior  rarts  and  we 
should  very  much  like  to,  record  with  W.  G.  Ku-a!:  ael)-  op. 
cit.  D.  45  n-51,  our  own  disagreement.  We  are  wonder- 
ing,  does  not  his  view  approach  Plato's  view  of 
man???  111  By  the  way,  we  may  note  that  rI.  Mnparat6TT)c, 
'0  "AvOewTEoý  tv 
., 
rý  Kaývý  ALaO  T) 
-A 
XnI 
Athens  (1955)  pp.  10-11.,  while  he  rejects  the 
trichotdmistic  view  of  1  Thess.  5.23Y  understands  the 
distinction  between  psyche  and  pneuma  as  that  between 
the  animal  and  spiritual  (higher-lower)  life  rrinciple; 
see  also  W.  G.  Kimmel.,  ibid.  D.  45  n.  51. 198. 
makes  use  of  the  current,  popular,  simple  and  approximate 
language  of  his  time.  ' 
Here.,  as  we  have  already  said,  he  is  speaking 
rhetorically,  not  theologically,  in  a  traditional, 
liturgical  fashion.  Here,  as  elsewhere  in  his  Enistles., 
he  does  not  look  at  human  nature  in  a  trichotomistic  way; 
he  is  not  thinking  of  man  as  composed  of  three  different 
distinct  parts,  or  exclusive  elements  or  entities,  nor 
does  he  divide  the  humon  being  "into  three  well-defined 
compartments". 
2  On  the  contrary,  St.  Paul  in  the  Present 
text  is  speaking  for  the  entire  man,  for  the  whole  man. 
He  is  concerned  for  the  preservation  and  sanctification 
of  manIs  entire  being,  for  his  totality,  for  his 
personality,  for  the  man  as  a  whole.  lilligan  has  it: 
"They  are  evidently  chosen  in  accordance  with  tho  general 
O.  T.  view  of  the  constitution  of  man  to  emrhasize  a 
sanctification  which  shall  extend  to  manIs  whole  being, 
whether  on  its  immortal,  its  personal,  or  its  bodily  side"--' 
F.  C.  Grant.,  An  Introductic 
New  York  (1950)  pp.  162-3. 
2.  W.  Neil 
to  New  Test  htý 
G.  Milligan,  Thessalonians,  P-78;  see  also  in  L. 
Morris,  The  ETistle  of  Paul  tO  the  Thessalonians 
(1956)  in  TINT  cf.  p-107- 199. 
or  again.,  as  G.  G.  Findlay  puts  it.,  t1here  the  entire  man 
is  surveyed,  with  his  whole  nature  in  its  manifold  aspects 
and  functions,  as  the  subject  of  sanctifying  grace". 
Once  more  St.  Paul  emphasizes  here  the  preservation  and 
sanctification  of  man  in  his  completeness,  in  his  totality, 
in  his  wholeness,  in  his  entire  being. 
Thus-lDneum  ,  Psyche  and  soma  are  not  distinct  parts., 
elements  of  man,  but  different  aspects  and  functions  of 
man  himself,  of  his  actuality,  of  his  Dersonality,  of  his 
entire  unity,  different  names  of  his  entire  being.  Man 
is  not  made  up  of  parts,  does  not  consist  of  separate 
elements,  he  is  a  living  unity.  Man  here  and  throughout 
the  Pauline  lettersand  in  the  Bible  generally,,  is  Van 
indissoluble  whole,  manifested  under  one  aspcct  or  another. 
It  is  a  case  not  of  a  "human  composite"  but  of  a  monismit.  2 
Brunner  insists  that  while  the  physical,  psychical 
and  spiritual  functions  are  distinguishable  in  man,  they 
cannot  be  Isolated  from  their  synthesis  in  him.  All  three 
are  involved  in  man  as  a  creature,  all  three  will  be 
involved  in  his  eternal  destiny.  It  is  clear  that  Brunner 
The  Eristles  of  Paul  the  Apostle  to  the  Thessalonians, 
Cambridge  (1925)  P-133. 
2.  C.  Spicq,  Dieu  et  11homme  solon  let  N.  T..,  p.  161  n-3. 200. 
refuses  to  regard  any  of  the  three  as  T'dispensable  matterl' 
which  eternity  will  ultimately  consign  to  the  dust-bin. 
1 
E.  Brunner,  IMan  in  Revolt,  London  (1939)  PP-362-3  n.  1 
(cf.  P-363  n.  1).  Perh#s  it  may  be  of  interest  to 
refer  to  Dr.  A.  Carrel's  remarks  on  this  point  from 
a  psychophysic  and  biological  point  of  view,  Ilan  the 
Unknown.,  Penguin  Books  (1948)  ', T)P.  115-61  1383  -25Z-, 
which  are  quite  relevant  indeed. 201. 
.%3 
As  we  enter  into  the  discussion  of  our  las:  '*.  chapter, 
two  things  most  particularly  stand  out  for 
consideration: 
1.  The  nature  of  the  resurrection  body  as  it  is 
represented  in  the  locus  classicus  1  Cor.  15-35-58 
(cf.  35-49)l  and  2  Cor.  5.1-10- 
2.  The  relationship  of  1  cor.  15-35-58  to  2  Cor. 
5.1-10. 
In  sayi.  -. L.;  LLiis  we  do  not  rule  out  other  passages  in 
Pauline  wr.!  i7ings  dealing  with  the  resurrection  body 
jr  transf'Qrmation  of  the  body  directly  or  indirectly, 
briefly  or  in  detail;  on  the  contrary,  such 
passages  are  the  following:  Rom.  8.11,18,25; 
2  Cor.  4.7-18;  Phil.  3.20,21;  Col.  3.4;  but  we 
maintain  that  1  Cor.  15  and  2  Cor.  5'are  the  main 
and  especially  the  most  celebrated  1  Cor.  15. 202, 
The  nature  of  the  resurrection  bod 
(a)  in  1  Cor.  15.35-58. 
After  establishing  that  Christ's  resurrection  is 
a  historical  fact  beyond  doubt  and  question. 
1  the 
cornerstone  and  foundation  of  our  faith,  the  heart  of 
the  Holy  Gospel,  which  will  be  a  lie  and  delusion 
without  it,  and  also  the  basis  of  the  resurrection  of 
the  living  and  dead,  2 
St.  Paul  proceeds  next  to  answer 
those  who  held  either  the  crude  Jewish  notion  of  a 
resurrection  of  flesh  in  a  literal  sense  or  the  Greek 
one  of  a  disembodied  immortality  of  the  soul  after 
death  and  demand  to  know  the  manner  and  the  nature  of 
the  resurrection  body.  3 
To  give  a  reply  to  these  questions  he  turns  to  a 
series  of  analogies  and  illustrations. 
We  would  form  an  idea  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
resurrection  body,  says  St.  Paul,  if  we  turn  our 
attention  to  the  phenomenon  of  the  seed. 
1.1  Cor.  15-1-11- 
2.  Ibid.  15.12-19  and  20-23. 
3.  Ibid.  15-35. 203. 
The  bare  grain  of  wheat  must  be  sown  in  the 
ground  and  die  in  order  to  give  a  new  and  glorious 
body.  God  gives  the  seed  the  sort  of  body 
according  to  His  will  and  laws.  ' 
The  interesting  thing  here  is  thatl?  aul  is  showing 
that,  at  one  and  the  same  time,  there  can  be 
dissolution,  difference  and  yet  continuity,  and  yet,  in 
spite  of  the  dissolution  anc:  in  spite  of  the  difference, 
2  it  is.  the  same  life,  the  same  seed". 
From  the  sowing  of  a  seed  and  its  growth  into  a 
plant,  St.  Paul  passes  on  to  the  world  in  general  and 
adds  a  supplementary  illustration.  He  points  out  that 
there  are  varieties  of  flesh.,  different  types  of 
animal  life:  there  is  the  flesh  of  human  beings, 
anot-her  flesh  of  animals.,  another  flesh  of  birds  and  a 
different  one  of  fishes.  In  like  manner  there  is 
also  a  difference  between  celestial  bodies  and 
terrestial  ones,  not  only  in  quality  but  in  glory  as 
1.1-Cor.  15-36-38;  comp.  John  12.24. 
2.  W.  Barclay,  The  Letters  to  the  Corinthians3  P-175. 204. 
weli. 
Now  that  the  Apostle  has  removed.  the  object  -ions 
and  made  his  point,  he  applies  this  analogy  to  the 
antithesis  and  difference  between  the  present,  earthly 
body  and  the  resurrection  body. 
To  emphasize  the  marked  antithesis  between  the 
body  that  now  is  and  the  body  of  the  future  and  to 
make  clearer  his  point,  Paul  uses  four  contraste. 
He  argues  that  (1)  the  present  body  is  mortal, 
perishabie  and  liable  to  corruption,  decay  and  death, 
while  the  resurrection  body  will  be  imperishable, 
incorruptible  and  immortal;  2  (2)  the  body  of  earth  is 
a  body  of  dishonour,  of  humiliation,  the  future  body 
is  a  body  of  glory,  of  splendour; 
3  (3)  the  body  that 
is  now  is  weak.,  feeble  and  the  body  to  come  is 
powerful; 
4 
and  (4)  the  earthly,  the  present  body  is  a 
1.1  Cor.  15-39-4-1. 
2.  Ibid.  15.42:  aTEcIpcTaL  tv  yOopl,  tyc(puuaL  tv 
C  3-  Ibid.  15.43:  tl  CYnECPC'CaL  ýV  6TLjlLa,,  ýYCCPC'CaL  tV 
comp.  Philip.  3.21. 
7-7  ...  : 
4.  Ibid.  15.43:  OTEC  C  PCT(l  LLV  &CYOC'VC  (a  LYCCPF-,  uat.  tv 
6uvdiltf, 205. 
natural,  physical,  and  animated  body,  whereas  the 
future,  the  resurrection  body  will  be  a  s-piritual  body.  ' 
In  the  fourth  contrast,  which  is  the  heart  of  the 
matter  and  the  core  of  the  whole  argument,  St.  Paul 
concludes  that  if  there  is  a  natural,  physical  body, 
surely  there  must  be  a  spiritual  one  as  well. 
2 
P",  ul,  to  confirm  what  he  has  just  been  saying, 
turns  this  time  to  the  Holy  Scriptures  and  furnishes 
-4,  * 
a  parallel  between  Adam  and  Christ. 
The  main  idea  of  this  parallelism  may  be  stated 
in  sumiary  fashion  as  follows: 
The  natural  body  corresponds  to  the  first  man, 
Adam,  who  became  an  animate  being3  through  the  divine 
act  of  creation.  '  Adam  is  earthly  and  passes  on  to 
the  whole  human  race  a  form  of  animate  life  which  is 
the  physical  body;  the  spiritual  body  is  related  and 
1  Cor.  15.44:  CF7TC(PETaL  GM11a  (ýUXL)t6v,  ýycCpeTaL 
gwýta  nvcupaTMv.  Vulg.  "Corpus  animale  ...  corpus  spiritalell;  AV 
fInatural 
...  spiritualt';  RSV  "physical 
spiritual";  NEB  "animal  ...  spiritual";  comp. 
also  with'l  Cor.  2.14-15;  2  Cor.  5.1;  Heb.  4.12 
Jud.  19. 
2.  Ibid.  15.44. 
3.1  Cor..  15.45;  comp.  also  with  Gen..  2.7  and  5-3. 206. 
corresponds  to  the  second  Adam,  Christ  himself,,  the 
life-giving  Spirit,  who  through  his  incarnation,  life, 
death  and  resurrection,  has  brought  into  being  a  now 
kind  of  humnan  existence,  completely  controlled  by  the 
Holy  Spirit  and  consequently  incorruptible,  glorious, 
powerful,  spiritual. 
' 
Having  answered  the  questions  of  v.  35  and 
completed  the  picture  of  the  nature  of  the 
resurrection  body  in  W.  36-49,  in  v-50  he  emphatically 
reaffirms  what  has  earlier  been  said  -and  preDares  the 
reader  for  the  next  section  vv.  51-58. 
His  reassertion  goes  like  this:  It  is  not  only 
impossible,  but  at  the  same  time  inconceivable  that 
flesh  and  blood  will  ever  participate  in  the  Kingdom 
of  God.  Indeed,  such  a  thing  is  utterly  imnossible 
for  the  simple  reason  -  the  perishable,  transitory, 
temporal  and  corruptible  cannot  inherit  the 
everlasting,  incorruptible  and  immortal.  2 
1  Cor.  15.45-49;  comp.  with  Dan  7.13;  Jo  6.63; 
Rom.  8.29;  1  Cor.  15.20-28;.  2  Cor.  3.6,17; 
Philip.  3.21. 
2.1  Cor.  15-50:  T'To-uvo  6c  yT)II[2  &6CX(POL'7  O'TL  CTdpý 
xC 
PaaLXECUV  GEOZ)  XXT)POVOýLýGUL  aL  alýta  Ob  6u\)(xTaL, 
ob6c  h  Y,  ýOpd  Týv  &YO  v%X  ovoll 
cpo(:  m"l)a.  wi 
Rp  GaIF  -1.16;  Heb. 
2.4;  Matt.  16-17;  Eph.  6.12. 207. 
Since  this  verse  might  be  regarded  as  a 
conclusion  of  W.  36-49  and  has  a  significance  of  its 
own,  let  us  pause  for  a  moment  and  see  its  real 
meaning  through  the  eyes  of  some  commentators: 
St.  John  Chrysostom  and  Photius  argue  that  flesh 
and  blood  must  be  taken  in  its  moral  sense  as 
denoting  moral  frailty.  '  Theodcritus  and  Cyril  of 
Alexandria  took  it  to  mean  the  mortal  and  corruptible 
2  human  nature.  Some  others  understood  it  as 
our  present  physical  )rganismlf., 
3  It...  human  nature  in 
its  p-resent  material.,  mortal  .  corruntible  state" 
I 
....  our  present  mortal  nature.,  not  our  evil 
propensitiesft.,  5  "the  body  as  capable  of  corruption  and 
Chrysostom,,  lfadpxa  TdC  novT)pdq  npdC.  cLr,  xaXc-L-;  o 
Photius:  TIOL  capxLxoC  %cL(  tpTcaOr-ýrpaaLXcCav  Ocot)  U 
Ob  XXT)pOVOjI'CFOUCYL"  T) 
2.  Theodoritus:  L 
"GdpXa  HaL,  aTpa  -Uýv  0\)Ti'rT)v'  Yý&ýV"XaxýL  T) 
Cyril  of  Alexandria  ""'Ewr,  ta-c(  u6  cyW-pa  -r6 
&v%Dp6nLvov  cdpý  xaC.  a[[ta,  votjT'F'-cjcL  DvT),  r6v  xaC 
0  p-c6\)"qtd  YX9r' 
-UT)C.  'OL  T]  r.  CL  7)  T)  r.  .Tc(; 
'g  jq5-6  3.  F.  Godet.,  1  Corinthians,  Vol.  2.  p.  433. 
4.  T.  C.  Edvards,  A  CommentarX  on  the  First.  Enistle  to  the  Corinthians,  London  (.  Idb5)  -5---449- 
5.  A.  Robertson  and  A.  Plummer, 
-1 
Corin-thians  in  ICC!, 
PP-375-6. 208. 
of  being  or  causing  any  inconvenience''., 
'  ''It  is 
stated  firmly  as  a  conclusion,  that  the  Jewish 
thought  of  a  resurrection  of  this  fleshly  body 
is  to  be  rejected"., 
2 
11  ....  human  nature  as  ornosed  to  the  Divinell.,  3 
,  is 
not  the  material  as  distinguished  from  the 
immaterial,  it  is  the  natural  as  opDosed  to  the 
supernaturalt'.  4  I'The  phrase  describes  humanity  living 
under  present  earthly  conditions.  These  are  not 
continued  in  the  Resurrection  (Mar.  12.25)tt.  5  In 
recent  years  Jeremias.,  in  an  excellent  and  illuminating 
articie,  makes  the  following  remarz:  s.  about  the  meaning 
of  1  Cor.  15-50:  The  whole  sentence  has  not  been 
created  by  St.  Paul  himself,  but  it  goes  back  to  the 
E.  Evans,  The  Epistles  of  Pr.  ml  the  Ai-),  ostle  to  the 
. 
Corinthians,  in  CB,  Oxford  (1930)  P-14-7. 
2.  H.  Lietzmann.,  An  die  Korinther  I-II,  Tubingen 
(1923)  in  HZNT,,  p.  87- 
3.  J.  Moffatt.,  1  Corinthians,  in.  AINTC,  London  (1938) 
p.  265- 
4.  R.  Xnox,  A  New  Testament  Commentary  for  English 
.. 
Readers,,,  II,  London  (19  4  Tp).  172.  5  7- 
5.  C.  T.  Craig, 
.1 
Corinthians.,  in  the  Interpreter's 
.. 
New  York  F 
. 
Bible  1953)  Vol-10y  p.  249. 209. 
eschatological  teaching  of  the  early  Church  and  means 
tthe  natural  man  as  a  frail  creature  in  opposition  to 
Godf.  Further.,  the  meaning  of  'flesh  and  bloodl  is 
that  neither  the  living  nor  the  dead  can  take  part  in 
the  Kingdom  of  God  as  they  are  in  their  rresent 
state.  The  same  sentence  refers  to  the  change  of  the 
living  at  the  Parousia  and  not  to  the  resurrection  of 
2  the  dead 
Whiteley  finds  Jeremias's  solution  correct  and 
3  convincing  and  follows  him. 
Allo  charges  Robertson  and  Plummer,  who  had  made 
much  the  same  point  as  Jeremias,  with  being  unduly 
subtle.,  -but  adauces  no  reason  to  substantiate  his 
judge,  ment.  4 
1.  J.  Jeremias.,  "Flesh  and  blood  cannot  inherit  the 
Kingdom  of  God",  New  Testament  Studies  (1963) 
Vol.  2,  No.  3.,  'P.  J-52. 
2.  Ibid.  PP-152-4. 
3.  D.  E.  H.  IThiteley,  The  Theology  of  St.  Paul,  p.  253- 
A 
4.  P.  Allý  Premiere  E2itre  aux  Corinthians,  Paris 
(1956  3, 
p.  431  on  15-50;  also  in  D.  E.  H.  Whiteley, 
.e  ibia.  p.  253  n-l- 210. 
The  remaining  section  of  the  text  runs  as 
foliows:  St.  Paul  sCays  with  a  solemn  way  and  firmness., 
we  shall  not  all  die,  but  we  shall  all  pass  through 
a  change  and  transformation.  2  This  "change  will  not 
be  a  long-drawn-out  affairt',  3  but  on  the  contrary  will 
be  a  sudden  one,  instantaneous,  will  take  place  in  the 
twinkling  of  an  eye,  when  the  last  trumpet  sounds. 
As  soon  as  the  trumpet  sounds  the  dead  shall  be 
raised  imperishable  and  incorruptible  and  we  (the 
living)  shall  be  changed  as  well. 
4 
It  is  quite  natural  an4  almost  inevitable  to  give 
an  answer  to  the  question:  how  shall  we  be  trans- 
formed  and  raised  up?  Paul's  answer  to  this  question 
is  positive  and  11-a  wholly  Christ-centred  and  a 
.5  He  says  quite  ex.,  wholly  moral  one"  Aicitly  that 
There  are  some  other  readings  or  variants  here. 
We  for  our  part  follow  that  of  AV.,  RSV.,  NEB,,  JB 
h  KaLvý  ALaO.  Jinn  ed.  BFBS  and  the  rccent 
eb.  ition  of  Greek  New  Testament  ed.  by  K.  Aland, 
M.  Black,  Am.  B.  S.,  BEBS  etc. 
2.  1  Cor. 
-15-51;  comp.  also  with  1  Thess.  4.15,17. 
3.  L.  Morris,  1  Corinthians  in  TNTC,  p.  233. 
4.  Ibid.  52;  comp.  with.  ý'Igtt.  24-31;  Rev.  8.2; 
Esdr.  6.23. 
5.  C.  F.  D.  Moule.,  "St.  Paul  and  Dualism:  The  Pauline 
Condeption  of  'Resurrection"  in  New  Testament 
Studies  (1966)  Vol.  12,  No.  2.,  p.  10FT-. 211. 
God  who  raised  Our  own  Lord  Jesus  Christ  from  the 
dead  will  also  raise  us  by  His  power. 
'  St.  Paul 
here  does  not  speculate,  he  does  not  use  vague  and 
incomprehensible  terms,  he  does  not  play  with  the 
words,  he  does  not  use  ambiguous  expressions  -and  Dut 
across  into  peopie's  minds  dubious  and  false  ideas; 
quite  the  opposite.,  he  makes  use  of  simple  words  and 
clear  statements;  he  speaks  out  from  the  bottom  of 
his  heart,  from  the  inmost  part  of  his  very  being, 
with  unusual,  unsurpassed  firmness  and  certainty,  as 
he  feels,  as  he  believes,  as  the  Holy  Spirit  insTires 
him. 
His  words  imply  and  convey  to  every  Christian  this 
most  fundamental  and  important  message:  we  are  not 
immortal  creatures  by  nature,  in  our  own  right;  we  do 
not  possess  immortality  within  us  or  a  potentiality 
capable  of  giving  immortality;  we  shall  be  transformed 
and  raised  up  from  the  dead  through  the  infinite  love 
and  mercy  of  God,  by  the  Grace  and  glorious  power  of 
God.,  through  our  Redeemer  and  Saviour,  through  the 
crucified  and  Risen  Christ,  who  has  been  raised  up  by 
1  Cor.  6.14;  15.20-22;  2  Cor.  4.14;  Rom.  8.11; 
5-1  6.5;  Philip.  3.21;  '  ýOlos;  3-1-4p  I.  Thess. 
4.1  comp.  With  MAttO  22-31-ý32;  *  Jo  6-392  40p' 
44,54;  11.25;  Acts  4.2. 212. 
the  Father. 
Our  own  resurrection  then  is  not  our  own 
natural  possession,  it  is  the  gift  of  God  to  us,  it 
is  the  beneficence  of  God  towards  us. 
In  the  remainder  of  the  section,  St.  Paul  reminds 
us  of-the  coming  change.  He  distinguishes  again 
between  perishable  and  imperishable,  adding  for  the 
first  time  here  the  word  immortality,  not 
necessarily  in  the  Platonic  sense,  far  from  it.  1 
For  St.  Paul,  Our  Lord's  resurrection  and  victory 
over  death  are  so  profound  and  fundamental  that,  by 
combining  and  adapting  Isa.  25.8  and  Hos.  13-14,  he 
celebrates  and  declares  triumphantly  the 
annihilation  of  death,  the  victory  over  sin  and  death 
and.,  in  a  word,  the  final  triumph  which  is  due  to  God 
through  our  risen  Lord  and  Saviour  Christ. 
In  v-58,  as  elsewhere,  we  can  trace  the  great- 
ness  of  his  mind  and  personality.  He  is  the 
theoritician  but  simultaneously  the  practical  minded 
man.  He  deals  with  abstract  and  abstruse  subjocts 
1.1  Cor.  15-53,54. 
2.1  Cor.  15-55-57. 213. 
many  times,  but  on  the  other  hand  puts  them  into 
practice  and  applies  them  in  every-day  life,  urging 
others  to  follow  the  same  course  of  action. 
Thasheý  closes  the  whole  chapter  with  a  practical 
conclusion.  Knowing  very  well  that  the  Corinthians 
were  prone  to  fickleness,  inconstant,  easily 
changeabie  in  their  faith  and  full  of  doubts,  he  urges 
them  never  to  give  in  and  admit  defeat,  but  to  stand 
firm  and  immovable  in  the  hope  of  future  glory,  doing 
GodIs  work,  applying  God's  will  in  their  daily  lives 
and  serving  God  as  it  pleases  Him.,  taking  into  account 
that  their  labour  and  strife  will  not  be  in  vain, 
' 
or 
as  two  commentatDrs,  in  their  standard  work  have  it: 
"They  must  get  rid  of  the  unsettled  and  unfruitful 
state  of  mind  caused  by  habitual  sce-,  ticism,  and  must 
learn  to  be  firmly  seated,  so  as  to  be  able  to  resist 
the  false  teaching  and  other  hostile  forces  that  would 
carry  them  away  (Col.  1.23).  Let  there  be  less 
1.1  Cor.  15-58--- 214. 
speculation  and  more  work.  Ill 
Since  we  have  already  outlined  St.  Paul's  teaching 
on  the  resurrection  body,  we  must  ask  how  are  we  to 
uncterstand  his  words,  how  after  all  shall  we  express  it 
in  modern  terms? 
Right  from  the  outset  we  must  rule  out  any  notion 
of  tho,  future  resurrection  body  as  being  similar  to  our 
physical  one,  to  ttie  material,  earthly 
A.  Robertson  and  A.  Piummor.  I  Corinthians  in  ICC, 
P-379;  some  scholars,  in  order  to  exvlain  better 
the  meaning  of  the  present  -,.,  ssage,  quote 
Aristotle,  Nic.  Eth.  2-zl-3 
where  AristotlO  is  insisting  on  morol  actions 
being  the  outcome  of  conscious,  steady  character. 
"In  the  case  of  moral  excellence  a  man  uiust  know 
what  he  is  doing,  then  he  must  choose  to  do  it  and 
to  do  it  for  its  own  sake,  and  finally  his  actions 
must  express  a  stable.,  immovable  character".  G.  G. 
Findiay,  1  QDrintD:  V-  ID  ,,  D§  in  BGT,  ,  .  943  n.  on  v-58; 
A.  Robertson  anc!  A.  Plummer,  1  Corinthians  in  ICC, 
P-379  n.  on  v-58;  J.  Moffatt,  I  Corinthians  in 
,. VLNTC,  p.  269;  G.  Simon, 
-The 
First  Eristle  to  the 
Corinthians,  in  Torch  Bible  (paperback)  M-A  Press, 
(1965)  P_75_ý3-  rL 215. 
body;  1 
such  a  view  would  be  a  grossly  misleading 
Most  of  the  Greek  and  Latin  Fathers,  generally 
speaking,  are  moving  towards  these  lines.  They 
assume  the  identity  of  the  risen  to  the  natural 
body  and  believe  in  the  resuscitation  of  the  very 
same  body  that  lived  on  earth:  Justine  the  Martyr, 
A,  pol.  1  pro  Christ,  18,19,  MPG  6,  PP-356-7; 
Athenugoras.,  Do  rbsurr.  '15,18-.  25,  MPG  6  pp.  1004-5 
and  1009-24.  The  interesting  point  about 
Athenagoras  is  that  he  thinks  of  man  as  a  composite 
being,  soul  and  body  together,  not  as  soul  or  body 
alone  and  such  a  happy  partnership  of  soul  and  body 
will  rarticipate  in  the  future  life;  Irenaeus,  Con. 
Hereses.  5.3.,  3  MPG  7)  P-1131;  Tertulian  De  resurr., 
T'V  ý  carn.  cap.  LII.,  ,,  dPL  2  pp.  918-9,923 
Jerome  Con.  Joan  Hieros.  16.,  MPL  23  pp. 
S; 
4- 
Methodius  of  Olympus,  De  resurr.  2.3.  MPG  1; 
2  p.  268; 
Eustathius  of  Antioch.,  De  engastr.  con.  Ori,  en,  22, 
IAPG  18,  p.  660;  EI)iT)hanius  ad  'Hae.  r.  Lib.  2)  tom.  2,, 
Haer.  64.20-22  14PG  42  1p.  63-8;  ibid.  Haer.  66. 
34-42.,  PP-87-92  (all  týe  three  aTiti-Orig.  enists); 
Ambrose,,  Do  excess.  Sat.  2.87,88,  MPL  16)  P-1398; 
Augustine.,  De  civitate  Dei,  Lib.  22  CaP.  13-30  Cf- 
19-21,  MPL  41)  pp-776-804;  Chrysostom,  Hom.  in  ep, 
2  ad  Cor.  hom.  10  MPG  61.,  pp.  466-74;  gpm.  in  Ep.  1 
ad  Cor.  41.2  IMPG 
61  Pr-356-7.  although5ýýasserts  the 
identity  of  the  two  bodies.,  nevertheless  lays 
stress  in  particular  on  the  Pauline  distinction 
between  the  -' 7resent  and  the  futare  body.  Origen, 
Con.  Cels.  5  18-19  11"G  11  Dp.  1205-9;  ibid.  3.41y 
PP-0172-3  iýld.  cf  4  56,  '61  pný.  1121-28;  ibid.  7. 
32  PP-144-66;  ibiL  L49  'Pal589; 
idem.  De  Princ. 
2.10.3  M.  PG  11  pp.  235-6;  ibi  -  3.61  6  PP-338-409 
adhering  to  Platonism  adopts  a  sniritual  and 
idealistic  theory;  Gregory  of  Nazianzus,  Orat.  2. 
17,1APG  35  pp.  426-8;  ibid.  Orat.  7.21-3  ýTt-T-K-5; 
Gregory  of  Nyssa,  De  hon-  onif.  27  MPG_441  pp.  225-9; 
idem.  De  anim.  et  resurr.  MPG  46  PP-73  80  and  145-9; 
and  rerhars  Basil  the  Great,  Hexaem.  hom.  8.8  MPG 
29  pp.  184-5;  idem.  homin  d.  temp.  fam.  et  5  ICC  9 
MPG  31  PT-327,  ado7ted  the  idealizing  and  spiritual- 
izing  views  of  Origen;  some  other  Fathers  ýollow 
cautiously  along  lines  reminiscent  of  Origen  but 
they  aviod  anything  which  is  prominent  Oripenistic 
element:  Cyril  of  Jerusalem,  Catech.  18.18,  MPG  33 
p.  1040;  Amphilochius,  sentent  et  e2Lcer.  10  MPG  391 216. 
interpretation  of  St.  Paults  words. 
The  resurrection  body  while  it  will  have  real 
organic  continuity  with  the  former  natural  body  and  an 
identity  of  essence,  it  will  be  an  entirely  different 
organization,  absolutely  distinct  from  its  earthly 
counterpart.  It  will  be  the  transformed  human 
nature,  renewed  by  the  Holy  Sririt.  It  will  be  an 
organic  individual.,  a  psycho-physical  organism,  a  form 
of  existence  free  from  the  limitations  and  imrer- 
fections  of  this  physical  life  (Mark  12.25  and  1  Cor. 
6.13)  and  similar  to  that  of  our  Risen  Lord  and 
Saviour  Jesus  Christ,  fit  and  well-adapted  for  the 
glorious  and  rerfect  life  of  the  eternal  Kingdom  of  God. 
(Contd.  from  page  215).  p.  108;  Didimus  of  Alex. 
'frg.  in  ep.  2  ad  Cor.  '  5.1,21'  MPG  39  P-1704; 
Isidore  of  Pilousýio  Erist.  Lib.  2.  ep.  43;  St. 
Thomas  Aquinas,  The  I'Summa-  Theolog1call  part  Ksuppl.  )  3Y  QQ  75)  78.,  *  79  c0  pp.  116-128)  148- 
85,  ed.  -and  trans.  by  Dom.  Fathers,  adopts  the 
doctrine  of  the  identity  ofthe  risen  to  the 
natural  body  of  the  Ancient  Church  with  many 
strange  conjectures,  such  as  tho  numorical  identity 
of  the  body  which  dies  and  rises  again;  H.  Clavier 
"Breves  ...  sur  la  notion  de  a-wpa  nvcvpaTLx6v 
in  the  Background  of  the  N.  T.  and-its  EschatologY. 
ed.  by  W.  D.  Davies  and  D.  Daube,  P-347  n.  4)  argues 
against  Thomas  Aquinas's  numerical  identity  and 
finds  a  recent  article  J-W.  Cobb  IfThe  Nature  of 
the  Resurrection  Body"  in  the  Revi6w  and  Ex-nositor 
(Oct.  *  1952)  p.  435  ff,  interesting,  but  inadequate- 
and  unconvincing. 217. 
Thus  St.  Paul's  resurrection  body  is  rendered  in 
modem  terminology  as  the  complete  man.,  organism  or 
frame.,  the  real  man,  the  individual.,  'Ithe  somatic 
identity",  l  the  personality.  2  as  the  termination  and 
perfection  of  the  whole  man  before  God  who  gives 
him  eternal  life. 
M.  E.  Dahl,  The  Resurrection  of  the  Body,  study  of 
1  Corinthians  15)  SCM  Press  .  (1962)  p.  94;  -it  may  be 
of  interest  to  note  that  R.  J.  '  Daly.,  reviewing  the 
above  Interpretation  in  New  Testament  Abstracts 
(Spring  1963)  Vol.  7,  No.  33  P-369-2  972  r.  finds 
that  Dah11 
's 
study  has  several  weaknesses,  among 
which  theimost  im]portant  are:  (1)  Dahl  neglects 
the  role  of  Jesus  Christ1s  Resurrection,  the  most 
essential  element  in  thelinterpretation  of  1  Cor. 
15.  (2)  "The  main  handicap  of  this  highly  stimul- 
ating'inteirpretation  seems  to  be  the  singling  out 
of  the  individual  and  physical  aspect  of  resurrect- 
ion  at  the  expense  of  its  christological, 
soteriological  and  communal  basis". 
2.  A.  M.  Hunter,  Internreting  Paul's  Gospel,  SCIA  (1962) 
PP-54  and  133;  ideý.  '  Introducing  Net4,  Testdmdnt 
. 
Theology,  SCM  (1963  )  P-101  idem.  The  Gospel* 
According  to  St.  Paul,  SCM 
4966) 
P-35;  see'  also 
C.  1.  Anderson  Scott  'Christianity  according  to  St. 
Paul,  Cambridge  (1986)  p.  23d;  J.  Moffat,  1'Corin- 
thians  in  14NTC  p.  '260.  It  must  be  'noted  further.,  ' 
that  in  favout  of  the  resurrection  body  as  meaning 
the  resurrection  of  the  entire.,  same,  real,  whole 
man,  individual,  living  whole,  and  the  like,  are 
also  the  following:  G.  G.  Findlay,  1  Corinthians  in 
EGT  P-746;  H.  L.  Goudg'e,  '  1  Corinthians  in  WC  pp.  '161 
and  164;  R.  'Niebuhr,  The  *Ndture  and  Des_tiný  of-Man 
London  (1944)  Val-II  DP-306-ý7;  '  C.  T.  Craig.,  '  1'''' 
Corinthians  in  IB  p.  '253;  L.  Morris.,  1  Corinthians 
in  _TNTC  P.  34;  W.  Barclay,  The  Letters  to'the  - 
Corinthians,  P-175;  *  I-LI.  E.  Thrall.  '  1  and  2  Corinth- 
. 
Ian  s  (10 
.., 
675  in  the  CBC  P-113;  K'  Rahner,  Theo- 
logical  Investigations: 
-Man 
in  ihe  Church,  Vol.  II 
'')  pp.  210-il;  K.  Rahner,,  Herbert  Vdrgrimlei., 
ItEschatology.,  Resurrection  of  the  Flesh't,  Concise 
Theological  Dictionar  q  Herder-Burn's  and  Oates, 
Frciburg-ýLohdon  (1965ff  pp-150,409. 
1 218. 
(b)  Next  St.  Paul  takes  up  the  question  of  the 
resurrection  body  again  in  2  Corinthians  5.1-10.  The 
whole  section  might  be  one  of  the  finest  Passages 
in  his  writings  and  its  verses  might  be  too  beautiful 
and  full  of  meaning  which  "afford  an  admirable  examT)le 
of.  the  imv.  ortance  of  attending,  not  merely  to  the 
words  at  the  moment  before  us,  but  to  the  inind  of  St. 
Paul  as  a  whole". 
1  This  might  -ýýcrhars  bc  so,  but  we 
must  not  forget  that  the  1ý,  resent  i)cassago  under  discussion 
is,  at  the  same  time,  one  of  the  most  obscure  -1-wassages 
in  the  Pauline  letters.,  if  not  in  the  whole  Now 
Testament  because  of  the  mixture  of  metaphor  and  is 
full  of  difficult  -probiems.  No  wonder  then,  that 
there  is  the  variety  of  interr,  retations  and  divergence 
of  opinions  on  the  matter. 
Now  let  us  recapitulate  it  first  then  consider 
very  briefly  the  Problems  involved. 
Onde  more  St.  Paul  affirms  emphatically  that  we 
know  that  when  we  are  done  with  the  earthly  body,  the 
I  house  of  our  tabernacle,  with  our  llpersonality-involved- 
1.  H.  L.  Goudge,  2  Corinthians  in  WC 219. 
in-perishable  body"'  we  have  a  heavenly  house, 
2 
lipersonality-glorified-by-spiritual-body"..,  a 
building  made,  not  by  man,  but  by  God.  From  the 
image  of  the  earthly  body  as  a  tent,  St.  Paul  points 
to  that  of  clothing.  Ile  groan  and  earnestly  desire 
to  be  clothed  with  the  house  which  is  from  Heaven; 
with  such  clothing  ve  shall  not  be  found  naked. 
3 
While  his  exl,.  ressions  are  as  human  and  homely  as 
anybody  elsets,  nevertheless.,  he  does  not  wish  to  be 
unclothed  and  strinred  of  this  house;  on  the  contrary 
he  earnestly  longs  to  nut  on  a  heavenly  garment  over 
it.,  so  that  what  is  mortal  is  swallowed  up  by  life.  4 
1.  R.  P.  C.  Hanson.,  2  Corinthinns  (Torch  ser.  )  London 
(1954)  p.  46,  in  SCIM;  also  in  D.  E.  H.  Whiteley.,  The 
Theology  of  St.  Paul.,  D.  254  ns.  69  and  70. 
2.  Ibid.  rp.  46  and  24.6  ns.  69,70. 
3-  2  Cor.  5-1-3:  '?  O'Lf6aýLEV  y6p  8,  uL  Hv  h  biCycLoc  h4v 
otxCa  To-v  axývovC  xaTaXvOý,  otxo5oýLýv  ýx  Oeo-u 
C 'XO[LCV 
'7 
Oth(aV  &XCLPO1OC1OTOV  at(LVLOV  ýV  ToLq  obpavoLc.... 
,r6  OLL  (ýOt-ýf)  pL0V  u6,  ý4  obpavot  tTcev56aqccrOqL  ý'ýrTLL 
Lea,  comp.  1  also  with'  4  *'l 
5;  2Pe  ty. 
-Ls. 
1 
38-12;  Rom.  8.  ý-3-,  -  1  Cor.,  15.44--49.,  51-53;  Col. 
3-3-4;  Ph.  3.20. 
1  4.2  Cor-  5-4.  '  ey  y  ob  OýXopev  bt6ýaaaOaL  &XX 
bEC\)(S6CTaaOaL,  tva  xauaTwO-ý  v6  OvT),  u6v  ýn6  uýr,  ýwýr,  111 
comp.  with  Is.  25-8;  1  Cor.  15-53-54. 220. 
In  addition  to  it  and  in  v.  5.  the  Apostle  goes  on  to 
insist  time  and  again  that  it  is  God  who  effects  this 
change.,  by  His  Sririt,  who  was  given  to  us  as  a 
guarantee,  TIplcdge  and  instalment")  (Moffat)  the 
Q 
assurance  of  its  truth.  ' 
The  resuiae  of  the  vvs.  6-8,1  think  is  simnly 
this:  though  the  assurance  of  the  Holy  Snirit  Insrires 
confidence,  the  fact  remains  that  the  life  in  the  body 
is  iikened  to  the  life  of  an  exile  away  from  Christ; 
for  it  Is  by  faith  we  walk,  not  by  sight.  When  we  can 
see  God  face  to  face,  then  we  shall  have  full 
communion,  fellowship  and  union  with  Christ;  for  that 
reason  we  would  really  rather  be  away  from  the  body  and 
2  at  home  with  the  Lord. 
Finaily,  he  concludes  that  our  most  important  task 
is  to  do  God's  will  here  and  nleU-se  Him.,  for  we  must 
all  appear  before  the  judgment  seat  of  Christ  and  each 
of  us  will  receive  his  due  reward  or  punishment  for 
2  Cor.  5.5;  comp.  with  Rom.  8.16)  23;  2  Cor.  1.22. 
2  cor.  5.6-8; 
, 
it 
,--- 
jInX/%OV  ýX6T)ýLýaaL  LX  TOV)  CF6pCLTOC. 
xaC  Lv6TIp-WaL  np6c  T6V  K6PLOV". 
see  also  Phil.  1.23. 221. 
the  things  he  did  in  the  body,  good  or  bad.  ' 
2.  After  the  recapitulation  of  the  above 
contraversial  section,  its  relation  to  I  Cor.  15  calls 
for  some  comments. 
In  v.  1  and  indeed  in  the  whole  passage,  some 
scholars  detect  a  hellenization,  hellenistic 
influences. 
Thus  Thackeray  traces  a  hellenistic  influence  on 
Paulf.  s  thought  and  in  particular  a  literary  connection 
only  -  without  any  basic  alteration  of  his  views 
concerning  the  resurrection  body  -  between  2  Cor.  5-1., 
4  and  Wisdom  9.15:  "for  a  rerishable  body  -,,  resses 
down  the  soul,  and  this  tent  of  clay  weighs  dovm  the 
teeming  hiind"  (trans.  JB) 
cp,  &.,  ap-u6v  -y,  dp'  affý&  Pap'6vcL  4wXýpj'.  xat  P0CL  vt! 
-y,,  E:  C5&cr.  ax,  ýv,,  oc,  , toUv  Tco%uyp6=u,  8a. 
2 
whichgoes  bacic  to  Pythagoreans  and  Plato. 
2  Cor.  5.9-10. 
2.  For  parallels  and  other  references  see  also  in 
C.  Clemen,  Primitive  Christianity  and  its  non- 
Jewish  Slurces,,  Edinburgh  (1912)  r.  p.  68-9;  H. 
Windisch.,  Der  Zweite  ýKorintherbrief,  Gottingen 
(1924)  P.  1-5'9-;  14.  L.  Knox,  St.  Raul 
- 
and  the  Church 
of  the  Gentiles.,  Cambridge  (1939)  !  )7ý-136-7  n.  8; 
W.  D.  Davies.,  Pýiul  and  Rabbinic  Judaism.,  rr-311-12, 
n.  l. 222. 
Further,  somo  other  scholars  who  support  the 
above  view,  argue  as  follows:  Windisch  argues  that 
St.  Paul  shows  here  a  clear  similarity  to  Hellenism  in 
his  dualistic  anthropology. 
'  Here  are  his  words: 
I'Mit  dem  Griechentum  und  der  durch  Plato  beeinfluszten 
hellenistischen  Religionsphilosophie  teilt  Paulus 
jedenfalls  die  dualistiche  Antropologie  und  das 
bedruckende  -Befuhl,  desz  dioser  irdische  Leib  eino  Last 
fur  den  Geist  ist.,  ein  beongendes  Kleid,  eine  Fessel 
oder  ein  Gefangnis,  wio  die  Hellenisten  in  ihren 
Vergleichcn  es  ausdruckten'l.  1.1 
Knox.,  starting  from  his  general  position  that 
Paulls'lepistles  show  a  progressive  adaptation  of  the 
Christian  message  to  the  general  mental  outlook  of  the 
1.  H.  I-Jindisch,  Der  Zweite  Korintherbrief,  p.  164;  R. 
Bultmann,  Theology  of  the  New  Testar-.  ient,  I.  pp. 
201-2.  accepts  the  sa-me  position:  "The  case  of 
2  Cor.  5.1  ff  is  different.  Here  Paul  comes  very 
close  to  Hellenistic-Gnostic  dualism  not  merely  in 
form  of  expression  ....  but  also  in  the  thought 
itself?  '. 223. 
Hellenistic  world". 
' 
maintains  that  St.  Paulfs  2  Cor-5 
Itis  largely  devoted  to  a  complete  revision  of  Pauline 
eschatology  in  a  Hellenistic  sense".  To  prove  his  case 
he  discusses  it  at  some  length  in  the  succeeding  pages 
and  makes  the  points:  the  Apostle,  on  the  one  hand, 
speaks  about  the  body  as  a  burden,  from  which  he 
earnestly  longs  to  be  delivered; 
2 
on  the  other  hand, 
the  notion  that  the  "present  state  of  the  Christian 
life  as  one  in  which  the  soul  was  an  exile  from  its 
true  home  in  heaven",  because  the  soul  itself  or  the 
highest  part  of  the  soul  t1was  of  divine  origin  and, 
although  a  celestial  being,,  imprisoned  in  the  material 
W.  L.  Knox,  St.  P-ul  and  the  Church  of  the  Gentiles) 
p.  26  n.  2;  '-*ibi-d.  p.  128.  Others  who  take  the  same 
view  in  a  different  way  are:  Pfleiderer,  Teich-mann, 
Holtzmann  and  others,  whose  views  are  examined  and 
criticised  by  A.  Schweitzer,  Paul  and  his  Inter- 
preters,  London  (1912)  pp.  cf.  69  ff;  C.  Clcmen, 
Primitive  Christianity  and 
- 
its  non-Jewish  Sources. 
P-367,  where  he  supports  the  view  that  2-5.!  -'10  depends  on  Greek  philosophy  and  that  the  same 
passage  is  ftthe  clearest  instance  of  Paulfs 
indebtedness  to  Greek  ph-losophy";  W.  H.  P.  '  Hatch 
I'St.  Paul's  view  of  the  future  life"  in  Paulus- 
Hellas-061mmene,  Athens  (1951)  p.  96,  concludes  that 
though  Judaism  'and  Hellenist  religion  fundamentally 
are  quite  distinct  and  differ  a  great  deal  in  almost 
all  points,  notwithstanding  they  exercised  an  influence  on  the  formation  of  Paulls  ideas  on  the 
future  life. 
2.  W.  L.  Knox.,  St.  Paul  and  the-Church  of  the  Gentiless 
pp.  136-7 224. 
world".  is  basically  of  Hellenistic  origin. 
1 
A  refutation  of  the  above  view  is  carried  out  by 
Schweitzer,,  2  Davies,  3 
and  Grundmann.  4  Their 
contentions  may  be  expressed  in  Davies  words:  "The 
language  of  Paul  can  be  explained  without  recourse  to 
Helienistic  sourcesti. 
5 
Some  other  scholars  maintain  that  St.  Paults 
thought  in  the  interval  between  writing  1  Cor.  15  and 
writing  2  Cor.  5.1-10  had  undergone  a  very  significant 
development,  that  is,  reviewing  his  previous  Dosition 
of  the  matter  (in  1  Cor.  15)  in  the  face  of  death 
(2  Cor.  1.8-10),  he  now  Duts  forward  new  ideas. 
W.  L.  Knox,  St.  Paul  and  the  Church  of  the  Gentiles, 
p.  140. 
2.  A.  Schweitzer  The  Mysticism  of  Paul  the  knostle, 
London  (1931ý  P-134. 
3.  W.  D.  Davies.,  Paul  ond  Rabbinic  Judaismy  PP-308-14. 
4.  W.  Grundmann,  It  ýX6T)p6wj  tv6IP6W  11  in 
Kittells  TWNT'  E.  T.  by  W.  Bromiley,  Vol.  2. 
pp.  62-4;  ZTf-*' 
. 
64,  n.  2.  p 
W.  D.  Davies.,  ibid.  P-314. 225. 
Charles.,  for  instance.,  argues  that  St.  Paul  felt 
in  the  interval  between  the  time  of  writing  First  and 
Second  Corinthians,  the  inconsistency  of  his  earlier 
traditional  view  concerning  the  Resurrection  body  at 
the  Parousia  and  now  in  the  2  Cor.,  he  ado.  pts  the 
resurrection'of  the  righteous  following  immediately 
on  death.  He  next  sees  no  contradiction  between  1 
Cor.  15-35-49  and  2  Cor.  5.1-8  concerning  the  idea  of 
the  future  body  as  a  divine  gift,  ý'but  maintains  that 
they  complement  each  other. 
' 
R.  H.  Charles,  Eschatolog  ,  pp.  452-31  457-9;  W.  D. 
Davies,  op.  cit.  PP.  *309-10  rejects  Charies's  views  as 
doubtful  and  hazardous.  Others  who  favour  the  view 
of  progression  of  thought  in  this  respect  are:  A. 
Sabatier,  The  Apostle  Paul.,  London'(18994)  -OT).  179-80 
speaks  of  a  momentous  crisis  "in  the  great  Apostlets 
own  soullf  and  of  a  Itmarked  change"  of  Paulls  eschat- 
ological  notions  which  took  place'in  the  iriterval 
between  the  writing  of  the  two  epistles  to  the  Cor- 
inthians;  G.  B.  Stevens,  The  Pauline  Theology,  p. 
343  n.  1,  finds  Sabatier's  view  1.1a'fanciful  picture"; 
H.  W.  Robinson,  The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Man,  pp.  * 
129-30;  H.  A.  Guy,  '  The  -New  Testame'nt  Doctrine  of  the 
"Last  Things1f,  London  (1949ý_5_.  117;  C.  V.  Pilcher, 
The  flereafterý  in  Jewish  and  Christian  Thouph  .  67-T  *  R.  Bultmann.,  Theology  London  (1940)  pp.  1  i.  of 
the  New  Testament,  p,  201;  C.  H.  Dodd,  New'Tes  tame'nt 
Studies.,  Manchester  1953)  pp.  110-11.,  sees  in*Paul 
an  alteration  of  his'viewsý  concerning  the  Resurrect- 
ion  Body,  because  of  the  extreme  danger  of  death 
which  Paul  faced  (2  Cor.  1.8-9).  Further,  he  writes 
that  "logically  this  should  make  no  difference  to 
his  conviction  that  the  Lord  will  soon  come,  but 
psychologically,  an  event  which  lies  beyond  the 
limits  of  one's  own  reasonable  expectation  of  life 
has  ceased  to'be  in  any  vital  sense  imminent.  And 
we  do  in  fact  find  that  in  subsequent  Epistles  the 
thought  of  the  imminence  of  the  Advent  retires  into 
the  background"  J.  A.  T.  Robinson,  J.  Osus  -and  His 
Co6ing.,  Lonaon 
11957) 
pp.  160-61  n.  l.  '' 226. 
Pfleiderer,  on  the  other  hand.,  argues  that  both  Greek 
and  Jewish  concepts  could  co-exist  quite  harmlessly 
side  by  side  in  Paul's  mind,  for  a  shorter  or  longer 
period,  ?  'without  any  thought  of  their  essential 
inconsistency"&' 
0.  Pfleiderer,  Paulinism)  Vol.  I)  T).  264;  A. 
Schweitzer,  Paul  and  his  Interrreters)  P-77, 
finding  Pfleiderer's  view"lan  untenable  theoretical 
hypothesis".  furthdr  remarks  ItFrom  the  whole  range 
of  the  history  of  thought  no  analogy  could  be 
produced  for  this  harmonious  co-existence  of  two 
different  worlds  of  thoughtfl;  Dr.  J.  Lowe.,  "An 
Examination  of  attempts  to  detect  developments  in 
St.  Paul's  Theology",  The  Journal  of  Theological 
. 
Studies.,  '(July-Oct.  1941)  Vol.  XLII.,  pp.  129-142.  ' 
cf.  '  141-42,  after  examining  the  character  of  the 
letters,  the  chronology,  the  topic  of  eschatol-ogy 
in  the  Pauline  letters  and  Knox  and  Dodd's  views 
at  some  length,  holds  the  above  view'too;  '  He 
characteristically  concludes:  "One  of  the 
essential  clues  to  Paul's  thinking  is  surely  this 
coupling  of  opposite  poles,  this  tireless 
emission  of  flashes  of  insight  which  he  never 
bothers  to  relate  to  one  another  ....  these  revol- 
utionary  ideas  with  an  almost  reactionary  conserv- 
atism  in  the  matter  of  social  practice,  this 
streaky  mixture  of  Hebraic  and  Hellenic  elements 
000  Fortunately  he  left  the  whole  wonderful 
muddle  unarranged  and  alive,  and  we  are  the  richer  for  itt'.  In  our  day  some  others  taking  up  the 
point  In  excellent  and  very  illuminating  papers, 
assert  the  following:  R.  F.  Hettinger.,  112  Corin- 
thians  5.1-10".,  Scottish  Journal  of  The6log  ,  (1957) 
Vol.  10,  No.  2,  PP-174-194  cf.  191-4.  first'  ' 
discusses  the  views  advanced  by  others  and  secondly 
argues  that  this  transition  and  development  of  thought  was  for  St.  Paul  important,  but  not  central 
and,  though  he  expected  to  die  before  the  Parousia 
nevertheless  he  still  lived  with  the  threat  of  the3 
end  of  this  age.  Further,  he  summarizes  his 
exposition  as  follows  (p.  194):  "In  other  words 
although  baptism  and  not  death  is  the  decisive 
moment  for  the  Christian,  he  does 227. 
This  theory'of  the  radical  transformation  of 
(Contd.  from  Page  226).  enter  at  death  upon  a 
significantly  new  stago  of  that  embodiment  in 
Christ  which  will  be  consummated  at  the  Parousiall; 
R.  Berry,  I'Death  and  life  in  Christ:  the  meaning 
of  2  Corinthians  5.1-10".  Scottish  Journal  of  - 
Theology  (1961)  Vol.  14)  No.  11  PP-60-76,  after 
considering  thd  verses  of  the  text  2  Cor.  5.1-10 
one  by  one  and  Hettlinger's  views  on  it,  and 
rejecting  (ibid.  1).  67)  the  change  of  mind 
attributed*to  Paul.,  upholds  the  view  that  St.  Paul 
t1was  in  two  minds  about  death?  '.,  disliking  and 
drawing  back  from  the  aspect  cif  11nakedness"  and 
longing  for  the  other  asrect  of  it,  the  conimunion 
and  fellowship  with  Christ;  C.  F.  D.  Idoule,  "St. 
Paul  and  aualism".  New  Testament  Studies  (1962) 
Vol.  12,  No.  21  PP-107-23)  while  he  does  riot  reject 
the  supported  view  of  a  change  in  St.  Paull.  s 
outlook  between  1  Cor.  15  and  2  Cor.  5.1-10,  he 
examines  it  from  a  different  angle.  He  sees  the 
difference  between  1  Cor.  15  and  2  Cor.  5.1-10  not 
in  the 
' 
when,  the  moment  of  the  chan  e,  as  in  the 
manner  of  it.  As  he  has  it  (p.  1165  t1the  change  is 
in  Paul's  ideas  about  the  relation  between  the  two 
phases  df  soma,  between  soma  psychico  and  somn 
pneumaticon,  betwoon  the  body  of  hum.  -Iliation''and 
the  body  of  glory,  between  the  t1outward  and  the 
inward"  and  further  (p.  123):  11the  essential 
distinction  between  his  positions  in  1  Cor.  15  and 
2  Cor.  5  is  only  that,  in  the  former,  he  too 
lightly  looked  for  addition,  whereas  by  2  Cor.  5. 
he  was  more  realistically  reckoning  with  exchange; 
and  that  throughout  his  thinking  in  the  extant 
epistles,  he  main'tains,  with  remarkable  tenacity, 
a  basic  consistency  regarding  dualismU.  By  dualism 
he  rueans  not  the  metaphysical  or  demonic  dualism 
but  the  moral  one,  that  is,  "the  dualism  of'will  - 
a  dualism  of  obedience  and  disobedience".  (pp. 
lo6-7,121-3). 228. 
Paul'..  s  ideas  on  the  future  life,  on  a  subject  so 
I 
vital  and  essential.,  has  been  subjected  to  severe 
criticism  by  many  scholars. 
Kennedy,  for  example,  has  sharply  criticized 
the  theory  of  those  writers  who  hold  the  hypothesis 
of  St.  Paulls  alteration  of  mind  within  such  a  short 
period  of  time,  a  hypothesis  which  "really  springs 
from  a  literalistic,  pedantic  interpretation'l.  He 
further,  excluding  any  reference  of  time,  of  period, 
in  2  Cor.  5.1.2  claims  that  the  same  passage  may  be 
taken  as  equivalent  to  that  of  1  Cor.  15,38,  ?  'God 
giveth  it  a  body".  3  Furthermore  he  argues  that  the 
1.  H.  A.  A.  Kennedy.,  St.  Pýulfs  Concertionsof  the  Last 
'Things,  London  71-9044)  pp.  263p  271. 
2.  OLX060PýV  LX  OEOt  'C'XOjICV"  Vulg.  "quod 
aedificationem  ex  Deo  habemusll;  AV  "a  buildirig  of 
God";  NEB  Ita  building  which  G'od  has  'provided" 
FISV  "a  building  from  God". 
3.  H'A.  A.  Kennedy,  St.  Paul's  Concention  of  the  Last 
ýhings.,  '  pp.  265-T_;  E.  E.  'Eliis,  112  Corinthians 
5.1-10  in  Pauline  eschatology",  in  New  Tostament 
Studies  (1960)  Vol.  6.  No.  3.  p.  21ý_.  maintains 
thatt'heavenly  habitation't-is  not  an  individual 
spiritual  body  at  all,  but  it  refers  to  the 
corporate  solidarity  in  Christ.  He  acquiesces  in 
the  judgment  of  J.  A.  T.  Robinson,  *  The  Body.,  p.  ý6, 
who  writes  t1whenever  Paul  uses  the  word  * 
(except  in  the  purely  figurative  sense  of 
Vedification'),  it  means  the  Body  of  Christ,  the 
Church  (1  Cor.  '  3.9;  Eph.  2.21;  4.12p  16)  not  an 
individual  body".  R.  Berry,  op.  cit.  p.  62, 
observes  that  Rdbinsonts  suggestion  is  unconvincing 
and  11the  statistical  evidence  he  adduces  is  in- 
sufficient  to  uphold  his  contentionfl;  P.  E.  Hughes,, 
2  Cor.  in  NLCNT  "  additional  note  on  5.1-10,  ý.  184. 
p  argues  to  the  same  effect. 229. 
words  of  2  Cor.  5.4:  "For  while  we  are  still  in  this 
tent.,  we  sigh  with  -:,  nxiety;  not  that  we  would  be 
unclothed3  but  that  we  would  be  further  clothed,  so 
that  what  is  mortal  may  be  swallowed  up  by  lifet' 
(trans.  RSV)  "give  a  hint  of  St.  Paul's  earnest  desire 
and  hope  of  surviving  to  the  Parousia,  and  so 
1 
escaping  the  terrifying  experience  of  deathil. 
In  addition,  he  protests  against  those  who  read 
in  St.  Paull:  s  words  "ye  may  not  be  found  naked" 
(.  Olb  YUgVOC  F-ýPF--9'0a64F-eU  )  (2  Cor.  5.3), 
H.  A.  A.  Kennedy,  St.  Paults  ConceptionTof  the  Last 
Things,  T).  265-6. 230. 
an  inte=ediate  state, 
' 
calling  such  notion 
H.  A.  A.  Kenned  .  St. 
-P-aul's 
Concer-tionsof  the  Last 
_JhLnAsy  r.  2N.  '  The  same  rosition  is  maintained 
by  R.  H.  Strachan  2  Corinthinns  in  Moffat  NTC 
P.  100,  who  followJs  Kennody;  G.  B.  Stevens,  The 
Pauline  Thoolog  j  Pr.  358-9.  is  content  to  note 
that  Paul  ci-ir,  not  give  any  definite  answer  to 
this  problem.,  "beyond  expressing  the  confident 
hope  that  the  belicver  enters  Lt  death  into 
fellowship  with  Christ";  W.  D.  Davies..  P,  -.  ijl  end 
Rabbinic  Judaism2  P-318,  asserts  that'-there  is 
no  room  in  PaUITs  theology  for  an  intermediate 
state  of  the  dedd";  Oepke  11  yuliv6r,  in 
T  IAN  T7 
., 
E.  T.  Vol.  1,  up.  714-5y  rejects  any  idea  of 
intervening  state;  also  E.  E.  Ellis,  112  Cor. 
5.1-10  in  Pauline  Eschatology".  New  Testament 
Studies  (1960)  Vol.  6j  No.  31  pp.  222  cf.  224; 
Scholars  who  interrret  the  "naked"  as  implying 
disembodied  intermediate  state  are:  A.  Plu=er, 
2  Corinthians,  in  ICC,  r.  147  ff;  A.  Schweitzer, 
The  mystIcism  of  St.  Paul.  P-134;  and  most 
particularly,  0.  Cullmann,  Christ  and  Time  (SC11 
paperback)  pp.  238-9.  citing  some  quotations  from 
Pauline  letters,  su,  )ports  the  same  view;  Idem. 
Immortality  of  the  Soul  or  Resurrection  of  the 
Deady  Loncion  (1955)  "P.  52-7;  J.  A.  T.  Robinson., 
The  Body,  p:  1.29,77;  J.  N.  Sevenster,  "So=e 
Remarks  on  the  yvgv6c  in  2  Cor.  5.3". 
Studia  Paulinap  H,  -.,  rlem  (1953)  np.  206-7  and 
210-11--and  Paul  and  Seneca,  Leidon  (1,061)  pp. 
238-91  whore  he  advocates  an  interim  state.  He 
suggests  that  St.  P-iul  rrobably  believed  that 
soul  in  the  futurc  life  "U'.  )UIC  c-)ntlnue  t-ý  live  --.  )n 
separately  ....  for  the  Tcriod  that  elarses 
between  the  death  of  the  individual  and  the 
resurrection  of  the  dead  and  the  last  Judgement". 
The  Individual  does  not  lose  his  identity,  but  he 
exists  in  the  intervening  period  in  a  state  of 
nakedness  (2  Car-  5-3).  "which  probably  means  in 
the  Soul  detached  from  the  body".  He  furth.  )r 
accepts  the  fact  that  the  Apostle  does  not 
elaborate  on  the  point;  F.  Prat,  The  Theology  o 
8t-  P321,  Vol.  2p  PO-356-9.  remarks  that  "the 
A-t  Os  t;!  -e--  -says  nothing  on  the  subject".,  nonetheless 231. 
Itimaginary  hypothesis". 
He  goes  on  to  observe  on  the  same  point  the 
following,  which  is  worth  quoting:  ITWe  do  not 
attribute  to  the  Apostle  any  theory  of  a  slecT)  of  the 
(Contd.  from  page  230).  lie  is  of  the  orinion  that 
'the  bare  facts  demand  such  a  view.  It  must  be 
further  noted  that  Dr.  Ellis,  op.  cit.  '  pp.  219-21., 
interprets  the  adjective  "naked"  in  a  different 
way.  lie  firstly  believe'that  "the  Greek  trail 
has  been  a  false  detour".  Next  ho  attempts  an 
exposition  of  the  'Inaked"  on  the  basis  of  Old 
Testament  eschatoldgy  and  not  on  the  Greek 
anthropology.  His  suggested  excecSisamounts  to 
this  equation:  in  the  Old  Testament,  late  Judaism 
and  in  the  Now  Testament  "nakedness  (or  being 
stripped)  and  shame  often  denote  the  guilty  under 
the  glaring  light  of  God's  judgement  and  are 
virtually  equivalent  terms".  Thus  naked  does 
not  refer  to  a  disembodied'soul,  but  to  judgement 
and  simply  means  guilty  It  ....  without  the  garment1l.; 
Prof.  C.  D.  F.  Moule,  "St.  'Paul  and  Dualism".,  op. 
cit.  p.  121n.  l.,  says  that  this  interrretation  ',  is 
scarcely  plausible". 232. 
soul 
1 
or  of  a  meditative  condition  of  calm  waiting 
in  -preparation  for  afuller  bliss  ...  Nor  may 
It  2 
infer  any  notion  of  semi-consciousness  or  the  like 
9 
G,  )udge  is  another  scholar  who  rejects,  without 
any  hesitation,  the  idea  of  a  Hellenistic  influcnce 
on  2  Corinthians  5.1-10,  and  offers  a  solution  on 
the  lines  of  Kennedy  more  or  less. 
Since  quite  a  few  writers  have  adopted  his 
exposition  in  recent  years.,  we  regard.  it  necessary 
to  summarise  it  very  briefly. 
0.  Cullmann,  Immortality  of-the  Soul  or 
Resurrection  of  the  Dead,  "  pp.  4b-57  cf.  51-57, 
prociuces  thd'startling  view  that  interim  state 
for  the  soul  implies  "sleep  of  the  soultI.,  in 
other  words  the  verb  koigagnai-koin.  onai 
could  be  said  to  have  two  meanings:  the  meaning 
of  death  and  the  meaning  of  unconsciousness. 
His  exposition,  though  attractive  and  interesting 
at  first  sight.,  is  rather  unconvincing  and  it 
does  not  do  justice  to  his  arguments.  After  all 
nothing  is  new  in  his  short  book.  Other's  have 
dealt  with  the  matter  briefly  or  in  detail 
before  him.  The  great  attraction  and  the  real 
contribution  to  theology  is  that  he  draws,  with 
his  customary  clarity  and  weight  of  scholarship, 
a  clear  distinction  between  the  Greek  doctrine 
of  immortality  and  the  Christian  doctrine  of 
resurrection  of  the  dead;  Ch.  Masson,  "Immort- 
alite  do  l1ame  ou  resurrection  des  morts?  "  Revue 
de  Theologie  et  de  Philosorhie  (1958)  Vol.  '  9-- 
., 
T)  .  2b5.,  is  of  the  opinion  that  Cullmannys'ideas  on 
the  resurrection  of  the  body  and  the*intermediato 
state  are  irreconcilable  with  the  teaching  of  the 
Apostle  Paul;  D.  E.  H.  Whiteley,  The  Theologv  of 
St.  Paul,  pp.  262-71,  reaches  a  like  conclusion 
by  a  different  way. 
II.  A.  A.  Kennedy,  op.  cit.  p.  268. 233. 
Goudge's  argument  very  briefly  runs  somewhat  as 
f  ollows: 
1.  Vvs.  2  Cor.  5.1-2  arc  related  to  1  Cor. 
15-38.,  47.,  52Y  53-54  and  refer  to  the  hope  of  the 
resurrection  body  to  be  reccived'at  the  Parousia.  1 
2.  Vvs.  2  Cor.  5.3-4  are  paralleled  to  1  Cor. 
15-53)  54  and  express  the  Apostle's  apDrehensivenoss, 
of  dying  before  the 
'Parousia 
and  so 
experiencing  a  term  of  incompleteness  (nakedness) 
instead  of  an  immediate  transition  from  the  state  of 
mortality  to  that  of  the  resurrection. 
2 
3.  Trom  vv.  5-10  Paul  speaks  about  the  victory 
over  this  apparent  fear  with  confidence  on  the 
grounds  that  God  has  given  us  His  Spirit  as  a  pledge 
and  the  tribunai  of  Christ,,  before  which  we  will  stand 
at  the  Lord's  return.  3 
H.  L.  Goudge,  2  Corinthians,  London  (19282)  in  WC, 
pp.  45-7  and  52-3- 
2.  Ibid.  PP-47-8  and  52-3- 
Ibid.  pp.  48-9  and  51. 234. 
4.  There  is  no  inconsistency  whatsoever 
between  the  teaching  of  the  1  Cor.  15  4nd  2  Cor. 
5.1-10.  (?  'The  second  epistle  was  written  but  a  few 
moJaths  after  the  first.,  and  the  teaching  of.  the 
first  Epistle  about  the  body  of  the  future  is  the 
chief  doctrinal  teaching  to  be  found  in  it"). 
1 
What  shall  we  say  to  this  divergence  of 
opinions  concerning  the  relation  of  2  Cor.  5.1-10 
to  1  Cor.  15? 
H.  L.  Goudge.,  op.  cit.  pp.  45  and  52.  Other  writers 
who  support  the  same  view  are:  A.  Plummer, 
2  Corinthians  in  ICC,  p.  161;  James  Denney, 
2  Corinthians  in  Ex.  B.  London  (1694)  pp.  1  8-84.0. 
F.  V.  Filson,  2  Corinthians.,  New'York  (1953ý  in  IB, 
PP:  326-32;  0.  Cullmann,  Christ  and  Time.,  SCM, 
pp  238-9;  R.  Hanson,  2  Corinthians,  Torch 
Cbmmentary,  p.  47;  A.  M.  Ramsey,,  The  Resurrection 
of  Christ  (in  Fontana  Books)  pp.  9-10;  L.  S. 
Thornton,  The  Common  Life  in  the  Body  of  Christ,, 
London  (19442)'pp.  284-6,  in  a  brief  but  excellent 
additional  note.,  "St.  Paul  on  the  Resurrection  of  the  Body",  shares'also  Goud  els  interpretation. 
Points  of  interest  are:  (15  2  Cor.  5.1  corresronds 
to  I  Cor.  15-38  and  2  Cor.  2-4  correspondingly"to 
1  Cor.  15.53.,  54  and  (2)  '?  both  passages  em1phasize 
the  continuity  which  connects  the  two  forms.  In 
1  Cor.  15  this  is  effected  by  the  analogy  from 
nature.  In  2  Cor.  5-p.  it  is  effected  by 
reference  to  the  &Ppa  v  of  the  Spirit". 235. 
Not  much  really,  for  we  dealt  with  the  matter 
of  the  two  sections  of  the  two  Corinthi"-ns  in  a 
sketchy  way  and  it  lies  outside  the  main  scope  of  the 
present  chapter,  which  is,  as  it  is  understood,  to 
discover  the  true  meaning  of  Resurrection  body. 
Then,  we  should  be  too  naive  if  we  should  claim 
that  we  can  offer  a  new  reconciliatory  soliltioný 
since  "great  scholars,  past  and  present,  have 
confess  ed.  to  bewilderment?  " 
and  "Paul  is  talking 
about  things  that  no  one  really  knows  anything  about. 
He  is  not  talking  about  verifiable  matters  of  fact, 
but  about  matters  of  faith.  He  Is  trying  to  exTress 
the  inexpressible  and  to  describe  tho  indescribable 
0  ...  ..  Paul  is  again  dealing  with  things  which  defy 
language  and  which  baffle  ex-rres'sion't. 
2 
C.  F.  D.  M-oule,  "St.  Paul  and  Dualism  etc.  ",  Now 
o66)  vol.  12  p.  Testament  Studies  (1,  lo6., 
2.  W.  Barclay,  The  Letters  to  the  Corinthians, 
pp-175)  l7d. 236. 
However  this  may  be,  we  simply  say  this:  in 
the  main  we  agree  with  and  endorse  Kennedyls  and 
Goudgets  interpretation  as  well-founded  and 
convincing,  for  reasons  given  adjoc.  and  on  the 
ground  that  it  invo-Ives  no  departure  from  the 
teaching  of  1  Cor.  15.  Since  this  is  so,  we  may 
safely  say  that  both  pass.,  ges  express  a  coherent 
teaching  about  the  resurrection  body  to  be  received 
at  the  Parousia. 
Consequently.,  an  assumption  which  detects  a 
Hellenizatioh  of  2  Cor.  5.1-10.,  a  difference,  a 
conflict,  between  tha  two  texts,  and  a  development 
In  St.  Paulls  mind  must  be  ruled  out. 
The  former  supposition  of  Hellenistic  influences 
on  tho  passage  has  skilfully  been  refuted,  by  Davies) 
the  latter  of  the  radical  transformation  does  not 
stand  logical  scrutiny,  or  as  Stevens  would  put  it., 
is  "an  assumption  wholly  destitute  of  Proof  and  in 
W.  D.  Davies,,  Paul  and  Rabbinic  Judaism)  PP-311-14. 237. 
1 
itself  quite  unnaturalt'. 
It  is  impossible  to  believe  that  ýt.  Paul 
changed  his  views  in  such  a  short  time  on  a  subject 
on  which  he  believed  so  firmly  and  passionately  and 
concerning  which  he  wrote  "If  we  live,  we  live  to 
the  Lord,  and  If  we  die.,  we  die  to  the  Lord;  so  then 
whether  we  live  or  whether  we  die,  we  are  the  LordIs" 
(Rom.  14.8  RSV  trans.  ). 
There  is  not  a  single  Dassage  in  the  Pauline 
letters,  as  far  as  we  know,  which  nalludes  to  such  an 
alteration.  The  alleged  2  Cor.  1.8-9  does  not 
really  suggest  that  this  terrifying  experience  Paul 
had  gone  through  could  alter  his  views  on 
Comp.  with  the  much  quoted  Wernle's  dictum:  "The 
man  who  wrote  the  great  Resurrection  chapter  in 
1  Corinthians,,  did  not  possess  the  capacity  for 
altering  his  opinions  which  belongs  to  the 
modern  theologian".  qtd..  by  H.  A.  A.  Kennedy,  St. 
Paul's  Conceptions  of  the  Last  Things,  p.  271; 
also-with  L.  S.  Thornton's  words,  The  Common  Life 
in  the  Body  of  Christ,  p.  286,  whých  point  to  the' 
same  effect:  11...  if  the  teaching  of  2  Cor.  5. 
1-10  were  in  radical  conflict  with  that  of  1  Cor. 
15  and  were  meant  to  sunercede  it.,  then  the 
solemn  rrotest  of  2  Cor  2.17  would  be  a  vain 
and  empty  boast". 238. 
Resurrection  in  general.  The  emphasis  here  is  on 
his  unshaken  trust  and  confidence  in  God. 
Lot  us  bring  this  discussion  of  the  rresent 
chapter  to  an  end.  What  has  finally  emerged  from 
it? 
As  we  have  already  said.,  and  we  re-7eat  here,  for 
St.  Paul  the  Resurrection  body  is  neither  the 
disembodied  soul  or  sririt,  nor  the  embodied  spirit 
or  soul,  but  the  inherent  org--nic  continuumý  a 
psycho-physic  organism.,  C  -rsycho-somatic  union,  a 
unified  person,  fit  and  suitable  for  the  ncw, 
glorious  and  perfect  life  in  the  world  to  come.  In 
more  modern  terms  when  St.  P-.  iul  sreaks  of  resurrection 
body,  he  is  concerned  with  the  wholr-.,  ness  of  man,  with 
the  entire  man,  with  the  individual.,  with  the  real 
person,  the  personality,  the  self.,  the  "Ill.,  the  flegot', 
who  will  be  raised,  not  because  of  his  natural  right, 
but  because  of  Our  Lord  Jesus  Christ's  Resurrection. 
Our  own  resurrection  in  full  consciousness  and 
intelligence  is  not  our  natural  possession,  but  the 
royal  gift  of  God  to  us  through  our  Risen  Lord  and 239. 
Saviour.  1 
C.  D.  F.  Moule,  orl.  cit.  ,  ).  -Ll6, 
finds  the 
individnLrs  identity  maintained  throughout  the 
Pauline  writings.  JpsjLsjjý;  ý*  verba  do  not 
readily  admit  of  summary  and  are  quoted  as  they 
stand:  "It  is  not  that  the  soul  escapes  from 
the  body"s  prison  ....  but  that  an  entire  -person, 
a  dies.,  and  the  same  person  is 
raised  to  life.  It  is  not  the  same  form: 
there  is  a  radical  tra-isfor.,  ziation.  He  dies 
mortal  and  corru,  -)tible  and  is  raised  a  glorious 
body;  he  dies  animal  and  is  raised  spiritual. 
But  always  it  is  the  same  individual". 240. 
An  assessment  -  conclusion: 
We  have  been  dealing  so  far  in  Parts  Two  and  Three 
with  the  reflections  of  Plato  and  St.  Paul  on  the  human 
soul  and  its  immortality  and  have  arrived  at  some 
conclusions.  In  the  present.  chapter  we  bring 
together  all  our  findings  and  attempt  an  assessment,  with 
the  sole  purpose  in  mind  of  detecting  similarities  or 
dissimilarities,  resemblances  or  differences6 
Methodolooical  considerations  compel  us  to  treat  the 
comparison  and  contrast  in  the  same  pattern-division  as 
In  the  previous  parts, 
The  scope  of  the  present  chapter  allows  us  only  to 
make  a  general  observation  on  this  comparison  and  contrast, 
before  we  embark  on  it, 
Neither  Plato  nor  St.  Paul  can  be  regarded  as 
scientific  psychologists  in  the  strictest  modern  sense  of 
the  word, 
Neither  the  former,  writing  in  dialogue  style,  nor 
the  latter,  writing  in  epistolary  form,  ever  succeeded  in 
fashioning  their  scattered  ideas  of  the  soul  in  a 
uniform,  systematically  elaborated  and  consistent  corpus 
of  dogma.  They  do  not  give  us  a  scientific  analysis  of 
the  theory  (doctrine)  of  the  soul.  Neither  sets  out  an 
ordered  system,  but  both  deal  with  problems  concerning  the 
soul  and  its  immortality  as  and  when  they  occur  in  the 241, 
course  of  the  discussionp  making  use  of  terms,  (moro 
particularly  St.  Paul)  not  accurately  and  precisely,  but 
with  a  certain  degree  of  approximation4 
However  this  nay  be,  it  does  not  prevent  us  from 
saying  that  they  have  contributed  a  great  deal  towards  the 
understanding  of  inner  conflict  of  man  and  his  perplexed 
problems  and  made  some  valuable  and  acute  psychological 
observations  which  have  found  their  place  in  the  history  of 
psychology,  anthropology,  philosophy  and  theology  in 
general.  It  would  be  a  grave  nistalcot  and  we  should  be 
unjust  critics  of  both,  if  we  did  not  point  out  horo  that 
their  theories  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  of  tho 
resurrection  of  the  body  are  in  a  more  prociseq  logical; 
coherent  and  dialectic  waye 
2'rom  the  above  general  remarks  we  pass  'on  to  anothor 
concornina  the  view  of  man  in  both  writers. 
Plato  views  nan  in  dualistic  fashion  with  accent  on 
the  superiority  of  the  soul. 
For  him  man  is  a  compound  structure,  consistina  of 
two  clearly  distinct  entities;  body  which  is  mortal,  a 
tool,  and  instrument  of  the  soul  and  which  in  time  pneses 
away,  and  soul 
I 
which  is  a  senior  and  permanent  ontityp 
ror  tbo  difference  between  the  body  and  soul  we  sball 
see  more  later. 2429 
inmortal,  the  real  Mang  in  short,  the  man,  as  we  have 
already  seen. 
Such  a  dualistic  description  is  absent  from  our 
Pauline  writings.  St.  Paul  thinks  of  man  along  monistic 
lines.  Ilan  is  not  conceived  by  Paul  in  the  Platonic  dual 
fashion,  but  in  the  Hebraic  one.  Man  is  neither  soul, 
spirit  nor  body  alone,  but  an  essential  unity#  a  unitary 
organism,  a  psycho-physical  organism,  the  entire  man,  what 
we  call  personality  under  different  functions.  Man  is  a 
living  and  indissoluble  unity;  bodyp  soul  and  spirit 
togother.  These  component  parts  have  meaning  only  in 
connection  with  the  totality  of  hie  being.  Man  is  viewod 
as  a  unityq  an  ensouled  body,  rather  than  an  embodied  soul, 
Perhaps  we  may  give  Bultmann's  Ipsessima  verbal  as  well 
stating  the  conception  of  man:  "Man  does  not  consist  of 
two  partso  much  loss  of  three;  nor  are  psyche  and  pnouma 
special  faculties  or  principles  (within  the  soma)  of  a 
montal  life  higher  than  his  aniraal  life.  Rathor  man  is  a 
living  unity.  He  is  a  person  who  becomes  an  object  to 
himself.  He  is  a  person  having  a  relationship  to 
himself  (soma).  IIe  is  a  person  who  lives  in  his 
intentionality,  his  pursuit  of  sone  purpose,  his  willing 
and  Imowing  (psyche,  pneuma).  This  state  of  livinG  toward 
some  goal,  having  sorie  attitude,  willing  something  and 243. 
knowing  something  belongs  to  man's  very  nature  and 
in  itself  is  neither  good  nor  bad.  " 
1 
41 
R,  Bultmann,  Theolony  of  the  1.1,  T,  Vol.  X.,  p.  209; 
S.  Laenchli,  "Monism  and  Dualism  in  Pauline 
Anthropology",  Biblical  Research  (PnUra  of  the, 
Chicago  Society  of  Biblical  Research)  3,  (1958-Tt 
15  -  27,  protests  against  those  who  interpret  Paul's 
view  of  rian  along  monistic  Nobraistic  lines.  NO  r 
for  his  part,  urges  that,  man  in  Pauline  letters  must 
be  examined  in  pluralistic  terms,  though  "this 
pluralism'  within  Paults  view  of  the  nan  is  not  his 
basic  concern.  His  central  drive  is  theological, 
the  nowness  of  the  man  in  Christ  as  the  break-in  in 
to  the  old  sarx. 244. 
Since  the  real  man,  the  true  self  is  soul  for  Plato, 
and  he  gives  it  such  prominence,  it  follows  that  there  must 
be  clear-cut  and  distinct  differences  between  the  Platonic 
conception  of  soul  and  the  Pauline  one. 
In  the  philosophy  of  Plato  the  soul  is  a  pure 
spiritual  principle,  a  rational  distinct  entity,  the 
subject  of  thought  and  intelligence;  it  is  the  self  mover 
and  the  source  and  first  principle  of  all  other  things  that 
are  moved,  the  source  of  lifeg  the  origin  of  life,  the  life 
itselft  and  as  such  it  is  bound  to  be  immortal,  divine, 
indestructible  and  ungenerated. 
TvIbereas  the  platonic  soul  is  portrayed  in  such  a 
colourful  way  -  still  in  a  general  manner  -  in  Paul's 
Epistles  it  does  not  hold  the  same  exceptionally  prominent 
position.  Its  infrequent  use  denotes  the  vame  ar,  the 
of  the  Old  Testament  and  ýIJXJ  of  the  LXX,  that  is 
breathing,  the  vital  principle,  the  principle  of  animal 
and  human  life  involving  a  state  of  consciousness,  of  will 
and  feeling,  which  disappears  with  death. 
The  soul  retires,  as  is  well  knowng  into  the 
background  and  its  place  is  taken  by  the  infinitely 
important  word  'spirit'.  a  term  far  richer  in  meaning  than 
tsoult. 
Though  the  term  spirit  is  of  paramount  importance 
for  Paults  theology  and  anthropology  and  very 245. 
indeed,  we  are  not  to  think  of  it  in  a  platonic  sense. 
It  cannot  be  described  as  a  distinct  pure  spiritual  or 
intellectual  entity  of  the  human  constitution.  Such  a 
view  is  hardly  plausible  in  the  Pauline  letters.  We  are 
safe,  if  we  interpret  spirit  in  a  psychological  sense  as 
signifying  the  source  of  human  consciousness,  intelligence, 
the  seat  of  feeling  and  will;  spirit  is  the  ruling  inner 
power  of  our  entire  human  existence.  It  is  this  power  of 
our  spirit  which  directs  all  our  intellectual  activities, 
thoughts,  emotions,  etc,  What  is  more  important  "In 
Paul  the  human  spirit  nay  perhaps  be  described  as  the  God-- 
conscious  element  in  man,  which  is  dormant  or  dead  until 
it  is  stirred  into  life  by  the  Spirit  of  God.  Or  it  may 
be  thought  of  'as  the  Christian  personality'  of  men  who, 
if  we  nay  put  it  so,  are  not  only  alivep  but  'Christianly? 
alive,  " 
1. 
So  far  we  have  compared  and  contrasted  the  definition 
of  man  and  human  soul  in  both  writers. 
Now  we  go  on  to  compare  and  contrast  the  Pauline  and 
Platonic  body-  relationship  9  division  of 
the  soul  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  the 
resurrection  of  the  body. 
F.  P.  Brucel  Ronans  in  T.  N.  T.  C.,  p.  48;  see  also 
supra  pe  ;  al.  2o  in  W.  Barclay,  Flesh  and 
STirit,  p.  14ý  Seta)5-v  g'uf  f'CL  F1  6  5)  'n.  4  . 1 
246-o 
With  reference  to  the  soul's  origint  Plato  seems  as 
if  he  were  in  two  minds  -  and  using  two  different 
languages:  sometimes  he  speaks  of  the  soul  as  uncreated, 
ungenerated  and  absolutely  without  bedinningl  (Phaedrus), 
At  other  times  he  refers  to  It  either  as  being  created 
Demiurge  (Timexis:  A  =ythical  view)  or  as  being  produced 
firstj  as  the  first  born  of  all  things  and  prior  to  the 
body  (Laws)*.  These  antithetibal  viewsq  as  we  have  said 
in  the  preceding  pages  combined  and  interpreted  in  an 
appropriate  manner  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  Plato  har-ý.  -2 
envisaged  any  creation  of  the  human  soul  in  time. 
However  this  may  be,  we  feel  with  Proclusq  Chernisst 
Hackforth  and  Rankin  that  the  human  soul  is  a  11process119 
not  necessarily,  of  courset  a  physical  onel'but  an 
intermediate  one  between  the  true  and  eternal  principles 
and  ultimate  realitiess  the  Form  and  the  Universe. 
It  may  then  be  said  that  the  human  soul  is  a  derivative 
existence  like  the  physical  world.  9  depending  on  something 
more  ultimate,  more'transcendent  indeedg  upon  the  real 
being  of  ideas,  and  more  particularly  upon  the  Idea  of 
Good,  which  is  not  only  the  source  of  knowledge  and  trut1A 
and  of  the  very  being,  but  it  is  beyond  beingp 
surpassing  it  in  dignity  and  power. 
Though  St.  Paul  has  not  dealt  with.  the  matter  at 247a 
length,  he  is  more  explicit  about  it. 
He  ascribes  the  soui's_,  origin  to  God,  He  teaches 
nothing  new  about  the  creation  of  the  soult  for  he  repeats 
what  the  Old  Testament  (Gene  2-7!  )  teaches.  There  it  is 
categorically  stated  that  mants,  creation  as  a  wholej  as 
one  unit,  as  a  psycho-somatic  organismt  is  due  to  a  distinct 
divine  creative  not,  by  which  it  was  drawn  into  being  from 
sheer  nothingnessi  As  a  consequence  of  this  the  soul.  was 
created  directly  and  immediately  by  God  out  of  nothing. 
Therefore  the  soul's  creation  is  the  result  of  God's 
personal  intervention  and  special  act  of  creation  in  time. 
In  speaking  of  the  soults  creation  we  must  not  understand, 
as  we  have  already  saidg,  the  infusion  of  breath  God 
into  the  nostrils  of  man  in  terms  of  an  independent  element 
and  distinct  spirituall  divinep  immortal  part  of  nant  as 
with  Platop  but  simply  as  denoting  the  animal  lifeg  the 
vital  power  which  gives  life  to  the  body  and  cannot  exist 
outside  nnd  without  it. 
With  regard  to  the  soul's  relation  to  the  bodyp  Plato 
treats  the  whole  question  in  dualistic  fashion*,.  Soul  and 
body  are  treated  as  belonging  to  two  different  worlds  and 
as  being  separateg  distinct  and  independent  entities.  The 
soulg  as  we  have  seen,  in  every  way  resembles  the  invisible 
and  belongs  to  the  divine,  immaterial  and  eternal  realm: 248a 
The  body  is  related  to  the  visible  world  and  belongs  to 
the  material  and  sensible  world.  It  is  mortal,  subject  t'D 
corruption  and  will  decay  after  the  moment  of  physical 
death*  But  what  is  more  important  is  this:  While  the 
psyche  is  the  reviving  force  of  the  bodyq  confines  itself 
in  it  during  life  on  earth  and  is  likened,  by  Plato  to  a 
sailor  in  a  boat  or  to  a  prisoner  in  a  jails  body# 
according  to  Platots  estimation  is  nothing  but  a  prison- 
house,  a  tombs  an  encumbrancei  a  hindrance  to  the  soul; 
it  acts  as  a  perpetual  impediment  to  the  higher  activition 
of  the  soul  and  on  the  whole  is  the  source  of  evil, 
disorder  and  corruption* 
We  hnrdly  meet  a  similar  view  in  Pauline  writingsq 
for  St.  Paul  scarcely  thinks  of  man's  make-up  in  dualist:!,  - 
terms.  For  him  the  body  is  not  a  detachableg  separate 
part  of  man  which  is  distinguished  in  dualistic  fashion 
from  the  soul. 
Paul  does  not  regard  the  body  as  evil,  responsible  Cz.  -:. 
the  sins  of  man,  and  in  a  word  identical  with  the  flesh, 
though  he  seems  to  do  sol  at  least  in  some  passages; 
nevertheless  other  passages  spe.;  dc  against  this 
identification  and  mark  the  difference  between  sarx  and 
som,  as  has  boon  already  shown. 
The  human  body  is  neither  despised  nor  condemned  in 24go 
the  Pauline  letters,  on  the  contrary  it  is  given  a 
prominent  and  an  honourable  place  in  Pauline  Theology 
and  anthropology, 
He  writes  that  for  the  Christian  the  body  is  Godls 
shrine,  the  temple  of  the  Holy  Spirits  Further  the  bod_ 
can  be  redeemed;  transformed  and  recroatedo  can  be  taken 
and  offered  as  a  living  sacrifice  to  God,  and  with  it  an,  -* 
in  it  every  man  must  honour  and  glorify  God. 
It  can  be  said  then,  that  in  Paul's  thought  the  body 
is  not  basically  bad,  but  is  accessible  to  God  or  evil  an!:  f. 
its  fate  "depends  on  which  force  controls  it  for  good  or 
evil  .  11  ýL  * 
We  hardly  need  to  look  for  a  parallelism  or  at  lens'. 
for  an  analogy  on  the  division  of  the  soul. 
Both  views  differ  widely  and  contradict  each  other 
in  content  and  form, 
The  obvious  big  difference  between  the  two  views  Is 
this  in  general:  Plato  is  concerned  with  the  throefoIC. 
division  of  tho  soul  and  Paul  is  concerned  with  the 
, 
trichotomy  of  the  entire  man,  if  there  is  any,  We  say 
"if  there  is  any",  because  our  investigation  has  shown 
that  neither  writer  holds  such  views. 
11  W.  Barclay,  Flesh  and  Spirit,  P-  17- 2-50* 
Plato,  on  the  one  hands  assumes  an  incompositeg 
uncompounded  and  simple  soul  withq  so  to  speak,  mental 
impulses,  aspects,  spiritual  facultiesq  transitory  and 
temporary  manifestationsq  modes  or  phases,  owing  their 
existence  to  the  soul's  connection  with  the  body,  and  not 
with  the  three  real  and  distinct  parts  or  elements. 
St.  Paul,  on  the  other  hands  does  not  sot  out  a 
scientific  trichotomic  theory  of  man  in  a  single  passage, 
be  simply  speahs  of  the  preservation  and  sanctification 
of  man  in  his  completenessg  in  his  totality,  in  a  loose, 
rhetorical  traditional  language, 
The  noteworthy  sharp  distinction/and  main  difference 
between  the  Platonic  immortality  of  the  soul  and  the 
Pauline  resurrection  is  the  following.  Plato  teaches 
that  the  soul  as  a  purely  spirituals  rationalp  simple  and 
indestructible  entity  will  continue  in  unending  and 
eternal  existence,  apart  from  the  body.  The  soul  for 
Plato  is  inherently  and  intrinsically  immortal,  viz.  in 
Its  own  right  and  in  virtue  of  its  nature  as  soul,  by  its 
inherent  deathlessness, 
St.  Paul  neither  teaches  such  a  view  nor  does  he  mako 
any  claim  to  do  so. 
There  is  no  room  in  St,  Paulls'teaching  for  an 
"inherently  disembodied  soul  or  spirit. 251i, 
The  Apostle  is  not  concerned  with  the  immortality 
of  the  psyche  or  spirit  as  separated  and  distinct  parts, 
but  with  the  resurrection  of  the  whole  complex  soul-spir..  - 
body  of  man,  of  the  whole  manis  make  up  as  the  consequon--o 
of  Christ'-s  Resurrectiono 
Paulfs  conception  of  the  resurrection-body  has  noth:.,  - 
to  do  with  the  resuscitation  of  dead  bodies  in  the  graven: 
His  conception  of  resurrection  body  may  be  better 
expressed  as  the  transformation,  ro-creation#  reconsti-'.. 
and  resurrection  by  the  power  of  Godq  of  the  whole  man 
unity,  of  the  same  person,  of  the  personality,  of  the  t=uo 
self,  of  the  psycho-somatic  organismg  of  the  human  psyche- 
physical  individual. 
Our  future  resurrection  will  take  place  not  as  our 
own  natural  possession,  but  as  the  royal  gift  of  God. 
Thus  St.  Paul  conceives  of  the  resurrection  of 
believers  as  an  act  and  gift  of  God  through  our  risen  Lor-' 
and  Saviour  Jesus  Christ,  and  not  as  an  inherent  right 
of  their  very  being. 
Arriving  at  the  end  of  our  enquiry  we  draw  the 
following  general  conclusion: 
It  is  aburAantly  clear  throughout  our  research  thcvý-V 
Plato  has  not  oxercised  any  influence  upon  St.  Paul 
directly  or  indirectly  concerning  the  nature  of  the  h=-- 252. 
soul  and  its  ýmzziortality, 
There  is  neither  similarilty  nor  any  affinity 
whatsoever  botWeen  the  two  on  the  matter  undor  discussion. 
'"hare  is  not  oven  any  comunity  of  mind  or  real  I 
"C1.1  .ý1.  kinship  of  t1iougj.  %,  between.  those  two  giants  of  human 
spirit  who  have  changed  the  course  of  history  and  tho 
pattern  of  European  thought  and  of  human  life  as  a  whole 
with  their  teachings. 
Prof.  E.  J.  pr_lcot  "'ptlul  and  Plato",  The  Hibbert 
Journal$  (Oct.  1917  -  July  1918)  (1-918-F'Vol.  16, 
TpF.  ---2-6"-3-2S2,  in  an  interestin,,  article  has  brought 
together  some  passages  and  carried  out  a  survey  in 
order  ko  point  out  the  affinities  bot-.,  Ieon  the  two, 
, 
His  whole  attempt  amounts  to  this:  'I'Mis  survey 
of  the  teaching  of  Paul  and  Plato  reveals  not  a 
little  affinity  between  those  two  great  minds.  I 
do  not  suggest  that  P--U1  was  Platonist  or  borrowad 
his  leadins  ideas  from  the  founder  of  the  Academy, 
Many  of  tlie  coincidenecs  which  I  have  brought 
forward  may  appear  superficial;  very  often,  no 
doubt,  they  can  be  explained  as  merely  accidental 
approximations  of  Greek  and  Hebrow  thoughte  stiut 
'-he  indiroct  should  be  that  t  the  genoral  result 
inflUel-10-0  of  Greek  thought  on  the  mind  of  Par-" 
greater  than  is  o-Z'-Zlen  sur-  her  po.!  Iod;  and  fur4 
'I'Me  rolig-ious  a'fJ.  n-;  tios  bot-Ween  Paul,  the  oo*eI 
theolodian  of  the  primitive  Church.  a-nd  Plato. 
theologian  of  the  Greoic  Schools  ......  .  )ecauso  of 
the  =_real  affinities  tho  thought  of  Plato  vqi)6. 
the  Ne-,  Ir  Tostcmient-,  11  Though  his'articlo  is  a 
praiseworthy  and  valuable  attempt,  nevertheless;  and 
with  all  duo  respect  to  his  ý learning,  iL,  seems  to  uc 
unconvincing.  11-.  ýs  arGizic-ats  on  "psycholoCyO 
pp.  274-77)  and  ta.  ', Iao  w%-*c11 
concerns  us,  do  not,  3trictly  speakingt  stand  logical 
scrut:  Uiy  and  strict  scianIbIfic  criticisii.  His 2536 
We  then  ma:  Lntain  that 
1)  We  cannot  speak  loosely  and  lightly  about 
similarities  or  parallisms  in  whatever  form  between  the 
two  great  thinkers  on  the  theory  of  the.  human  psyche  and 
its  destiny  after  death.  There  is  no  affinity  or 
'fro 
utterances  are  more  speculations  and  conjectures, 
(a)744 
generalisations,  incidental  reflections  and 
conclusions  drawn  out  of  endless,  continual, 
ceaseless  offortl  passionate  love  and  keen  desire 
to  relate  the  teaching  of  the  Apostle  with  the 
Greek  philosophy  and  detect  its  influence  on  him 
and  the  similarities  between  them;  An  effort  and 
interest  so  lively  even  to-day,  when  Biblical 
studies  are  highly  developed  with  a  tremendous 
accent  on  the  Hebrew  and  Rabbinic  background  of 
the  New  Testament  and  St.  Paul  in  general  in 
almost  all  respects;  Prof.  Price  is  followed  in 
his  view  also  by  W.  Pairweatherp  Jesus  and  the, 
ax:!  ýeksp,,  Edinburgh,  1,924,  pp,  289-295  cf.  pp, 
2--  1  -Q.  5  PftXTT,, 
q"IIXCLTwv-  HaMor,  '  rlXd=v;  l 
.f.  19609970C  129  23/249  Athens,  pp.  162-68; 
R,  R.  Hartford,  "St.  Paul,  Plato  and  Thmortality" 
Hermathena,  194  ,  No.  LXV,  pp.  C.  Ace- 
-5 
ý4-79; 
:  rrnnn,  The  Christian  Element  in  Plato  and  the 
Platonic  Philosophy,  Edinburgh,  1860,  point  in 
the  same  direction. 254'. 
cimilari-!  7  .7  whatsoever  bet-weer.  thcm  either  in  ideaso 
language,  form,  cont  -ent,  points  of  doctrine  or 
phraseology.  The  difference  between  them  in  what  we 
have  discussed  is  sharply  distinct  and  real. 
2)  St.  Paul's  borrowings  directly  from  the  Old 
Testament,  to  which  he  gives  new  menningg  are  only  those 
which  concern  immediately  the  human  soul,  that  is,  Jts 
meaning  end  origin  (Creation:  imago  Dei,,  Gen.  2  1,26, 
27  and  Gen.  2-  7)  and  partly  the  human  body,  and 
trichotomy  of  man. 
3)  Most  of  the  materiall  set  out  in  the  preceding 
pages  is  purely  Pauline,  entirely  his  own,  and  wholly 
Christian*  We  say  "wholly  Christian"  because  we  believo 
that  the  meaning  of  man  and  his  destiny  in  the  life  to 
come,  the  Pauline  anthropology  and  ozchatoloeyp  in 
general  can  be  studied,  examined  and  understood  only 
t1i.  -ouifa  and  -In  volatio-n  to  incarnate,  Crucified  and 
Risen  Lord  and  Caviour  Jesus  Christ 
is 
-and  not  apart  fro= 
him.  Any  attempt  to  cxcmino  it  on  a  puroly  philosopili- 
Comp.  also  IT.  D.  Stacey:  The  Pauline  View  of  M3n) 
p.  241:  "From  studying  St.  Paul  we  have  learn., 
little  about  the  constitut-on  of  man,  but  very  much 
tabout  mmi  in  rolation  to  God.  The  Christian 
believer  will  not  regret  this  because  it  is  for 
religion,  and  not  for  psychology,  that  we  turn  to 255  i 
and  ps  cholo  ical  basisq  lexicol2rical  and  lInguistic  0  -2 
4M 
ne  would  fail.  Such'an  attempt,  apart 
from  Christ  and  in  isolation,  would  not  produce  the 
expected  logical  results, 
the  Bible.  If  we  can  understand  what  Paul  Cal)  PVT'2ý4)said 
about  man  in  relation  to  Godq  we  shall  have 
gained  now  light  on  the  meaning  and  purpose  of 
the  Christian  Faith  itself.  " n 
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